Climate Economics
Climate economics is the branch of economics that asks what climate change is worth to us, and what we should do about it.
9 frameworks, from 1920 to today · Environmental Economics · Economics
- Pigouvian tax 1920-Present
- Global commons 1968-Present
- Prices versus Quantities 1974-Present
- Integrated Assessment Modelling 1990-Present
- Empirical Damage Functions 2000-Present
- Social Cost of Carbon 2000-Present
- Social discount rate 2006-Present
- Catastrophic Risk and Fat-Tailed Uncertainty 2009-Present
- Decarbonisation and Transition Economics 2010-Present
Overview
Climate economics is the branch of economics that asks what climate change is worth to us, and what we should do about it1. Its central problem is that greenhouse gases are an externality—a cost of one person's activity borne by others—and a uniquely awkward one: the harm falls on people far away and decades or centuries in the future, the causes are spread across billions of emitters, and the worst outcomes are uncertain but potentially irreversible. Practitioners try to put a price on a tonne of carbon, estimate the damages of warming, and compare the cost of cutting emissions now against the cost of adapting or suffering later1. The field's history is a long argument about how to make those comparisons across time and across uncertainty, and about whether the answer is a tax, a permit market, or a technology push.
From Pigou to the Global Commons
The intellectual foundation was laid by Arthur Pigou, whose The Economics of Welfare (1920) argued that when a producer imposes costs on others—smoke on a town, say—the market price understates the true social cost, and a corrective tax can bring private and social costs into line. Pigou's framework was about local harms, not a global atmosphere, but it supplied the basic logic: price the damage, and let the price change behaviour.
The global dimension arrived with the environmental movement of the late 1960s and 1970s. Garrett Hardin's 1968 essay "The Tragedy of the Commons" popularised the idea that shared resources get overused, and economists formalised it. The key theoretical move was recognising that the atmosphere is a public good—non-excludable and non-rival—so no one has an incentive to pay for its protection, and a global commons whose management requires collective action. William Nordhaus's early work in the 1970s on the economics of climate and the 1975 paper by Nordhaus and James Tobin on "Is Growth Obsolete?" helped establish that environmental quality could be treated as a measurable component of welfare. The 1972 Limits to Growth report, produced for the Club of Rome, framed the debate in more apocalyptic terms and provoked economists to respond with models of their own.
Prices versus Quantities
A central theoretical dispute crystallised in a 1974 paper by Martin Weitzman, "Prices vs. Quantities." Weitzman asked: if a regulator wants to control pollution, is it better to set a tax (a price) or a cap (a quantity of permits)? His answer turned on the relative steepness of the marginal cost and marginal damage curves. If the marginal cost of abatement is uncertain and steep, a price instrument is safer; if marginal damages are steep, a quantity instrument is safer. The paper gave the field a precise vocabulary for a question that had been argued loosely, and it remains the standard framework for choosing between carbon taxes and cap-and-trade.
The policy world took both routes. The U.S. Clean Air Act's 1990 acid rain programme created the first large-scale emissions trading market for sulphur dioxide, and it worked well enough to become a template. The European Union launched its Emissions Trading System in 20052. Carbon taxes were adopted earlier in some Nordic countries—Finland in 1990, Sweden in 1991—and later spread. The theoretical debate never fully resolved; in practice, jurisdictions have mixed instruments, and the choice often reflects politics as much as economics.
Integrated Assessment Modelling
The most distinctive tool of climate economics is the integrated assessment model (IAM): a computer model that couples a simplified climate system to a simplified economy, so that emissions, warming, damages, and policy can be simulated together13. The idea dates to the 1970s and 1980s, when Nordhaus and others began building energy-economy models. Nordhaus's DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy) model, first published in the early 1990s, became the best-known. It represents the world economy as a single aggregate production function, links emissions to a carbon cycle, and converts warming into a loss of output. The model's purpose is to find the emissions path that maximises the present value of consumption over centuries.
A rival tradition, associated with the PAGE model developed by Chris Hope at Cambridge in the 1990s, used a more detailed probabilistic treatment of damages and was used in early UK climate policy. The models differ in structure and in their ethical assumptions, and those differences matter enormously: the same physics and the same damage estimates can produce very different policy recommendations depending on the discount rate1.
Discounting and the Ethics of the Long Run
Discounting is the practice of giving less weight to future costs and benefits than to present ones, usually by applying a rate of interest1. In climate economics it is not a technical detail but the central ethical question1. A high discount rate makes future damages look small and argues for modest, gradual action; a low rate makes them look large and argues for steep cuts now1.
The debate exploded in 2006 with the publication of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, commissioned by the UK government and led by Nicholas Stern4. Stern used a near-zero pure rate of time preference—the rate at which we discount future welfare simply because it is future—on the ethical ground that a person's welfare counts the same whenever they live1. That choice, combined with a relatively high estimate of damages, produced a recommendation for urgent, large-scale action4. Nordhaus and others attacked the choice, arguing that observed market interest rates reveal how people actually trade off present and future, and that Stern's low rate was an ethical assertion rather than an empirical finding1. The dispute was never settled; it clarified that the discount rate is a value judgement, and that different judgements support different policies1.
Catastrophic Risk and Fat Tails
A second challenge to the standard framework came from the possibility of catastrophe1. Standard IAMs assume damages rise smoothly with temperature. But climate scientists warned of tipping points—collapse of ice sheets, release of methane from permafrost, dieback of the Amazon—that could produce abrupt, large, and irreversible losses. In 2009 Martin Weitzman argued that the relevant probability distributions have "fat tails": the chance of extreme warming is small but not negligible, and the expected loss may be dominated by those extremes. Weitzman's "dismal theorem" suggested that under fat-tailed uncertainty, standard cost-benefit analysis may break down, because the expected value of damages can be infinite or arbitrarily large. The practical implication was that insurance-like precautionary action might be justified even if the central estimates look modest. This line of work pushed economists to take tail risk seriously and to model uncertainty explicitly rather than treating it as a nuisance1.
The Social Cost of Carbon
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is the dollar value of the damage done by emitting one additional tonne of carbon dioxide, and it became the field's most policy-relevant number. It is calculated by running an IAM and computing the marginal change in discounted damages from a small increase in emissions. The concept was developed in the 1990s and 2000s, and in 2010 the U.S. government convened an interagency working group to produce a standard SCC for regulatory review. That estimate—initially around $21 per tonne, later revised—was used across federal agencies. It was controversial because it depended on the discount rate and on damage estimates, and different administrations revised it sharply. The SCC made the abstract debates concrete: a single number that could be plugged into a cost-benefit analysis of a regulation, and therefore a political football2.
Empirical Damage Functions
Underlying all of this is the damage function: the relationship between temperature change and economic loss1. Early damage functions were crude, often based on expert judgement or simple extrapolations. From the 2000s onward, economists began estimating them empirically, using variation in temperature and economic outcomes across regions and time. Studies of agriculture, labour productivity, energy demand, and mortality found that damages rise more steeply at higher temperatures than the early models assumed, and that poor, hot countries suffer disproportionately. This empirical work fed back into the IAMs and raised the estimated SCC. It also connected climate economics to development economics, since the burden falls hardest on low-income regions1.
Decarbonisation and Transition Economics
The final strand is the economics of actually cutting emissions. Early climate economics focused on pricing—get the price right and the market will do the rest. But the transition to a low-carbon economy requires replacing capital stock, building new infrastructure, and deploying technologies that are not yet cheap. This raised questions about innovation, learning-by-doing, and the design of industrial policy. The concept of decarbonisation—reducing the carbon intensity of energy and production—became central. Economists studied the cost curves of renewable technologies, the role of subsidies and public investment, and the political economy of transition. The debate between carbon pricing and direct public investment in clean technology became one of the field's live controversies, with some arguing that pricing alone is too slow and others warning that picking winners is wasteful.
The Present
Today climate economics is a mature but contested field. Integrated assessment models remain the workhorse, but they are increasingly supplemented by empirical damage estimates, detailed sectoral models, and analyses of transition pathways. The social cost of carbon is still the central policy number, and its estimation remains contested. The discounting debate has settled into a recognition that ethical choices must be made explicitly. Catastrophic risk is taken seriously, though modelling it remains difficult1. The field has moved from asking whether to act to asking how fast and through which instruments, and the answers depend on empirical work on damages, on the costs of clean technology, and on the political feasibility of different policies. The open questions are the ones that have always driven the field: how much do we owe the future, how should we handle uncertainty we cannot quantify, and what does a just transition look like.
References
- Economic analysis of climate change (introduction, Purposes, Aggregate cost-benefit models, Risk management, Discount rates, Underestimation of economic impacts, Damage functions, By region, Efficiency and equity), Wikipedia
- Social cost of carbon (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- Integrated assessment modelling, Wikipedia
- Stern Review (introduction, Background), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Climate Economics
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1920-Present
- 1968-Present
- 1974-Present
- 1990-Present
Integrated Assessment Modelling
What emissions path maximises welfare over centuries?
- 2000-Present
Empirical Damage Functions
How much output does a degree of warming destroy?
- 2009-Present
Catastrophic Risk and Fat-Tailed Uncertainty
How should we act when the worst is uncertain?
- 2010-Present
Decarbonisation and Transition Economics
How does an economy move off carbon?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Social Cost of Carbon grew out of Integrated Assessment Modelling
The social cost of carbon is computed by running an integrated assessment model and taking the marginal change in discounted damages from one extra tonne of emissions; it is a direct output of the IAM machinery.
Carried by William Nordhaus.
Prices versus Quantities influenced by Pigouvian tax
Weitzman's 1974 comparison of prices and quantities took the corrective tax as one of its two instruments and asked under what conditions it beats a permit cap; the Pigouvian tax is the price arm of his framework.
Carried by Martin Weitzman; Prices vs. Quantities (1974).
Integrated Assessment Modelling influenced by Global commons
Treating the atmosphere as a global commons whose use must be optimised across centuries set the problem that integrated assessment models were built to solve; Nordhaus's DICE model optimises a global emissions path for exactly that shared resource.
Carried by William Nordhaus.
Empirical Damage Functions influenced by Integrated Assessment Modelling
Empirical damage estimation was undertaken largely to replace the crude, judgement-based damage functions inside integrated assessment models with estimates from observed temperature variation, and the results were fed back into those models.
Catastrophic Risk and Fat-Tailed Uncertainty reacted against Integrated Assessment Modelling
Weitzman's fat-tail argument attacked the smooth damage functions and expected-value cost-benefit analysis built into standard integrated assessment models, arguing that their central estimates miss the catastrophic tail.
Carried by Martin Weitzman.
Social Cost of Carbon influenced by Empirical Damage Functions
Steeper empirically estimated damage functions raised the marginal damages used to compute the social cost of carbon, and the U.S. interagency estimates drew on this newer damage literature.
Decarbonisation and Transition Economics influenced by Prices versus Quantities
The price-versus-quantity framework supplied the terms in which carbon taxes and emissions trading were debated as transition instruments, and the mixed instruments adopted in practice were read through it.
Carried by Martin Weitzman.
Decarbonisation and Transition Economics influenced by Social Cost of Carbon
The social cost of carbon gave transition policy a benchmark price against which carbon taxes, permit prices and subsidy costs could be judged, shaping the economics of decarbonisation.
Beyond the field
Where Climate Economics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 37 links.
Global commons influenced Global public good in Public Goods Theory
Global commons analysis, especially Hardin's tragedy of the commons, supplies the resource-depletion and free-riding problems that global public good theory addresses at international scale.
Carried by Garrett Hardin.
Global commons provoked Governing the Commons in Public Goods Theory
Ostrom's Governing the Commons was framed as a refutation of Hardin's tragedy of the commons, showing that communities often devise institutions that avoid resource collapse.
Carried by Elinor Ostrom; Garrett Hardin.
Prices versus Quantities influenced Carbon price in Energy Economics
The Weitzman prices-versus-quantities analysis of uncertainty supplied the core theoretical justification for choosing carbon taxes versus cap-and-trade in climate policy.
Carried by Martin Weitzman.
Social Cost of Carbon influenced by Integrated assessment modelling in Environmental Economics
Integrated assessment models are the computational vehicle of the social cost of carbon: the estimate is obtained by perturbing emissions in an IAM and reading off the discounted change in damages.
Social Cost of Carbon influenced by Integrated assessment modelling in Resource Economics
Resource-economics integrated assessment models, coupling energy use, emissions and climate response, are the models from which social cost of carbon estimates are computed.
Social discount rate influenced by Social welfare function in Public Economics
The social welfare function is the core apparatus of climate-econometric discounting: the choice of discount rate is derived from an intergenerational social welfare function. The Stern Review (2006) and integrated assessment models built their discounting on this public-economics construct.
Carried by Stern Review (2006); William Nordhaus.
Pigouvian tax grew out of Pigouvian Welfare Economics in Welfare Economics
Climate economics applies the Pigouvian corrective-tax logic to the global externality of greenhouse-gas emissions, notably through the social cost of carbon.
Carried by William Nordhaus.
Pigouvian tax influenced Congestion Pricing and Marginal-Cost Road Pricing in Transportation Economics
Pigou's marginal social cost pricing argument, applied to congested roads, is the direct ancestor of marginal-cost road pricing; the congestion-pricing literature takes the Pigouvian toll as its starting point.
Carried by The Economics of Welfare (1920).
Global commons influenced Green theory in International Relations
The global commons literature, notably Hardin's tragedy of the commons, provided green theory with a central problem of shared resources and collective action.
Carried by Garrett Hardin; The Tragedy of the Commons (1968).
Global commons influenced Global Environmental Governance in Environmental Health
The global commons concept, especially Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons and later Ostrom's work, gave global environmental governance its central problem of managing shared resources. Governance regimes for atmosphere and oceans were built on this framing.
Carried by Garrett Hardin.
Global commons influenced by Common heritage of humanity in Law Of The Sea
The global-commons idea, articulated in the late 1960s around oceans, atmosphere and space as shared resources beyond national jurisdiction, supplied the conceptual frame Arvid Pardo used when he proposed common heritage of mankind at the UN in 1967.
Carried by Arvid Pardo.
Global commons influenced by Public good in Public Economics
The public-goods framework of Samuelson supplied the criteria of non-rivalry and non-excludability that later writers applied to the global commons.
Carried by Paul Samuelson; The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure (1954).

Climate Economics is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 9 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Climate EconomicsRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Public Goods Theory 5 links
- Energy Economics 3 links
- Development Finance 2 links
- Environmental Economics 2 links
- Resource Economics 2 links
- Environmental Risk Assessment 2 links
- Public Economics 2 links
- Welfare Economics 2 links
- Land Economics 1 link
- Crop Modeling And Agroclimatology 1 link
- Behavioral Decision Theory 1 link
- Ecological Economics 1 link
More in Environmental Economics
- Ecological Economics
- Energy Economics
- Environmental Economics
- Environmental Valuation
- Externalities Theory
- Resource Economics
See where Climate Economics sits on the Map of Human Knowledge