Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism is the study of situations in which more than one body of law governs the same people or the same territory.
12 frameworks, from 1900 to today · Law And Society · Law
- Classical Legal Pluralism 1900-1970
- State Legal Pluralism and Personal Law Systems 1900-Present
- Legal realism 1920-1970
- Legal Realism and Law-and-Society Empiricism 1930-1980
- Sociology of law 1950-Present
- Dispute Processing and Forum Shopping 1960-Present
- Religious Legal Pluralism 1970-Present
- New Legal Pluralism 1973-Present
- Empirical Studies of Overlapping Legal Orders 1980-Present
- Gender and Legal Pluralism 1980-Present
- Institutional Legal Pluralism 1980-Present
- Global and Transnational Legal Pluralism 1990-Present
Overview
Legal pluralism is the study of situations in which more than one body of law governs the same people or the same territory1. The idea sounds simple, but it overturns a premise most lawyers take for granted: that law is what the state says it is, applied uniformly within national borders. In much of the world—colonial and postcolonial societies, immigrant neighborhoods, indigenous territories, international commercial arbitration—people live under several legal orders at once, and the state's law is only one of them, sometimes not the most important1. Legal pluralism asks how these orders coexist, which one people actually use, how they conflict, and how institutions recognize or suppress each other. Its history is a story of a concept moving from the margins of colonial administration to the center of how law is understood globally.
Classical Legal Pluralism: Law in Colonial and Customary Settings
The term "legal pluralism" was coined in the 1970s, but the phenomenon it names was described much earlier by colonial administrators, missionaries, and anthropologists. In British and French colonies, officials confronted a practical problem: local populations lived by customary rules—about marriage, land, inheritance, and dispute settlement—that had nothing to do with metropolitan law. Administrators needed to know what those rules were in order to govern, tax, and adjudicate. The result was a body of work that came to be called classical legal pluralism: the study of the relationship between the imported law of the colonial state and the "customary" or "native" law of colonized peoples.
A landmark was the work of the Dutch scholar Cornelis van Vollenhoven on the adat law of the Netherlands East Indies in the early twentieth century. Van Vollenhoven argued that indigenous Indonesian legal systems were genuine law, not mere custom, and should be studied on their own terms rather than forced into Dutch legal categories. His work influenced colonial policy and helped establish the comparative study of non-Western legal systems. In British Africa, administrators and anthropologists produced detailed accounts of "native law and custom," often codified into handbooks that colonial courts then applied—a process that froze fluid practices into fixed rules.
Classical legal pluralism had a characteristic weakness. It tended to treat "customary law" as ancient and static, and it took the colonial state's perspective as the natural vantage point. The pluralism it described was usually a hierarchy: state law on top, native law tolerated below. Scholars later criticized this as a picture drawn by the colonizers, in which the "custom" being recorded was often a product of colonial administration itself.
Legal Realism and the Turn to Empirical Study
The intellectual ground for a more critical pluralism was prepared by American Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s. Realists such as Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank argued that law in action diverges from law on the books—that what courts and officials actually do matters more than what statutes say. Llewellyn's later work with E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (1941), applied this insight to a Native American legal system, treating it as a functioning body of law to be studied through its actual disputes rather than through formal rules. This was a bridge between realism and anthropology.
After the Second World War, the law and society movement in the United States pushed legal scholarship toward empirical methods: surveys, interviews, court records, and fieldwork. Scholars asked how people actually used courts, why some disputes never became legal claims, and how legal institutions functioned in practice. This empirical orientation made it possible to study legal orders that were not states—village tribunals, religious courts, customary authorities—as real law rather than as curiosities.
New Legal Pluralism: Law Beyond the State
The decisive shift came in the 1970s, when anthropologists and legal scholars redefined the field. The key move was to detach the concept of law from the state. If law is whatever people treat as binding and authoritative in their disputes, then a village council, a religious court, or a merchant guild can have law, and the state is just one legal order among many.
The anthropologist Sally Falk Moore captured this with her concept of the semi-autonomous social field (1973): a social group that generates its own rules and can enforce them, but is also embedded in a larger legal and political order. A garment industry in New York, a Mexican village, or a trade association could each be such a field, making rules and settling disputes internally while remaining subject to state law. Moore's idea gave researchers a unit of analysis that did not presuppose the state.
John Griffiths gave the movement its manifesto in a 1986 article, "What Is Legal Pluralism?" He distinguished weak legal pluralism—the state officially recognizing multiple legal systems within its territory—from strong legal pluralism, the empirical fact that multiple legal orders exist in any social field regardless of state recognition. Griffiths argued that strong pluralism was the more honest description of how law actually works, and that the state-centered view was an ideology rather than a finding.
This new legal pluralism was not confined to former colonies. Carol Greenhouse studied how a small American town's residents used law and avoided it. Robert Ellickson, in Order Without Law (1991), showed that California cattle ranchers settled disputes over straying livestock through informal norms rather than the formal legal rules that supposedly governed them. The point was general: even in a modern state with a dense legal system, people often live by other rules.
Overlapping Orders in Practice
Empirical studies of overlapping legal orders became the field's core method. Researchers documented how people navigate between state courts, customary tribunals, religious authorities, and informal mediators—choosing forums strategically, forum-shopping among legal orders the way litigants shop among courts.
A classic example is the study of dispute processing in colonial and postcolonial Africa. Scholars such as Richard Abel and Max Gluckman examined how customary courts and state courts competed for cases, and how litigants moved between them. In South Africa under apartheid, John Comaroff and Simon Roberts studied Tswana dispute settlement, showing how customary and state legal orders interacted and how the state's recognition of "customary law" reshaped it. In India, studies of village panchayats and state courts revealed similar patterns of forum selection.
The field also examined legal pluralism within the state itself: separate court systems for different religious communities, military justice alongside civilian courts, and specialized tribunals. The Ottoman millet system, which gave recognized religious communities authority over personal law, and the British colonial system of "personal law" in India, where Hindus, Muslims, and others were governed by different family laws, became standard cases. These arrangements persist: India, Israel, and several other states still maintain separate religious family-law jurisdictions.
Gender and Legal Pluralism
From the 1980s, feminist scholars brought a crucial critique. Legal pluralism had celebrated the coexistence of legal orders, but gender and legal pluralism scholarship asked who benefited from that coexistence. When customary or religious law governs marriage, divorce, and inheritance, women often fare worse than under state law—or the reverse, depending on the context. The field examined how plural legal orders could be sites of both oppression and resistance for women.
Scholars such as Sally Engle Merry studied how international human rights norms interacted with local legal orders, including customary and religious systems, and how women's rights advocates navigated between them. The Vienna Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, became a focal point: states with plural legal systems often entered reservations exempting personal law from its provisions, and scholars analyzed how this played out in practice. The question was no longer simply whether pluralism existed, but whose interests it served.
Global and Transnational Legal Pluralism
In the 1990s and 2000s, the field expanded beyond the state altogether. Global and transnational legal pluralism studies legal orders that operate across borders: international human rights law, transnational commercial arbitration, lex mercatoria (the informal body of merchant practice and arbitration that governs much international trade), indigenous rights regimes, and the overlapping jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals.
A leading figure is Gunther Teubner, who argued that global law is fragmented into multiple "collisions" between functionally distinct regimes—trade law, human rights law, environmental law—none of which is hierarchically superior. Sally Engle Merry's work on the translation of human rights norms into local contexts showed how global legal orders are remade as they move. The field also studied the transnational legal order of business: arbitration awards enforced across borders, and private standard-setting bodies that make rules with global effect.
Religious Legal Pluralism
Religious legal pluralism examines how religious legal systems coexist with state law and with each other. The classic cases are the Ottoman millet system, colonial and postcolonial personal-law regimes in South Asia and Africa, and the legal systems of religious minorities in the Middle East. Scholars studied how religious courts operate, how state law recognizes or limits them, and how individuals choose between religious and secular forums.
A prominent example is the study of sharia courts in various contexts: in Nigeria, where twelve northern states extended sharia criminal law in 1999–2000, creating a complex relationship with federal secular law; in India, where Muslim personal law is administered by state courts applying religious rules; and in Britain, where informal sharia councils advise on family matters without formal legal authority. The field asks how religious law is interpreted, who has authority to interpret it, and how it interacts with state law and human rights norms.
Institutional Legal Pluralism
Institutional legal pluralism focuses on how formal institutions—courts, legislatures, administrative agencies—manage and produce pluralism. It examines the rules by which states recognize customary or religious law, the design of plural court systems, and the ways institutions themselves generate multiple legal orders. This includes the study of legal pluralism within international institutions, where different treaty regimes and tribunals create overlapping obligations, and within federal systems, where national and subnational law coexist.
The field also studies institutional recognition: how states decide which customary or religious authorities to recognize, and how that recognition changes the recognized order. Colonial codification of customary law is the paradigm case, but the same dynamic appears in contemporary recognition of indigenous legal systems, such as in Canada, Australia, and Latin America, where state law formally acknowledges indigenous jurisdiction while limiting its scope.
The Present: Pluralism as a General Condition
Today legal pluralism is less a bounded subfield than a general condition that law and society scholarship assumes. The old debate between weak and strong pluralism has largely settled in favor of the view that multiple legal orders exist everywhere, and the interesting questions concern how they interact. Current work focuses on forum shopping and legal consciousness—how people perceive and choose among legal orders; on human rights and pluralism, especially the tension between universal norms and local legal orders; on global legal pluralism and the fragmentation of international law; and on empirical mapping of plural legal orders in specific settings, from immigrant communities in Europe and North America to post-conflict states rebuilding legal systems.
The field's enduring contribution is methodological and conceptual: it taught law and society scholars to stop assuming that state law is the whole of law, and to study legal orders as social institutions that people actually use, avoid, and reshape. The open questions are about power—which legal orders get recognized, whose norms prevail, and how the coexistence of legal orders distributes advantage and disadvantage—and about scale, as legal pluralism moves from the village to the globe.
References
- Legal pluralism (introduction, Colonial societies), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Legal Pluralism
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1900-1970
- 1900-Present
State Legal Pluralism and Personal Law Systems
How do states recognize separate personal law systems?
- 1920-1970
- 1930-1980
Legal Realism and Law-and-Society Empiricism
How do people actually use legal institutions?
- 1950-Present
- 1960-Present
Dispute Processing and Forum Shopping
How do people choose among competing forums?
- 1970-Present
Religious Legal Pluralism
How do religious and state laws share authority?
- 1973-Present
- 1980-Present
Empirical Studies of Overlapping Legal Orders
How do people navigate overlapping legal orders?
- 1980-Present
Gender and Legal Pluralism
Whose interests do plural legal orders serve?
- 1980-Present
Institutional Legal Pluralism
How do institutions recognize and coordinate other legal orders?
- 1990-Present
Global and Transnational Legal Pluralism
How do legal orders operate across national borders?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
New Legal Pluralism reacted against Classical Legal Pluralism
New legal pluralism defined itself against classical legal pluralism's state-centered, hierarchical picture in which native law was tolerated below colonial law. Moore's semi-autonomous social field and Griffiths's strong pluralism rejected the assumption that the state's perspective was the natural vantage point.
Carried by Sally Falk Moore; John Griffiths.
Legal Realism and Law-and-Society Empiricism grew out of Legal realism
Legal realism's distinction between law on the books and law in action, and Llewellyn's dispute-centered study of the Cheyenne, supplied the core premise of the law-and-society movement. Postwar scholars turned that premise into empirical programs using surveys, court records and fieldwork to study how legal institutions actually functioned.
Carried by Karl Llewellyn; The Cheyenne Way (1941).
Empirical Studies of Overlapping Legal Orders grew out of New Legal Pluralism
Once new legal pluralism detached law from the state, researchers turned to documenting empirically how people navigate between state courts, customary tribunals and religious authorities. Studies of forum shopping and competing courts in Africa and India applied the strong-pluralism premise as a research method.
Carried by John Comaroff; Simon Roberts.
Global and Transnational Legal Pluralism grew out of New Legal Pluralism
Global and transnational legal pluralism generalized the new pluralism's detachment of law from the state to orders operating across borders, such as human rights law and transnational arbitration. It applied the strong-pluralism premise to legal orders that no single state contains.
Religious Legal Pluralism grew out of State Legal Pluralism and Personal Law Systems
Studies of state-recognized personal law systems, in which religious communities retain authority over family law, provided the cases from which religious legal pluralism as a distinct focus grew. The persistence of separate religious family-law jurisdictions in India and Israel kept these arrangements central to later scholarship.
New Legal Pluralism influenced by Legal realism
Realism's insistence that actual disputing behavior matters more than formal rules carried into the new legal pluralism through Llewellyn and Hoebel's treatment of a non-state legal system as functioning law. Sally Falk Moore's semi-autonomous social field built on this dispute-centered, empirical approach to law beyond the state.
Carried by Karl Llewellyn; Sally Falk Moore.
New Legal Pluralism influenced by Legal Realism and Law-and-Society Empiricism
The law-and-society movement's empirical methods for studying how people actually use and avoid legal institutions gave the new legal pluralism its toolkit for examining non-state orders. Field studies of village tribunals and customary authorities as real law drew directly on that empirical orientation.
New Legal Pluralism influenced by Sociology of law
The sociology of law's treatment of law as a social institution, studied through its actual operation rather than its formal texts, prepared the ground for treating non-state orders as law. New legal pluralism drew on this sociological orientation when it located law in social fields rather than in state commands.
Empirical Studies of Overlapping Legal Orders influenced by Dispute Processing and Forum Shopping
The dispute-processing tradition's focus on how litigants choose among forums supplied the concept of forum shopping to empirical studies of overlapping legal orders. Researchers documented litigants moving strategically between customary and state courts using that framework.
Carried by Richard Abel.
Gender and Legal Pluralism reacted against New Legal Pluralism
Feminist scholars attacked new legal pluralism's celebration of coexisting legal orders for ignoring who benefited from them. Gender and legal pluralism scholarship asked how customary and religious law affected women's marriage, divorce and inheritance rights, reframing pluralism as a question of power.
Carried by Sally Engle Merry.
Institutional Legal Pluralism grew out of New Legal Pluralism
Institutional legal pluralism extended the new pluralism's insight that multiple orders coexist by examining how state institutions themselves recognize, coordinate or suppress other legal orders. It treated the state's internal arrangements, such as separate court systems and tribunals, as a form of pluralism.
Beyond the field
Where Legal Pluralism's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 53 links.
Classical Legal Pluralism led to Legal Pluralism in Law And Social Inequality
Classical legal pluralism, the colonial-era anthropology and sociology of coexisting indigenous and state law, was the direct source of the 1970s legal pluralism framework, which generalised its findings into a theory of law.
Classical Legal Pluralism led to Legal Pluralism in Jurisprudence
Classical legal pluralism, the colonial-era study of coexisting indigenous and imported law, was the direct antecedent from which the 1970s legal-pluralism school generalised. The later framework reworked its ethnographic and administrative findings into a general theory of normative plurality.
Carried by M. B. Hooker; Sally Falk Moore.
Classical Legal Pluralism led to Legal pluralism in Comparative Law
Classical legal pluralism, the colonial-era anthropological and legal study of coexisting indigenous and imported orders, is the direct ancestor from which the 1970s legal pluralism framework grew. The later framework generalised the classical observation of plural orders into a general theory of law.
Classical Legal Pluralism led to Legal Pluralism in Comparative Legal History
The classical legal pluralism of colonial and anthropological scholarship, associated with the study of dual legal systems in empires, supplied the concepts and cases from which the 1970s legal-pluralism framework was built.
Classical Legal Pluralism led to Legal Pluralism in Legal Cultures
The classical colonial-era legal pluralism of administered native law and imported metropolitan law was the object that later legal pluralism generalised and rethought; the modern field grew directly out of critique and extension of that classical model.
Classical Legal Pluralism led to Legal Pluralism in Mixed And Hybrid Legal Systems
Classical legal pluralism, the earlier study of coexisting state and non-state legal orders, was the direct antecedent from which the 1960s legal-pluralism framework grew, extending its scope from colonial and personal-law settings to all societies.
Legal Realism and Law-and-Society Empiricism influenced Empirical Socio-Legal Analysis in Mixed And Hybrid Legal Systems
Legal realism and the law-and-society empiricism of 1930–1980 supplied the methods and questions of empirical socio-legal analysis: studying law in action through social science rather than doctrine, a tradition the later field explicitly continues.
Classical Legal Pluralism influenced by Historical Jurisprudence in Legal Cultures
Historical jurisprudence, above all Savigny's and Maine's accounts of law as an expression of a people's spirit and of legal evolution, gave classical legal pluralism its premise that law need not emanate from the state. Legal pluralists drew on this historicist view of custom and folk law.
Carried by Friedrich Carl von Savigny; Henry Maine; Ancient Law (1861).
Classical Legal Pluralism influenced by Indirect rule and dual legal orders in Colonial Legal History
Colonial administrators' descriptions of indirect rule and dual legal orders, especially in British Africa, supplied the empirical cases that classical legal pluralists analysed. The contrast between native courts and imported law became the paradigm of coexisting legal orders.
Carried by Frederick Lugard; The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922).
Classical Legal Pluralism revived by Legal Pluralism in Legal Theory
Classical legal pluralism, associated with early twentieth-century colonial and anthropological studies of overlapping legal orders, was deliberately revived and reframed by the later legal pluralism movement.
Classical Legal Pluralism influenced Legal Pluralism and Indigenous Law in Colonial Legal History
Classical legal pluralism, above all the colonial 'native law' studies of the 1930s-60s, supplied the basic observation that colonial societies contain coexisting legal orders. Later scholars of indigenous law took up that observation and its ethnographic method while rejecting its colonial administrative framing.
Classical Legal Pluralism influenced Legal Pluralism in Legal Sources Theory
Classical legal pluralism, the anthropological study of customary and colonial legal orders, was the direct source of the later general theory. The later framework generalised its findings about coexisting normative orders.
Carried by M. B. Hooker; Sally Falk Moore.

Legal Pluralism is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 12 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Legal PluralismRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Legal Cultures 5 links
- Legal Sources Theory 5 links
- Law And Social Change 5 links
- Legal Anthropology 4 links
- Jurisprudence 4 links
- Comparative Law 3 links
- Mixed And Hybrid Legal Systems 3 links
- Legal Theory 3 links
- Law And Society 3 links
- Legal Consciousness 3 links
- Law And Social Inequality 2 links
- Colonial Legal History 2 links
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