Legal Pluralism

Legal pluralism is the study of situations in which more than one body of law governs the same people or the same territory.

12 frameworks, from 1900 to today · Law And Society · Law

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Overview

Legal pluralism is the study of situations in which more than one body of law governs the same people or the same territory1. The idea sounds simple, but it overturns a premise most lawyers take for granted: that law is what the state says it is, applied uniformly within national borders. In much of the world—colonial and postcolonial societies, immigrant neighborhoods, indigenous territories, international commercial arbitration—people live under several legal orders at once, and the state's law is only one of them, sometimes not the most important1. Legal pluralism asks how these orders coexist, which one people actually use, how they conflict, and how institutions recognize or suppress each other. Its history is a story of a concept moving from the margins of colonial administration to the center of how law is understood globally.

Classical Legal Pluralism: Law in Colonial and Customary Settings

The term "legal pluralism" was coined in the 1970s, but the phenomenon it names was described much earlier by colonial administrators, missionaries, and anthropologists. In British and French colonies, officials confronted a practical problem: local populations lived by customary rules—about marriage, land, inheritance, and dispute settlement—that had nothing to do with metropolitan law. Administrators needed to know what those rules were in order to govern, tax, and adjudicate. The result was a body of work that came to be called classical legal pluralism: the study of the relationship between the imported law of the colonial state and the "customary" or "native" law of colonized peoples.

A landmark was the work of the Dutch scholar Cornelis van Vollenhoven on the adat law of the Netherlands East Indies in the early twentieth century. Van Vollenhoven argued that indigenous Indonesian legal systems were genuine law, not mere custom, and should be studied on their own terms rather than forced into Dutch legal categories. His work influenced colonial policy and helped establish the comparative study of non-Western legal systems. In British Africa, administrators and anthropologists produced detailed accounts of "native law and custom," often codified into handbooks that colonial courts then applied—a process that froze fluid practices into fixed rules.

Classical legal pluralism had a characteristic weakness. It tended to treat "customary law" as ancient and static, and it took the colonial state's perspective as the natural vantage point. The pluralism it described was usually a hierarchy: state law on top, native law tolerated below. Scholars later criticized this as a picture drawn by the colonizers, in which the "custom" being recorded was often a product of colonial administration itself.

Legal Realism and the Turn to Empirical Study

The intellectual ground for a more critical pluralism was prepared by American Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s. Realists such as Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank argued that law in action diverges from law on the books—that what courts and officials actually do matters more than what statutes say. Llewellyn's later work with E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way (1941), applied this insight to a Native American legal system, treating it as a functioning body of law to be studied through its actual disputes rather than through formal rules. This was a bridge between realism and anthropology.

After the Second World War, the law and society movement in the United States pushed legal scholarship toward empirical methods: surveys, interviews, court records, and fieldwork. Scholars asked how people actually used courts, why some disputes never became legal claims, and how legal institutions functioned in practice. This empirical orientation made it possible to study legal orders that were not states—village tribunals, religious courts, customary authorities—as real law rather than as curiosities.

New Legal Pluralism: Law Beyond the State

The decisive shift came in the 1970s, when anthropologists and legal scholars redefined the field. The key move was to detach the concept of law from the state. If law is whatever people treat as binding and authoritative in their disputes, then a village council, a religious court, or a merchant guild can have law, and the state is just one legal order among many.

The anthropologist Sally Falk Moore captured this with her concept of the semi-autonomous social field (1973): a social group that generates its own rules and can enforce them, but is also embedded in a larger legal and political order. A garment industry in New York, a Mexican village, or a trade association could each be such a field, making rules and settling disputes internally while remaining subject to state law. Moore's idea gave researchers a unit of analysis that did not presuppose the state.

John Griffiths gave the movement its manifesto in a 1986 article, "What Is Legal Pluralism?" He distinguished weak legal pluralism—the state officially recognizing multiple legal systems within its territory—from strong legal pluralism, the empirical fact that multiple legal orders exist in any social field regardless of state recognition. Griffiths argued that strong pluralism was the more honest description of how law actually works, and that the state-centered view was an ideology rather than a finding.

This new legal pluralism was not confined to former colonies. Carol Greenhouse studied how a small American town's residents used law and avoided it. Robert Ellickson, in Order Without Law (1991), showed that California cattle ranchers settled disputes over straying livestock through informal norms rather than the formal legal rules that supposedly governed them. The point was general: even in a modern state with a dense legal system, people often live by other rules.

Overlapping Orders in Practice

Empirical studies of overlapping legal orders became the field's core method. Researchers documented how people navigate between state courts, customary tribunals, religious authorities, and informal mediators—choosing forums strategically, forum-shopping among legal orders the way litigants shop among courts.

A classic example is the study of dispute processing in colonial and postcolonial Africa. Scholars such as Richard Abel and Max Gluckman examined how customary courts and state courts competed for cases, and how litigants moved between them. In South Africa under apartheid, John Comaroff and Simon Roberts studied Tswana dispute settlement, showing how customary and state legal orders interacted and how the state's recognition of "customary law" reshaped it. In India, studies of village panchayats and state courts revealed similar patterns of forum selection.

The field also examined legal pluralism within the state itself: separate court systems for different religious communities, military justice alongside civilian courts, and specialized tribunals. The Ottoman millet system, which gave recognized religious communities authority over personal law, and the British colonial system of "personal law" in India, where Hindus, Muslims, and others were governed by different family laws, became standard cases. These arrangements persist: India, Israel, and several other states still maintain separate religious family-law jurisdictions.

Gender and Legal Pluralism

From the 1980s, feminist scholars brought a crucial critique. Legal pluralism had celebrated the coexistence of legal orders, but gender and legal pluralism scholarship asked who benefited from that coexistence. When customary or religious law governs marriage, divorce, and inheritance, women often fare worse than under state law—or the reverse, depending on the context. The field examined how plural legal orders could be sites of both oppression and resistance for women.

Scholars such as Sally Engle Merry studied how international human rights norms interacted with local legal orders, including customary and religious systems, and how women's rights advocates navigated between them. The Vienna Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, became a focal point: states with plural legal systems often entered reservations exempting personal law from its provisions, and scholars analyzed how this played out in practice. The question was no longer simply whether pluralism existed, but whose interests it served.

Global and Transnational Legal Pluralism

In the 1990s and 2000s, the field expanded beyond the state altogether. Global and transnational legal pluralism studies legal orders that operate across borders: international human rights law, transnational commercial arbitration, lex mercatoria (the informal body of merchant practice and arbitration that governs much international trade), indigenous rights regimes, and the overlapping jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals.

A leading figure is Gunther Teubner, who argued that global law is fragmented into multiple "collisions" between functionally distinct regimes—trade law, human rights law, environmental law—none of which is hierarchically superior. Sally Engle Merry's work on the translation of human rights norms into local contexts showed how global legal orders are remade as they move. The field also studied the transnational legal order of business: arbitration awards enforced across borders, and private standard-setting bodies that make rules with global effect.

Religious Legal Pluralism

Religious legal pluralism examines how religious legal systems coexist with state law and with each other. The classic cases are the Ottoman millet system, colonial and postcolonial personal-law regimes in South Asia and Africa, and the legal systems of religious minorities in the Middle East. Scholars studied how religious courts operate, how state law recognizes or limits them, and how individuals choose between religious and secular forums.

A prominent example is the study of sharia courts in various contexts: in Nigeria, where twelve northern states extended sharia criminal law in 1999–2000, creating a complex relationship with federal secular law; in India, where Muslim personal law is administered by state courts applying religious rules; and in Britain, where informal sharia councils advise on family matters without formal legal authority. The field asks how religious law is interpreted, who has authority to interpret it, and how it interacts with state law and human rights norms.

Institutional Legal Pluralism

Institutional legal pluralism focuses on how formal institutions—courts, legislatures, administrative agencies—manage and produce pluralism. It examines the rules by which states recognize customary or religious law, the design of plural court systems, and the ways institutions themselves generate multiple legal orders. This includes the study of legal pluralism within international institutions, where different treaty regimes and tribunals create overlapping obligations, and within federal systems, where national and subnational law coexist.

The field also studies institutional recognition: how states decide which customary or religious authorities to recognize, and how that recognition changes the recognized order. Colonial codification of customary law is the paradigm case, but the same dynamic appears in contemporary recognition of indigenous legal systems, such as in Canada, Australia, and Latin America, where state law formally acknowledges indigenous jurisdiction while limiting its scope.

The Present: Pluralism as a General Condition

Today legal pluralism is less a bounded subfield than a general condition that law and society scholarship assumes. The old debate between weak and strong pluralism has largely settled in favor of the view that multiple legal orders exist everywhere, and the interesting questions concern how they interact. Current work focuses on forum shopping and legal consciousness—how people perceive and choose among legal orders; on human rights and pluralism, especially the tension between universal norms and local legal orders; on global legal pluralism and the fragmentation of international law; and on empirical mapping of plural legal orders in specific settings, from immigrant communities in Europe and North America to post-conflict states rebuilding legal systems.

The field's enduring contribution is methodological and conceptual: it taught law and society scholars to stop assuming that state law is the whole of law, and to study legal orders as social institutions that people actually use, avoid, and reshape. The open questions are about power—which legal orders get recognized, whose norms prevail, and how the coexistence of legal orders distributes advantage and disadvantage—and about scale, as legal pluralism moves from the village to the globe.

References

  1. Legal pluralism (introduction, Colonial societies), Wikipedia

The frameworks of Legal Pluralism

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1950-Present

    Sociology of law

    How does law function as a social institution?

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  2. 1960-Present

    Dispute Processing and Forum Shopping

    How do people choose among competing forums?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Classical Legal PluralismState Legal Pluralism and Personal La…Legal realismLegal Realism and Law-and-Society Emp…Sociology of lawDispute Processing and Forum ShoppingReligious Legal PluralismNew Legal PluralismEmpirical Studies of Overlapping Lega…Gender and Legal PluralismInstitutional Legal PluralismGlobal and Transnational Legal Plural…

Beyond the field

Where Legal Pluralism's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 53 links.

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