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Mathematical Logic
Mathematical logic is the study of reasoning carried out with mathematical precision: formal languages, what they can express, what can be proved in them, and what they can describe.
16 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Mathematical Logic · Mathematics
- Syllogistic 350 BCE-1850
- Algebraic Logic 1847-1930
- Logicism 1879-1931
- Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory 1908-Present
- Type Theory 1910-Present
- Modal Logic 1918-Present
- Hilbert's program 1920-1931
- Intuitionistic Logic 1920-Present
- Proof Theory 1920-Present
- Model Theory 1930-Present
- Incompleteness and Limitative Metamathematics 1931-Present
- Computability Theory 1936-Present
- Logic and Computation 1960-Present
- Categorical Logic 1963-Present
- Curry–Howard Correspondence 1969-Present
- Finite Model Theory and Descriptive Complexity 1974-Present
Overview
Mathematical logic is the study of reasoning carried out with mathematical precision: formal languages, what they can express, what can be proved in them, and what they can describe1. Its practitioners build artificial languages with exact rules, define what counts as a proof, and then ask what those systems can and cannot do1. The stakes are unusually high. Logic is where mathematics examines its own foundations, and several of its results—above all Gödel's incompleteness theorems—changed how mathematicians understand what a formal system can achieve1. This is the story of how a tool for checking arguments became a discipline with its own objects of study: proofs, models, computable functions, and types.
From Aristotle's Syllogistic to Algebraic Logic
Logic begins as a theory of valid argument. Aristotle's Prior Analytics (4th century BCE) set out the syllogistic: patterns of inference built from categorical statements such as "all A are B" and "some A are B," with rules for which conclusions follow23. For over two thousand years this was the dominant framework, taught in universities and refined by medieval logicians, who developed sophisticated theories of terms, modality, and consequence. But syllogistic could not express relations ("every student reads some book") or nest quantifiers, and it treated logic as a catalogue of valid forms rather than a calculus to be manipulated.
The decisive break came in the nineteenth century. George Boole, in The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) and An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), proposed that logical reasoning could be done by algebra: represent propositions by symbols, combine them with operations obeying algebraic laws, and compute4. Augustus De Morgan extended the logic of relations. Later in the century, Charles Sanders Peirce and Ernst Schröder developed a more general algebra of relations1. This algebraic logic recast inference as calculation, and it made logic a subject with theorems rather than merely rules.
Frege, Quantifiers, and the Logicist Programme
Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift (1879) is the founding document of modern logic1. Frege introduced a notation for quantifiers—the symbols for "for all" and "there exists"—and with them a logic of predicates that could express relations and nested generality1. He also drew a sharp distinction between an expression and what it refers to, and between a proposition and the assertion of it. Frege's aim was logicism: the thesis that arithmetic is a branch of logic, so that its truths follow from purely logical laws5. In Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (vol. 1, 1893; vol. 2, 1903) he attempted the derivation, using a system with a basic law (Law V) governing the extensions of concepts.
Bertrand Russell's letter to Frege in 1902 pointed out that Law V generates a contradiction—the set of all sets that are not members of themselves—and Frege acknowledged the blow in an appendix to the second volume6. Russell and Alfred North Whitehead responded with Principia Mathematica (1910–1913), a monumental attempt to derive mathematics from logic using a theory of types: a hierarchy in which objects, sets of objects, sets of sets, and so on occupy distinct levels, so that a set can never contain itself178. Logicism in its strong form did not survive, but the work established the notation and standards of rigor that later logic inherited.
Axiomatic Set Theory and the Crisis of Foundations
The paradoxes—Russell's, and earlier the Burali-Forti paradox of the largest ordinal—showed that naive set theory was inconsistent19. Ernst Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory (1908), later extended by Abraham Fraenkel and others into what is now called ZFC, gave set theory a precise foundation: sets exist according to stated axioms, and comprehension is restricted to subsets of already-given sets110. This axiomatic set theory became the standard framework in which mathematics is formalized10. It also opened a research field of its own, but within logic its role was foundational: it supplied the universe of objects that formal theories talk about.
Hilbert's Programme and the Birth of Metamathematics
David Hilbert proposed, in lectures around 1920 and in his 1922 address "Neubegründung der Mathematik," a programme to secure mathematics against the paradoxes. The idea was finitism: to formalize all of mathematics as an axiomatic system, and then prove, using only restricted, "finitary" reasoning that no one could doubt, that the system is consistent and complete111. This required treating proofs themselves as finite combinatorial objects—strings of symbols—and studying them mathematically12. That study, metamathematics or proof theory, was a new discipline: proofs became data13.
Hilbert's school produced substantial results. Wilhelm Ackermann and John von Neumann worked on consistency proofs for fragments of arithmetic14. Paul Bernays collaborated with Hilbert on the Grundlagen der Mathematik (1934, 1939). The programme set the agenda for a generation.
Gödel: Incompleteness and the Limits of Formalism
Kurt Gödel's 1931 paper "Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme" destroyed the central hope of Hilbert's programme114. Gödel showed that any consistent formal system strong enough to express basic arithmetic is incomplete: there is a true statement in its language that it cannot prove14. The proof works by arithmetization—encoding statements and proofs as numbers—so that the system can talk about its own provability, and then constructing a sentence that says, in effect, "I am not provable."14 If the system proves it, it is inconsistent; if it does not, the sentence is true but unprovable. A second theorem showed that such a system cannot prove its own consistency14.
The consequences were profound. No single formal system captures all arithmetical truth, and the consistency of a strong system cannot be established within that system14. Hilbert's finitary consistency programme, in its original form, was untenable111. Gödel's work also introduced the technique of arithmetization and the notion of a primitive recursive function, which fed directly into computability theory.
Computability and the Church–Turing Thesis
In 1936, independently, Alonzo Church, Alan Turing, and Emil Post gave precise definitions of what it means for a function to be effectively computable. Church used the lambda calculus, a formal system of functions and application; Turing used abstract machines now called Turing machines; Post used string-rewriting systems. They proved these definitions equivalent, and Church's thesis (the Church–Turing thesis) asserts that they capture the intuitive notion of effective calculability15. Turing's paper also proved the undecidability of the halting problem: no general procedure can decide, for an arbitrary program and input, whether the program will halt116.
Computability theory grew from this117. It studies which sets and functions are decidable or computable, degrees of unsolvability, and reducibilities. Gödel's incompleteness and Turing's undecidability are two faces of the same phenomenon: formal systems and machines have intrinsic limits.
Proof Theory after Gödel
Proof theory did not end with Gödel; it changed direction. Gerhard Gentzen introduced natural deduction and the sequent calculus in the 1930s, systems designed to mirror ordinary reasoning and to make the structure of proofs visible181. In 1936 Gentzen gave a consistency proof for arithmetic using transfinite induction up to a certain ordinal (epsilon-zero), a method that goes beyond finitary reasoning but is still constructive in a broader sense. This founded ordinal analysis: measuring the strength of a formal system by the least ordinal whose well-ordering it cannot prove. Later proof theorists, including Kurt Schütte and others, extended these techniques. Proof theory today also includes proof mining (extracting computational content from proofs) and proof complexity (studying the length of proofs in different systems)112.
Model Theory: Structures and Theories
Where proof theory studies proofs, model theory studies the relationship between formal theories and the structures that satisfy them19. A structure is a set with relations, functions, and distinguished elements; a theory is a set of sentences; a model is a structure in which all sentences of the theory are true. The compactness theorem—a set of sentences has a model if every finite subset does—was proved by Gödel (1930) for countable languages and extended by Anatolii Mal'cev in the 1930s2019. The Löwenheim–Skolem theorems (1915, 1920) show that theories with infinite models have models of various cardinalities, a result with striking consequences: no first-order theory can pin down the natural numbers up to isomorphism.
Alfred Tarski's work in the 1930s and after gave model theory its semantic foundation, including the definition of truth in a structure19. In the 1950s and 1960s, Abraham Robinson developed nonstandard analysis using model-theoretic methods, and the classification theory of Saharon Shelah (from the 1970s) organized theories by the complexity of their models. Model theory became a powerful tool in algebra and geometry, with applications to fields, groups, and valued fields.
Type Theory and the Curry–Howard Correspondence
Russell's type theory was a foundation for mathematics; later type theories became programming languages and proof assistants. Alonzo Church's simply typed lambda calculus (1940) and Per Martin-Löf's intuitionistic type theory (1970s) are central2122. The Curry–Howard correspondence—discovered by Haskell Curry and William Alvin Howard—identifies proofs with programs and propositions with types: a proof of a proposition is a program of the corresponding type23. This correspondence, also called proofs-as-programs, underlies modern proof assistants such as Coq and Agda, and it connects logic, computation, and category theory.
Modal Logic and Categorical Logic
Modal logic extends classical logic with operators for necessity and possibility24. It has ancient roots (Aristotle's modal syllogistic) and a modern flowering: C. I. Lewis's systems in the early twentieth century, Saul Kripke's possible-worlds semantics (1959), and the subsequent development of modal logic as a tool in philosophy, computer science, and linguistics. Kripke semantics gave modal logic a model theory of its own24.
Categorical logic applies category theory to logic25. William Lawvere's work in the 1960s and 1970s showed that theories in logic correspond to categories, and that logical constructions have categorical analogues. Topos theory, developed by Lawvere and Myles Tierney, provides a category-theoretic foundation for mathematics that can model intuitionistic logic. Categorical logic connects logic to algebra, geometry, and computer science.
Constructive and Intuitionistic Logic
Intuitionistic logic, formulated by L. E. J. Brouwer and formalized by Arend Heyting in the 1920s and 1930s, rejects the law of excluded middle (every proposition is either true or false) as a general principle. A proof of "A or B" must exhibit which one holds; a proof of "there exists x such that P(x)" must exhibit such an x. This constructive stance has deep consequences: intuitionistic logic is the internal logic of topoi, the basis of many type theories, and the logic of computation. Its proof theory is particularly well-behaved, and it is the natural logic of the Curry–Howard correspondence1.
Logic and Computation
The twentieth century ended with logic and computer science intertwined. Automata theory, formal languages, and complexity theory all draw on logic. Finite model theory, developed by Boris Trakhtenbrot and others, studies the expressive power of logical languages on finite structures, with direct relevance to databases and verification. Descriptive complexity, pioneered by Ronald Fagin in the 1970s, characterizes complexity classes by the logical languages that define them1. Satisfiability solvers, model checkers, and proof assistants are practical tools built on logical foundations.
The Present
Mathematical logic today is a family of connected research areas. Set theory, model theory, proof theory, computability theory, and type theory each have their own journals, conferences, and open problems. The foundational questions that drove the field—consistency, completeness, the nature of proof—remain, but they are now studied with a rich toolkit: forcing in set theory, stability theory in model theory, ordinal analysis in proof theory, and type-theoretic semantics in computer science. The field's history is one of repeated redefinition: from the syllogism to the quantifier, from the paradoxes to axiomatization, from Hilbert's programme to Gödel's limits, and from logic as a foundation to logic as a computational and mathematical discipline in its own right.
References
- Mathematical logic (introduction, 19th century, Set theory and paradoxes, Foundations of mathematics, Symbolic logic, Algorithmically unsolvable problems, Recursion theory, Proof theory and constructive mathematics, Connections with computer science), Wikipedia
- Syllogism, Wikipedia
- Term logic, Wikipedia
- Boolean algebra, Wikipedia
- Logicism, Wikipedia
- Russell's paradox (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Type theory (History), Wikipedia
- Principia Mathematica, Wikipedia
- Set theory, Wikipedia
- Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- Hilbert's program, Wikipedia
- Proof theory, Wikipedia
- Metamathematics (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Gödel's incompleteness theorems (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- Church–Turing thesis, Wikipedia
- Halting problem, Wikipedia
- Computability theory, Wikipedia
- Natural deduction (History), Wikipedia
- Model theory (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Compactness theorem (History), Wikipedia
- Lambda calculus (History), Wikipedia
- Intuitionistic type theory, Wikipedia
- Curry–Howard correspondence, Wikipedia
- Modal logic, Wikipedia
- Categorical logic, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Mathematical Logic
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 350 BCE-1850
- 1847-1930
- 1879-1931
- 1908-Present
- 1910-Present
- 1918-Present
- 1920-1931
- 1920-Present
- 1920-Present
Proof Theory
What is the structure of a formal proof?
About Proof Theory
Proof theory is the branch of mathematical logic that treats proofs themselves as formal mathematical objects. Where model theory asks what a statement means by interpreting it in a structure, proof theory asks how a statement can be derived from axioms using rules of inference. This syntactic perspective makes it possible to study the power and limits of formal systems with mathematical precision. Proof theory emerged from David Hilbert's program to secure the foundations of mathematics, and it has since grown into a rich field with deep connections to computability theory, computer science, and philosophy.At its core, proof theory asks: What is a proof? The answer is given by defining proofs inductively from axioms and inference rules. The first systematic formalizations were Hilbert systems—axiomatic calculi with a small number of rules, such as modus ponens. These were the setting for Hilbert's program and for Gödel's incompleteness theorems. But a more natural representation came from Gerhard Gentzen in the 1930s. He introduced natural deduction, where each logical connective has introduction rules (how to prove a formula) and elimination rules (how to use a formula). This mirrors actual mathematical reasoning. He also introduced the sequent calculus, a symmetric system that makes explicit the structural rules of weakening, contraction, and exchange. The sequent calculus is especially powerful because it allows a clean analysis of proofs.The central result of structural proof theory is Gentzen's cut elimination theorem (Hauptsatz): any proof that uses the cut rule (a form of transitivity) can be transformed into a cut-free proof. Cut-free proofs have the subformula property—every formula in the proof is a subformula of the conclusion. This makes them easier to analyze. Gentzen used cut elimination to give the first consistency proof for Peano arithmetic, by showing that any proof of a contradiction could be eliminated, using transfinite induction up to the ordinal . This launched ordinal analysis, the assignment of proof-theoretic ordinals to theories as a measure of their strength. Other core concepts include provability logic (the modal logic that captures the provability predicate), reverse mathematics (determining which axioms are needed to prove theorems), and structural proof theory (the study of proof calculi). The concept of analytic proof—a proof that does not rely on hidden lemmas—is central to the field, and normalization is the process of converting a natural deduction proof into a normal form. Proof theory also provides a natural framework for intuitionistic logic, where the constructive content of proofs is made explicit.The intellectual history of proof theory begins with Hilbert's program (1900–1931). Hilbert believed that all mathematical truths could be formalized in a complete, consistent system, and that a finitary consistency proof would secure mathematics once and for all. Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems (1931) shattered this dream: any consistent system strong enough to encode arithmetic cannot prove its own consistency, and there are true statements it cannot prove. Gentzen responded by developing structural proof theory, showing that consistency could be proved using methods that, while not finitary, were still constructive and transparent. His 1934 paper "Investigations into Logical Deduction" introduced natural deduction and the sequent calculus, and his 1936 consistency proof for arithmetic set the stage for ordinal analysis. Later figures such as Dag Prawitz (normalization), Solomon Feferman (transfinite progressions), and Jean-Yves Girard (linear logic) deepened the structural approach. Proof theory continues to thrive, with applications in automated theorem proving, proof mining, and the analysis of programming languages.Proof theory is not a replacement for model theory or computability theory; rather, it complements them. Where model theory studies the semantic interpretation of logical languages, proof theory studies the syntactic structure of derivations. Where computability theory focuses on what can be computed, proof theory focuses on what can be proved and how efficiently. Together, these frameworks give a complete picture of the foundations of mathematics.The 10 concepts its tower teaches
- Consistency proof
- Cut elimination
- Hilbert systems
- Natural deduction
- Normalization
- Ordinal analysis
- Proof-theoretic ordinal
- Sequent calculus
- Structural proof theory
- Subformula property
- 1930-Present
- 1931-Present
Incompleteness and Limitative Metamathematics
What can a formal system not prove?
- 1936-Present
- 1960-Present
- 1963-Present
- 1969-Present
- 1974-Present
Finite Model Theory and Descriptive Complexity
What can logical languages express on finite structures?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Type Theory grew out of Logicism
Russell and Whitehead's theory of types in Principia Mathematica was developed directly out of Frege's logicist programme, as a stratified reconstruction of logic and arithmetic that avoided the paradoxes. The ramified type hierarchy is the logicist derivation of mathematics carried out in typed form.
Carried by Bertrand Russell; Alfred North Whitehead; Principia Mathematica (1910–1913).
Proof Theory grew out of Hilbert's program
Proof theory was created as the metamathematical discipline required by Hilbert's programme: proofs became finite combinatorial objects to be studied mathematically. Hilbert's finitist consistency project is the origin of proof theory as a field.
Carried by David Hilbert; Paul Bernays; Grundlagen der Mathematik (1934).
Incompleteness and Limitative Metamathematics reacted against Hilbert's program
Gödel's incompleteness theorems were aimed directly at Hilbert's programme, showing that no consistent formal system strong enough for arithmetic can prove its own consistency. The 1931 paper names Principia Mathematica and related systems and dismantles the finitist consistency hope.
Carried by Kurt Gödel; Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze (1931).
Curry–Howard Correspondence influenced by Proof Theory
The Curry–Howard correspondence rests on the proof-theoretic observation that natural deduction proofs correspond to typed lambda terms. Gentzen's natural deduction supplied the proof side of the identification.
Carried by Haskell Curry; William Alvin Howard; Gerhard Gentzen.
Finite Model Theory and Descriptive Complexity grew out of Model Theory
Finite model theory is the branch of model theory that restricts attention to finite structures, motivated by connections to computational complexity. It grew directly out of the model-theoretic tradition of structures and satisfaction.
Carried by Ronald Fagin.
Computability Theory influenced by Incompleteness and Limitative Metamathematics
Gödel's arithmetization of syntax and his notion of primitive recursive function fed directly into the definitions of computability given by Church, Turing and Post in 1936. The techniques for encoding proofs as numbers became tools for defining effective calculability.
Carried by Kurt Gödel; Alonzo Church; Alan Turing.
Algebraic Logic replaced Syllogistic
Boole presented his algebra of logic as a calculus that could do what the traditional syllogistic could not: express relations and be manipulated symbolically. He explicitly contrasted his algebraic method with the Aristotelian catalogue of valid forms.
Carried by George Boole; The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847).
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory influenced by Logicism
Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory was a response to the paradoxes that undermined Frege's logicist system, above all Russell's contradiction in Law V. Zermelo restricted comprehension to subsets of given sets to block the paradoxes that defeated logicism.
Carried by Ernst Zermelo.
Hilbert's program reacted against Logicism
Hilbert's programme was framed as an alternative to logicism: rather than reducing mathematics to logic, it sought to formalize mathematics and prove its consistency by finitary means. Hilbert treated the logicist derivation as one possible formal system among others to be secured.
Carried by David Hilbert.
Model Theory influenced by Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory
Model theory took the set-theoretic universe supplied by Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory as the domain in which structures and their satisfaction relations are defined. The axiomatic set theory provided the framework in which models are built.
Carried by Alfred Tarski.
Incompleteness and Limitative Metamathematics influenced by Type Theory
Gödel's incompleteness proof was carried out on the formal system of Principia Mathematica, using its type-theoretic language and arithmetization of its syntax. The typed system supplied the concrete formal object whose limits Gödel demonstrated.
Carried by Kurt Gödel; Principia Mathematica (1910–1913).
Categorical Logic influenced by Type Theory
Categorical logic drew on type theory and the lambda calculus in formulating doctrines of types and proofs as categorical structures. Lawvere's work on adjoint functors and hyperdoctrines built on the typed formal systems of the earlier tradition.
Carried by F. William Lawvere.
Hilbert's program rival of Intuitionistic Logic
Brouwer's intuitionism rejected the classical logic and finitary formalism on which Hilbert's programme rested, denying excluded middle for infinite domains. The two programmes competed over the same foundational questions in the 1920s.
Carried by L. E. J. Brouwer.
Proof Theory influenced by Intuitionistic Logic
Gentzen's natural deduction and sequent calculus were designed to capture constructive reasoning, and his consistency proof for arithmetic used transfinite induction in a constructively acceptable sense. Intuitionist ideas about what counts as a proof shaped the structure of these systems.
Carried by Gerhard Gentzen.
Logic and Computation grew out of Computability Theory
Logic and computation grew out of computability theory as the theory of what machines can decide was applied to programming languages, automata and formal semantics. The Turing machine and lambda calculus became the theoretical basis for the new field.
Carried by Alan Turing; Alonzo Church.
Curry–Howard Correspondence influenced by Computability Theory
The Curry–Howard correspondence identified proofs in formal systems with programs in the lambda calculus, connecting proof theory to computability. The lambda calculus, a product of computability theory, supplied the computational side of the correspondence.
Carried by Haskell Curry; William Alvin Howard.
Finite Model Theory and Descriptive Complexity influenced by Computability Theory
Descriptive complexity characterized complexity classes by the logical languages needed to express them, using computability and complexity theory as its target. Fagin's theorem linked existential second-order logic to NP, tying model theory to machine complexity.
Carried by Ronald Fagin.
Beyond the field
Where Mathematical Logic's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 208 links.
Syllogistic replaced by First-order logic in Philosophical Logic
Frege's predicate logic replaced the syllogistic as the working framework of logic, retaining categorical forms only as a small fragment expressible in the new notation.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Begriffsschrift (1879).
Algebraic Logic influenced by Symbolic algebra and analytic geometry in Algebra
Boole modelled his logical calculus on the symbolic algebra of his day, using algebraic operations and the laws of ordinary algebra as the pattern for a calculus of classes.
Carried by George Boole; The Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847).
Algebraic Logic influenced Digital Logic Design in Electrical Engineering
Algebraic logic, especially Boolean algebra, was applied by Shannon in 1937 to switching circuits, giving digital logic design its fundamental design calculus. The later framework is unthinkable without this passage.
Carried by George Boole; Claude Shannon.
Algebraic Logic influenced Algebraic and category-theoretic logic in Philosophy Of Logic
The nineteenth-century algebraic logic of Boole and Schröder is the direct ancestor of treating propositional logics as varieties of algebras. Later work on Boolean algebras and relation algebras carried that method into mathematical logic.
Carried by George Boole; Ernst Schröder.
Logicism provoked Intuitionism in Philosophical Logic
Intuitionism defined itself against the logicist reduction of mathematics to logic, denying that classical logic could ground mathematical existence.
Carried by L. E. J. Brouwer.
Logicism led to Neo-logicism in Philosophy Of Mathematics
Neo-logicism is a continuation of the logicist programme in mathematical logic, using Frege's Grundgesetze and the consistency of Hume's Principle to reconstruct arithmetic within second-order logic. Wright and Hale built on the technical logicist tradition.
Carried by Crispin Wright; Bob Hale.
Logicism grew out of First-order logic in Philosophical Logic
First-order logic is the quantificational framework Frege introduced and Russell and Whitehead used in Principia Mathematica to carry out the logicist reduction.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Bertrand Russell; Principia Mathematica (1910).
Logicism grew out of Fregean predicate logic in Logic
Frege's predicate logic, introduced in the Begriffsschrift, was devised as the instrument for deriving arithmetic from logical laws, so logicism grew directly out of it.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Begriffsschrift (1879).
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory influenced Forcing in Descriptive Set Theory
Forcing was developed as a technique in mathematical logic for proving independence results relative to ZF, using the metamathematics of models and consistency. It is a logical method built on the syntax and semantics of ZF.
Carried by Paul Cohen.
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory influenced Forcing in Set Theory
Forcing was devised by Cohen as a technique for constructing models of ZF and proving independence results relative to Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory.
Carried by Paul Cohen.
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory led to Von Neumann–Bernays–Gödel set theory in Set Theory
NBG set theory is a conservative extension of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory: it keeps the ZF axioms for sets and adds a theory of classes, so it grew directly out of ZF as a refinement.
Carried by John von Neumann; Paul Bernays.
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory reacted against Logicism in Foundations Of Mathematics
Zermelo's axiomatisation was a response to the paradoxes that undermined Frege's and Russell's logicist reduction, replacing the logicist derivation of sets with independent set axioms.
Carried by Ernst Zermelo; Bertrand Russell.

Mathematical Logic is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 16 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Mathematical LogicRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Logic 20 links
- Philosophy Of Logic 18 links
- Philosophical Logic 17 links
- Modal Logic 15 links
- Proof Theory 14 links
- Philosophy Of Mathematics 12 links
- Type Theory 10 links
- Computability 10 links
- Computational Logic 10 links
- Foundations Of Mathematics 9 links
- Constructive Mathematics 8 links
- Model Theory 8 links
More in Mathematical Logic
- Constructive Mathematics
- Descriptive Set Theory
- Model Theory
- Proof Theory
- Recursion Theory
- Set Theory
- Type Theory
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