Conflict And Peace Studies

Conflict and peace studies is the branch of political science that asks why organized violence breaks out, how it is fought, and how it can be ended or prevented.

9 frameworks, from 1946 to today · Political Science · Social Sciences

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Conflict and peace studies is the branch of political science that asks why organized violence breaks out, how it is fought, and how it can be ended or prevented. Its practitioners count wars, model deterrence, interview ex-combatants, evaluate peacekeeping missions, and argue about whether "peace" means the mere absence of fighting or something more demanding. What makes the field distinctive is that it treats war and peace as empirical questions—measurable, comparable, and potentially manageable—rather than as fate or morality tale. That commitment has produced hard-won knowledge and sharp internal quarrels, and the history of the field is largely the history of those quarrels.

Strategic Studies and the Logic of Deterrence

The field's first modern strand grew out of the catastrophe of the two world wars and the arrival of nuclear weapons. Strategic studies—the analysis of how military force is used to achieve political ends—was built in the 1950s and 1960s largely by civilian scholars, many of them economists and mathematicians, working in and around American think tanks such as RAND. Their central concept was deterrence: persuading an adversary not to act by convincing it that the costs of acting will outweigh the gains12.

The decisive intellectual move was to treat deterrence as a problem of rational choice under threat. Bernard Brodie's The Absolute Weapon (1946) argued that nuclear weapons made war between great powers self-defeating, and Thomas Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict (1960) formalized bargaining, threats, and "credibility"—the question of whether a threat will be believed. Schelling's insight that a threat can be strengthened by limiting one's own options (the "threat that leaves something to chance") showed how game theory could illuminate strategy. Herman Kahn's On Thermonuclear War (1960) pushed escalation scenarios to notorious extremes. The framework's practical payoff was arms control: the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and later SALT agreements drew on strategic-studies reasoning about stability, second-strike survivability, and mutual vulnerability.

Deterrence theory's weakness was that it assumed rational, unitary actors. Its predictions about crises and limited war were tested against cases—Korea, Cuba, Vietnam—with mixed results, and critics noted that it said little about civil wars, insurgencies, or the motives of non-state actors.

Peace Research and the Turn to Data

A second strand emerged in deliberate opposition. Peace research, institutionalized with the founding of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) in 1959 and the Journal of Peace Research in 1964, rejected the state-centric, strategy-first orientation of strategic studies. Its founders—Johan Galtung foremost among them—argued that peace required understanding the causes of violence, not just managing its instruments.

Galtung's 1969 essay "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research" introduced a distinction that reshaped the field: negative peace (the absence of direct violence) versus positive peace (the absence of "structural violence"—harm built into social arrangements such as poverty or discrimination). This let researchers study inequality, repression, and exploitation as forms of violence even where no shots were fired1. Galtung also developed the "conflict triangle" of attitudes, behavior, and contradiction, a template for analyzing conflicts as dynamic systems.

Peace research was normative and interdisciplinary, drawing on sociology and psychology, and it built institutions—PRIO, the Tampere Peace Research Institute, and later the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (founded 1980s)—that made conflict measurable. Its critics within political science found it sometimes activist and methodologically loose, but its data-building legacy proved indispensable.

The Behavioralist Revolution: Correlates of War

The most consequential methodological turn came from J. David Singer, whose Correlates of War (COW) project began at the University of Michigan in 19633. Singer's ambition was behavioralist in the strict sense: to replace anecdote and doctrine with systematic, replicable measurement. COW built datasets on interstate wars, militarized disputes, alliances, and national capabilities, coding wars by magnitude and participants.

The project's founding question—"what correlates with war?"—produced a research program rather than a single answer. Scholars tested whether alliances, power parity, or arms races predicted conflict; the "power transition" and "power preponderance" debates, and the finding that dyadic disputes escalate more often between roughly equal powers, all rest on COW-style data. The project's coding rules became a shared standard, and its datasets are still used. Its limitation was the interstate focus: for decades, civil wars were poorly covered, and the behavioralist drive to quantify sometimes outran the theory explaining what was counted.

Civil Wars and the Greed-versus-Grievance Debate

With the end of the Cold War, attention shifted to internal conflict1. The 1990s saw a burst of large-N civil-war research, much of it using new datasets such as the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler's World Bank work (from the late 1990s) advanced a striking claim: that civil wars were better explained by economic opportunity than by political grievance. In their "greed" model, rebellion was a form of predation, and the risk of war rose with the availability of lootable resources (diamonds, drugs), low opportunity costs for recruits, and weak state capacity. Their econometric papers, and Collier's Breaking the Conflict Trap (2003), made "greed versus grievance" a household phrase.

Critics—notably scholars of ethnicity and political economy—countered that grievance (exclusion, inequality, repression) was being measured away rather than refuted, and that the two were entangled: resource wealth often funded grievance-driven movements. The debate forced the field to specify mechanisms and to improve data on conflict onset, duration, and recurrence. It also connected conflict studies to development economics, a bridge that reshaped both.

Comparative-Historical Analysis of Civil War

Alongside the statistical work ran a qualitative, case-based tradition. Comparative-historical analysis—the systematic comparison of a small number of cases to identify causal configurations—was applied to revolutions, state formation, and civil war. Theda Skocpol's States and Social Revolutions (1979) had shown how state structure and international pressure shaped revolutionary outcomes; later scholars applied similar logic to civil wars, asking why some states collapse into insurgency and others do not.

This tradition's contribution was attention to sequence, context, and mechanism—how a fiscal crisis, an ethnic cleavage, and a weak army combine into rebellion. It also produced influential typologies, such as distinctions between ideological, ethnic, and resource wars, and between "sons of the soil" conflicts over land and separatist wars over territory. Its weakness was generalization: small-N comparison could identify plausible causes but rarely adjudicate between them with confidence. The field's later "micro-level" turn was in part a response.

Counterinsurgency Theory

A parallel body of thought concerned how states fight internal wars. Counterinsurgency (COIN) theory—the doctrine of defeating insurgency by winning population support rather than by attrition alone—has deep roots in colonial warfare and was codified in the twentieth century. The classic statements include Robert Thompson's Defeating Communist Insurgency (1966), drawn from the Malayan Emergency, and the French "oil spot" doctrine from Algeria. David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare (1964) set out a theory of population control and political action.

The doctrine's modern revival came with the US wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 2006 Field Manual 3-24, drafted under General David Petraeus and informed by scholars such as Eliot Cohen and Sarah Sewall, restated COIN as "clear, hold, build"—protect the population, separate it from insurgents, and deliver governance. The "surge" in Iraq (2007) was widely credited with reducing violence, though the attribution remains contested. Critics argued that COIN's population-centric claims were hard to test, that it understated the role of local politics, and that its historical cases were selected to flatter the doctrine. The debate pushed the field toward more rigorous evaluation of what actually reduces insurgent violence.

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Evaluation

As UN missions multiplied after 1989, a new research agenda asked whether peacekeeping and peacebuilding worked. Early studies were descriptive; the turning point was the use of quasi-experimental designs. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis's work in the early 2000s assessed whether UN peace operations reduced the recurrence of war, and later scholars exploited the fact that missions are deployed where they are most needed—a selection problem—by using matching and instrumental-variable strategies. Virginia Page Fortna's Does Peacekeeping Work? (2008) argued that peacekeeping does reduce the risk of renewed war, especially when missions are robust.

Peacebuilding—the broader project of rebuilding institutions, economies, and social ties after war—proved harder to evaluate. The 2000 Brahimi Report reformed UN peace operations, and the concept of "liberal peacebuilding" (elections, markets, rule of law) came under sustained critique for imposing external models. Evaluation research increasingly focused on local ownership, sequencing, and unintended effects, and on whether peacebuilding addressed the grievances that fueled war in the first place.

Critical Peace Studies

From the late 1990s, a critical strand challenged the field's foundations. Drawing on Foucault, postcolonial theory, and critical security studies, scholars argued that "peace" as practiced by international institutions was a particular liberal project with power effects—defining who counts as legitimate, depoliticizing conflict, and reproducing hierarchies between the global North and South. Oliver Richmond's work on the "liberal peace" and its critique, and Roger Mac Ginty's studies of hybrid peace and everyday peace, exemplified this turn. The critique's contribution was to insist that peacebuilding is a political act, not a technical one, and to foreground local agency and resistance. Its critics found it long on critique and short on testable propositions, but it reshaped how the field talks about intervention.

The Micro-Level Turn

The most recent transformation has been methodological and empirical: the shift from country-level to individual- and community-level analysis. The "micro-level" turn, gathering force from the mid-2000s, used survey experiments, geocoded event data, and fieldwork to study how violence affects individuals and localities. Stathis Kalyvas's The Logic of Violence in Civil War (2006) showed that violence within civil wars is often selective and strategic—driven by local control and information—rather than indiscriminate. Studies of rebel recruitment, wartime governance, and post-conflict reintegration followed, many using randomized or natural experiments.

This turn connected conflict studies to causal-inference methods and to behavioralism's legacy: the same drive to measure and test that produced COW now operates at the level of villages and households. It also raised new ethical and practical problems—research in war zones, the limits of generalizing from single conflicts, and the difficulty of linking micro-findings to macro-outcomes.

Where the Field Stands

Today the field is plural. Strategic studies and deterrence theory remain central to security policy, especially after nuclear proliferation concerns revived. Large-N conflict research, built on COW, Uppsala, and newer datasets, continues to test theories of onset, duration, and recurrence. Comparative-historical and micro-level work coexist, often in the same departments, with different standards of evidence. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding evaluation has become a mature applied field, while critical peace studies keeps the normative questions alive. The open questions are familiar but unresolved: why some peace agreements hold and others fail; whether liberal peacebuilding can be made to work or should be abandoned; how climate change, technology, and shifting power balances will reshape conflict; and how to connect the field's many levels of analysis into a coherent account of war and peace.

References

  1. Peace and conflict studies (Appeasement and deterrence, introduction, As pedagogical activity), Wikipedia
  2. Deterrence theory, Wikipedia
  3. Correlates of War, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Conflict And Peace Studies

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1946-Present
  2. 1959-Present
  3. 1963-Present
  4. 1964-Present
  5. 1979-Present
  6. 1998-Present
  7. 1998-Present
  8. 2000-Present
  9. 2006-Present
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