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Security Theory
Security theory is the part of cybersecurity that tries to state, in precise and checkable terms, what "secure" means.
9 frameworks, from 1949 to today · Cybersecurity · Computer Science
- Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography 1949-Present
- Reference Monitor and Trusted Computing Base 1972-Present
- Multilevel security 1973-1995
- Lattice-Based Information Flow 1976-Present
- Formal Verification and Evaluated Assurance 1983-Present
- Access control 1985-Present
- Role-Based Access Control 1992-Present
- Language-Based Information-Flow Control 1996-Present
- Threat model 1999-Present
Overview
Security theory is the part of cybersecurity that tries to state, in precise and checkable terms, what "secure" means. Instead of asking whether a particular system seems safe, it asks what property a system must have, what assumptions that property rests on, and whether those assumptions can be proved or tested. The stakes are practical: a defender who cannot say exactly what they are defending against cannot tell whether a defense works, and a guarantee that rests on an unexamined assumption is no guarantee at all. The history of the subfield is a sequence of attempts to turn vague intuitions—"only authorized users get in," "the attacker cannot learn the message," "the system cannot be subverted"—into formal statements that can be reasoned about, and then to build systems that actually satisfy them.
Secrecy as a Mathematical Problem
The earliest rigorous strand came from cryptography. For centuries ciphers were judged by whether they resisted the attacks people had tried. In 1949 Claude Shannon reframed the question: given a cipher and an adversary with unlimited computing power, how much can the adversary learn1? His answer, perfect secrecy, defined a cipher as perfectly secret when the ciphertext is statistically independent of the plaintext—so seeing the ciphertext changes nothing about the attacker's beliefs. Shannon proved that this requires a key at least as long as the message, which is why the one-time pad is the only perfectly secret cipher. The result was double-edged: it gave secrecy a precise meaning and simultaneously showed that the strongest possible meaning is impractical for most uses. That tension—between provable security and usable security—runs through everything that follows.
The Reference Monitor and the Trusted Computing Base
The next problem was access: how does a system decide which programs and users may read or change which data? In the early 1970s, work associated with the U.S. Air Force and the MITRE Corporation produced the reference monitor concept. A reference monitor is an abstract component that mediates every access by every subject to every object, is always invoked, and is small enough to be analyzed. The concrete implementation of that idea—the hardware and software that must be trusted for the guarantee to hold—became known as the trusted computing base (TCB)2. The insight was structural: security depends on a small, verifiable core, and everything outside it can be untrusted. The 1972 Anderson report, which surveyed computer security for the U.S. government, helped fix these terms in the field's vocabulary. The reference monitor remains the conceptual backbone of operating-system security, and the TCB idea explains why "keep the trusted part small" is a recurring design principle.
Multilevel Security and the Lattice
The reference monitor needed a policy to enforce. The U.S. Department of Defense, concerned with classified information shared among users of different clearances, sponsored a series of models in the 1970s. The best known is the Bell–LaPadula model (1973), which stated two rules: a subject may not read data classified above its clearance (no read up), and may not write data classified below its level (no write down, sometimes called the -property). The second rule prevents a cleared user from leaking secrets into a lower classification. Around the same time, the Biba model (1977) addressed integrity rather than confidentiality, reversing the flow rules to stop low-integrity data from contaminating high-integrity data3.
These models were unified by Dorothy Denning's lattice model of information flow (1976), which treated security labels as elements of a mathematical lattice—a partially ordered set in which any two elements have a least upper bound and greatest lower bound. Information may flow only upward in the lattice. The lattice formulation made multilevel security a general theory rather than a collection of ad hoc rules, and it made the central question explicit: not just who may access what, but where information is allowed to flow.
Formal Verification and the Evaluated System
If a policy can be stated formally, can a system be proved to enforce it? This question drove the most ambitious projects of the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S. Department of Defense's Computer Security Initiative, later the National Computer Security Center, produced the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), published in 1983 and known as the Orange Book. It defined a ladder of evaluation classes—from D (minimal) through C1, C2, B1, B2, B3, to A1 (formally verified)—each demanding more assurance: more rigorous design, more testing, and at the top, a formal proof that the system's implementation matched its security model. The criteria introduced assurance levels as a graded notion of how much confidence a security claim deserved, distinct from the features a system offered.
The flagship attempt to reach the top was the Honeywell SCOMP (Secure Communications Processor), which in 1985 became the first system evaluated at class A1. Formal verification of real systems proved extraordinarily expensive, and few systems followed. Europe responded with its own schemes—the German Green Book and the British and French criteria—and in the 1990s these were harmonized into the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408, first version 1996, now widely used). The Common Criteria shifted emphasis from a fixed ladder to protection profiles and evaluation assurance levels (EAL1–EAL7), letting a vendor state a target and have it evaluated against that target. The lesson of this era was sobering: formal proof of a whole system is possible but costly, and most practical assurance comes from careful design, testing, and independent evaluation rather than end-to-end proof.
Access Control Beyond the Military
Multilevel security assumed a hierarchical classification. Commercial and civilian systems did not work that way, and the 1980s and 1990s produced models for other settings. Discretionary access control—where an owner decides who may access a file—was the default in early operating systems but offered weak guarantees. Mandatory access control, of which multilevel security is one form, makes access depend on system-wide labels the user cannot change.
A different problem arose in large organizations: permissions multiplied, and administering them individually became unmanageable. Role-based access control (RBAC), formalized by David Ferraiolo and Richard Kuhn in 1992 and later developed into a family of models (RBAC96 by Sandhu and colleagues), assigned permissions to roles rather than to people, and assigned people to roles. This matched how organizations actually worked and made permission management tractable. RBAC became a standard (the NIST model, ANSI INCITS 359) and is now embedded in most enterprise systems. The broader lesson was that access-control theory had to model the organization, not just the data.
Threat Modeling: Asking What the Attacker Will Do
Formal models describe what a system should guarantee; they say little about which threats matter. Threat modeling emerged as the discipline of systematically asking, before building, what an adversary might do. Its modern form was shaped in the late 1990s at Microsoft, where engineers developed a structured process—identify assets, enumerate threats, rank them, and choose mitigations—and published it in the early 2000s. A widely used technique, STRIDE, classifies threats into categories such as spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege4. Threat modeling connected security theory to design practice: it made the adversary's goals an explicit input to the architecture rather than an afterthought.
The Present: Composition, Proof, and the Limits of Models
Today the strands coexist and increasingly interlock. The reference monitor and TCB idea survives in hardware roots of trust and in small verified kernels; seL4, a formally verified microkernel, demonstrated in the 2000s and 2010s that machine-checked proof of enforcement is achievable for a carefully scoped system. Information-flow control has been revived in language-based security, where compilers and type systems track labels through programs. The Common Criteria remains the dominant evaluation framework, though its cost and the difficulty of interpreting assurance levels are persistent criticisms. RBAC has been extended by attribute-based access control, which decides access from arbitrary attributes of user, resource, and environment.
The open questions are the ones the history kept exposing. Perfect secrecy is unattainable in practice, so computational assumptions carry the weight—and those assumptions can fail. Formal proofs are only as good as their models, and models of the adversary are always incomplete. Assurance levels measure process as much as outcome. The field's enduring contribution is not any single model but the habit it established: state the security property precisely, name the assumptions, and make the claim checkable.
References
- Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems, Wikipedia
- Trusted computing base, Wikipedia
- Biba Model, Wikipedia
- STRIDE model, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Security Theory
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1949-Present
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography
How much can an attacker learn from a ciphertext?
- 1972-Present
Reference Monitor and Trusted Computing Base
What small core must be trusted to enforce access?
- 1973-1995
Multilevel security
How can classified data be shared without leaking secrets?
- 1976-Present
- 1983-Present
Formal Verification and Evaluated Assurance
Can a system be proved to enforce its security policy?
- 1985-Present
- 1992-Present
Role-Based Access Control
How can permissions be managed in large organizations?
- 1996-Present
Language-Based Information-Flow Control
Can a program's information flows be checked by its compiler?
- 1999-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Lattice-Based Information Flow grew out of Multilevel security
Dorothy Denning's lattice model generalized the Bell–LaPadula and Biba multilevel security models into a single mathematical theory of information flow, treating security labels as elements of a lattice.
Carried by Dorothy E. Denning.
Language-Based Information-Flow Control grew out of Lattice-Based Information Flow
Language-based information-flow control grew directly out of Denning's lattice model, recasting information flow as a property enforced by type systems and compilers rather than by an operating-system reference monitor.
Carried by Dorothy E. Denning; Andrew C. Myers.
Multilevel security influenced by Reference Monitor and Trusted Computing Base
The reference monitor concept provided the enforcement mechanism that multilevel security policies were designed to be enforced by. Bell and LaPadula's model was formulated as a policy for a reference monitor to implement.
Carried by David Elliott Bell; Leonard J. LaPadula.
Formal Verification and Evaluated Assurance influenced by Reference Monitor and Trusted Computing Base
The TCSEC evaluation criteria required that systems implement a reference monitor and a trusted computing base, and the highest class A1 demanded a formal proof that the TCB enforced the security policy.
Carried by Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (1983).
Formal Verification and Evaluated Assurance influenced by Multilevel security
The TCSEC's multilevel security requirements (classes B1 and above) were built around the Bell–LaPadula model, and evaluation required showing that the system enforced that model's rules.
Carried by Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (1983).
Beyond the field
Where Security Theory's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 34 links.
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography grew out of Shannon information theory in Coding Theory
Shannon's 1948 mathematical theory of communication supplied the entropy and equivocation measures, and his 1949 'Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems' applied them directly to ciphers, making perfect secrecy a branch of information theory.
Carried by Claude Shannon; Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems (1949).
Reference Monitor and Trusted Computing Base influenced Evaluation Criteria and Assurance in Systems Security
Reference monitor and TCB ideas are the substance the evaluation criteria measure, with assurance levels tied to how completely the monitor is enforced and verified. The Orange Book's classes are defined in these terms.
Carried by Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (1983).
Reference Monitor and Trusted Computing Base influenced Multilevel Security and Mandatory Access Control in Systems Security
The reference monitor concept gave multilevel security its enforcement mechanism: Bell and LaPadula's model assumed a monitor mediating all accesses against the lattice of labels. The TCB notion then defined what had to be trusted to enforce the policy.
Carried by David Elliott Bell; Leonard J. LaPadula.
Lattice-Based Information Flow influenced by Multilevel security and access control models in Cybersecurity
Denning's lattice model generalised the Bell-LaPadula multilevel security model and the military classification lattice into an abstract information-flow framework, taking its security-class structure as the motivating case.
Carried by Dorothy E. Denning.
Formal Verification and Evaluated Assurance influenced by Formal verification in Software Testing
Formal verification techniques, program proving and specification methods developed from the late 1960s, were adopted as the highest assurance evidence in the security evaluation criteria.
Carried by John Rushby.
Access control grew out of Multilevel security and access control models in Cybersecurity
The multilevel security and access-control models literature is the direct parent of general access control, whose matrix, role-based and policy models generalise the mandatory lattice models.
Carried by Ravi Sandhu.
Access control grew out of Multilevel Security and Mandatory Access Control in Systems Security
General access control grew out of multilevel security and mandatory access control: Bell-LaPadula's lattice and mandatory rules were abstracted into access-matrix and role-based models covering discretionary and commercial systems.
Carried by David F. Ferraiolo; Ravi Sandhu.
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography influenced Public-Key Cryptography in Applied Cryptography
The perfect-secrecy framework supplied the security definitions and the key-distribution problem that public-key cryptography set out to solve under weaker, computational assumptions.
Carried by Whitfield Diffie; Martin Hellman.
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography influenced Public-key cryptography in Cybersecurity
Perfect secrecy theory supplied the ideal of provable confidentiality that public-key cryptography reworked into computational security under hardness assumptions.
Carried by Claude Shannon; Whitfield Diffie; Martin Hellman.
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography influenced Cryptographic Privacy Engineering in Digital Privacy
Perfect secrecy and information-theoretic cryptography, from Shannon's 1949 work, provided the foundational definitions of secrecy that privacy engineering extended to computational settings. Later privacy definitions were framed against Shannon's model.
Carried by Claude Shannon.
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography influenced by Machine Cryptanalysis in Applied Cryptography
Shannon drew on wartime cryptanalytic practice, including work on cipher machines and statistical attacks on keys, when formalising what a cryptanalyst can learn from ciphertext in his secrecy paper.
Carried by Claude Shannon.
Perfect Secrecy and Information-Theoretic Cryptography influenced by Information theory and source coding in Signal Processing
Shannon's source-coding results, including the noiseless coding theorem, were developed alongside and fed into his secrecy analysis, where redundancy in the source is what a cipher must conceal from the cryptanalyst.
Carried by Claude Shannon.

Security Theory is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 9 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Security TheoryRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Cybersecurity 10 links
- Software Security 7 links
- Systems Security 7 links
- Applied Cryptography 3 links
- Network Security 2 links
- Software Testing 2 links
- Coding Theory 1 link
- Signal Processing 1 link
- Digital Privacy 1 link
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