Behavioral Game Theory
Game theory is the mathematics of interdependent decisions: what you should do depends on what others do, and what they do depends on what they expect you to do.
9 frameworks, from 1950 to today · Behavioral Economics · Economics
- Experimental game theory 1950-Present
- Experimental Economics Methodology 1976-Present
- Social preferences 1993-Present
- Learning models 1995-Present
- Level-k reasoning models 1995-Present
- Developmental game theory 2000-Present
- Cross-cultural experimental economics 2001-Present
- Neuroeconomic game theory 2003-Present
- Cognitive hierarchy theory 2004-Present
Overview
Game theory is the mathematics of interdependent decisions: what you should do depends on what others do, and what they do depends on what they expect you to do. Its classical form, built by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) and extended by John Nash's equilibrium concept in 1950, assumes players are perfectly rational, purely self-interested, and capable of unlimited strategic reasoning. Behavioral game theory is the empirical and theoretical project of finding out what happens when real people—with limited attention, social feelings, and habits learned from experience—actually play. Its practitioners run controlled, usually paid, experiments; build models that predict the observed deviations; and test those models against new data. What is at stake is whether the elegant equilibrium machinery of economics describes human interaction at all, and if not, what should replace it.
Testing equilibrium in the laboratory
The founding move was to put game theory into the laboratory. In the 1950s and 1960s, researchers such as Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher at the RAND Corporation ran the first prisoner's dilemma experiments, and Anatol Rapoport and colleagues at the University of Michigan studied repeated games and coalition formation extensively. These early studies found that people cooperated far more than equilibrium predicted and that behavior shifted with the framing of the game.
The decisive methodological step came from Vernon Smith, whose work from the late 1950s onward established that laboratory markets could be made rigorous. His key device was induced value theory: give subjects a payoff schedule that makes their monetary reward depend on the outcome, so that the experimenter controls their preferences and can test theory cleanly. Smith's double oral auction experiments showed that even unsophisticated traders converged toward competitive equilibrium prices—evidence that markets can work without rational traders. For this body of work he shared the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize with Daniel Kahneman. The induced-value approach became the standard toolkit of experimental economics and, by extension, of behavioral game theory: if you want to know how people play a game, pay them according to its payoffs and watch.
Social preferences: people care about others
The most robust departure from standard theory is that players are not purely selfish. In the ultimatum game—one player proposes a split of a sum, the other accepts or rejects, and rejection leaves both with nothing—self-interested responders should accept any positive offer, and proposers should offer the minimum. Experiments from the early 1980s onward, notably by Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze (1982), found that proposers typically offered 40–50 percent and that low offers were frequently rejected at real cost to the responder. The dictator game, in which the responder has no veto, isolated pure generosity: many allocators gave away part of their endowment even when they could keep everything1.
Explaining this required models in which utility depends on others' payoffs. Gary Becker had proposed in 1974 that people may care about others' welfare, but the modern formalization came in the 1990s. Matthew Rabin's 1993 model of fairness made kindness and retaliation depend on intentions, not just outcomes. Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999) and, independently, Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) built inequity aversion models: players dislike unequal outcomes, both when they are behind and when they are ahead. A concrete prediction of Fehr–Schmidt is that a player will pay to reduce an advantage she holds over someone else—behavior seen in experiments where subjects give up money to lower a partner's payoff. These social preference models made sense of a wide range of results, including costly punishment of free-riders in public-goods games, where contributors pay to penalize non-contributors even though punishment yields no material gain.
Learning: how behavior changes with repetition
In one-shot games, players have no chance to adapt. In repeated games, they do—and the pattern of adaptation became a research program in its own right. Alvin Roth and Ido Erev's 1995 paper "Learning in Extensive-Form Games" showed that simple reinforcement models, in which strategies that paid off in the past are more likely to be chosen again, tracked experimental data better than equilibrium predictions in many settings. The idea is close to psychological learning theory: choices are strengthened by reward.
A rival family of models assumed players best-respond to beliefs about others, updating those beliefs from observed play. Colin Camerer and Teck-Hua Ho's experience-weighted attraction (EWA) model (1999) combined reinforcement and belief-based learning in a single framework, letting the data decide how much weight to give each. The broader lesson was that "equilibrium" is often better understood as a limit that learning processes may or may not reach, and that the path matters.
Limited reasoning: level-k and cognitive hierarchy
A different puzzle is that people seem to reason only a few steps deep. In beauty-contest games—guess a fraction of the average guess, so that the winner is the one who anticipates others' reasoning—equilibrium requires infinite iterated reasoning, yet experimental guesses cluster at low levels. Rosemarie Nagel's 1995 study of such games found spikes at guesses corresponding to one or two steps of reasoning, not at the equilibrium.
Two models formalized this. Level-k models, developed by Dale Stahl and Paul Wilson (1995) and extended by Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001), posit a hierarchy: a level-0 player follows a simple rule, a level-1 player best-responds to level-0, a level-2 player best-responds to level-1, and so on, with the population spread across levels. Cognitive hierarchy models, introduced by Colin Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho, and Juin-Kuan Chong (2004), make the same move but let higher-level players believe they face a distribution of lower-level types rather than a single type. These models predict behavior in many games—entry games, auctions, p-beauty contests—better than equilibrium, and they connect game theory to the psychology of bounded reasoning.
Beyond the lab: culture, development, and the brain
From the 1990s, researchers asked whether the findings were universal. Joseph Henrich and colleagues' cross-cultural ultimatum and dictator game studies, published in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2001 and in the book Foundations of Human Sociality (2004), found enormous variation across small-scale societies: some groups made near-zero offers, others made generous ones, and market integration and cooperation in everyday life predicted game behavior. This undercut any simple claim that fairness preferences are fixed human constants. A parallel developmental literature, using simplified games with children, traced how strategic reasoning, fairness, and punishment emerge with age—work associated with researchers such as Ernst Fehr, Bettina Rockenbach, and their collaborators.
Meanwhile, neuroeconomic game theory began in the early 2000s to ask what happens in the brain during strategic play. Studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging, such as Alan Sanfey and colleagues' 2003 paper on the ultimatum game, found that unfair offers activated the insula and anterior cingulate—regions linked to negative emotion—and that activity predicted rejection. This gave a physiological correlate to the social-preference findings and helped motivate dual-process accounts in which emotional reactions and deliberative control compete.
The present
Behavioral game theory today is a mature experimental science with several live strands. Social-preference models remain central but are increasingly tested against alternatives such as guilt aversion (players dislike letting others down) and conditional cooperation (people cooperate when they believe others will). Learning models and level-k/cognitive-hierarchy models are standard tools for predicting behavior in auctions, markets, and strategic settings, and are routinely compared against equilibrium in new experiments. Cross-cultural and developmental work has expanded into field experiments and large-scale replication efforts, and neuroeconomic methods continue to probe the mechanisms behind strategic choice. The open questions are substantial: how stable preferences are across contexts, how learning and reasoning interact, whether laboratory findings generalize to high-stakes field settings, and how to build models that are psychologically realistic without losing predictive power. The field's founding insight—that the rational-actor benchmark is a starting point, not a description—remains its organizing principle.
References
- Dictator game, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Behavioral Game Theory
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1950-Present
- 1976-Present
Experimental Economics Methodology
How can laboratory experiments test economic theory reliably?
- 1995-Present
- 1995-Present
- 2000-Present
Developmental game theory
When do fairness and strategy emerge in children?
- 2001-Present
Cross-cultural experimental economics
Are fairness preferences the same across cultures?
- 2003-Present
Neuroeconomic game theory
What happens in the brain during strategic play?
- 2004-Present
Cognitive hierarchy theory
How do people form beliefs about others' reasoning?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Experimental Economics Methodology grew out of Experimental game theory
Vernon Smith's induced-value theory and double oral auction experiments grew out of the early laboratory game experiments of the 1950s, turning their ad hoc procedures into a rigorous methodology. Smith's work established the paid, controlled protocol that experimental economics later codified.
Carried by Vernon Smith.
Cognitive hierarchy theory grew out of Level-k reasoning models
Cognitive hierarchy theory generalized level-k models by letting higher-level players hold beliefs about a distribution of lower-level types rather than a single type. Camerer, Ho, and Chong built directly on Stahl and Wilson's and Nagel's level-k hierarchy.
Carried by Colin Camerer; Teck-Hua Ho; Juin-Kuan Chong.
Social preferences grew out of Experimental game theory
The ultimatum and dictator game experiments of the early 1980s, themselves part of the experimental game theory tradition, produced the anomalies that social preference models were built to explain. Rabin, Fehr and Schmidt, and Bolton and Ockenfels formalized the deviations those experiments revealed.
Carried by Werner Güth; Matthew Rabin; Ernst Fehr.
Learning models grew out of Experimental game theory
Repeated-game experiments from the experimental game theory tradition supplied the data on which reinforcement and belief-learning models were fitted. Roth and Erev's learning models were built directly on the patterns of adaptation observed in those experiments.
Carried by Alvin Roth; Ido Erev.
Level-k reasoning models grew out of Experimental game theory
Beauty-contest and other experimental games showed systematic departures from equilibrium that level-k models were designed to capture. Nagel's 1995 experimental study of beauty contests provided the data that Stahl and Wilson's level-k hierarchy formalized.
Carried by Rosemarie Nagel; Dale Stahl; Paul Wilson.
Cross-cultural experimental economics grew out of Experimental game theory
Cross-cultural experimental economics took the ultimatum and dictator game protocols developed in experimental game theory and ran them in small-scale societies. Henrich and colleagues' 2001 and 2004 studies are direct extensions of the laboratory game paradigm to new populations.
Carried by Joseph Henrich; Foundations of Human Sociality (2004).
Neuroeconomic game theory grew out of Experimental game theory
Neuroeconomic game theory applied brain-imaging methods to the standard strategic games of the experimental tradition, notably the ultimatum game. Sanfey and colleagues' 2003 fMRI study is a direct extension of experimental game theory into neuroscience.
Carried by Alan Sanfey.
Cognitive hierarchy theory grew out of Experimental game theory
Cognitive hierarchy models were built on the experimental evidence from beauty contests and other games that players reason only a few steps deep. Camerer, Ho, and Chong formalized that evidence into a distributional model of bounded reasoning.
Carried by Colin Camerer; Teck-Hua Ho; Juin-Kuan Chong.
Social preferences influenced by Experimental Economics Methodology
The induced-value methodology of experimental economics gave social preference researchers the controlled, monetarily incentivized protocols needed to isolate other-regarding behavior. The ultimatum and dictator game designs that grounded the models were run under that methodology.
Carried by Vernon Smith.
Learning models influenced by Experimental Economics Methodology
Experimental economics methodology supplied the paid, repeated-session designs that made learning observable and comparable across studies. Learning models were estimated on data generated under those standardized procedures.
Carried by Vernon Smith.
Cross-cultural experimental economics influenced by Experimental Economics Methodology
Cross-cultural experimental economics carried the standardized, incentivized game protocols of the laboratory into field settings across societies. The comparability of results depended on the methodology established in experimental economics.
Carried by Joseph Henrich.
Developmental game theory influenced by Social preferences
Developmental game theory took the social-preference questions about fairness and costly punishment and asked when they emerge in children. The inequity-aversion and reciprocity models supplied the hypotheses tested in developmental experiments.
Carried by Ernst Fehr; Bettina Rockenbach.
Cross-cultural experimental economics influenced by Social preferences
Cross-cultural studies tested whether the fairness preferences formalized in social preference models hold universally. Henrich and colleagues' findings of large variation were framed as a challenge to those models' claims of fixed human preferences.
Carried by Joseph Henrich.
Neuroeconomic game theory influenced by Social preferences
Neuroeconomic game theory sought physiological correlates of the other-regarding motives modeled by social preferences. Sanfey and colleagues' finding that unfair offers activate emotion-related regions was motivated by the inequity-aversion and reciprocity literature.
Carried by Alan Sanfey.
Cognitive hierarchy theory rival of Learning models
Learning models and cognitive hierarchy models competed to explain the same experimental departures from equilibrium, one through adaptation over repetition and the other through bounded depth of reasoning. They were developed as alternative accounts of the same data.
Carried by Colin Camerer; Alvin Roth.
Developmental game theory grew out of Experimental game theory
Developmental game theory adapted the standard experimental games of the laboratory tradition to children, simplifying the protocols to trace how strategic and fairness behavior emerges with age. It grew out of the experimental game theory toolkit rather than replacing it.
Carried by Ernst Fehr; Bettina Rockenbach.
Level-k reasoning models influenced by Experimental Economics Methodology
Level-k studies relied on the incentivized, controlled protocols of experimental economics to elicit guesses in beauty-contest and related games. The methodology made the reasoning-depth data comparable across experiments.
Carried by Vernon Smith.
Neuroeconomic game theory influenced by Experimental Economics Methodology
Neuroeconomic game studies used the incentivized ultimatum and related game designs standardized by experimental economics so that brain activity could be tied to controlled strategic payoffs.
Carried by Alan Sanfey.
Beyond the field
Where Behavioral Game Theory's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 43 links.
Experimental game theory led to Behavioral Game Theory in Game Theory
Behavioral game theory grew directly out of experimental game theory: the laboratory games run from the 1950s onward, such as prisoner's dilemma and bargaining experiments, produced the anomalies it set out to explain. It is the theoretical interpretation of those experimental results.
Experimental game theory led to Behavioral Game Theory in Behavioral Economics
Behavioral game theory grew out of experimental game theory, using laboratory play of games to test and revise equilibrium predictions with boundedly rational models.
Carried by Colin Camerer.
Experimental game theory led to Public goods game in Public Goods Theory
The public goods game is a standard experimental game, developed within experimental game theory to test cooperation and free-riding predictions.
Experimental game theory influenced by Game Theory in Microeconomics
Experimental game theory took von Neumann and Morgenstern's 1944 formulation of games and equilibrium as the object to be tested in the laboratory. Early experiments such as the prisoner's dilemma and bargaining studies were designed around the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior's concepts.
Carried by John von Neumann; Oskar Morgenstern; Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944).
Experimental game theory led to Behavioral Game Theory in Game Theory
Behavioral game theory grew directly out of experimental game theory: the accumulated laboratory anomalies in bargaining, public-goods and ultimatum games prompted models of fairness, reciprocity and limited reasoning.
Carried by Werner Güth; Colin Camerer.
Experimental Economics Methodology led to Replication and Methodological Self-Scrutiny in Experimental Economics
The replication and methodological self-scrutiny movement in experimental economics grew directly out of the discipline's own laboratory methodology, turning its standards of control and incentive compatibility onto the reproducibility of its findings. The norms of experimental economics methodology were the base from which replication audits and pre-registration arose.
Experimental Economics Methodology led to Experimental Asset Markets in Experimental Economics
Experimental asset markets grew directly out of the laboratory methodology developed by experimental economists such as Vernon Smith, who applied the induced-value and market-institution techniques of experimental economics to securities trading. The double-auction and call-market procedures refined in the 1960s-70s methodology were carried into the asset-market bubble experiments of the 1980s.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Experimental Economics Methodology influenced Behavioural and Experimental Resource Economics in Resource Economics
The induced-value and public-goods experimental methodology developed by Vernon Smith and others gave resource economists the tools to test commons and quota behaviour in the lab. The later field's experiments are built on this methodology.
Carried by Vernon Smith.
Learning models grew out of Behavioral Game Theory in Behavioral Economics
Learning models in behavioral game theory were developed to explain how subjects adjust play over repeated games, extending behavioral game theory's focus from one-shot deviations to dynamics. Reinforcement and belief-learning models were fitted to the same experimental data.
Carried by Alvin E. Roth; Ido Erev.
Cross-cultural experimental economics grew out of Experimental Economics of Social Preferences in Social Preferences
Cross-cultural experimental economics grew directly out of the experimental economics of social preferences, extending ultimatum, dictator and public-goods games to small-scale societies. The 2001 cross-cultural project by Henrich and colleagues built on the game designs and preference models developed in the earlier laboratory literature.
Carried by Joseph Henrich; Robert Boyd; Colin Camerer.
Cognitive hierarchy theory grew out of Behavioral Game Theory in Behavioral Economics
Cognitive hierarchy theory is a model within behavioural game theory, formalising the iterated reasoning that behavioural experiments had documented. It grew directly out of that literature's effort to explain deviations from Nash equilibrium.
Carried by Colin Camerer; Teck-Hua Ho; Ju-Kuan Chong.
Experimental game theory grew out of Repeated game in Game Theory
Experimental game theory took the repeated-game setting, especially the iterated prisoner's dilemma, as its central laboratory, so the experimental programme grew out of repeated-game analysis.

Behavioral Game Theory is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 9 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Behavioral Game TheoryRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Behavioral Economics 8 links
- Game Theory 5 links
- Experimental Economics 5 links
- Social Preferences 4 links
- Game Theory 3 links
- Microeconomics 3 links
- Neoclassical Economics 2 links
- Applied Mathematics 2 links
- Multiagent Systems 1 link
- Neuroeconomics 1 link
- Reasoning Decision Making 1 link
- Political Economy Of Development 1 link
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