Experimental Economics
Experimental economics is the practice of testing economic ideas by putting real people into controlled, usually paid, decision situations and observing what they do.
10 frameworks, from 1950 to today · Behavioral Economics · Economics
- Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Testing 1950-Present
- Market Institution Experiments 1962-Present
- Induced Value Theory 1976-Present
- Auction Experiments 1979-Present
- Behavioral Decision Experiments 1979-Present
- Social preferences 1982-Present
- Experimental Asset Markets 1988-Present
- Field experiment 2000-Present
- Online Laboratory Experiments 2005-Present
- Replication and Methodological Self-Scrutiny 2010-Present
Overview
Experimental economics is the practice of testing economic ideas by putting real people into controlled, usually paid, decision situations and observing what they do1. Its practitioners build miniature markets, auctions, bargaining games and lotteries in laboratories and, increasingly, in the field, and they use the results both to check economic theory and to discover regularities theory missed1. What is at stake is the empirical status of economics itself: whether claims about markets, rationality and institutions rest on evidence or on assumption. The field's history is a story of a method becoming a discipline—of small, sceptical demonstrations growing into a standard tool of the profession, and of the arguments over what such experiments can and cannot show.
Precursors: Individual Choice Experiments before Mid-Century
Economists had long reasoned about choice without observing it. The first sustained experimental work on individual decisions came from psychologists. In the 1940s and 1950s, Ward Edwards and others began testing expected utility theory—the model that says a person chooses between gambles by weighing each outcome by its probability and its value—against how people actually behaved. Around the same time, Maurice Allais in 1953 described choice patterns that violated the theory's axioms, and Daniel Ellsberg in 1961 showed that people treat ambiguous probabilities differently from known ones23. These were thought experiments and questionnaire demonstrations rather than controlled laboratory studies, but they established the central puzzle: people's choices among risky prospects systematically depart from the standard model.
The other precursor was the theory of games4. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern's Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) and John Nash's equilibrium concept (1950) gave economists precise predictions about interdependent decisions. But game theory's predictions were notoriously hard to test with field data, because the theorist cannot observe the payoffs and information players actually faced. A laboratory could control exactly those things.
The 1960s: Markets in the Laboratory
The decisive move came from Vernon Smith, then at Purdue. In a series of papers beginning in 1962, Smith ran experimental markets with student subjects trading a fictitious commodity under rules borrowed from real exchanges—double auctions, in which both buyers and sellers call out bids and offers. The question was whether the competitive equilibrium price that theory predicts would emerge even when traders had no idea of the underlying supply and demand1. It did, and remarkably quickly. Smith's finding was that market institutions could aggregate dispersed private information into efficient prices, a result that supported Friedrich Hayek's intuition about markets as information processors but gave it experimental teeth.
Smith's work founded what became known as market institution experiments: the systematic comparison of trading rules—double auction, posted offer, sealed bid—and how each performs under different information conditions. The design principle that made this possible was induced value theory, articulated by Smith in 1976. The idea is that an experimenter can make a laboratory commodity mean whatever she wants by paying subjects a reward that depends on their performance: if a subject earns more by buying low and selling high, she will behave as if she valued the good accordingly. Induced values let the experimenter control preferences, which is exactly what field data never allow. The theory rests on assumptions—nonsatiation (subjects prefer more money), salience (rewards depend on the decisions in question), and dominance (the reward outweighs other motives)—and much later methodological debate concerned when these assumptions fail.
Auctions and the Theory-Experiment Dialogue
In the late 1970s and 1980s, experimental work turned to auctions, where theory made sharp predictions and real stakes were large. The motivation was practical: governments were auctioning radio spectrum, timber and oil leases, and the design of auction rules mattered enormously. Experiments compared auction formats—English (ascending open outcry), Dutch (descending clock), first-price sealed bid, second-price sealed bid—and tested the "revenue equivalence" theorem, which says certain formats should yield the same expected revenue5. They often did not, and the deviations were informative: bidders in first-price auctions tended to overbid relative to the risk-neutral prediction, a pattern consistent with risk aversion. This work fed directly into the design of real auctions, most famously the US spectrum auctions of the 1990s, where experimenters tested proposed rules before they were adopted.
Behavioral Decision Experiments and Prospect Theory
Meanwhile the psychology of choice was being transformed. In 1979 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published prospect theory, which described how people actually evaluate risky prospects: they weigh losses more heavily than equivalent gains (loss aversion), they evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point rather than absolute wealth, and they distort probabilities—overweighting small ones and underweighting moderate and large ones. Prospect theory was built partly on laboratory choice experiments, and it in turn generated a large experimental literature testing its predictions. The classic demonstration is the endowment effect: people demand more to give up a mug they own than they would pay to acquire an identical one, a gap that standard theory cannot explain because ownership should not change valuation6. Experimental economists adopted these methods and, in the 1980s and 1990s, increasingly ran their own decision experiments to test whether the patterns held under real monetary incentives—a question that mattered because psychologists often paid flat fees rather than performance-based rewards.
Social Preferences: The Other-Regarding Turn
Through the 1980s, the experimental literature had largely confirmed that markets worked and that individual choice was imperfect. A third strand asked whether people cared only about their own payoffs. The ultimatum game, introduced by Werner Güth and colleagues in 1982, was the catalyst: one player proposes a split of a sum, the other can accept or reject, and rejection leaves both with nothing. A purely self-interested responder should accept any positive offer, and a self-interested proposer should offer the smallest possible amount. In experiments, proposers typically offered around 40–50 percent, and responders frequently rejected low offers at cost to themselves. The dictator game, developed by Kahneman, Jack Knetsch and Richard Thaler in 1986, removed the responder's power and still found substantial giving.
These results launched the study of social preferences—the ways people care about others' outcomes, not just their own1. The theoretical response came in the 1990s: Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt's inequity aversion model (1999) and Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin's model of reciprocity (2002) formalized the idea that people dislike unequal outcomes and reward kindness with kindness. The experimental literature also documented conditional cooperation: in public-goods games, where players contribute to a shared pool, many people contribute substantially but reduce contributions when others free-ride. The finding that punishment of free-riders is common—and that people will pay to punish even at cost to themselves—became a major theme, extended by cross-cultural field experiments such as the fifteen-society study led by Joseph Henrich and colleagues, published in Science in 2001, which found that fairness norms varied systematically with market integration and cooperation in everyday life.
Experimental Asset Markets and Bubbles
Smith, together with Gerry Suchanek and Arlington Williams, published in 1988 a study of experimental asset markets that became a landmark7. Subjects traded a risky asset with a known finite life and known dividend distribution, so the fundamental value of the asset was computable. Standard theory predicted prices near fundamental value. Instead, prices often rose far above it and then crashed—bubbles and crashes in the laboratory. The result was striking because it showed that mispricing could arise from the trading institution and the traders' psychology rather than from any real-world complexity. Subsequent work explored what reduced bubbles: experience, short-selling, futures markets, and the presence of traders who had seen bubbles before. This line of research connected experimental economics to behavioral finance and gave regulators a laboratory for studying market instability.
Methodology, Incentives and Replication
As the field grew, so did methodological self-scrutiny. The 1970s and 1980s saw debate over whether student subjects were representative, whether hypothetical choices were valid, and how to avoid experimenter demand effects—subjects behaving as they think the experimenter wants. The induced-value framework was the field's answer to the incentive problem, and the standard practice became paying subjects according to performance. In the 1990s and 2000s, the field codified its practices: pre-registration of designs, reporting of all conditions, and attention to replication. A notable episode was the replication crisis that swept psychology and, to a lesser degree, economics in the 2010s; experimental economists responded with large-scale replication projects, such as the Many Labs efforts, and with greater emphasis on statistical power and transparency. The debate over whether laboratory results generalize to the field—"external validity"—became a central methodological question1.
Field Experiments
The most consequential methodological development of the 2000s was the rise of field experiments: randomized controlled trials conducted in real settings with real stakes. The approach drew on development economics, where researchers such as Esther Duflo and Abhijit Banerjee tested interventions—deworming, microfinance, teacher incentives—with randomization. In behavioral economics, field experiments tested whether laboratory findings held outside the lab: do people save more when reminded, do they respond to default options, does loss aversion shape labor supply? The 2019 Nobel Prize to Banerjee, Duflo and Michael Kremer recognized the field-experiment method's rise. Field experiments blurred the boundary between experimental economics and applied microeconomics, and they raised new questions about ethics, consent and the limits of what randomization can identify.
Online and Digital Laboratories
The final turn was technological. From the 2000s onward, researchers began running experiments over the internet, first through custom platforms and then through large online labor markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, launched in 2005, and later Prolific. Online laboratories made it cheap to recruit large, diverse samples and to run studies quickly, and they enabled cross-cultural comparisons at scale. The trade-off was control: researchers could not monitor subjects, and the representativeness of online pools became a subject of study in itself. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 accelerated the shift, as in-person laboratories closed and online experiments became the default. Today, many experimental economists run hybrid programmes, combining laboratory, field and online designs.
The Present
Experimental economics today is a mature subfield with its own journals, its own methodological standards and its own Nobel laureates—Smith and Kahneman shared the 2002 prize, and Thaler won in 2017. Its main approaches descend directly from the history above: market and auction experiments test institutional design; game experiments test equilibrium and social preferences; decision experiments test prospect theory and its successors; field experiments test external validity; and online platforms extend all of these1. The open questions are methodological and substantive: when do laboratory results generalize, how should experiments handle subject pools that are not representative, and what do the persistent deviations from standard theory imply for policy1. The field's founding insight—that controlled observation can discipline economic theory—remains its organizing principle.
References
- Experimental economics (introduction, Market games, Social preferences, Critiques, Experimental topics), Wikipedia
- Allais paradox (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Ellsberg paradox, Wikipedia
- Game theory, Wikipedia
- All-pay auction, Wikipedia
- Endowment effect, Wikipedia
- Experimental finance (History), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Experimental Economics
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1950-Present
Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Testing
Do people play equilibrium strategies in games?
- 1962-Present
- 1976-Present
- 1979-Present
- 1979-Present
Behavioral Decision Experiments
How do people actually choose under risk?
- 1988-Present
Experimental Asset Markets
Why do asset prices deviate from fundamentals?
- 2000-Present
- 2005-Present
- 2010-Present
Replication and Methodological Self-Scrutiny
Are experimental results reproducible?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Induced Value Theory grew out of Market Institution Experiments
Induced value theory was articulated by Vernon Smith as the methodological principle that made market institution experiments possible: by paying subjects according to performance, the experimenter can control preferences and make the laboratory commodity mean what the experiment requires.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Experimental Asset Markets grew out of Market Institution Experiments
Experimental asset markets were a direct extension of Vernon Smith's market institution experiments, applying the same double auction trading rules to a risky asset with known dividend distribution. The 1988 bubble study by Smith, Suchanek and Williams built on the earlier market design.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith; Gerry Suchanek; Arlington Williams.
Auction Experiments grew out of Market Institution Experiments
Auction experiments grew out of the market institution tradition, applying the same controlled trading environment to compare auction formats and test revenue equivalence. The double auction and other market mechanisms studied by Smith were the direct precursors.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Auction Experiments influenced by Induced Value Theory
Induced value theory provided the incentive-compatible payment methods that auction experiments relied on to make bidders' valuations salient and dominant. Without controlled induced values, auction tests of revenue equivalence would not have been credible.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Experimental Asset Markets influenced by Induced Value Theory
Induced value theory supplied the method for controlling asset values and dividends in experimental asset markets, making fundamental value computable and salient to traders. The bubble experiments relied on induced values to ensure that mispricing was not an artifact of uncontrolled preferences.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Field experiment influenced by Market Institution Experiments
Field experiments adopted the controlled market and incentive designs of laboratory market experiments, applying them to real-world settings. The methodological toolkit of induced values and market institutions was transferred to natural environments.
Field experiment influenced by Behavioral Decision Experiments
Field experiments in behavioral economics carried decision-making questions from the laboratory into natural settings, testing whether biases like loss aversion hold outside the lab. The experimental designs and hypotheses came from behavioral decision experiments.
Replication and Methodological Self-Scrutiny influenced by Behavioral Decision Experiments
Replication and methodological self-scrutiny in experimental economics grew partly from concerns about the robustness of behavioral decision findings, such as priming and anchoring effects. The replication movement tested whether classic behavioral results held under scrutiny.
Replication and Methodological Self-Scrutiny influenced by Social preferences
Replication efforts in experimental economics targeted social preference findings like the ultimatum game and dictator game, checking whether results held across settings. This scrutiny was part of the broader methodological self-examination.
Beyond the field
Where Experimental Economics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 53 links.
Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Testing influenced by Game Theory in Microeconomics
Experimental game theory took von Neumann and Morgenstern's equilibrium solution concepts as the hypotheses to be tested in the laboratory. The Melvin Dresher and Merrill Flood prisoner's dilemma experiment at RAND in 1950 tested the game-theoretic prediction of mutual defection and found cooperation instead.
Carried by John von Neumann; Oskar Morgenstern; Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944).
Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Testing influenced by Game Theory in Neoclassical Economics
The Nash equilibrium concept from neoclassical game theory supplied the predictions that laboratory experiments were designed to check. Experimental game theory's central question, whether subjects play equilibrium, is defined against this body of theory.
Carried by John Nash; John von Neumann; Oskar Morgenstern.
Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Testing influenced by Game Theory in Applied Mathematics
The mathematical formulation of games and equilibria developed in applied mathematics provided the formal models that experimentalists then put to laboratory test. Experimental game theory's hypotheses are stated in this mathematical vocabulary.
Carried by John von Neumann; Oskar Morgenstern; Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944).
Market Institution Experiments influenced Empirical Market Design in Market Design
Empirical market design grew out of experimental market-institution research, using laboratory trading experiments to test and refine market rules.
Carried by Vernon Smith.
Auction Experiments influenced by Auction Theory in Market Design
Laboratory auction experiments were built to test the predictions of auction theory, especially the revenue-equivalence and bidding-strategy results. The experimental designs varied auction formats precisely to check whether theoretical predictions held with real bidders.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Behavioral Decision Experiments influenced Behavioral Consumer Theory in Consumer Theory
Behavioral decision experiments, notably Kahneman and Tversky's work on heuristics and framing, supplied the empirical findings that behavioral consumer theory built on to explain deviations from standard consumer choice.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Behavioral Decision Experiments influenced Experimental and Behavioral Governance in Political Economy Of Development
Behavioural governance takes its core findings and experimental paradigm from the behavioural decision research launched by Kahneman and Tversky, applying heuristics, framing and bias to citizen and official behaviour. The later field is a direct application of that psychology.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Social preferences influenced by Behavioral Game Theory in Game Theory
Behavioral game theory supplied the experimental games, especially the ultimatum and dictator games, in which social preferences were first measured. The social-preference models were built to explain the deviations from equilibrium play these games revealed.
Carried by Werner Güth; Richard Thaler.
Social preferences led to Inequity Aversion in Social Preferences
Inequity aversion was proposed as a formal model of the social preferences documented in experiments, fitting distributional concerns into utility functions over relative payoffs.
Carried by Ernst Fehr; Klaus M. Schmidt.
Experimental Asset Markets grew out of Experimental Economics Methodology in Behavioral Game Theory
Experimental asset markets grew directly out of the laboratory methodology developed by experimental economists such as Vernon Smith, who applied the induced-value and market-institution techniques of experimental economics to securities trading. The double-auction and call-market procedures refined in the 1960s-70s methodology were carried into the asset-market bubble experiments of the 1980s.
Carried by Vernon L. Smith.
Replication and Methodological Self-Scrutiny grew out of Experimental Economics Methodology in Behavioral Game Theory
The replication and methodological self-scrutiny movement in experimental economics grew directly out of the discipline's own laboratory methodology, turning its standards of control and incentive compatibility onto the reproducibility of its findings. The norms of experimental economics methodology were the base from which replication audits and pre-registration arose.
Game-Theoretic Equilibrium Testing influenced Cross-cultural experimental economics in Behavioral Game Theory
Cross-cultural experimental economics carried the laboratory game methodology of equilibrium testing into field settings, using the same bargaining and public-goods games. The experimental protocols and the practice of comparing behaviour to game-theoretic benchmarks came from that tradition.
Carried by Joseph Henrich.

Experimental Economics is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Experimental EconomicsRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Behavioral Game Theory 5 links
- Market Design 4 links
- Social Preferences 3 links
- Neoclassical Economics 3 links
- Personnel Economics 3 links
- Consumer Behavior 3 links
- Behavioral Business Ethics 2 links
- Education Economics 2 links
- Resource Economics 2 links
- Market Microstructure 2 links
- Marketing Research 2 links
- Game Theory 1 link
More in Behavioral Economics
- Behavioral Decision Theory
- Behavioral Economics
- Behavioral Game Theory
- Neuroeconomics
- Social Preferences
See where Experimental Economics sits on the Map of Human Knowledge