Keynesian Economics
Keynesian economics is the body of theory and policy that grew out of John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) and the attempts to make sense of it.
7 frameworks, from 1948 to today · History Of Economic Thought · Economics
Overview
Keynesian economics is the body of theory and policy that grew out of John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) and the attempts to make sense of it123. Its central claim is that a market economy can settle at a level of output well below full employment, and stay there, because total spending—aggregate demand—can be too low, and because wages and prices do not adjust quickly enough to fix the problem by themselves1. That claim inverted the classical presumption that economies naturally return to full employment and gave governments a rationale for managing demand1. The history of Keynesian economics is the history of how that idea was formalized, fought over, absorbed into the mainstream, pronounced dead, and rebuilt.
The problem Keynes set out to solve
Before 1936, the dominant view—descending from Adam Smith and David Ricardo through Alfred Marshall and Arthur Pigou—held that unemployment was largely frictional or caused by wages being held too high. Say's Law, the proposition that supply creates its own demand, implied that producing goods generated the income to buy them, so a general glut was impossible1. Saving was thought to flow automatically into investment through the interest rate1.
The Great Depression broke this picture1. Unemployment in the United States reached roughly a quarter of the workforce by 1933, and in Britain it stayed above 10 percent through the 1920s and 1930s. Falling wages did not restore employment; the slump deepened. Keynes, a Cambridge economist who had made his name with The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) and the Treatise on Money (1930), argued that the classical adjustment mechanism failed because the interest rate did not equate saving and investment, and because wage cuts reduced spending as well as costs.
The General Theory and its core ideas
The General Theory introduced a set of concepts that reoriented macroeconomics4. Aggregate demand is total planned spending by households, firms, and government5. The multiplier is the idea that an initial increase in spending produces a larger total increase in income, because recipients spend part of it and pass income on; Keynes credited the multiplier arithmetic to his Cambridge colleague Richard Kahn, who had worked it out in 1931. Liquidity preference is the demand to hold money rather than bonds, which helps determine the interest rate1. The marginal efficiency of capital is the expected return on new investment, which depends on volatile expectations and can collapse in a slump1.
The practical upshot was that investment, driven by "animal spirits"—investors' confidence—could fall short of what was needed to absorb full-employment saving, and no automatic mechanism would pull it back16. Government spending could fill the gap1. Keynes's How to Pay for the War (1940) applied the framework to wartime finance, and his role in designing the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944 carried the approach into international economic governance.
The neoclassical synthesis
Keynes's book was written in prose and resisted formalization1. The next generation translated it into equations3. John Hicks's 1937 paper offered the IS–LM model—a diagram in which the goods market (investment equals saving, IS) and the money market (liquidity preference equals money supply, LM) jointly determine output and the interest rate17. This made Keynes's argument teachable and comparable with classical theory, but it also narrowed it: the model treated the economy as settling at an equilibrium, and it pushed expectations and uncertainty into the background1.
The neoclassical synthesis, the label for the postwar mainstream associated above all with Paul Samuelson's Economics (1948 onward), combined this Keynesian macroeconomics with neoclassical microeconomics3. The synthesis held that markets allocate resources efficiently in the long run, while Keynesian demand management was needed in the short run to keep output near potential3. This became the orthodoxy of the 1950s and 1960s, embodied in the Phillips curve trade-off between inflation and unemployment that A. W. Phillips described in 1958: policymakers believed they could choose a point on the curve, accepting somewhat higher inflation for lower unemployment.
The monetarist challenge
Milton Friedman's monetarism attacked the synthesis on two fronts8. First, Friedman and Anna Schwartz's A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (1963) argued that the Great Depression was caused not by a failure of private spending but by the Federal Reserve allowing the money supply to contract—so the remedy was monetary, not fiscal. Second, Friedman's 1968 presidential address to the American Economic Association introduced the natural rate of unemployment: there is a level of unemployment consistent with stable inflation, and attempts to push below it only generate accelerating inflation as expectations adjust. The Phillips curve, on this view, was not a stable menu9.
The stagflation of the 1970s—high inflation and high unemployment together—seemed to confirm the monetarist critique and discredit simple demand management110. Central banks shifted toward targeting monetary aggregates, though the practical results of money-supply targeting in the late 1970s and early 1980s were uneven, and most abandoned it.
New classical macroeconomics
Robert Lucas and others pushed further111. New classical macroeconomics combined the natural-rate idea with rational expectations—the assumption that people form forecasts using all available information and do not make systematic errors1012. Lucas's 1976 critique argued that econometric models built on historical relationships would fail when policy changed, because the relationships themselves depended on the policy regime. If expectations are rational and prices flexible, anticipated policy has no real effect; only surprise policy does12. This made systematic demand management seem futile and shifted the discipline toward micro-founded models built on optimizing individuals1.
New Keynesian economics
The new classical challenge forced Keynesians to rebuild13. New Keynesian economics, developed from the late 1970s and 1980s by economists including Stanley Fischer, John Taylor, Guillermo Calvo, and later Michael Woodford, accepted rational expectations and microfoundations but argued that prices and wages are sticky—they do not adjust instantly. The sources of stickiness were modeled explicitly: menu costs (the cost of changing prices), staggered contracts (Taylor's overlapping wage contracts, Calvo's random price adjustment), and imperfect competition14. With sticky prices, monetary policy has real short-run effects even when anticipated, which rescued a Keynesian role for stabilization within a rigorous framework1315.
The result was a convergence: the New Neoclassical Synthesis or "new consensus" model of the 1990s and 2000s, in which a central bank sets interest rates according to a rule (Taylor's 1993 rule being the canonical example) to target inflation, with output determined by demand and sticky prices. This framework guided central banking through the "Great Moderation."1
Post Keynesian and other heterodox strands
Not everyone accepted the synthesis. Post Keynesian economics, associated with Joan Robinson, Nicholas Kaldor, Michał Kalecki, and later Hyman Minsky, argued that the mainstream had stripped out what was radical in Keynes: fundamental uncertainty, the role of money and finance, and the possibility of persistent disequilibrium. Kalecki had independently developed a theory of effective demand and mark-up pricing. Minsky's financial instability hypothesis held that stability breeds fragility, as firms and banks take on more debt during good times—an idea that returned to prominence after the 2008 crisis16. Post Keynesians also developed growth models (the Kaleckian and Kaldorian traditions) and, more recently, Modern Monetary Theory, which argues that a sovereign currency issuer is not financially constrained in the way households are. These strands remain outside the mainstream but have influenced policy debate.
The crisis and after
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent recession tested the consensus1. Central banks cut interest rates to near zero and turned to quantitative easing—large-scale asset purchases—when conventional policy ran out. Governments ran large fiscal deficits. The episode revived Keynesian arguments about the limits of monetary policy and the need for fiscal stimulus, and it revived interest in Minsky116. At the same time, the crisis exposed gaps: mainstream models had largely assumed away the financial sector and had little to say about balance sheets and banking panics.
Today the mainstream inherits the New Keynesian framework but has widened it13. DSGE models (dynamic stochastic general equilibrium) now routinely include financial frictions, heterogeneous agents, and occasionally bounded rationality. The zero lower bound on interest rates, the effectiveness of quantitative easing, the fiscal multiplier's size in different conditions, and the sources of the post-2008 productivity slowdown remain open questions. The older debates—how sticky prices really are, whether expectations are truly rational, how much uncertainty matters—are still live, and the post-Keynesian critique of the mainstream's treatment of money and finance has not been fully answered.
References
- Keynesian economics (introduction, Development of The General Theory, Keynes and classical economics, Aggregate demand, Liquidity preference, Saving and investment, The General Theory, The IS–LM model, Postwar Keynesianism, New classical, Monetarism), Wikipedia
- Macroeconomics, Wikipedia
- Neoclassical synthesis (introduction, Development), Wikipedia
- The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Wikipedia
- Aggregate demand, Wikipedia
- Animal spirits (Keynes), Wikipedia
- IS–LM model, Wikipedia
- Monetarism, Wikipedia
- Phillips curve, Wikipedia
- New classical macroeconomics (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- History of macroeconomic thought, Wikipedia
- Rational expectations (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- New Keynesian economics, Wikipedia
- Menu cost (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Nominal rigidity, Wikipedia
- Hyman Minsky (Financial instability hypothesis), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Keynesian Economics
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1948-1975
Neoclassical Synthesis
How can demand management keep output near potential?
- 1950-Present
Post Keynesian Economics
Why does uncertainty make the economy unstable?
- 1963-1985
- 1972-1990
New Classical Macroeconomics
Do anticipated policies affect real output?
- 1980-Present
New Keynesian Economics
Why do prices and wages adjust slowly?
About New Keynesian Economics
New Keynesian economics emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s as a direct response to the new classical macroeconomics challenge. Its central question was: can Keynesian conclusions about involuntary unemployment and the real effects of monetary policy be derived from models that respect rational expectations and explicit microeconomic foundations? The answer was a qualified yes, achieved by introducing two key frictions—nominal rigidities and imperfect competition—into otherwise neoclassical general-equilibrium frameworks. This made New Keynesian economics distinct from both the older Neoclassical Synthesis, which had treated sticky wages as a convenient assumption, and from Post-Keynesian economics, which rejected the microfoundations project altogether. The framework became the dominant mainstream approach from the 1980s onward, eventually merging with New Classical elements into the New Neoclassical Synthesis.A first course in New Keynesian economics typically builds around these core concepts in logical order:- Microfoundations – The insistence that macroeconomic models must be derived from optimizing behavior of households and firms, a direct response to the Lucas critique.
- Rational Expectations – Adopted from New Classical economics, the assumption that agents form expectations consistent with the model's predictions, but now combined with frictions that prevent immediate market clearing.
- Nominal Rigidities – The central friction: prices and wages do not adjust instantly to shocks. This includes sticky prices (firms change prices infrequently) and sticky wages (wage contracts are fixed for periods).
- Imperfect Competition – Firms have market power, so they set prices above marginal cost, creating a wedge that makes price adjustment costly and strategic.
- Menu Costs – Small costs of changing prices (e.g., printing new menus) that can lead to large aggregate non-neutralities of money.
- Real Rigidities – Factors that make firms reluctant to change prices even when menu costs are small, such as firm-specific capital, customer markets, or efficiency wages.
- Efficiency Wages – A theory of wage rigidity: firms pay above-market-clearing wages to boost productivity, reduce turnover, or elicit effort, creating involuntary unemployment.
- Monetary Non-Neutrality – The key result: because of nominal rigidities, changes in the money supply affect real output and employment in the short run, even under rational expectations.
- Coordination Failures – The idea that multiple equilibria can exist because agents' actions are strategic complements; a demand shortfall can be self-fulfilling.
- New Keynesian Phillips Curve – A forward-looking relation between inflation and output (or unemployment), derived from optimizing firms' price-setting behavior under sticky prices.
- Policy Implications – Active monetary policy can stabilize output, but the framework also highlights the importance of credibility and time consistency, borrowing from New Classical insights.
A representative exemplar is the Calvo pricing model (1983), where each firm has a constant probability of being able to change its price each period, generating a simple, tractable form of sticky prices that became the workhorse of New Keynesian DSGE models.The intellectual history of New Keynesian economics begins with the crisis of the Neoclassical Synthesis in the 1970s. The stagflation of the 1970s and the Lucas critique (1976) undermined the old Keynesian models that lacked microfoundations. New Classical macroeconomics, led by Robert Lucas, Thomas Sargent, and Robert Barro, argued that if agents have rational expectations and markets clear continuously, systematic monetary policy has no real effects (the policy ineffectiveness proposition). This posed a fundamental challenge: either abandon Keynesian economics or rebuild it on solid microfoundations.The New Keynesian response coalesced in the late 1970s and 1980s. Key figures include:- Stanley Fischer (1977) and Edmund Phelps (with John Taylor, 1977) showed that long-term nominal wage contracts could generate monetary non-neutrality even under rational expectations.
- John B. Taylor (1979, 1980) developed staggered wage and price contracting models, showing that overlapping contracts produce persistent real effects of monetary shocks.
- Olivier Blanchard and Nobuhiro Kiyotaki (1987) integrated imperfect competition and aggregate demand externalities, showing how small menu costs can lead to large welfare losses.
- George Akerlof and Janet Yellen (1985) developed the near-rationality approach, arguing that small deviations from full optimization (e.g., menu costs) can have large macroeconomic consequences.
- Joseph Stiglitz and Bruce Greenwald (1980s) emphasized credit market imperfections and efficiency wages as sources of real rigidities.
- N. Gregory Mankiw (1985) provided a clear, influential exposition of the menu cost argument in a simple model.
- David Romer (1990s) synthesized and extended New Keynesian ideas, particularly on real rigidities.
Seminal works include:- Fischer (1977), "Long-Term Contracts, Rational Expectations, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule"
- Taylor (1979), "Staggered Wage Setting in a Macro Model"
- Akerlof and Yellen (1985), "A Near-Rational Model of the Business Cycle, with Wage and Price Inertia"
- Mankiw (1985), "Small Menu Costs and Large Business Cycles: A Macroeconomic Model of Monopoly"
- Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand"
- The collected volume New Keynesian Economics (1991), edited by Mankiw and Romer, which codified the field.
By the 1990s, New Keynesian economics had largely absorbed the New Classical emphasis on microfoundations and rational expectations, while retaining Keynesian conclusions about non-neutrality. This synthesis, sometimes called the New Neoclassical Synthesis, became the basis for modern DSGE models used by central banks. The framework coexists with Post-Keynesian economics, which rejects its neoclassical core, and with New Classical economics, which remains influential in areas like fiscal policy and growth theory.The 13 concepts its tower teaches
- Coordination Failures
- Efficiency Wages
- Imperfect Competition
- Menu Costs
- Microfoundations
- Monetary Non-Neutrality
- New Keynesian Phillips Curve
- Nominal Rigidities
- Policy Implications
- Rational Expectations
- Real Rigidities
- Sticky Prices
- Sticky Wages
- 1990-Present
- 1993-2008
New Neoclassical Synthesis
How should a central bank set interest rates?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Post Keynesian Economics reacted against Neoclassical Synthesis
Post Keynesians such as Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor defined themselves against the IS–LM formalization and the Samuelson synthesis, arguing these had stripped out Keynes's fundamental uncertainty and the role of money. Their alternative growth and distribution models were built as a rejection of the synthesis's equilibrium method.
Carried by Joan Robinson; Nicholas Kaldor; Michał Kalecki.
Monetarism reacted against Neoclassical Synthesis
Friedman's monetarism attacked the synthesis's Phillips curve trade-off and its fiscal emphasis, arguing from the Monetary History (1963) that money supply, not spending, drove the Depression. The natural-rate address of 1968 directly rejected the synthesis's assumption of a stable inflation-unemployment menu.
Carried by Milton Friedman; A Monetary History of the United States (1963).
New Classical Macroeconomics grew out of Monetarism
New classical macroeconomics took the natural-rate hypothesis from monetarism and combined it with rational expectations, extending Friedman's point that anticipated policy cannot hold unemployment below its natural rate. Lucas's policy-ineffectiveness results generalize the monetarist critique of the Phillips curve.
Carried by Robert Lucas.
New Keynesian Economics reacted against New Classical Macroeconomics
New Keynesians accepted rational expectations and microfoundations from the new classical school but rejected its flexible-price conclusion, modeling explicit sources of price and wage stickiness. Fischer, Taylor and Calvo built overlapping-contract and menu-cost models to show anticipated monetary policy has real effects.
Carried by Stanley Fischer; John Taylor; Guillermo Calvo.
New Neoclassical Synthesis grew out of New Classical Macroeconomics
The New Neoclassical Synthesis combined new classical microfoundations and rational expectations with sticky-price New Keynesian elements into a single consensus model. The Taylor rule of 1993 and the resulting inflation-targeting framework grew directly out of this convergence.
Carried by John Taylor; Michael Woodford.
New Neoclassical Synthesis grew out of New Keynesian Economics
The new consensus model of the 1990s built the New Keynesian sticky-price framework into a full DSGE system with an interest-rate rule, making it the working model of central banks. The Taylor rule and Calvo pricing carried over as its core components.
Carried by John Taylor; Guillermo Calvo; Michael Woodford.
New Classical Macroeconomics reacted against Neoclassical Synthesis
Lucas's 1976 critique was aimed at the large-scale econometric models of the neoclassical synthesis, arguing their estimated relationships would break down under policy change. New classical models were built as a micro-founded replacement for the synthesis's structural macroeconometrics.
Carried by Robert Lucas.
New Keynesian Economics grew out of Neoclassical Synthesis
New Keynesian economics revived the synthesis's core claim that demand management can stabilize output, rebuilding it on microfoundations and sticky prices rather than the IS–LM apparatus. The Keynesian role for stabilization passed from the synthesis into the new framework.
Carried by John Taylor; Michael Woodford.
Modern Monetary Theory grew out of Post Keynesian Economics
Modern Monetary Theory grew out of the post Keynesian tradition, extending its chartalist and endogenous-money arguments about a sovereign currency issuer's lack of financial constraint. It shares the post Keynesian rejection of mainstream fiscal orthodoxy.
Carried by Hyman Minsky; Warren Mosler.
New Keynesian Economics influenced by Monetarism
New Keynesians absorbed the monetarist and natural-rate point that there is no permanent inflation-unemployment trade-off, so their models treat monetary policy as affecting output only through stickiness. The emphasis on monetary rather than fiscal policy as the main stabilizer carried over from monetarism.
Carried by Milton Friedman.
Modern Monetary Theory reacted against Neoclassical Synthesis
Modern Monetary Theory defined itself against the mainstream synthesis view that governments face the same budget constraint as households, arguing a sovereign issuer does not. This is a rejection of the synthesis's fiscal orthodoxy rather than a borrowing from it.
Carried by Warren Mosler.
Beyond the field
Where Keynesian Economics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 65 links.
Neoclassical Synthesis provoked New Classical Macroeconomics in Neoclassical Economics
New classical macroeconomics was framed as a rejection of the neoclassical synthesis's Keynesian policy framework, replacing it with market-clearing equilibrium models.
Carried by Robert Lucas.
Neoclassical Synthesis provoked New Classical Macroeconomics in History Of Economic Thought
The new classical school was framed as a rejection of the Keynesian-derived neoclassical synthesis, especially its assumption of exploitable inflation-unemployment trade-offs.
Carried by Robert Lucas; Thomas Sargent.
Neoclassical Synthesis grew out of Keynesian Economics in History Of Economic Thought
The neoclassical synthesis was built directly out of Keynes's General Theory, with Hicks's 1937 IS-LM formalisation and Samuelson's textbook presentation recasting Keynesian conclusions in neoclassical general-equilibrium terms.
Carried by John Hicks; Paul Samuelson; The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).
Neoclassical Synthesis grew out of Neoclassical Economics in History Of Economic Thought
The synthesis was constructed by reattaching Keynesian macroeconomics to the neoclassical marginalist core of Marshall, Walras and their successors, so the later framework grew out of neoclassical economics as its macro extension.
Carried by John Hicks; Paul Samuelson.
Neoclassical Synthesis grew out of Keynesian economics in Macroeconomics
The synthesis was the postwar macroeconomics that grew out of Keynes's General Theory, translating its aggregate-demand framework into the IS-LM model and neoclassical textbook macro.
Carried by John Hicks; Alvin Hansen; Paul Samuelson.
Neoclassical Synthesis provoked New Classical Macroeconomics in Business Cycle Theory
New classical macroeconomics arose as a rejection of the synthesis's Keynesian component, denying that systematic monetary and fiscal policy can stabilise output when expectations are rational.
Carried by Robert Lucas; Thomas Sargent; Neil Wallace.
Post Keynesian Economics led to Minsky's financial instability hypothesis in Post Keynesian Economics
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis was developed within and as a contribution to post Keynesian economics, drawing on Keynes's treatment of uncertainty and finance and on Kalecki's profits analysis. It became one of the school's central theoretical pillars.
Carried by Hyman Minsky.
Post Keynesian Economics grew out of Keynesian Economics in History Of Economic Thought
Post Keynesian economics grew out of Keynes's General Theory, with Joan Robinson, Kaldor and others developing its fundamental uncertainty, effective demand and non-ergodic expectations against the neoclassical synthesis.
Carried by Joan Robinson; The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).
Post Keynesian Economics reacted against Neoclassical Synthesis in Neoclassical Economics
Post Keynesian economics defined itself largely by rejecting the neoclassical synthesis's IS-LM reduction of Keynes, insisting on uncertainty and non-neutral money against the synthesis's equilibrium macro.
Carried by Joan Robinson; G. L. S. Shackle.
Post Keynesian Economics grew out of Keynesian economics in Macroeconomics
Post Keynesian macroeconomics is a direct descendant of Keynesian macroeconomics, keeping effective demand and liquidity preference while rejecting the neoclassical synthesis's equilibrium reading.
Carried by Joan Robinson; The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).
Post Keynesian Economics led to Monetary circuit theory in Post Keynesian Economics
The monetary circuit is a branch of post-Keynesian economics, developed by French and Italian writers from Keynesian and Kaleckian elements into a theory of money in a production economy. It grew directly out of the post-Keynesian project.
Carried by Alain Parguez; Bernard Schmitt.
Post Keynesian Economics led to Kaleckian growth model in Post Keynesian Economics
The Kaleckian growth model is a branch of post-Keynesian economics, developed by Steindl, Robinson and later Kaleckians from Kalecki's mark-up and accumulation analysis. It grew directly out of the post-Keynesian growth project.
Carried by Josef Steindl; Joan Robinson.

Keynesian Economics is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 7 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Keynesian EconomicsRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- History Of Economic Thought 11 links
- Macroeconomics 10 links
- Post Keynesian Economics 9 links
- Business Cycle Theory 7 links
- Neoclassical Economics 6 links
- Expectations And Inflation 4 links
- Monetary Policy Theory 4 links
- Money And Credit Theory 4 links
- Monetary Economics 3 links
- International Finance 2 links
- Fiscal Policy Theory 2 links
- Econometrics 1 link
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