Law And Morality
Law and morality are two systems of norm that govern the same conduct, and the question of how they relate is one of the oldest problems in jurisprudence.
12 frameworks, from 400 BCE to today · Jurisprudence · Law
- Natural Law Theory 400 BCE-Present
- Classical Natural Law 1250-Present
- Legal Positivism 1830-Present
- Inner Morality of Law 1964-Present
- New natural law 1965-Present
- Exclusive Positivism 1970-Present
- Feminist Legal Theory 1970-Present
- Critical Legal Studies 1977-1995
- Law as Integrity 1977-Present
- Inclusive Positivism 1980-Present
- Procedural justice 1988-Present
- Critical Race Theory 1989-Present
Overview
Law and morality are two systems of norm that govern the same conduct, and the question of how they relate is one of the oldest problems in jurisprudence1. Does an unjust rule count as law1? Must a legal system meet some moral minimum to be a legal system at all? Should judges decide hard cases by consulting moral principle, or only the materials the law itself supplies? These questions matter because the answers change what courts do: whether a statute can be struck down for injustice, whether a constitution is read narrowly or morally, whether a person can be punished under a rule they had moral reason to reject. The history of the subfield is a history of competing answers, each built to solve a problem the previous answer could not.
Classical Natural Law: Law as Participation in Reason
The oldest sustained position holds that law is intelligible only as a command of practical reason, and that human law derives its authority from a higher order. Thomas Aquinas, writing in the thirteenth century, gave the classic formulation: a human law that conflicts with natural law is a "corruption of law" rather than law simply, though it may still be obeyed to avoid scandal or disorder. Natural law here is not a code of detailed rules but a set of first principles of practical reason — that good is to be done and evil avoided, that life, knowledge, and social order are goods — from which more specific norms are derived. The position's strength is that it explains why we criticize law from within law's own vocabulary of obligation; its weakness is the difficulty of settling what natural law requires when reasonable people disagree.
The early modern period secularized the idea. Hugo Grotius, in the early seventeenth century, argued that natural law would hold "even if we should concede that God does not exist," grounding it in human social nature rather than divine command. This move made natural law available to a Europe dividing along confessional lines and helped found international law. Later, the American and French revolutionary declarations drew on natural-rights language, though the philosophical debts were often loose.
Legal Positivism: The Separation of Law and Morals
The decisive challenge came from positivism, which holds that what counts as law depends on its source — enactment, precedent, official recognition — not on its merit12. John Austin, in the 1830s, built a command theory: law is the command of a sovereign backed by sanction. The theory was crude but clarifying, because it made the question sharp: if law is just the sovereign's command, then a wicked command is still law, and the moral objection to it is a separate matter.
H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law (1961) replaced Austin's model with a more convincing one. Hart argued that a legal system is a union of primary rules (rules of conduct) and secondary rules — rules about rules — the most important being the rule of recognition, a social practice among officials that identifies which rules count as law13. A rule is legally valid if it satisfies the criteria the officials actually use, whatever its moral quality. Hart's key example was the "gunman situation writ large": Austin's model could not distinguish a tax statute from an armed robbery, because both are commands backed by threats. The rule of recognition solved this by locating law's authority in an accepted social practice rather than in force alone1.
Hart did concede a "minimum content of natural law": any legal system that is to survive must protect persons, property, and promises to some degree, because humans are vulnerable, roughly equal, and limited in altruism. But this was a contingent fact about survival, not a moral test of validity.
The Hart–Fuller Debate and the Inner Morality of Law
Lon Fuller answered in The Morality of Law (1964) with what he called the inner morality of law: eight principles that any system of rules must satisfy to be a system of rules at all — rules must be general, public, prospective, clear, consistent, possible to obey, stable, and applied as announced. These are not moral rules about content but about the craft of governing by rules. Fuller's claim was that a system that violates them systematically fails to be law, not merely fails to be good law. His example was the Nazi legal order: Fuller argued that the regime's use of secret, retrospective, and unpredictable decrees meant it had so degraded the forms of legality that its "laws" could not be applied by post-war courts as law. Hart replied that this conflated the question of what law is with the question of what to do about it; a court could recognize a wicked rule as law and then refuse to apply it on moral grounds, which is more honest than pretending it was never law.
The debate set the terms for everything after: positivists defended the separation of validity from merit, while anti-positivists argued that legality itself carries moral weight.
Dworkin: Law as Integrity and the Moral Reading
Ronald Dworkin, from the late 1960s onward, attacked positivism from a different direction. His early target was the idea that law consists only of rules. In Taking Rights Seriously (1977) he argued that legal reasoning also uses principles and policies: standards that are not enacted but are nonetheless binding because they figure in the best justification of the legal materials. His example was Riggs v. Palmer (1889), where a New York court held that a murderer could not inherit from the will of the man he killed, though no statute said so; the court reasoned from the principle that no one should profit from his own wrong.
In Law's Empire (1986) Dworkin developed law as integrity: judges should interpret the legal record so that it is presented in its best moral light, as a coherent scheme of principle. The image was the "chain novel," in which each judge writes the next chapter, constrained by what came before but aiming at coherence. This made morality internal to law rather than external to it: a judge deciding a hard case must ask which interpretation best fits and best justifies the legal practice1. Critics objected that this gave judges too much discretion dressed as fidelity, and that "best moral light" smuggled contested moral views into adjudication.
Exclusive and Inclusive Positivism
Hart's legacy split. Exclusive positivists, most prominently Joseph Raz, hold that law's authority is necessarily exclusive: legal reasons pre-empt the reasons they replace, and a norm can be legally valid only if it is identified by its source, never by its moral merit. Raz's "sources thesis" makes this a conceptual claim about the nature of authority1. Inclusive positivists (sometimes called "soft" positivists), including Jules Coleman and Wil Waluchow, hold that a rule of recognition may itself incorporate moral criteria: a constitution might say "no cruel and unusual punishment," making moral judgment part of the test of validity. On this view, whether morality enters law is a contingent feature of particular systems, not a conceptual necessity. The debate is technical but consequential: it determines whether a judge applying a moral standard is applying law or making it.
New Natural Law Theory
A separate revival came from Germain Grisez, John Finnis, and others from the 1960s onward, known as new natural law theory4. Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980) argued that there are basic human goods — life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness, religion — that are self-evidently worthwhile, and that law's authority depends on its service to these goods and to the common good. The theory is distinctive in rejecting the derivation of moral norms from human nature as a biological fact; it grounds them in practical reason instead. It has been influential in Catholic legal thought and in critiques of liberal neutrality.
Critical Legal Studies: Law as Politics
From the late 1970s, the Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS) rejected the whole framing15. Drawing on American legal realism and continental theory, writers such as Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Duncan Kennedy, and Morton Horwitz argued that legal doctrine is indeterminate — that rules and principles do not by themselves determine outcomes — and that law serves to legitimate hierarchy while appearing neutral. Kennedy's work on the "form/content" distinction in legal reasoning showed how judges oscillate between conflicting premises (individualism versus altruism, formalism versus policy) and choose by ideological preference. CLS did not offer a theory of the relation between law and morality so much as a critique of the claim that law is a coherent moral enterprise at all. Its influence peaked in the 1980s and declined as a movement, but its methods persisted.
Feminist Legal Theory and Critical Race Theory
Two offshoots pressed the critique into specific terrain. Feminist legal theory, from the 1970s, asked how law's supposedly neutral standards encode male experience: Catharine MacKinnon's work on sexual harassment and pornography argued that law's "objective" standpoint was a male standpoint, and that formal equality could entrench substantive subordination. The field developed internal divisions — liberal, radical, and difference feminism — over whether equality means sameness or accommodation.
Critical Race Theory, from the late 1980s, grew out of CLS and the civil rights tradition. Derrick Bell's "interest convergence" thesis argued that legal gains for Black Americans came when they served white interests; Kimberlé Crenshaw's work on intersectionality showed how single-axis discrimination law missed those at the intersection of race and gender. The movement insisted that law's moral rhetoric — colorblindness, neutrality — could function as a mechanism of racial subordination rather than a remedy for it6.
Procedural Justice Theory
A more empirical strand asks not what law is but why people obey it. Procedural justice theory, associated with Tom Tyler's research from the late 1980s, found that people's willingness to accept legal decisions depends less on the outcome than on whether they perceive the process as fair — whether they were heard, treated with respect, and judged by neutral decision-makers. This reframed the law–morality relation as a psychological and sociological one: legitimacy is earned through procedure, not just content. It has been widely used in policing, courts, and regulatory design.
The Present
The field today is plural. Positivism remains the dominant analytical framework in Anglophone jurisprudence, with the exclusive–inclusive debate still active. Dworkinian interpretivism survives as a major alternative, especially in constitutional theory. Natural law persists in both its Thomist and new-natural-law forms, and has gained attention in debates over human rights and religious liberty. The critical traditions — feminist, race-critical, and postcolonial — have moved from the margins into mainstream legal scholarship, though their relationship to the analytical core remains contested. Empirical work on legitimacy and procedural justice has grown rapidly. The open questions are old ones in new dress: whether legal validity can be separated from moral merit without losing law's claim to authority; whether interpretation can be constrained without collapsing into politics; and whether the critical insight that law serves power can be reconciled with the aspiration that law also constrain it.
References
- Jurisprudence (Definition and scope, Natural law, Analytic philosophy and analytical jurisprudence, Morality and the law, Legal interpretivism, Critical legal studies), Wikipedia
- Legal positivism, Wikipedia
- The Concept of Law (Background), Wikipedia
- New natural law, Wikipedia
- Critical legal studies (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Critical race theory, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Law And Morality
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 400 BCE-Present
Natural Law Theory
Does unjust law still count as law?
About Natural Law Theory
Natural Law Theory is the oldest sustained answer to the question at the heart of jurisprudence: does a law have to be moral to be valid? Its central claim is that there is a necessary connection between law and morality—a rule that is grossly unjust is not truly law at all. This framework treats moral evaluation as part of the very definition of law, refusing to grant legal validity to any norm that fails a substantive moral test. In doing so, it sets a high bar for what counts as law and grounds legal authority in a higher moral order discoverable through reason.At the core of Natural Law Theory is the necessary connection thesis: the idea that law and morality are conceptually linked, not separate. This leads to the maxim lex iniusta non est lex—an unjust law is no law at all. The framework relies on practical reason, the human capacity to discern what is good and to act accordingly. This reasoning is guided by primary precepts (basic, universal goods such as life, knowledge, and sociability) and secondary precepts (more specific rules derived from primary precepts, such as "do not steal"). These precepts are part of a larger hierarchy: eternal law (God's rational plan for the universe), divine law (revealed in scripture), natural law (the participation of rational creatures in eternal law), and human law (positive law enacted by human authorities). The capacity to grasp natural law is called synderesis, the innate habit of knowing first principles of practical reason. Conscience applies these principles to particular situations. The ultimate aim of law and morality is the common good—the sum of conditions that allow individuals and communities to flourish. This is grounded in teleology, the idea that everything has a natural purpose or end. When actions have both good and bad effects, the double effect principle helps evaluate moral responsibility.Natural Law Theory emerged in ancient Greek philosophy, particularly with Aristotle, who argued that justice is rooted in nature rather than mere convention. The Stoics later developed a cosmopolitan vision of a universal law accessible to reason. Roman jurists and Cicero (in De Legibus) transmitted these ideas, which were then integrated into Christian theology by Augustine and later systematized by Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Aquinas's synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy with Christian doctrine became the definitive expression of natural law in the Western tradition. His Summa Theologica (c. 1274) remains the seminal work, articulating the hierarchy of laws and the role of practical reason. During the Scholastic period, natural law was central to Catholic moral theology and canon law. The framework faced a major challenge from Legal Positivism, beginning with John Austin in the nineteenth century, which argued for the separation of law and morality. In the twentieth century, natural law saw a revival through thinkers such as John Finnis, who recast it in a secular, analytical form in Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980). Today, Natural Law Theory coexists with Legal Positivism, Procedural Natural Law, and other frameworks, continuing to shape debates about legal validity, human rights, and the limits of state authority.The 14 concepts its tower teaches
- Common good
- Conscience
- Divine law
- Double effect
- Eternal law
- Human law
- Lex iniusta non est lex
- Natural law
- Necessary connection thesis
- Practical reason
- Primary precepts
- Secondary precepts
- Synderesis
- Teleology
- 1250-Present
Classical Natural Law
How does human law derive from a higher moral order?
- 1830-Present
Legal Positivism
What makes a rule legally valid?
About Legal Positivism
Legal positivism is the framework that insists on a conceptual separation between law as it is and law as it ought to be. In the law-and-morality debate, it directly challenges the natural law tradition by arguing that a rule's legal validity depends on its source—whether it was enacted by the proper authority according to established procedures—not on its moral content. This allows legal positivists to study law as a social fact, without requiring that every valid law also be just. The framework's central question is not "What makes a law moral?" but "What makes a rule legally valid?"Core CurriculumThe first course in legal positivism typically begins with the Separation Thesis, the claim that law and morality are conceptually distinct. This is the framework's signature move. From there, students learn the Command Theory, John Austin's model of law as the command of a sovereign backed by threats. Austin's theory introduces the Sovereign, the person or body whose commands are habitually obeyed and who obeys no one else, and Sanctions, the penalties that give commands their force. H. L. A. Hart later refines this into a more sophisticated account centered on Primary and Secondary Rules: primary rules impose duties, while secondary rules govern how to change, adjudicate, and identify the primary rules. The most important secondary rule is the Rule of Recognition, a social convention that officials use to determine which norms count as law. Hart also introduces the Internal Point of View, the perspective of officials who accept the rule of recognition as a standard for guiding and evaluating conduct. The Hart-Devlin Debate of the 1960s brought these ideas into sharp public focus, with Hart arguing that law need not enforce shared morality. Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law offers a different positivist path, treating law as a hierarchy of norms that ultimately rests on a Basic Norm (Grundnorm), a presupposed foundation that gives the entire system its validity. Finally, the Radbruch Formula, though developed by a critic of positivism, is often taught as a limit case: an unjust law may lose its legal character when the injustice becomes intolerable.Intellectual HistoryLegal positivism emerged in the 19th century as a direct challenge to natural law theory. Its roots lie in Thomas Hobbes's idea that law is the command of the sovereign, but the framework's canonical founder is John Austin (1790–1859), whose 1832 work The Province of Jurisprudence Determined set out the command theory in systematic form. Austin, influenced by Jeremy Bentham, argued that jurisprudence should study law as it is, not as it ought to be. This "separation thesis" became the framework's defining claim. In the early 20th century, Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) developed a more abstract version in his Pure Theory of Law (1934), purging law not only of morality but also of sociological facts. Kelsen's hierarchy of norms, capped by a basic norm, offered a rigorously formal account of legal validity. The most influential 20th-century positivist was H. L. A. Hart (1907–1992), whose The Concept of Law (1961) replaced Austin's command model with the idea of law as a union of primary and secondary rules. Hart's rule of recognition grounded legal validity in social practices, not sovereign commands. The Hart-Devlin debate of the 1960s, sparked by the Wolfenden Report's recommendation to decriminalize homosexuality, became a landmark clash between positivism and natural law. Later figures such as Joseph Raz (1939–2022) refined the framework further, but the core curriculum remains anchored in Austin, Kelsen, and Hart. Legal positivism coexists with later frameworks such as procedural natural law and critical legal studies, but its insistence on the separation of law and morality continues to define the terms of debate in jurisprudence.The 11 concepts its tower teaches
- Basic Norm (Grundnorm)
- Command Theory
- Hart-Devlin Debate
- Internal Point of View
- Primary and Secondary Rules
- Pure Theory of Law
- Radbruch Formula
- Rule of Recognition
- Sanctions
- Separation Thesis
- Sovereign
- 1964-Present
- 1965-Present
- 1970-Present
- 1970-Present
Feminist Legal Theory
How does law reflect and reinforce gender hierarchy?
- 1977-1995
Critical Legal Studies
Is legal doctrine determinate or political?
About Critical Legal Studies
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) emerged in the late 1970s as a radical challenge to the dominant frameworks of jurisprudence, particularly Legal Positivism and Natural Law Theory. While those traditions debated whether law's validity depends on moral content or social facts, CLS argued that both sides missed a deeper point: law is fundamentally a tool of political power, shaped by and reinforcing the interests of dominant groups. For CLS, the question is not whether a law is moral or properly enacted, but whose interests it serves and how it masks its own political character. This framework draws on Marxism, the Frankfurt School, and Legal Realism to expose the ways liberal legal systems—despite their promises of neutrality, equality, and rights—perpetuate hierarchy, inequality, and injustice.At the heart of a first course in Critical Legal Studies are several interconnected concepts that form its analytical toolkit. The curriculum typically begins with Law as Politics, the foundational claim that law is not an autonomous, neutral system but an expression of political struggle and power. This leads to the Indeterminacy Thesis: legal rules and doctrines do not dictate unique outcomes; they are sufficiently vague or contradictory that judges can justify almost any result, revealing that legal reasoning is a cover for political choice. CLS practitioners then engage in Trashing—a method of deconstructing legal arguments to expose their hidden assumptions, contradictions, and political biases. The framework draws on Hegemony (from Gramsci) to explain how law secures consent from subordinate groups, and Legitimation to show how legal institutions make unjust social arrangements seem natural and inevitable. Contradiction refers to the fundamental tensions within liberal legalism, such as the conflict between individual freedom and collective welfare. Reification describes how legal concepts (like property or contract) are treated as fixed, natural objects rather than contingent social constructs. The Critique of Rights argues that rights discourse, while sometimes useful, ultimately reinforces the existing order by channeling dissent into individual claims rather than collective transformation. Legal Consciousness examines how legal professionals internalize and reproduce the system's assumptions. Ideology Critique analyzes how legal ideas serve to justify and mask power. Praxis emphasizes the unity of theory and action: CLS is not just an academic exercise but a call to transform legal practice and society. The framework begins with a Critique of Legal Formalism (the idea that law can be applied mechanically) and a Critique of Liberal Legalism (the broader ideology that law is a neutral, rights-based system that can reconcile freedom and equality).Intellectually, Critical Legal Studies emerged in the United States in the late 1970s, drawing on earlier traditions of Legal Realism (which had already attacked formalism) and the critical social theory of the Frankfurt School. The movement's founding moment is often traced to the Conference on Critical Legal Studies in 1977, which brought together scholars dissatisfied with both mainstream jurisprudence and the left's neglect of law. Key figures include Duncan Kennedy (whose 1979 article "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries" is a seminal work), Roberto Unger (author of Knowledge and Politics, 1975, and The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 1983), Mark Tushnet (who developed the critique of rights), and Morton Horwitz (whose The Transformation of American Law series provided historical grounding). Other important contributors include Peter Gabel, Catharine MacKinnon (whose work bridges CLS and Feminist Legal Theory), and Karl Klare. The movement peaked in the 1980s, generating intense debate and backlash, and while it declined as an organized force by the 1990s, its insights have been absorbed into subsequent approaches, including Feminist Legal Theory and Interpretive Theory of Law. CLS remains a vital critical lens for understanding law's role in perpetuating inequality and for imagining alternative, more democratic legal orders.The 13 concepts its tower teaches
- Contradiction
- Critique of Legal Formalism
- Critique of Liberal Legalism
- Critique of Rights
- Hegemony
- Ideology Critique
- Indeterminacy Thesis
- Law as Politics
- Legal Consciousness
- Legitimation
- Praxis
- Reification
- Trashing
- 1977-Present
- 1980-Present
- 1988-Present
- 1989-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Classical Natural Law grew out of Natural Law Theory
Aquinas built his account of human law as a corruption of natural law on the classical and patristic natural-law tradition he inherited, notably Aristotle's practical reason and Roman law's ius naturale. His synthesis in the Summa Theologiae made natural law a systematic theory of law's moral foundation.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas; Summa Theologiae (1265).
Legal Positivism reacted against Classical Natural Law
Austin defined law as the sovereign's command backed by sanction precisely to separate legal validity from moral merit, rejecting the natural-law view that unjust commands are not law. His command theory set the terms for the positivist tradition.
Carried by John Austin; The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832).
New natural law revived Classical Natural Law
Grisez and Finnis deliberately revived the Thomistic natural-law project, recasting it in terms of self-evident basic goods and practical reason rather than biological nature. Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Rights is the central statement of the revival.
Carried by Germain Grisez; John Finnis; Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980).
Inner Morality of Law reacted against Legal Positivism
Fuller's inner morality of law was written as a direct answer to Hart's positivism, arguing that a system of rules must satisfy formal principles of legality to count as law at all. The Hart–Fuller debate framed the issue for decades.
Carried by Lon L. Fuller; The Morality of Law (1964).
Exclusive Positivism grew out of Legal Positivism
Raz developed exclusive positivism as a refinement of Hart's rule of recognition, adding the sources thesis and a theory of authority to explain why legal validity depends only on source. It is a branch of the positivist tradition Hart founded.
Carried by Joseph Raz; The Authority of Law (1979).
Law as Integrity reacted against Legal Positivism
Dworkin attacked the positivist model of law as a system of rules identified by a rule of recognition, arguing that legal reasoning also uses binding principles. His law as integrity was built as an alternative to Hart's account.
Carried by Ronald Dworkin; Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
Inclusive Positivism grew out of Legal Positivism
Inclusive positivists such as Coleman and Waluchow took Hart's rule of recognition and argued that its criteria may themselves include moral tests, making morality's entry into law a contingent feature of particular systems. The view grew directly out of Hart's framework.
Carried by Jules Coleman; Wil Waluchow.
Critical Legal Studies reacted against Legal Positivism
Critical Legal Studies rejected the positivist picture of law as a determinate system of rules, arguing that doctrine is indeterminate and serves to legitimate hierarchy. The movement drew on legal realism but defined itself against the mainstream positivist and liberal accounts.
Carried by Roberto Mangabeira Unger; Duncan Kennedy.
Critical Race Theory grew out of Critical Legal Studies
Critical race theory emerged from the CLS movement, taking its critique of legal neutrality and indeterminacy and applying it to race and racism. Derrick Bell and others developed it as a distinct branch of the critical tradition.
Carried by Derrick Bell; Kimberlé Crenshaw.
Critical Race Theory rival of Feminist Legal Theory
Feminist legal theory and critical race theory developed as parallel critical projects in the same period, both challenging law's neutrality from the standpoint of a subordinated group. They competed over the primacy of gender versus race in legal critique.
Carried by Kimberlé Crenshaw.
Beyond the field
Where Law And Morality's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 91 links.
Natural Law Theory provoked Pure Theory of Law in Jurisprudence
Kelsen defined the Pure Theory against natural law theory, rejecting any derivation of valid law from morality or reason and insisting on a strict separation of is and ought. The whole project is framed as an attack on natural-law dualism.
Carried by Hans Kelsen.
Natural Law Theory led to Thomist Natural Law in Political Philosophy
Thomist natural law is the central development of the classical natural law theory tradition. Aquinas built his account on the Greek, Roman and patristic natural law sources that constitute that earlier tradition.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas.
Natural Law Theory provoked Legal Positivism in Legal Theory
Legal positivism arose as a deliberate rejection of natural law theory, denying that law's validity depends on conformity with a rational moral order. Bentham and Austin defined their command theory against the natural-law tradition they sought to displace.
Carried by Jeremy Bentham; John Austin.
Natural Law Theory led to New natural law in Legal Obligation
New natural law theory is a branch of the broader natural law tradition, reformulating its account of law's dependence on practical reason.
Carried by John Finnis.
Natural Law Theory influenced Natural-Law Law of Nations in International Trade Law
Early modern natural-law theorists built the law of nations on the broader natural-law theory of Aquinas and the Spanish scholastics, so that nature and reason would bind states in the absence of positive law. Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) carried this scheme directly into the law of nations.
Carried by Hugo Grotius; Cicero; Thomas Aquinas.
Natural Law Theory influenced Just war theory in Use Of Force
Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) grounded the justice of war in a secular natural law, and later just-war theorists worked within that natural-law frame. The tradition's criteria of just cause and right intention were carried by this natural-law argument.
Carried by Hugo Grotius; De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625).
Legal Positivism led to Pure Theory of Law in Jurisprudence
Kelsen's Pure Theory grew out of nineteenth-century legal positivism, taking from it the separation of law from morality and the identification of law with positive state-issued norms. His 1911 Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre was written within that positivist tradition before he radicalised it.
Carried by Hans Kelsen; Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre (1911).
Legal Positivism led to Rule of Recognition in Legal Sources Theory
Hart's rule of recognition reframed the positivist separation of law and morality by grounding legal validity in social fact, a direct outgrowth of the Benthamite-Austinian tradition.
Carried by H. L. A. Hart; The Concept of Law (1961).
Legal Positivism provoked Interpretivism in Legal Theory
Interpretivism defined itself against legal positivism's separation of law and morality, holding that moral considerations are internal to identifying legal rights.
Carried by Ronald Dworkin.
Legal Positivism provoked Interpretivism in Legal Sources Theory
Dworkin developed interpretivism as an attack on legal positivism's separation of law and morality, denying that valid law can be identified without moral argument.
Carried by Ronald Dworkin; Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
Legal Positivism led to Sources Thesis in Legal Sources Theory
Raz's sources thesis grew out of the Benthamite-Austinian positivist tradition, restating the separation of law and morality as a claim about the sources of valid law.
Carried by Joseph Raz.
Legal Positivism reacted against Natural law in Legal Theory
Bentham and Austin defined legal positivism against the natural-law tradition, denying that law's validity depends on its conformity to a moral order. The school arose as a rejection of the classical natural-law thesis that unjust law is no law.
Carried by Jeremy Bentham; John Austin.

Law And Morality is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 12 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Law And MoralityRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Legal Theory 13 links
- Jurisprudence 12 links
- Legal Obligation 8 links
- Legal Sources Theory 6 links
- Critical Legal Theory 5 links
- Constitutional Theory 3 links
- International Law 3 links
- Rights Theory 3 links
- Legal History 3 links
- Ethics 3 links
- Legal Reasoning 2 links
- Normative Ethics 2 links
More in Jurisprudence
- Critical Legal Theory
- Jurisprudence
- Legal Hermeneutics
- Legal Obligation
- Legal Reasoning
- Legal Sources Theory
- Legal Theory
- Precedent And Common Law Reasoning
- Rights Theory
- Statutory Interpretation
See where Law And Morality sits on the Map of Human Knowledge