Use Of Force
The law of the use of force is the branch of international law that governs when states may go to war or otherwise send armed force across borders, and what limits apply once they do.
8 frameworks, from 400 to today · International Law · Law
- Just war theory 400-Present
- Sovereign Right to Wage War 1648-1919
- Collective Security 1945-Present
- Self-defence in international law 1945-Present
- Humanitarian Intervention 1970-2005
- International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes 1993-Present
- Responsibility to Protect 2001-Present
- Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors 2001-Present
Overview
The law of the use of force is the branch of international law that governs when states may go to war or otherwise send armed force across borders, and what limits apply once they do123. It is the part of international law closest to the oldest question of all: can law restrain violence between sovereigns, or does it merely dress up whatever the powerful decide to do? The stakes are concrete. Every invasion, every drone strike, every peacekeeping mission, every claim that a war is "illegal" is argued in this vocabulary. The field's history is a long argument between two ideas that never fully reconcile: that each state is judge of its own cause, and that force should answer to a collective authority.
Holy War, Just War, and the Medieval Inheritance
The earliest systematic thinking about force in the European tradition came from Christian theology. Augustine of Hippo, writing in the early fifth century, argued that a Christian could serve in war if it was waged to preserve peace and restrain wrongdoing, and that the inner disposition of the soldier mattered as much as the act. Centuries later, Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae (written in the 1260s–70s) set out three conditions: proper authority, just cause, and right intention. This became the just war tradition—a moral and theological framework for judging war, not yet a legal code binding rulers.
Its most influential legal elaboration came from the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria, lecturing at Salamanca in the 1530s on the Spanish conquest of the Americas. Vitoria denied that mere religious difference or imperial title justified war, and argued that the justice of a war had to be assessed by standards applicable to all peoples. His follower Francisco Suárez and, later, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) carried the framework into a more secular key. Grotius distinguished the jus ad bellum (the law on when resort to war is permissible) from the jus in bello (the law on how war is conducted)—a distinction that still organizes the field.
The just war tradition's weakness was enforcement. It told princes what a just war looked like but gave no institution the power to judge them. In practice, the justice of a war remained the warring prince's own affair.
Sovereignty and the Free Right to Wage War
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years' War, is conventionally taken as the moment when European states were recognized as sovereign equals owing no superior. In the centuries that followed, the dominant doctrine was that sovereignty included the right to wage war. The Swiss jurist Emer de Vattel, in Le Droit des Gens (1758), put it memorably: a sovereign who takes up arms against another does nothing unlawful, because each nation is judge of what its own security requires. War became a recognized legal institution—declared, conducted, and concluded by formal rules—rather than a crime.
This did not mean law was absent. The nineteenth century saw a flourishing of jus in bello: the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the wounded, the Lieber Code issued to Union forces in the American Civil War in 1863, and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 regulating the means and methods of warfare456. But the jus ad bellum remained largely empty. The sovereign right to wage war was the baseline, and international law mostly regulated the fighting rather than the decision to fight.
The First World War and the Attempt to Outlaw War
The catastrophe of 1914–18 broke that baseline. The Covenant of the League of Nations (1919) did not prohibit war outright, but it required members to submit disputes to arbitration or inquiry and to wait before resorting to arms. The bolder step came in 1928: the Kellogg–Briand Pact, formally the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, in which the signatories—eventually most of the world's states—renounced war as an instrument of national policy and agreed to settle disputes only by pacific means.
The Pact's weakness was that it said nothing about how to tell aggression from self-defence, and nothing about enforcement. When Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931 and Italy invaded Ethiopia in 1935, the League proved unable to act7. The lesson drawn after 1945 was that a prohibition on force needed a collective machinery behind it.
The UN Charter: Prohibition and Collective Security
The United Nations Charter, signed at San Francisco in 1945, rebuilt the law of force around a single prohibition8. Article 2(4) requires all members to refrain from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."19 This was a genuine revolution: for the first time, a general treaty banned force across the board, not merely aggressive war.
The prohibition was paired with collective security10. Under Chapter VII, the Security Council may determine that there is a threat to or breach of the peace and authorize measures, including military action, to restore it117. The idea was that force would be pooled under the Council's authority rather than exercised by states at will. In practice the Cold War froze the Council: the veto held by the five permanent members meant that collective security against a great power was impossible. The one major case where the Council authorized force in the Cold War era was the Korean War (1950), and even that was possible only because the Soviet Union was boycotting the Council at the time.
The Charter left one explicit exception. Article 51 preserves the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" if an armed attack occurs, until the Security Council has taken measures to maintain peace. This self-defence doctrine became the field's central battleground. Its classic statement is the Caroline incident of 1837, when British forces crossed into the United States to destroy a ship supplying Canadian rebels; the exchange of notes between the two governments produced the formula of necessity that is "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." The 1986 Nicaragua judgment of the International Court of Justice confirmed that self-defence must meet requirements of necessity and proportionality, and that it responds to an armed attack—though what counts as an armed attack, and whether it must be attributable to a state, remained contested.
The Cold War: Intervention, the "Unwilling or Unable," and the Rise of Human Rights
Through the Cold War, the superpowers and their clients intervened constantly while officially denying that they were using force at all—sending "volunteers," "advisers," or "fraternal assistance." The legal argument was less about whether force was permitted than about how to characterize it. The General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression tried to pin down what aggression meant, and the Nicaragua case (1986) held the United States responsible for supporting the contras in violation of the prohibition on force and non-intervention.
A parallel development was the rise of human rights law and the idea that a state's treatment of its own people could be a matter of international concern. This fed humanitarian intervention—the claim that force may be used to stop atrocities within a state without its consent12. The claim was made in practice in Tanzania's 1979 intervention in Uganda that overthrew Idi Amin, and in Vietnam's 1978 intervention in Cambodia against the Khmer Rouge. Both were widely welcomed in outcome but legally awkward: their authors justified them on self-defence grounds rather than on a right of humanitarian intervention, and most states resisted recognizing such a right, fearing it would license great-power meddling.
After the Cold War: New Wars, New Courts, New Doctrines
The end of the Cold War unfroze the Security Council. In 1991, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the Council authorized a coalition to use "all necessary means" to restore peace—the closest the system has come to the collective security the Charter envisaged. The 1990s then produced a series of crises that stretched the law: the interventions in Somalia (1992), Bosnia (with NATO action from 1995), and above all Kosovo in 1999, when NATO bombed Serbia without Security Council authorization. Kosovo crystallized the debate: supporters called it a humanitarian intervention necessary to stop ethnic cleansing; critics called it a violation of the Charter that no emergency could excuse.
The same decade saw the creation of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994), and then the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the International Criminal Court. This built the international criminal law of aggression and war crimes: individual criminal responsibility for launching aggressive war and for atrocities in its conduct139. The crime of aggression was defined at the Kampala Review Conference in 2010, though the Court's jurisdiction over it remains limited. The tribunals made a point the older law could not: that the individuals who order illegal force can be held personally answerable14.
The 1990s also produced the doctrine of self-defence against non-state actors. The attacks of 11 September 2001, planned by al-Qaeda from Afghanistan, led the United States to invoke Article 51 against a non-state group and the state harbouring it. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) recognized the right of self-defence in that context. The ensuing debate—whether a state may use force in another state that is "unwilling or unable" to suppress a non-state threat—remains unresolved. The 2006 war in Lebanon and the long campaign against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq kept the question alive.
The Responsibility to Protect and the Present
The 2000s produced an attempt to reconcile sovereignty with atrocity prevention. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, convened in 2000, reported in 2001 with the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P): sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect one's own population, and where a state manifestly fails, the international community has a responsibility to react, including through force if necessary, but only through the Security Council. The World Summit of 2005 endorsed a narrowed version. R2P's test came in Libya in 2011, when the Security Council authorized force to protect civilians; the intervention's rapid expansion into regime change in practice soured many states on the doctrine, and it has since been invoked cautiously.
Today the field's main approaches descend directly from this history. The Charter prohibition and the Article 51 exception remain the framework, but their content is contested: the scope of anticipatory and pre-emptive self-defence (the 2002 US National Security Strategy claimed a right to pre-emptive action against emerging threats, a claim most states rejected); the legality of targeted killings and drone strikes outside armed conflict zones; the status of "unwilling or unable" self-defence against non-state groups; and whether humanitarian intervention survives as a legal category or has been absorbed into R2P. The International Court of Justice, through cases such as Nicaragua (1986), the Oil Platforms case (2003), and the Bosnia Genocide case (2007), has shaped the doctrine, while the Security Council's practice—authorizing force in Libya, failing to act in Syria—shows how much still depends on politics. The unresolved question is the oldest one: whether a legal prohibition can hold when the institutions meant to enforce it are themselves divided by the interests of the powerful.
References
- Use of force in international law, Wikipedia
- Law of war, Wikipedia
- Jus ad bellum, Wikipedia
- War crime, Wikipedia
- Geneva Conventions, Wikipedia
- Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- United Nations Security Council (Background and creation, introduction), Wikipedia
- Charter of the United Nations, Wikipedia
- Crime of aggression (Development in the United Nations, introduction), Wikipedia
- Collective security, Wikipedia
- Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Wikipedia
- Humanitarian intervention, Wikipedia
- International criminal law, Wikipedia
- Nuremberg trials, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Use Of Force
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 400-Present
- 1648-1919
- 1945-Present
- 1945-Present
Self-defence in international law
When may a state use force to defend itself?
- 1970-2005
Humanitarian Intervention
May force be used to stop atrocities within a state?
- 1993-Present
International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes
Who is criminally responsible for illegal war and atrocities?
- 2001-Present
Responsibility to Protect
Does sovereignty entail a duty to protect people?
- 2001-Present
Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors
May a state use force against non-state attackers abroad?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Collective Security replaced Sovereign Right to Wage War
The UN Charter's Article 2(4) prohibition and Chapter VII collective security replaced the sovereign right to wage war as the baseline rule of international law, making resort to force lawful only under collective authority or self-defence.
Carried by United Nations Charter (1945).
Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors grew out of Self-defence in international law
The doctrine of self-defence against non-state actors is a direct extension of the Article 51 self-defence framework, adapted after 9/11 to apply when armed attacks come from non-state groups rather than states.
Carried by UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001).
Responsibility to Protect grew out of Humanitarian Intervention
The Responsibility to Protect grew directly out of the humanitarian intervention debate, reframing sovereignty as a responsibility and seeking to resolve the legitimacy problems exposed by Kosovo and Rwanda.
Carried by International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty; The Responsibility to Protect (2001).
Sovereign Right to Wage War reacted against Just war theory
The Westphalian settlement and later Vattel's Le Droit des Gens (1758) rejected the just war tradition's premise that war's justice could be judged by universal standards, asserting instead that each sovereign is judge of its own cause.
Carried by Emer de Vattel; Le Droit des Gens (1758).
Self-defence in international law influenced by Just war theory
The just war tradition's criteria of necessity and proportionality, elaborated by Grotius and others, were taken up by international courts and jurists to define the lawful limits of self-defence under Article 51.
Carried by Hugo Grotius; Nicaragua v. United States (1986).
Self-defence in international law influenced by Sovereign Right to Wage War
Article 51 of the UN Charter preserved the 'inherent right' of self-defence, a concept whose content was shaped by the pre-1945 sovereign right to use force and by the Caroline incident's necessity formula.
Carried by United Nations Charter (1945); Caroline incident (1837).
Humanitarian Intervention reacted against Collective Security
Humanitarian intervention doctrine arose as a challenge to the collective security system's requirement of Security Council authorization, most sharply in the 1999 Kosovo intervention, where NATO acted without Council approval to stop atrocities.
Carried by Kosovo intervention (1999).
Beyond the field
Where Use Of Force's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 35 links.
Just war theory influenced by Natural Law Theory in Law And Morality
Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) grounded the justice of war in a secular natural law, and later just-war theorists worked within that natural-law frame. The tradition's criteria of just cause and right intention were carried by this natural-law argument.
Carried by Hugo Grotius; De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625).
Just war theory influenced by Classical Virtue and Natural Law Justice in Justice Theory
Cicero's Stoic natural law and just-war passages, recovered in the Renaissance, supplied the framework for Vitoria's and Suárez's treatment of just war. Grotius then built his just-war doctrine on the same natural-law and virtue premises.
Carried by Cicero; Francisco de Vitoria; Hugo Grotius.
Sovereign Right to Wage War grew out of Natural Law of Nations in International Law
The early-modern natural law of nations, above all Grotius and his successors, supplied the doctrine that sovereigns hold a right to wage war under the law of nations. The post-Westphalian sovereign right to war is a refinement of that natural-law framework.
Carried by Hugo Grotius; Samuel von Pufendorf.
Sovereign Right to Wage War influenced by Sovereignty in Public Law
Bodin's theory of sovereignty (1576) defined the sovereign as holding the right to make war and peace, which became the core of the post-Westphalian right to wage war. The doctrine of sovereign right to war presupposes Bodin's concept.
Carried by Jean Bodin; Six Books of the Commonwealth (1576).
Collective Security influenced by Liberal Internationalism in International Law
Interwar liberal internationalism, with its faith in law and collective action against aggression, was the direct source of the UN's collective-security design. The League of Nations experiment and its theorists carried the idea into the 1945 Charter.
Carried by Woodrow Wilson; League of Nations Covenant (1919).
Humanitarian Intervention influenced by International Human Rights Law in International Law
International human rights law, codified from 1948, supplied the normative basis for claiming that gross rights violations justify outside intervention. The later doctrine framed its arguments in human-rights terms.
Carried by Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948).
Humanitarian Intervention revived Humanitarian Intervention Doctrine in International Human Rights Law
Late twentieth-century humanitarian intervention deliberately revived the nineteenth-century doctrine that force may be used to stop atrocities. The earlier doctrine's precedents and arguments were recovered and reworked in the 1970s and after.
International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes influenced by International Humanitarian Law in International Human Rights Law
International humanitarian law, especially the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, supplied the substantive prohibitions that the later criminal law of war crimes enforces. The tribunals prosecuted violations of that body of law.
Carried by Geneva Conventions (1949).
International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes grew out of Grave breaches regime in International Humanitarian Law
The grave-breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions supplied the substantive definitions of war crimes that the later tribunals and the Rome Statute enforce. The later criminal law is a direct outgrowth of that regime.
Carried by Geneva Conventions (1949).
International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes grew out of Grave Breaches and Geneva Law in International Criminal Law
The grave-breaches regime of the 1949 Geneva Conventions defined the war crimes that the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute later prosecuted. The later criminal law of war crimes grew out of that regime.
Carried by Geneva Conventions (1949).
International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes influenced by Individual Criminal Responsibility in State Responsibility
Individual criminal responsibility, established at Nuremberg and developed in state-responsibility debates, is the foundational principle on which the later law of aggression and war crimes rests. The tribunals applied that principle to individuals rather than states.
Carried by Nuremberg Charter (1945).
International Criminal Law of Aggression and War Crimes influenced by International criminal adjudication in International Adjudication And Dispute Settlement
The Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals established international criminal adjudication as a practice, and the 1990s tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda built directly on that precedent. The later law of aggression and war crimes is enforced through that inherited adjudicative model.
Carried by Nuremberg Charter (1945).

Use Of Force is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 8 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Use Of ForceRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- International Human Rights Law 4 links
- International Law 4 links
- International Humanitarian Law 3 links
- State Responsibility 3 links
- International Criminal Law 2 links
- Irregular Warfare History 2 links
- Authority And Legitimacy 2 links
- Substantive Criminal Law 1 link
- Human Rights Law 1 link
- International Adjudication And Dispute Settlement 1 link
- International Trade Law 1 link
- Law And Morality 1 link