Economic Analysis Of Law

Economic analysis of law asks a deceptively simple question: what happens when you treat a legal rule as a price?

17 frameworks, from 1789 to today · Law And Economics · Law

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Economic analysis of law asks a deceptively simple question: what happens when you treat a legal rule as a price1? A fine is what you pay to park illegally; a damage award is what you pay for breaking a promise; a prison sentence is what you pay for a crime. Once rules are seen this way, the economist's toolkit—incentives, costs, marginal reasoning, equilibrium—can be pointed at almost any area of law. The field's practitioners have used this move both to explain what legal rules actually do (positive analysis) and to argue about what they should be (normative analysis)1. Its history is a story of successive attempts to make that move rigorous, to test it against evidence, and to reckon with its limits.

Precursors: Utilitarian Jurisprudence and Old Institutional Economics

The idea that law should be judged by its consequences is old. Jeremy Bentham, writing in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, argued that legislation should aim at the greatest happiness of the greatest number and famously dismissed natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts." His utilitarian jurisprudence supplied the normative impulse—maximize welfare—but not the analytical machinery. That came later, from neoclassical economics.

A separate strand ran through American institutionalism. In the early twentieth century, economists such as John R. Commons studied the legal foundations of economic activity—property, contract, and the working rules of collective bargaining—insisting that markets are constituted by legal institutions rather than existing prior to them. This "old institutionalism" was historically rich but theoretically loose, and it largely lost ground to the formal, price-theoretic economics that came to dominate mid-century departments. Its concerns would be revived, in sharper form, decades later.

The 1960s Breakthrough: Coase, Calabresi, and the New Questions

The pivotal year is often taken to be 1960, when Ronald Coase published "The Problem of Social Cost." Coase's target was the then-standard Pigouvian approach to externalities—harms like pollution or factory smoke that one party imposes on another—which held that the proper remedy was a tax equal to the harm23. Coase argued that the logic was incomplete. If property rights are clearly defined and bargaining is costless, the parties will negotiate to the efficient outcome regardless of who initially holds the right; the assignment of rights matters for distribution, not efficiency4. The real world, however, is full of transaction costs—the costs of finding trading partners, negotiating, writing contracts, and enforcing them—and it is these costs that determine which legal rules actually matter and how. The lesson practitioners drew was to compare institutions by their relative transaction costs rather than assume a single corrective fix.

Around the same time, Guido Calabresi, a law professor at Yale, was developing an economic analysis of accident law. His 1961 article "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts" and his 1970 book The Costs of Accidents asked who should bear the costs of injuries—the injurer, the victim, or some broader pool—and analyzed the consequences for deterrence, compensation, and administrative cost. Calabresi's framework was explicitly multi-goal: he did not reduce accident law to a single efficiency metric but weighed "secondary" and "tertiary" costs (the costs of distributing losses and of administering the system) alongside the primary goal of reducing accident costs. This Yale strand gave the field a normative pluralism that would compete with the more single-minded Chicago approach.

Chicago Price Theory and the Efficiency of the Common Law

If Coase supplied the conceptual pivot, Aaron Director and his colleagues at the University of Chicago supplied the intellectual culture1. The "Chicago School" applied price theory—the analysis of how rational actors respond to prices and constraints—to antitrust, regulation, and eventually law generally. The most influential figure in the legal domain was Richard Posner, whose Economic Analysis of Law (1973) became the field's canonical textbook. Posner argued that the common law—the judge-made law of property, contracts, torts, and crimes—could be understood as if it aimed at wealth maximization. His "efficiency of the common law" hypothesis claimed that judges, even without intending to, tend to select rules that promote efficient resource allocation, because inefficient rules generate litigation pressure from those harmed by them.

The claim was bold and controversial. It gave the field a powerful research program: take a doctrine, model the incentives it creates, and ask whether the resulting behavior is efficient. Posner's normative program went further, arguing that wealth maximization itself could serve as a defensible ethical criterion for law—a position that drew sustained criticism from philosophers and legal theorists, but which set the terms of debate for a generation.

Public Choice and the Economics of Crime

Two adjacent developments broadened the field's reach. The first was public choice theory, associated with James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, whose The Calculus of Consent (1962) modeled political actors—voters, legislators, bureaucrats—as self-interested maximizers rather than benevolent planners. Applied to law, public choice suggested that legislation and regulation are often products of interest-group pressure rather than public-regarding deliberation, which undercut the assumption that legal rules are designed to be efficient. This created a productive tension with the Chicago efficiency thesis: if legislators are captured, why expect the common law to be any better?

The second was the economics of crime and deterrence. Gary Becker's 1968 article "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach" modeled criminals as rational actors who weigh the expected gains of crime against the expected costs—probability of detection times severity of punishment. The insight was that deterrence could be analyzed as a production problem: society chooses levels of policing and punishment to minimize the social cost of crime plus the cost of enforcement. Becker's model generated testable predictions (for example, that higher probabilities of detection deter more reliably than longer sentences) and helped establish that criminal law was not a domain of pure moral judgment but of incentive design.

The 1970s–1980s: Expansion, Formalization, and the New Institutional Economics

Through the 1970s and 1980s, law and economics expanded into virtually every doctrinal field. Contract law was analyzed through default rules and the costs of drafting; property through the tragedy of the commons and the design of ownership regimes; corporate law through agency costs and the separation of ownership from control. The field also became more formal, importing game theory to model strategic interaction—bargaining, settlement, and compliance—where price theory alone was too blunt.

A parallel development was the new institutional economics, associated with Oliver Williamson and Douglass North. Williamson's work on transaction costs and governance asked why firms exist and why economic activity is organized through hierarchies rather than markets; North applied similar reasoning to the historical evolution of institutions. For legal scholars, this provided a richer account of how legal rules and economic organization co-evolve, and it connected the field to economic history and comparative institutional analysis.

Behavioral Law and Economics and the Empirical Turn

By the 1990s, the rational-actor assumption at the field's core came under pressure from within. Behavioral law and economics drew on the psychology of judgment and decision-making—Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's work on heuristics and biases, and prospect theory's finding that people weigh losses more heavily than equivalent gains—to argue that real people deviate systematically from the rational maximizer. Legal applications followed: default rules in retirement savings, disclosure requirements, and the design of consumer contracts were re-examined in light of bounded rationality. The behavioral strand did not displace the price-theoretic core but complicated it, and it spawned its own normative program, "libertarian paternalism," which argued for choice architecture that steers people toward better outcomes without coercing them.

At the same time, the field took an empirical turn. Where earlier work was largely deductive—modeling what rational actors should do—a new generation of scholars tested claims against data. The "credibility revolution" in economics, with its emphasis on causal identification, spread to legal scholarship: differences-in-differences, regression discontinuity, and natural experiments were used to estimate the actual effects of legal rules. Deterrence research, for example, moved from theoretical predictions to quasi-experimental studies of sentencing reforms and policing strategies. Empirical law and economics became a distinct and growing branch, often in productive tension with the theoretical mainstream.

Law and Social Norms, and the Present

A further strand, emerging in the 1990s, examined law and social norms: the informal rules that govern behavior—norms of cooperation, reciprocity, and trust—and how they interact with formal law. Scholars such as Robert Ellickson, in Order Without Law (1991), showed that neighbors often resolve disputes through informal norms rather than formal legal rules, raising questions about when law is redundant, when it crowds out norms, and when it can harness them. This work connected law and economics to sociology and anthropology and tempered the field's tendency to treat legal rules as the only relevant incentive.

Today the field is plural. Chicago price theory remains the backbone of much teaching and scholarship, but it coexists with behavioral analysis, empirical causal inference, game-theoretic modeling, and institutional and comparative approaches. The central questions remain open: how far the rational-actor model can be pushed before it distorts more than it explains; whether efficiency is the right normative criterion or merely one among several; how legal rules interact with informal norms and political incentives; and how to identify causal effects of law in a world where legal change is rarely random. The field's history is, in large part, the history of refining the answer to its founding question—what does a legal rule actually do?

References

  1. Law and economics (introduction, Positive and normative law and economics, Positive law and economics, Normative law and economics, Origin), Wikipedia
  2. Pigouvian tax, Wikipedia
  3. Externality, Wikipedia
  4. Coase theorem, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Economic Analysis Of Law

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1789-1900

    Utilitarian Jurisprudence

    Should law aim at the greatest happiness?

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  2. 1910-1950

    Old Institutional Economics

    How do legal rules constitute economic activity?

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  3. 1960-Present

    Chicago price theory

    How do rational actors respond to legal prices?

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  4. 1960-Present

    Coasean Transaction-Cost Analysis

    Which legal rule minimizes transaction costs?

    About Coasean Transaction-Cost Analysis
    Coasean Transaction-Cost Analysis asks a question that sounds simple but reshapes legal theory: given that real-world bargaining is never free, how should legal rules be designed to minimize the costs of getting from conflict to efficient outcomes? This framework emerged in the early 1960s as a direct challenge to the idea that law could be analyzed as if markets worked frictionlessly. Its central insight is that legal institutions are not merely backdrops to private ordering but themselves tools for economizing on the costs of transacting. For students of economic analysis of law, this framework supplies the analytical vocabulary for comparing legal rules not by their abstract justice but by their capacity to reduce the practical obstacles to voluntary agreement.
    The curriculum of Coasean Transaction-Cost Analysis begins with a pair of foundational concepts. The Coase Theorem establishes a baseline: when transaction costs are zero, parties will bargain to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial legal rule. The theorem is not a description of reality but a thought experiment that reveals the real work that legal rules must do. That work is governed by transaction costs—the search, bargaining, and enforcement expenses that block efficient exchange. Students learn to identify the major categories: information costs, bargaining costs, and enforcement costs.
    From this base, the framework asks how legal rules can minimize those costs. Property rules protect entitlements with injunctions, forcing parties to bargain; liability rules protect entitlements with damages, allowing unilateral takings at a court-set price. The choice between them turns on whether transaction costs are low enough for bargaining to succeed. Remedies such as specific performance versus expectation damages are then evaluated by their transaction-cost implications. The framework also examines nuisance law as a paradigmatic setting where competing land uses create externalities that bargaining might resolve—or might not, depending on costs.
    Because real-world institutions are varied, Coasean analysis compares alternative institutional arrangements—market, firm, regulation, and common law—by their relative transaction costs. This comparative institutional analysis rejects the idea that any one arrangement is always superior. Finally, the framework leaves space for the recalcitrance of transaction costs: even well-designed legal rules cannot eliminate all barriers to efficient exchange, and some forms of social cost are ineradicable.
    The intellectual history of Coasean Transaction-Cost Analysis begins with Ronald Coase’s 1960 article “The Problem of Social Cost,” published while he was at the University of Chicago. The article’s immediate target was Arthur C. Pigou’s presumption that externalities require government intervention—a presumption that assumed regulators could costlessly identify and fix market failures. Coase showed that the same assumption applied to private bargaining would make legal rules irrelevant; once transaction costs are acknowledged, the choice between private and public ordering becomes an empirical and comparative question, not an ideological one.
    At Chicago, Coase’s work coexisted uneasily with the emerging Chicago School of Law and Economics, led by Richard Posner and Gary Becker. Where the Chicago School often posited that common law rules tend toward efficiency as if by an invisible hand, Coasean analysis treated efficiency as an open empirical question contingent on specific transaction-cost environments. The two frameworks shared a vocabulary of rational choice but diverged sharply on the automaticity of efficient outcomes.
    No immediate successor framework displaced Coasean analysis in the 1960s, but it was absorbed and transformed by later movements. New Institutional Economics, emerging in the mid-1970s, generalized Coase’s insights to the study of all economic institutions—firms, contracts, property rights—and remains closely allied. In law, New Haven Law and Economics (beginning around 1961) and later Behavioral Law and Economics (from the late 1990s) have supplemented Coasean analysis: New Haven by emphasizing distributional justice and the interpretive richness of legal texts, behavioral economics by questioning the rationality assumptions that underpin transaction-cost reasoning. Coasean analysis did not disappear; it survives as a required toolkit for any lawyer or economist who wants to ask whether a legal rule makes it easier or harder for people to strike mutually beneficial deals.
    The 8 concepts its tower teaches
    • Alternative Institutional Arrangements
    • Coase Theorem
    • Comparative Institutional Analysis
    • label
    • Nuisance Law
    • Property Rules and Liability Rules
    • Remedies
    • Transaction Costs

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  5. 1960-Present

    Transaction-cost economics

    Why are transactions organized in firms or markets?

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  6. 1961-Present
  7. 1961-Present

    New Haven Law and Economics

    How should law weigh efficiency against other goals?

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  8. 1962-Present

    Public choice

    Do political actors pursue the public interest?

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  9. 1962-Present

    Public Choice Theory

    What motivates voters, legislators, and bureaucrats?

    About Public Choice Theory
    Public Choice Theory applies the tools of economics—rational choice, methodological individualism, and the logic of exchange—to the study of political processes. Within economic analysis of law, it poses a fundamental challenge: if legal rules are the product of political decision-making, why should we assume they serve efficiency rather than the private interests of legislators, bureaucrats, and interest groups? Public choice offers a systematic framework for understanding how political actors respond to incentives, how collective choices are aggregated, and why government intervention often fails to correct market failures. Its core insight is that the same self-interest that drives market behavior also shapes voting, lobbying, and regulation, making "government failure" as endemic as market failure.

    Core Curriculum

    Foundations of Collective Choice. Public Choice Theory begins with the observation that political decisions are made by individuals pursuing their own goals. The Voting Paradox shows that majority rule can produce inconsistent or cycling outcomes, undermining the idea that democracy reliably reflects a coherent public will. Arrow's Theorem formalizes this impossibility: no voting system can simultaneously satisfy a set of reasonable fairness conditions without sometimes producing intransitive results. The Median Voter Theorem offers a counterpoint, predicting that under certain conditions (single-peaked preferences, one-dimensional policy space) majority rule yields a stable outcome at the median voter's ideal point. Yet Rational Ignorance explains why voters often remain uninformed: the cost of acquiring political knowledge exceeds the expected benefit of influencing an election.
    Political Exchange and Interest Groups. Politics, in public choice theory, is a market in which votes, policies, and regulations are exchanged. Logrolling—the trading of votes on different issues—and Legislative Exchange more broadly allow legislators to build coalitions and pass packages that benefit concentrated interests at the expense of diffuse majorities. Interest Group Politics analyzes how small, well-organized groups secure favorable legislation (e.g., tariffs, subsidies, occupational licensing) because their per-capita stakes are high, while the general public bears small per-capita costs and remains rationally ignorant. Rent-Seeking describes the wasteful expenditure of resources to capture artificially created transfers—for example, lobbying for a monopoly license rather than producing value.
    Government Failure and Its Varieties. Where traditional welfare economics identifies market failure as a rationale for state intervention, public choice emphasizes Government Failure—situations in which political processes produce outcomes that are inefficient or contrary to the public interest. Bureaucratic Behavior, as modeled by William Niskanen, suggests that bureaucrats maximize their budgets (and hence power and salary) rather than the efficient provision of public goods. Regulatory Capture occurs when regulated industries dominate the agencies meant to oversee them, turning regulation into a tool for private profit. The distinction between Public Interest vs. Private Interest is central: public choice theory sides heavily with the private-interest view of legislation and administration.
    Constitutional Constraints. Constitutional Economics, a branch of public choice pioneered by James Buchanan, asks what rules should govern the political game to limit the scope for rent-seeking and government failure. It advocates for precommitment to constraints—such as balanced budget amendments or supermajority requirements—that bind future legislatures, treating the constitution as a social contract designed to channel self-interest toward the common good.

    Intellectual History

    Public Choice Theory emerged in the early 1960s as economists began to treat political behavior as an object of economic analysis. The seminal work is James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock's The Calculus of Consent (1962), which applied the logic of exchange and unanimous consent to constitutional design. It established the "Virginia School" of political economy, distinct from the Chicago School's focus on common law efficiency. Two key precursors sharpened the new framework: Kenneth Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values (1951) had already demonstrated the logical impossibility of a perfect voting rule, and Anthony Downs's An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) modeled voters and parties as rational actors. Building on these foundations, Mancur Olson's The Logic of Collective Action (1965) explained why large groups fail to organize for common interests, providing a microfoundation for interest-group politics.
    Within the law-and-economics subfield, public choice gained traction as a corrective to the Chicago School's efficiency hypothesis. If judges are appointed through political processes, and if legislation is driven by rent-seeking, then legal rules cannot be presumed efficient. Scholars like William Niskanen (Bureaucracy and Representative Government, 1971) modeled bureaucratic supply, while George Stigler (The Theory of Economic Regulation, 1971) and Sam Peltzman (Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 1976) formalized regulatory capture. These works fell within or just after the local dominance window (1962–2026) and remain central to understanding how law shapes—and is shaped by—political markets.
    Public Choice Theory was not replaced but rather absorbed and transformed by later frameworks. New Institutional Economics (from the mid-1970s) incorporated public choice insights into a broader analysis of transaction costs, property rights, and institutional change. The Chicago School of Law and Economics coexisted alongside public choice, producing productive tension: Chicago emphasized efficiency, while public choice emphasized self-interested political design. Today, public choice is a standard tool for analyzing legislation, administrative law, and constitutional design within economic analysis of law.
    The 14 concepts its tower teaches
    • Arrow's Theorem
    • Bureaucratic Behavior
    • Constitutional Economics
    • Government Failure
    • Interest Group Politics
    • Legislative Exchange
    • Logrolling
    • Median Voter Theorem
    • Public Choice Theory
    • Public Interest vs. Private Interest
    • Rational Ignorance
    • Regulatory Capture
    • Rent-Seeking
    • Voting Paradox

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  10. 1968-Present
  11. 1970-Present
  12. 1975-Present

    Game-theoretic analysis of law

    How do legal actors behave strategically?

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  13. 1975-Present

    New institutional economics

    How do institutions shape economic performance?

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  14. 1980-Present

    Empirical Law and Economics

    What effects do legal rules actually have?

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  15. 1990-Present

    Behavioral law and economics

    How do real people deviate from rational choice?

    About Behavioral law and economics
    Behavioral law and economics asks a deceptively simple question: what happens to legal analysis when we legal rules are designed for people who are not perfectly rational? The framework emerged in the late 1990s as a direct challenge to the Chicago School's assumption that individuals are rational wealth-maximizers who respond to legal incentives like prices in a market. Instead, behavioral law and economics draws on cognitive psychology to argue that real people are subject to systematic biases, use mental shortcuts, and care about fairness—all of which change how legal rules actually affect behavior. The framework does not reject economic analysis of law; it insists that analysis must be psychologically realistic to be useful.
    Core Curriculum
    The first course in behavioral law and economics typically begins with the foundational concept of bounded rationality—the idea that human decision-making is limited by available information, cognitive capacity, and time. From there, students learn about the specific mental shortcuts and systematic errors that shape legal behavior. The core concepts cluster into four teaching moves:
    1. Heuristics and biases: People rely on mental shortcuts (heuristics) that generally work but lead to predictable errors (biases). Key biases include the availability heuristic (overestimating the likelihood of vivid, easily recalled events), anchoring (fixing on an initial piece of information), overconfidence bias (overestimating one's own abilities or knowledge), and the self-serving bias (attributing successes to oneself and failures to external factors).
    1. Prospect theory and framing effects: Developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, prospect theory shows that people evaluate outcomes relative to a reference point, are loss-averse (losses hurt more than equivalent gains please), and treat gains and losses differently. Framing effects occur when the same choice presented in different ways (e.g., as a gain vs. a loss) leads to different decisions.
    1. Endowment effect and status quo bias: The endowment effect means people value what they already own more than identical items they do not own. Status quo bias is the tendency to prefer the current state of affairs. Both have major implications for property law, contract remedies, and regulatory design.
    1. Fairness and reciprocity: People are not purely self-interested; they care about fair treatment and will punish unfair behavior even at a cost to themselves. This insight reshapes analysis of contract enforcement, tort damages, and criminal punishment.
    1. Libertarian paternalism, nudge, and asymmetric paternalism: These concepts translate behavioral insights into legal and policy design. Libertarian paternalism argues that it is legitimate to steer people toward better choices while preserving freedom of choice. A nudge is a low-cost, choice-preserving intervention that changes behavior predictably (e.g., automatic enrollment in retirement plans). Asymmetric paternalism holds that interventions should help boundedly help those who make mistakes while imposing minimal costs on fully rational actors.
    Intellectual History
    Behavioral law and economics emerged in the late 1990s as a direct response to the Chicago School's dominance. The Chicago School, led by Richard Posner, Gary Becker, and others, had argued since the 1960s that legal rules tend to promote efficiency because individuals are rational actors who respond predictably to incentives. By the 1990s, however, a growing body of empirical work in cognitive psychology—especially by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky—had documented systematic departures from rational choice. Their work on heuristics and biases, prospect theory, and framing effects provided the empirical ammunition for a new approach.
    The key figures who imported these insights into law were Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler. Their 1998 article "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics" is widely regarded as the seminal work that launched the framework. Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler argued that economic analysis of law should be rebuilt on psychologically realistic foundations. They showed how bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self-interest affect behavior in legal contexts ranging from torts and contracts to criminal law and regulation.
    Behavioral law and economics coexists with and competes with the Chicago School. It does not reject efficiency as a normative criterion, but it insists that predictions about how legal rules affect behavior must account for real human psychology. The framework has been especially influential in consumer protection, securities regulation, and health policy, where the nudge approach has been adopted by governments worldwide. It also overlaps with Social Norms Theory, which emphasizes how social expectations shape behavior, but behavioral law and economics focuses more on individual cognitive mechanisms.
    Precursors include the broader field of cognitive psychology and the work of Kahneman and Tversky, who are not themselves legal scholars but whose experimental findings provided the empirical foundation. Later codifiers and transmitters include scholars like Dan Ariely and Sendhil Mullainathan, who popularized behavioral insights for broader audiences, but the canonical legal framework remains anchored in the late 1990s and early 2000s work of Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler.
    The 11 concepts its tower teaches
    • Asymmetric paternalism
    • Behavioral law and economics
    • Bounded rationality
    • Endowment effect
    • Fairness and reciprocity
    • Framing effects
    • Heuristics and biases
    • Libertarian paternalism
    • Nudge
    • Prospect theory
    • Status quo bias

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  16. 1991-Present

    Law and social norms

    How do informal norms enforce social order?

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  17. 1995-Present

    Empirical law and economics

    What does the evidence say about legal rules?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Utilitarian JurisprudenceOld Institutional EconomicsChicago price theoryCoasean Transaction-Cost AnalysisTransaction-cost economicsLaw and economics of accidents (Calab…New Haven Law and EconomicsPublic choicePublic Choice TheoryEconomics of crime and deterrenceInstitutional and Comparative Law and…Game-theoretic analysis of lawNew institutional economicsEmpirical Law and EconomicsBehavioral law and economicsLaw and social normsEmpirical law and economics

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Where Economic Analysis Of Law's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 134 links.

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