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Managerial Decision Making
Managerial decision making is the study and practice of how people in organizations choose what to do—which markets to enter, how much inventory to hold, whom to hire, which project to fund, when to stop investing in a failing product.
14 frameworks, from 1911 to today · Management · Business, Management & Finance
- Scientific Management 1911-1940
- Fayolism 1916-1955
- Operations research 1940-Present
- Bounded rationality 1947-Present
- Decision Analysis 1960-Present
- Multiple-criteria decision analysis 1960-Present
- A Behavioral Theory of the Firm 1963-Present
- Scenario Planning 1970-Present
- Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models 1971-Present
- Heuristics and Biases 1971-Present
- Garbage Can Model 1972-Present
- Group Decision Making and Groupthink 1972-Present
- Behavioral Economics and Choice Architecture 1980-Present
- Algorithmic Decision Support 2010-Present
Overview
Managerial decision making is the study and practice of how people in organizations choose what to do—which markets to enter, how much inventory to hold, whom to hire, which project to fund, when to stop investing in a failing product. What makes it a field rather than a topic is that its central question is not "what is the right choice?" but "how do real managers actually choose, and how could they choose better?" The answers have moved through several distinct eras: from the assumption that managers could be made into calculating machines, to the discovery that human judgment is systematically flawed, to the present attempt to combine human judgment with algorithms. Each era began with a problem the previous one could not solve.
Making Management Scientific: Taylor and the Efficiency Engineers
The first systematic attempt to improve managerial decisions came from Frederick Winslow Taylor, whose The Principles of Scientific Management appeared in 1911. Taylor's problem was the workshop: foremen decided how work should be done by rule of thumb, and output varied wildly between workers and shops. His solution was to treat production decisions as objects of measurement. In his famous pig-iron experiments at Bethlehem Steel, Taylor determined that a worker loading pig iron could handle roughly 47 tons per day rather than the customary 12.5, by prescribing rest intervals and a specific lifting motion. The decision about how to work was thus removed from the worker and the foreman and placed with a planning department that set standards, routes, and times.
Taylor's contemporary Henri Fayol approached the problem from the top. In Administration industrielle et générale (1916), Fayol argued that management was a set of functions—planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, controlling—governed by principles such as unity of command and the scalar chain of authority. This "administrative management" school, later carried to the English-speaking world by Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, gave managers a vocabulary for structuring decisions: who reports to whom, where authority for a choice sits. Neither Taylor nor Fayol studied how managers actually thought; both assumed that once structure and standards were right, decisions would follow.
Operations Research: Decisions as Mathematics
The decisive break came during the Second World War12. British and American military planners faced problems of allocation under scarcity—how to deploy radar, escort convoys, schedule bombing raids—that exceeded intuitive judgment. Teams of mathematicians, physicists, and economists, working in what became known as operational research, built mathematical models of these problems. The convoy problem is a good example: by modeling the probability of U-boat encounters against convoy size, analysts showed that larger convoys reduced shipping losses, a conclusion that reversed naval practice.
After the war, these techniques migrated into industry as operations research and management science12. Linear programming, developed by George Dantzig in 1947 for the U.S. Air Force, allowed a manager to find the best allocation of limited resources subject to constraints—maximizing output from a set of machines, say, or minimizing the cost of a feed mix. The simplex method made such problems solvable by hand and then by computer. Decision analysis, developed by Howard Raiffa and Robert Schlaifer in the 1960s, extended the mathematical approach to decisions under uncertainty: a manager assigned probabilities to outcomes, values to consequences, and combined them into an expected value, often drawn as a decision tree. Multi-criteria decision analysis addressed choices with several incommensurable objectives—a plant location that must balance cost, labor supply, and political risk—by making the trade-offs explicit and weighted.
These methods shared a premise: the manager's job was to specify the problem precisely, and the mathematics would supply the answer. They worked brilliantly where problems were well structured and data plentiful. They faltered where objectives were ambiguous, probabilities unknown, or the problem itself unclear—which, practitioners noticed, described most managerial decisions.
Bounded Rationality: The Manager as Satisficer
Herbert Simon attacked the premise directly345. In Administrative Behavior (1947) and later work with James March, Simon argued that the classical model of the rational decision maker was psychologically impossible467. Managers face limited information, limited time, and limited computational capacity35. Simon called this bounded rationality: rationality constrained by the actual conditions of human cognition35. The consequence was satisficing—searching for alternatives until one is found that meets an acceptable standard, then stopping, rather than exhaustively comparing all options for the best345. A purchasing manager who accepts the first supplier quote below a target price is satisficing; the classical model would require comparing every possible supplier.
Simon's work reframed the field's question from "how should decisions be made?" to "how are they made?" The behavioral theory of the firm, set out by Richard Cyert and James March in 1963, followed this lead67. Firms, they argued, are coalitions of groups with divergent goals; decisions emerge from bargaining, and organizations learn by adjusting aspiration levels to experience. A division that consistently misses its sales target will see the target revised downward—the organization adapts its goals rather than failing perpetually.
Heuristics and Biases: The Systematic Errors of Judgment
Where Simon described the limits of rationality in general terms, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky mapped its specific failures89. Beginning in the early 1970s, their heuristics-and-biases program showed that people rely on mental shortcuts—heuristics—that are usually useful but produce predictable errors89. The availability heuristic, for instance, leads people to judge the frequency of an event by how easily examples come to mind; managers overestimate risks that have been vividly publicized10. Anchoring leads estimates to be pulled toward an arbitrary starting number3. In one well-known demonstration, experienced real-estate agents valued a house differently depending on an artificially set listing price, despite denying that the anchor influenced them.
This program, which earned Kahneman the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2002 (Tversky had died in 1996), gave managerial decision research its most influential finding: expertise does not immunize against bias. It also fed behavioral economics, which replaced the rational actor of economic theory with a psychologically realistic one11. Richard Thaler's work on mental accounting and fairness, and later the idea of choice architecture—designing how options are presented so that people choose better—carried these insights into policy and management. The "nudge" framing, popularized by Thaler and Cass Sunstein in 2008, proposed that organizations could improve decisions by changing defaults and framing rather than by instruction.
The Organizational and Political Turn
A parallel tradition insisted that managerial decisions are not made by a single mind at all. The garbage can model, published by Michael Cohen, James March, and Johan Olsen in 1972, described organizations as "organized anarchies" in which problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities flow independently and collide. A solution may exist before the problem it fits; a decision may be made because the meeting was scheduled, not because the issue was ripe. The model explained why university decisions often seemed to bear little relation to anyone's intentions.
The bureaucratic politics and organizational process models, developed by Graham Allison in his study of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Essence of Decision, 1971), made a related point for high-stakes decisions: outcomes reflect the standard operating procedures of organizations and the bargaining among officials with different positions, not a single rational calculation. Where one model asked "what would a rational actor do?", Allison's alternatives asked "which organization's routines produced this option?" and "whose interest prevailed in the room?"
Group decision making became a field of its own, with research on how groups polarize toward riskier or more cautious positions than individuals, and on the failure modes of consensus—Irving Janis's 1972 study of "groupthink" argued that cohesive groups suppress dissent and produce worse decisions, a claim that has been much debated but shaped how organizations run meetings.
Scenario Planning: Decisions Under Deep Uncertainty
For decisions whose future cannot be assigned probabilities, scenario planning offered a different discipline12. Developed at the RAND Corporation in the postwar years and brought to prominence by Pierre Wack and his colleagues at Royal Dutch Shell in the early 1970s, scenario planning constructed several plausible futures rather than one forecast. Shell's planners, having built scenarios in which an oil price shock was possible, were less surprised than competitors by the 1973 embargo. The method's claim was not prediction but preparation: decisions should be robust across scenarios, and managers should rehearse the assumptions that would make their strategy fail.
The Algorithmic Present
The most recent turn returns to the mathematical ambition of operations research, but with tools the 1950s lacked. Cheap computation, large datasets, and machine learning have made it possible to automate or augment many managerial decisions—credit scoring, demand forecasting, pricing, hiring screens, and recommendation systems. The field now studies not only how to build such systems but how managers should use them: when to trust an algorithm over judgment, how to detect bias in training data, and how to keep humans meaningfully in the loop. The tension is familiar. Algorithms excel at well-structured problems with abundant data, exactly the territory where operations research always worked; they remain weak where judgment, context, and values dominate. The behavioral research on bias now cuts both ways: it justifies algorithmic decision support, since algorithms do not anchor or satisfice, but it also warns that humans defer to automated outputs in ways that can propagate error.
Today the field's main approaches descend directly from these eras. Decision analysis and multi-criteria methods remain standard in structured corporate choices; behavioral decision research underpins everything from risk communication to the design of management information systems; organizational and political models inform strategy and public administration; and the algorithmic turn is reshaping all of them. The open questions are the old ones in new dress: how to combine human judgment with machine calculation without inheriting the weaknesses of either, how to make decisions accountable when the reasoning is buried in a model, and whether the satisficing manager of Simon's description can be improved at all, or only understood.
References
- Operations research (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Management science (History), Wikipedia
- Decision-making (Optimizing vs. satisficing, Individual, Cognitive and personal biases), Wikipedia
- Satisficing, Wikipedia
- Bounded rationality (Background and motivation, introduction), Wikipedia
- A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Wikipedia
- James G. March, Wikipedia
- Heuristic (psychology) (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Cognitive bias (History), Wikipedia
- Availability heuristic, Wikipedia
- Behavioral economics, Wikipedia
- Scenario planning, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Managerial Decision Making
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1911-1940
- 1916-1955
- 1940-Present
Operations research
How can allocation problems be solved mathematically?
- 1947-Present
- 1960-Present
- 1960-Present
Multiple-criteria decision analysis
How are trade-offs among many objectives made?
- 1963-Present
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
How do firms actually set goals and choose?
- 1970-Present
- 1971-Present
Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models
Whose routines and interests produce a decision?
- 1971-Present
- 1972-Present
- 1972-Present
Group Decision Making and Groupthink
When do groups decide worse than individuals?
- 1980-Present
Behavioral Economics and Choice Architecture
How can choice settings improve decisions?
- 2010-Present
Algorithmic Decision Support
How can algorithms support managerial judgment?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Decision Analysis grew out of Operations research
Decision analysis grew out of operations research and management science, extending its mathematical modeling from resource allocation to decisions under uncertainty. Raiffa and Schlaifer, trained in the OR tradition, built decision trees and expected-value methods on that base.
Carried by Howard Raiffa; Robert Schlaifer.
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm grew out of Bounded rationality
Cyert and March's behavioral theory of the firm built directly on Simon's bounded rationality and satisficing, turning them into a theory of the firm as a coalition with bargaining goals and adaptive aspiration levels. Simon's Carnegie School work is the immediate parent.
Carried by Richard Cyert; James March; A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963).
Behavioral Economics and Choice Architecture grew out of Heuristics and Biases
Behavioral economics and choice architecture grew directly out of Kahneman and Tversky's heuristics and biases; Thaler built mental accounting and nudges on their findings. The 2008 nudge framing by Thaler and Sunstein carried the program into policy design.
Carried by Richard Thaler; Cass Sunstein; Nudge (2008).
Bounded rationality reacted against Fayolism
Simon's Administrative Behavior attacked the administrative-management doctrines of Fayol and Gulick, arguing that their principles were proverbs and that the rational manager they presupposed was psychologically impossible. Bounded rationality defined itself against this formal, top-down account of managerial choice.
Carried by Herbert Simon; Administrative Behavior (1947).
Multiple-criteria decision analysis grew out of Operations research
Multiple-criteria decision analysis branched from operations research when linear programming and optimization could not handle several incommensurable objectives. It kept the OR commitment to explicit mathematical formulation while adding weighted trade-offs among criteria.
Algorithmic Decision Support influenced by Operations research
Algorithmic decision support descends from operations research's optimization models, which supplied the linear programming and allocation methods that modern decision-support software automates. The mathematical formulation of managerial problems passed through intact.
Heuristics and Biases influenced by Bounded rationality
Kahneman and Tversky's heuristics-and-biases program took up Simon's claim that human rationality is limited and made the specific shortcuts and errors an experimental subject. Simon's bounded rationality supplied the framing question of how real judgment departs from the rational model.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Garbage Can Model influenced by Bounded rationality
The garbage can model, by Cohen, March and Olsen, extended Simon's bounded rationality and the Carnegie School's attention to organizational limits into organized anarchies where problems and solutions meet by chance. March's earlier collaboration with Simon on organizations carried the link.
Carried by James March; Michael Cohen; Johan Olsen.
Garbage Can Model grew out of A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
The garbage can model grew out of the behavioral theory of the firm's picture of organizations as coalitions with divergent goals, radicalizing it into organized anarchies with ambiguous preferences. Cohen, March and Olsen worked in the same Carnegie tradition.
Carried by James March; Michael Cohen; Johan Olsen.
Operations research influenced by Scientific Management
Scientific management's project of replacing rule-of-thumb workshop judgment with measurement and planning passed into wartime operational research, whose analysts modeled allocation problems quantitatively. The shared premise that decisions could be made calculable links the efficiency engineers to the OR teams.
Algorithmic Decision Support influenced by Decision Analysis
Algorithmic decision support inherits decision analysis's formalism of explicit probabilities, values and expected outcomes, now computed by machine. The decision-tree and expected-value vocabulary persists in modern decision-support systems.
Algorithmic Decision Support influenced by Heuristics and Biases
Designers of algorithmic decision support draw on the heuristics-and-biases findings to anticipate where human judgment fails and where machine aids should intervene. The documented passage is the use of bias research to justify algorithmic assistance.
Beyond the field
Where Managerial Decision Making's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 62 links.
Operations research led to Revenue management in Pricing Strategy
Revenue management in the airline and hotel sense grew directly out of operations research and management-science techniques: linear programming, overbooking models and yield formulas developed from wartime and postwar OR were applied to seat and room inventory. Littlewood's 1972 rule and later Belobaba's expected marginal seat revenue work stand on this OR base.
Carried by Operations research; Robert G. Cross.
Bounded rationality reacted against Homo economicus in Consumer Behavior
Bounded rationality was formulated by Herbert Simon as a direct attack on the homo economicus model of fully rational, utility-maximising agents, replacing it with satisficing under cognitive limits.
Carried by Herbert A. Simon; Administrative Behavior (1947).
Decision Analysis led to Robust Decision Making in Decision And Risk Analysis
Robust Decision Making grew directly out of decision analysis, retaining its expected-utility and value-model structure while replacing single probability distributions with ensembles of scenarios to test strategies.
Carried by Robert Lempert.
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm influenced by Bounded rationality in Information Systems
Simon's bounded rationality, developed at the Carnegie Institute of Technology, supplied the core premise of the behavioral theory of the firm: firms satisfice rather than maximise.
Carried by Herbert A. Simon; Models of Man (1957).
Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models influenced by Bounded rationality in Information Systems
Allison's bureaucratic politics and organizational process models rest directly on Simon's bounded rationality and the Carnegie school's account of organizations as satisficing coalitions.
Carried by Graham T. Allison; Essence of Decision (1971).
Heuristics and Biases provoked Fast and Frugal Heuristics in Reasoning Decision Making
Fast and frugal heuristics arose as a direct challenge to the heuristics-and-biases programme, arguing that the same simple rules are adaptive rather than defective. Gigerenzer and colleagues defined their approach by rejecting the biases framing.
Carried by Gerd Gigerenzer; Daniel G. Goldstein.
Heuristics and Biases influenced by Bounded rationality in Information Systems
Tversky and Kahneman's heuristics and biases research was built on Simon's bounded rationality and his notion of satisficing, recasting it as specific cognitive shortcuts and systematic errors.
Carried by Herbert A. Simon; Amos Tversky; Daniel Kahneman.
Garbage Can Model influenced by Bounded rationality in Information Systems
The garbage can model is an extension of Simon's bounded rationality to settings of problematic preferences and unclear technology, where satisficing search meets temporal sorting.
Carried by James G. March; Herbert A. Simon.
Behavioral Economics and Choice Architecture influenced by Behavioral Decision Theory in Management
Behavioral decision theory, rooted in Simon's bounded rationality and the Kahneman-Tversky heuristics research, provided the descriptive models of judgment that choice architecture applies to policy and consumer settings.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky; Herbert Simon.
Behavioral Economics and Choice Architecture influenced Behavioral Science and Behavior-Change Intervention Design in Health Promotion
Thaler and Sunstein's choice architecture and nudge concepts, built on Kahneman and Tversky's behavioural economics, were taken up directly by behaviour-change intervention designers as the theoretical basis for altering choice environments to change health behaviour.
Carried by Richard Thaler; Cass Sunstein; Nudge (2008).
Algorithmic Decision Support influenced by Bounded Rationality and Semi-Structured Decision Framework in Decision Support Systems
Simon's bounded rationality and the semi-structured decision framework of Gorry and Scott Morton defined the problem space that algorithmic decision support addresses with computation.
Carried by Herbert Simon; Gorry and Scott Morton.
Scientific Management influenced Managerial School of Sales Force Management in Sales Management
The managerial decision-making tradition that grew from scientific management's emphasis on rational, standard-based administration supplied the planning and control vocabulary the managerial school applied to sales operations.

Managerial Decision Making is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 14 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Managerial Decision MakingRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Information Systems 7 links
- Decision And Risk Analysis 7 links
- Decision Support Systems 5 links
- Infrastructure Planning 4 links
- Management 4 links
- Operations Research 3 links
- Behavioral Decision Theory 2 links
- Health Technology Assessment 2 links
- Business Analytics 2 links
- Organizational Behavior 2 links
- Sales Management 2 links
- Accounting 1 link
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