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Strategic Management
Strategic management is the study of how organizations decide what to do and how to do it: which markets to enter, which products to build, how to compete, what to own, and how to coordinate it all.
11 frameworks, from 1955 to today · Management · Business, Management & Finance
- Business Policy and the Design School 1955-1980
- Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis 1962-1990
- Behavioral strategy 1963-Present
- Strategy Formation and Emergent Strategy 1978-2000
- Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning 1979-Present
- Resource-based view 1984-Present
- Stakeholder Theory 1984-Present
- Knowledge-Based View and Organizational Learning 1990-Present
- Ecosystems, Platforms, and Open Innovation 1993-Present
- Dynamic Capabilities 1997-Present
- Strategy as Practice 2000-Present
Overview
Strategic management is the study of how organizations decide what to do and how to do it: which markets to enter, which products to build, how to compete, what to own, and how to coordinate it all1. What is at stake is survival and prosperity under uncertainty. A firm that picks the wrong market, misjudges a rival, or fails to adapt can collapse; one that reads its environment and builds distinctive capabilities can thrive for decades. The field's history is a series of attempts to answer one basic question—where do successful strategies come from?—and each era's answer emerged from the limits of the previous one.
Corporate Planning and Business Policy: Strategy as Deliberate Design (1950s–1960s)
Strategic management began as an offshoot of business education. After the Second World War, American business schools began teaching a "capstone" course called business policy, which integrated accounting, finance, marketing, and production into the problem of running a whole firm. The first textbooks—by Harvard faculty among others in the late 1950s and 1960s—treated strategy as a matter of top-management judgment taught through case discussions.
The push for rigor came in 1965 with H. Igor Ansoff's Corporate Strategy, which framed strategy as a set of decisions about product-market scope and growth, and with the accounting scholar Kenneth Andrews's formulation at Harvard shortly after: strategy as a deliberate pattern of objectives and plans matching a firm's internal strengths to external opportunities. This "design school" view—strategy made at the top before execution begins—could not tell a firm how to match strengths to opportunities, only that doing so mattered. Into that gap came one of the field's most influential analytic tools.
Corporate-Level Strategy and Diversification (1960s–1970s)
As post-war conglomerates multiplied, researchers asked what mix of businesses a corporation should own. The first comprehensive attack was the Boston Consulting Group's growth–share matrix, launched in the late 1960s. It sorted a portfolio by market growth (attractiveness) and market share (relative competitive strength), yielding categories such as "stars," "cash cows," and "dogs," each with a suggested cash policy. In 1971, McKinsey consultants working with General Electric produced the GE–McKinsey nine-box matrix, scoring businesses on industry attractiveness and competitive position. These frameworks gave executives a common language for resource allocation, but they rested on a shaky premise: that share and growth were the essential measures of value.
Richard Rumelt's 1974 study Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance tested that premise far more rigorously. Examining large American firms, he categorized diversification—dominant business, related, and unrelated—and linked diversification strategy to organizational structure (a theme owed to Alfred Chandler's 1962 Strategy and Structure) and to performance. The empirical question—does related diversification create more value than unrelated?—remains contested to this day.
Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Behavioral Strategy (1963–present)
Running alongside the planning tradition was a more skeptical view, coming out of organization theory rather than business schools' strategy units. In 1963, Richard Cyert and James March's A Behavioral Theory of the Firm argued that firms do not optimize; they set acceptable targets, search locally when those targets are missed, and favor slack and precedent. This foregrounded politics, routine, and bounded rationality—the idea that managers have limited time and capacity to calculate.
The behavioral strand was periodic rather than continuous; decades later it would be revived under the label "behavioral strategy," which explicitly draws on cognitive and social psychology to explain how managers actually allocate attention and make strategic decisions. Its contribution to the field's history is the sustained challenge it poses to any strategy model that assumes rational, optimizing planners.
Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning (1970s–1980s)
The strategic-planning frameworks inherited a problem they could not solve: they built analysis inward from a firm's portfolio rather than outward from the structure of the competition it faced. Michael Porter's "five forces" framework, published in 1979–1980, offered an answer2. Drawing on the discipline of industrial organization economics, it identified five forces shaping industry profitability: rivalry among existing competitors, the threat of new entrants, the threat of substitutes, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the bargaining power of buyers12.
Porter followed in 1980 with Competitive Strategy and in 1985 with Competitive Advantage, which introduced the value chain—the sequence of activities from inbound logistics to service that together produce a product—and proposed that firms compete either by cost leadership, differentiation, or focus13. His core analytical claim, that industry structure largely determines profit, anchored the "outside-in" view: strategy is positioning within an given structure. A persistent critique, pressed by researchers including Richard Rumelt, was that firm-specific effects explained more profit variance than industry effects—pointing toward what came next.
Strategy Formation and Emergent Strategy (1978–1990s)
At McGill University, Henry Mintzberg built perhaps the field's sharpest challenge to the deliberate-design view. His 1978 paper with James Waters, "Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent," distinguished strategies intended in advance from patterns that form as a firm acts and responds—often neither fully planned nor fully unplanned. The most vivid demonstration was his 1985 piece on Honda's entry into the American motorcycle market, where the famous strategy appeared to be discovered through experience—Honda's managers, intending to sell small bikes, found the large ones failing—rather than formulated. (That account has since been challenged by other researchers, with competing renderings of the same history; the dispute itself illustrates how hard it is to separate realized strategy from the intentions behind it.)
Mintzberg's 1994 The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning attacked planning departments as ritualistic and divorced from reality, arguing strategy is closer to craft than computation. His later work codified various "schools" of strategy thought1. This processual strand—including Andrew Pettigrew's longitudinal studies of organizational change—won many adherents by matching what they saw in practice, although its critics felt it explained strategy better than it helped make it.
Resource-Based View and Core Competence (1984–1990s)
If industry analysis looked outside the firm, the resource-based view (RBV) looked inside. In 1984, Birger Wernerfelt published "A Resource-Based View of the Firm," arguing that the mix of resources—valuable, rare, hard-to-imitate assets such as brands, patents, or skills—explains competitive advantage. Jay Barney's 1991 paper gave the view its canonical formulation, the VRIN criteria: a resource generates sustained advantage if it is Valuable, Rare, Inimitable, and Non-substitutable45. A practical example: a firm's accumulated engineering know-how or its decades-old distribution network is far harder for a rival to copy than a machine it can buy.
A related but distinct formulation came from C. K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel in 1990, whose "core competence" was the collective skill—not a physical asset—that spans products and is difficult to replicate16. Their example of Honda's competence in engines, applied across motorcycles, cars, and generators, made the idea memorable. The RBV's problems, pressed by its own researchers, were later made explicit: how do you know a resource is inimitable before the fact, and what happens when the environment shifts?
Stakeholder Theory (1984–)
The same years produced a normative rival to the shareholder-centered view of the firm. R. Edward Freeman's 1984 Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach argued that managers must attend to all parties affected by the firm—employees, customers, suppliers, communities, and financiers—not only owners78. Stakeholder theory was as much a question of purpose as of performance, but in strategic terms it reframed whom strategy must satisfy and how legitimacy is earned. It has since become central to debates on corporate purpose and sustainability, though its research program is split between instrumental arguments (stakeholder management performs better) and normative ones (it is the right thing to do).
Knowledge-Based View and Organizational Learning (1990s)
RBV's next extension was epistemic. The knowledge-based view treated firms as social institutions that create, store, and deploy knowledge, with tacit knowledge—skill that is hard to spell out in instructions, like riding a bicycle—as the resource most resistant to imitation. Organizational learning literature, notably Chris Argyris and Donald Schön's work on single- and double-loop learning, distinguished fixing errors within existing rules from questioning the rules themselves9. This stream also brought the absorptive capacity idea (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990): a firm's ability to benefit from outside knowledge depends on the knowledge it already has. Like the behavioral strand, it located advantage in processes and people rather than markets or machines.
Strategy as Practice (1990s–2000s)
The 2000s brought a turn toward studying strategists themselves rather than strategy as a plan. The strategy-as-practice movement—advanced by researchers such as Richard Whittington, Paula Jarzabkowski, and Ann Langley—asked what managers actually do when they "do strategy": meetings, workshops, PowerPoint decks, offsites. Its distinctiveness lies in its unit of analysis: the micro-activities of strategizing rather than the firm's overall position. It borrowed from sociology and anthropology and gave the field rich descriptions of strategy work, though critics saw reconciliation with macro-level strategic questions as unfinished business.
Dynamic Capabilities (1990s–present)
If RBV asked what resources confer advantage, dynamic capabilities asked how a firm changes its resources when markets shift. David Teece, Gary Pisano, and Amy Shuen's 1997 paper introduced the term as the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure competencies to address rapidly changing environments101. The central question became why some firms (for instance, well-studied technology incumbents) adapt to disruption while others, holding the same physical assets, do not. Proponents distinguished ordinary capabilities (running today's business) from dynamic ones (changing tomorrow's). The idea remains influential but has been criticized for being hard to measure—capabilities risk becoming a label for good performance rather than a predictor of it.
Ecosystems, Platforms, and Open Innovation (1990s–present)
The latest era broadens the unit of analysis beyond the firm. Open innovation, popularized by Henry Chesbrough in 2003, argued that firms should source and commercialize ideas across organizational boundaries rather than only internally. Platform competition, described by Annabelle Gawer and Michael Cusumano and by David Yoffie and Michael Cusumano's work on platform leadership, shifted attention from products to the rules governing interactions among firms that build on a shared base. "Business ecosystems," as framed by James Moore in the 1990s and later by Ron Adner, described networks of interdependent firms co-specializing around a core technology or value proposition. In all three, advantage comes not from what a firm owns but from its position in relationships with others—a shift with real consequences for what counts as strategy.
Where the Field Stands Now
Today strategic management is plural. Industry and positioning analysis remains a workhorse tool; the resource-based and dynamic-capabilities views dominate inside-out thinking and the study of how firms change; behavioral strategy is ascendent in explaining decision-making; stakeholder theory underwrites purpose- and sustainability-driven strategy; platform and ecosystem perspectives dominate fields where value is co-created114. The open questions remain the field's oldest: how to measure capabilities whose value is visible mostly in hindsight, how firm effects and industry effects should be weighted, and whether strategy is best understood as something designed, something that emerges, or something enacted by people at every level. Each answer descends from a specific turn in the history above, and each is still being tested against the record of real firms.
References
- Strategic management (introduction, Industry structure and profitability, Generic competitive strategies, Value chain, Definitions, Core competence, Strategy as adapting to change), Wikipedia
- Porter's five forces analysis, Wikipedia
- Value chain, Wikipedia
- Resource-based view (Origins and background, introduction), Wikipedia
- VRIO, Wikipedia
- Core competency (introduction, Background), Wikipedia
- Stakeholder theory (History), Wikipedia
- Stakeholder approach (History), Wikipedia
- Organizational learning (History of study), Wikipedia
- Dynamic capabilities, Wikipedia
- Behavioral strategy, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Strategic Management
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1955-1980
Business Policy and the Design School
How should top managers match strengths to opportunities?
- 1962-1990
Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis
Which mix of businesses should a corporation own?
- 1963-Present
- 1978-2000
Strategy Formation and Emergent Strategy
Where does realized strategy actually come from?
- 1979-Present
Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning
What makes an industry profitable?
- 1984-Present
- 1984-Present
- 1990-Present
Knowledge-Based View and Organizational Learning
How do firms create and use knowledge?
- 1993-Present
Ecosystems, Platforms, and Open Innovation
How do firms create value with partners and platforms?
- 1997-Present
Dynamic Capabilities
How do firms renew their capabilities as markets shift?
- 2000-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Strategy Formation and Emergent Strategy reacted against Business Policy and the Design School
Mintzberg and Waters's 'Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent' (1978) defined itself against the design school's premise that strategy is formulated at the top before execution. Mintzberg's later attack on strategic planning extended this rejection of the deliberate-design view.
Resource-based view reacted against Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning
Wernerfelt's 1984 resource-based paper and Barney's 1991 VRIN formulation answered Porter's claim that industry structure largely determines profit by locating advantage in firm-specific, hard-to-imitate resources. Rumelt's finding that firm effects outweighed industry effects was the empirical wedge.
Carried by Birger Wernerfelt; Jay Barney; Richard Rumelt.
Knowledge-Based View and Organizational Learning grew out of Resource-based view
The knowledge-based view extended the resource-based view by treating knowledge as the key inimitable resource and firms as institutions for creating and deploying it. Prahalad and Hamel's core-competence formulation (1990) carried the RBV's logic from physical assets to collective skills.
Carried by C. K. Prahalad; Gary Hamel.
Dynamic Capabilities grew out of Resource-based view
Dynamic capabilities grew directly out of the resource-based view's problem of how resources stay valuable when environments shift. Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997) recast the RBV's static resources as capabilities that must be renewed.
Carried by David Teece; Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management (1997).
Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis grew out of Business Policy and the Design School
Ansoff's Corporate Strategy (1965) grew out of the business policy tradition, turning its general design questions into explicit decisions about product-market scope and growth. The diversification frameworks of the late 1960s then built directly on that corporate-level formulation.
Carried by H. Igor Ansoff; Corporate Strategy (1965).
Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning reacted against Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis
Porter's five-forces framework (1979–1980) was framed as a corrective to portfolio-planning tools that analyzed inward from the firm's businesses rather than outward from industry structure. He drew instead on industrial organization economics to explain profitability.
Carried by Michael Porter.
Strategy as Practice grew out of Strategy Formation and Emergent Strategy
Strategy-as-practice grew out of Mintzberg's processual, emergent view and Pettigrew's longitudinal studies of organizational change, shifting attention from formulated strategy to the everyday activities of strategists. It refined the process tradition into a practice-theoretic research program.
Carried by Andrew Pettigrew; Henry Mintzberg.
Dynamic Capabilities influenced by Knowledge-Based View and Organizational Learning
The dynamic-capabilities literature drew on the knowledge-based and organizational-learning strand, treating learning and knowledge recombination as the processes by which capabilities are reconfigured. Teece's formulation explicitly builds on organizational learning and knowledge creation.
Carried by David Teece.
Resource-based view influenced by Business Policy and the Design School
The resource-based view took up the design school's question of matching internal strengths to external opportunities but recast 'strengths' as identifiable, inimitable resources. Andrews's SWOT-style formulation supplied the internal side of the problem the RBV then made analytic.
Carried by Kenneth Andrews.
Resource-based view influenced by Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis
Rumelt's 1974 study of diversification and performance, itself part of the corporate-strategy literature, supplied evidence that firm-specific effects mattered, which the resource-based view used to argue against industry-level explanations. The RBV inherited the corporate-strategy question of what a firm should own.
Carried by Richard Rumelt; Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance (1974).
Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning rival of Behavioral strategy
The behavioral tradition and Porter's positioning school were contemporaries offering competing accounts of firm conduct and performance, one stressing bounded rationality and routines, the other industry structure. There is no documented descent between them.
Ecosystems, Platforms, and Open Innovation reacted against Industry Analysis and Competitive Positioning
Ecosystem and platform thinking defined itself against the positioning view's assumption of a given industry structure, arguing that firms co-create and reshape their environments through networks and complementors. The unit of analysis moved from the industry to the ecosystem.
Ecosystems, Platforms, and Open Innovation influenced by Knowledge-Based View and Organizational Learning
The ecosystems and open-innovation literature drew on the knowledge-based view's claim that firms create and exchange knowledge across boundaries, extending it to inter-organizational networks and platforms. The shift from firm-held knowledge to distributed knowledge across partners carried the KBV's premise outward.
Beyond the field
Where Strategic Management's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 48 links.
Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis grew out of Strategy and Structure in Management
Chandler's Strategy and Structure (1962) supplied the strategy-then-structure thesis and the diversification categories that Ansoff and later corporate strategy analysts built on in the mid-1960s.
Carried by Alfred D. Chandler; Strategy and Structure (1962); H. Igor Ansoff.
Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis influenced Synergy and Strategic Rationale in Mergers And Acquisitions
The strategic rationale for mergers and the synergy concept grew out of corporate strategy and diversification analysis, which asked why firms should combine businesses. Synergy arguments are the merger-specific application of that diversification logic.
Carried by Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis.
Resource-based view influenced Familiness and Resource-Based View in Family Business
Strategic management's resource-based view, especially Barney's VRIN criteria, is the direct theoretical base of the familiness construct. Habbershon and Williams applied RBV logic to argue family involvement can yield valuable, rare and hard-to-imitate resources.
Carried by Jay B. Barney; Timothy G. Habbershon; Mary L. Williams.
Stakeholder Theory reacted against Shareholder primacy in Corporate Governance
Stakeholder theory was framed in explicit opposition to the shareholder-primacy view associated with Friedman's 1970 doctrine and its later restatements. Freeman defined the stakeholder approach by rejecting the claim that managers owe obligations only to owners.
Carried by R. Edward Freeman; Milton Friedman.
Stakeholder Theory reacted against Shareholder Primacy in Business Ethics
Stakeholder theory arose as a direct attack on the shareholder-primacy position, whose modern statement is Berle and Means' 1932 separation-of-ownership argument and its later defence by Friedman. Freeman defined his framework by rejecting the primacy of shareholder claims.
Carried by Adolf A. Berle; Gardiner C. Means; R. Edward Freeman.
Ecosystems, Platforms, and Open Innovation influenced Platform and Ecosystem Strategy in Information Systems
Work on ecosystems, platforms and open innovation supplied the core concepts of platform and ecosystem strategy. Platform strategy research extended this body of work to competitive dynamics among platform firms.
Dynamic Capabilities grew out of Resource-Based View in Management
Dynamic capabilities grew directly out of the resource-based view, extending its static account of valuable, rare, inimitable resources to how firms renew those resources in changing environments. Teece, Pisano and Shuen built explicitly on Barney and the resource-based literature.
Carried by David J. Teece; Gary Pisano; Jay B. Barney.
Strategy as Practice influenced by Practice-Based and Processual Approaches in Organization Theory
Practice-based and processual approaches in organization theory, especially the strategy-process work of Mintzberg and Pettigrew, supplied the concepts and methods that strategy-as-practice researchers adopted. The later framework carried that processual orientation into the study of strategy work.
Carried by Andrew Pettigrew; Henry Mintzberg.
Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis influenced Growth–share matrix in Marketing Strategy
Corporate strategy work on diversification and product-market portfolios, notably at Harvard, supplied the categories the growth-share matrix plotted as businesses to keep, build or divest.
Corporate Strategy and Diversification Analysis influenced Integrated Strategy in Global Strategy
Corporate strategy and diversification analysis, especially the strategy-structure and portfolio traditions, provided the corporate-level questions about scope and synergy that integrated strategy reworked at the business and network level.
Carried by Alfred Chandler; Michael Porter.
Behavioral strategy influenced Behavioral and process approach in Entrepreneurship
The behavioral and process approach to entrepreneurship drew on behavioral strategy's concern with how managers actually make decisions under uncertainty rather than on rational-choice models. Concepts of bounded rationality and incremental decision-making passed into the study of entrepreneurial processes.
Carried by James G. March; Richard Cyert.
Behavioral strategy influenced by Behavioral Decision Theory in Management
Behavioral decision theory, especially the bounded-rationality and heuristic work of Simon and his collaborators, supplied the cognitive premises that Cyert and March built into the behavioral theory of the firm. Behavioral strategy inherited its view of managers as boundedly rational searchers.
Carried by Herbert A. Simon.

Strategic Management is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 11 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Strategic ManagementRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Management 6 links
- Organizational Knowledge 5 links
- Innovation Management 4 links
- Marketing Strategy 4 links
- Information Systems 3 links
- Organization Theory 3 links
- Business Ethics 2 links
- Entrepreneurship 2 links
- Digital Strategy 2 links
- Platform Strategy 2 links
- Global Strategy 2 links
- International Business 2 links
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See where Strategic Management sits on the Map of Human Knowledge