Choice Under Uncertainty
Choice under uncertainty is the part of microeconomics that asks how a person should—and how a person actually does—choose when the consequences of each option are not known in advance.
9 frameworks, from 1654 to today · Microeconomics · Economics
- Expected Value Theory 1654-1738
- Expected utility hypothesis 1944-Present
- Subjective Expected Utility 1954-Present
- Prospect Theory 1979-Present
- Rank-dependent expected utility 1982-Present
- Ambiguity Aversion Models 1989-Present
- Maxmin Expected Utility 1989-Present
- Behavioral Belief Formation 1990-Present
- Smooth Ambiguity Model 2005-Present
Overview
Choice under uncertainty is the part of microeconomics that asks how a person should—and how a person actually does—choose when the consequences of each option are not known in advance1. A farmer deciding which crop to plant, an insurer setting a premium, a saver allocating a pension, a doctor choosing a treatment: each must weigh outcomes that may or may not happen. The field's history is a long argument about what "rational" choice under risk means, and about what to do when real people depart from the rational benchmark. Its central tool, expected utility theory, became one of the most successful theories in all of economics—and its most productive failures became the foundation of behavioral economics.
Gambling, Probability, and Expected Value
The mathematical study of risk began with games of chance12. In the mid-seventeenth century, correspondence between Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat (1654) laid the foundations of probability theory while analyzing how to divide stakes in an interrupted game12. Soon after, Christiaan Huygens published the first printed treatise on probability (1657), and Jacob Bernoulli's Ars Conjectandi (posthumous, 1713) gave the law of large numbers and the first sustained treatment of using probability to make decisions.
From this work emerged the expected value rule: the value of a gamble is the sum of each outcome's value multiplied by its probability1. A coin flip paying 100 or nothing is worth 503. The rule is simple, and it was enormously influential—it underlies actuarial practice and much of early probability. But it had an obvious problem, noticed early: people do not value gambles by their expected money1. The St. Petersburg paradox, discussed by Daniel Bernoulli in a 1738 paper for the Imperial Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg, made the point sharply14. A coin is flipped until heads appears; the pot starts at 2 and doubles each flip. The expected payout is infinite (½·2 + ¼·4 + ⅛·8 + …), yet few would pay more than a modest sum to play. Expected value could not explain this.
Bernoulli's Utility and the Marginalist Tradition
Daniel Bernoulli's answer was that people value the utility of money, not money itself, and that utility rises at a diminishing rate. The first dollars matter more than the thousandth. This idea—diminishing marginal utility—made the St. Petersburg gamble worth a finite amount and gave a psychological account of risk aversion. It also connected choice under uncertainty to the broader marginalist revolution in economics, which by the 1870s (Jevons, Menger, Walras) was building value theory on marginal utility.
For decades, though, utility remained a vague, hedonistic quantity. Economists could not measure it, and comparisons across people seemed meaningless. The decisive move came from the ordinalist revolution of the 1930s, associated with John Hicks and R. G. D. Allen, which argued that consumer theory needed only rankings of bundles, not measurable utility. That raised an awkward question for risk: if utility is only ordinal, what does it mean to take an expected value of it? Adding utilities presupposes that they can be compared and weighted—a cardinal notion the ordinalists had rejected.
Von Neumann–Morgenstern and the Axiomatic Expected Utility
The resolution came from an unexpected direction: game theory. In Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern needed a numerical payoff for each player to define equilibrium. They showed that if a decision-maker's preferences over lotteries satisfy a small set of axioms—completeness, transitivity, continuity, and a substitution or "independence" condition—then those preferences can be represented by a utility function whose expected value ranks lotteries correctly. Utility was back, but now as a constructed index derived from choices among gambles, not a psychological feeling.
The independence axiom is the heart of it: if you prefer lottery A to lottery B, then mixing each with the same third lottery C (with the same probability) should not reverse your preference. This is what licenses the probability-weighted sum. The result was a triumph: it gave economics a rigorous, choice-based theory of risk and made expected utility the default model for insurance, finance, and macroeconomics. Later axiomatizations by Leonard Savage and others refined it, and the framework became so standard that "expected utility" and "rational choice under risk" were nearly synonymous.
Savage and Subjective Probability
Von Neumann–Morgenstern assumed the probabilities were known—objective chances, like dice5. Most real uncertainty is not like that. A firm does not know the chance its product fails; a doctor does not know the chance a treatment works. Leonard Savage's The Foundations of Statistics (1954) extended the theory to subjective expected utility: if a person's preferences over acts satisfy a set of axioms (including a "sure-thing" principle), then there exist both a personal probability and a utility function such that the person behaves as if maximizing expected utility with those personal probabilities65. Probability became a property of the decision-maker's beliefs, revealed by choices, not of the world5.
Savage's framework, building on earlier work by Frank Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti, is one of the deepest results in decision theory6. It also carried a strong normative claim: a rational person's beliefs should obey the probability calculus, and their choices should be consistent with expected utility. The "Dutch book" argument—that inconsistent beliefs or preferences expose you to a set of bets you are bound to lose—gave this claim teeth1.
Allais, Ellsberg, and the Cracks
Even as the theory consolidated, anomalies accumulated. In 1953 Maurice Allais presented a pair of choice problems in which most people, including eminent decision theorists, violated the independence axiom. The pattern—now called the Allais paradox—showed that people overweight outcomes that are certain relative to merely probable ones, a "certainty effect" the expected utility model cannot accommodate.
A second challenge came from ambiguity. Daniel Ellsberg's 1961 thought experiments (published in 1961 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics) presented urns with known versus unknown proportions of colored balls. Most people prefer to bet on the urn with known odds, even when the unknown urn offers the same or better expected payoff7. This ambiguity aversion violates Savage's sure-thing principle. Together, Allais and Ellsberg showed that the elegant axioms were descriptively false for many people—and raised the question of whether they were normatively required5.
Prospect Theory and the Behavioral Turn
The decisive break came from psychology. In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published prospect theory, a descriptive model built from experimental evidence rather than axioms89. Its central features: people evaluate outcomes as gains or losses relative to a reference point, not as final wealth levels; losses loom larger than equivalent gains (loss aversion); and probabilities are transformed—small probabilities are overweighted, moderate and high ones underweighted—so that the decision weight attached to an outcome is not its objective probability. The value function is concave for gains and convex for losses, producing risk aversion in gains and risk seeking in losses.
Prospect theory explained the Allais pattern, the certainty effect, and a mass of framing effects that expected utility could not. It became the empirical workhorse of behavioral economics; Kahneman received the Nobel Memorial Prize in 2002 (Tversky had died in 1996). A later refinement, cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), fixed technical problems with how the original handled many-outcome gambles by applying probability weighting to cumulative distributions, making the model consistent with stochastic dominance.
Rank-Dependent Utility and the Weighting of Probabilities
Prospect theory's probability weighting had a mathematical ancestor and descendant. In 1982, John Quiggin proposed rank-dependent utility, in which outcomes are ranked and decision weights are assigned by a transformation of cumulative probabilities rather than to each outcome separately10. This preserved the expected-utility structure in a generalized form while allowing systematic departures from linear probability weighting—and it avoided the violations of dominance that plagued naive weighting schemes. Rank-dependent utility, developed further by Chew, Epstein, Segal, and others, became a general framework within which prospect theory's weighting function could be embedded. It showed that one could keep much of the axiomatic apparatus while relaxing the independence axiom in a disciplined way.
Maxmin Expected Utility and the Ambiguity Literature
Ellsberg's paradox demanded a theory of ambiguity, and the leading response came from Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler in 1989: maxmin expected utility. A decision-maker who is unsure of the probabilities is modeled as holding a set of possible priors and evaluating each act by its worst-case expected utility over that set11. This "pessimistic" rule rationalizes ambiguity aversion and connects to earlier work by Schmeidler on non-additive probabilities (capacities) and by Peter Wakker and others. Alternative models followed—variational preferences (Maccheroni, Marinacci, Rustichini, 2006), smooth ambiguity (Klibanoff, Marinacci, Mukerji, 2005), and the "alpha-maxmin" family—each trading off tractability, explanatory power, and normative appeal. The ambiguity literature remains active, with applications to asset pricing (the equity premium puzzle), insurance, and climate policy.
Behavioral Belief Formation
A parallel line of research asked not how people weight given probabilities but how they form beliefs at all. Psychologists had long documented systematic biases: overconfidence (people's confidence intervals are too narrow), the hindsight bias, and the tendency to update beliefs too little or too much relative to Bayes' rule. In economics, the behavioral belief formation literature—associated with figures such as Matthew Rabin, Colin Camerer, and later Stefano DellaVigna and Ulrike Malmendier—studied how people extrapolate from recent experience, overweight salient events, and hold biased priors. The "law of small numbers" (people treat small samples as representative) and projection bias (people underestimate how their preferences will change) became standard explanatory tools. This work fed into behavioral finance, where biased beliefs help explain bubbles, underreaction, and overreaction in asset markets.
The Present
Today, choice under uncertainty is a plural field. Expected utility remains the benchmark—the model against which alternatives are measured and the default in most applied work, from asset pricing to mechanism design. But the descriptive literature has produced a menu of models—prospect theory, rank-dependent utility, maxmin and smooth ambiguity, reference-dependent preferences, and behavioral belief formation—each capturing some departures from the benchmark while leaving others unexplained12. A central open question is which model to use when: the field lacks a single unified descriptive theory, and the normative status of the alternatives is contested. Some argue that ambiguity aversion is a rational response to genuine uncertainty; others treat it as a bias to be corrected. The rise of machine learning and large-scale data has also opened new ways to estimate preference parameters and test models outside the laboratory. What began as a puzzle about a coin-flipping game in St. Petersburg has become one of the most empirically rich and theoretically contested areas of microeconomics.
References
- Decision theory (Choice under uncertainty, introduction, History, Probability theory), Wikipedia
- Expected value (History), Wikipedia
- Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia
- St. Petersburg paradox, Wikipedia
- Subjective expected utility, Wikipedia
- Savage's subjective expected utility model, Wikipedia
- Ellsberg paradox, Wikipedia
- Prospect theory, Wikipedia
- Loss aversion (History), Wikipedia
- Rank-dependent expected utility, Wikipedia
- Itzhak Gilboa, Wikipedia
- Generalized expected utility, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Choice Under Uncertainty
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1654-1738
Expected Value Theory
How should one calculate the average outcome of a random event?
- 1944-Present
Expected utility hypothesis
How should one choose between uncertain outcomes?
- 1954-Present
Subjective Expected Utility
How should one assign value to uncertain outcomes?
- 1979-Present
- 1982-Present
Rank-dependent expected utility
How should one weigh different possible outcomes?
- 1989-Present
Ambiguity Aversion Models
How should one decide when probabilities are unknown?
- 1989-Present
Maxmin Expected Utility
How should one make decisions when facing unknown risks?
- 1990-Present
Behavioral Belief Formation
How are beliefs about uncertain events formed?
- 2005-Present
Smooth Ambiguity Model
How should one choose when probabilities are uncertain?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Prospect Theory reacted against Subjective Expected Utility
This model arose directly from empirical observations showing systematic deviations from the assumptions of expected utility theory.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Expected utility hypothesis influenced by Expected Value Theory
The concept of expected value from early probability laid the foundation for the formal utility maximization approach developed in game theory.
Carried by John von Neumann; Oskar Morgenstern.
Subjective Expected Utility grew out of Expected utility hypothesis
The idea that utility could be subjective, rather than derived from objective axioms, was an extension of the utility concept established by the axiomatic approach.
Carried by Leonard Savage.
Rank-dependent expected utility influenced by Prospect Theory
The weighting of probabilities in prospect theory found a mathematical generalization in the concept of rank-dependent utility.
Carried by John Quiggin.
Smooth Ambiguity Model grew out of Ambiguity Aversion Models
The need to formally model decisions under uncertainty about probabilities drove the development of models like this one.
Beyond the field
Where Choice Under Uncertainty's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 58 links.
Expected Value Theory replaced by Expected utility hypothesis in Decision And Risk Analysis
Expected value theory, the Pascal-Fermat criterion of maximising monetary expectation, was replaced by Bernoulli's expected utility as the working account of choice under risk.
Carried by Daniel Bernoulli.
Expected Value Theory replaced by Expected utility hypothesis in Behavioral Decision Theory
Expected value theory, the rule of maximising probability-weighted monetary outcomes, was the working view until Bernoulli showed in 1738 that it fails on the St Petersburg paradox. Expected utility replaced it by weighting outcomes by their utility rather than their monetary value.
Carried by Daniel Bernoulli.
Expected Value Theory influenced Expected-Value Theory in Poker
Poker's expected-value theory applies the classical expected-value calculus developed from Pascal and Fermat through Huygens and Bernoulli to pot odds, drawing odds and bet sizing.
Carried by Blaise Pascal; Christiaan Huygens.
Expected Value Theory replaced by Expected utility hypothesis in Consumer Theory
The expected utility hypothesis replaced expected value as the working theory of choice under risk: Bernoulli's St Petersburg resolution and the later axiomatisation substituted expected utility for the expected monetary value of the older calculus.
Carried by Daniel Bernoulli; John von Neumann; Oskar Morgenstern.
Expected Value Theory replaced by Expected utility hypothesis in Insurance Theory
Expected value theory, the rule of maximising the arithmetic mean of monetary outcomes, was replaced by Bernoulli's expected utility, which resolved the St Petersburg paradox by valuing outcomes through a concave utility function. Bernoulli's 1738 paper defined the new hypothesis against the old rule.
Carried by Daniel Bernoulli; Specimen theoriae novae de mensura sortis (1738).
Expected utility hypothesis provoked Prospect Theory in Behavioral Law And Economics
Prospect theory was explicitly presented as a critique of expected utility theory, replacing its axioms with an empirically derived value function and probability weighting.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Expected utility hypothesis provoked Prospect Theory in Reasoning Decision Making
Prospect theory was explicitly constructed as a descriptive replacement for expected utility, rejecting its axioms with observed violations such as loss aversion and probability weighting.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Expected utility hypothesis led to Subjective Expected Utility in Decision And Risk Analysis
Subjective expected utility was built directly on the expected utility hypothesis, extending its axioms to subjective probability.
Carried by Leonard J. Savage.
Expected utility hypothesis provoked Bounded Rationality in Behavioral Economics
Simon framed bounded rationality against the expected utility model of rational choice, arguing agents satisfice rather than maximize expected utility.
Carried by Herbert A. Simon.
Expected utility hypothesis provoked Prospect Theory in Behavioral Economics
Prospect theory was framed as a descriptive alternative to expected utility theory, defining itself by the violations of expected utility axioms it documented.
Carried by Daniel Kahneman; Amos Tversky.
Expected utility hypothesis led to Subjective expected utility in Reasoning Decision Making
Subjective expected utility, developed by Savage from 1954, generalized von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility by deriving both probabilities and utilities from preferences.
Carried by Leonard J. Savage; The Foundations of Statistics (1954).
Subjective Expected Utility grew out of Expected utility hypothesis in Decision And Risk Analysis
Subjective expected utility is a generalization of expected utility: Savage replaced objective probabilities with subjective ones while keeping the expected-utility maximization structure.
Carried by Leonard J. Savage; The Foundations of Statistics (1954).

Choice Under Uncertainty is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 9 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Choice Under UncertaintyRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Decision And Risk Analysis 13 links
- Reasoning Decision Making 6 links
- Consumer Theory 6 links
- Behavioral Decision Theory 5 links
- Insurance Theory 4 links
- Behavioral Economics 3 links
- Neoclassical Economics 3 links
- Microeconomics 3 links
- Behavioral Law And Economics 2 links
- Psychology 2 links
- Reinforcement Learning 1 link
- Experimental Economics 1 link
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