Irregular Warfare History
Irregular warfare is armed conflict fought by forces that are not a state's regular army, or against such forces: guerrillas, partisans, insurgents, militias, terrorists, privateers, and the state forces sent to suppress them.
10 frameworks, from 1808 to today · Military History · History
Overview
Irregular warfare is armed conflict fought by forces that are not a state's regular army, or against such forces: guerrillas, partisans, insurgents, militias, terrorists, privateers, and the state forces sent to suppress them123. Its history is the story of how people have fought without—or against—the conventional battle line, and of how the regular armies that faced them learned, often painfully, to adapt. What is at stake is not a minor sideshow to "real" war. Most armed conflict since 1945 has been irregular, and most of the strategic disasters of the past two centuries—Napoleon in Spain, the United States in Vietnam, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan—were failures to understand it1. The field's central problem is a mismatch of knowledge: irregular war is fought by the weak against the strong, so its records are scattered, its doctrine often unwritten, and its history frequently written by the side that lost.
Partisans, francs-tireurs, and the Napoleonic crucible
Irregular war is ancient—Roman legions fought Iberian guerrillas, and the word "guerrilla" (Spanish for "little war") dates from the Peninsular War of 1808–1814, when Spanish irregulars and bands tied down French armies243. But the modern field begins with the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, when mass conscription and nationalism made whole populations potential combatants3. In Spain, the guerrilleros combined local knowledge, ambush, and terror against isolated French garrisons; the French response—reprisals, hostage-taking, and the burning of villages—became a template for counterinsurgency that recurs for two centuries4. In Russia in 1812, partisan detachments under commanders such as Denis Davydov harassed Napoleon's retreating army, and peasant resistance turned the winter into a weapon5.
The nineteenth century added two crucial developments. First, the francs-tireurs—French irregulars who sniped at Prussian forces in 1870–71—convinced European armies that civilians in arms were a threat to be met with harsh reprisal, a belief that shaped the laws of war and the brutality of occupation in 1914. Second, colonial warfare gave regular armies a laboratory: the British in India and South Africa, the French in Algeria and Indochina, the Russians in the Caucasus. These "small wars" produced the first self-conscious doctrine. C. E. Callwell's Small Wars (1896) codified the British experience—how to march, supply, and fight against "uncivilised" enemies—and became a standard text1. Its assumptions about racial and technological superiority would later be dismantled, but its recognition that irregular war demanded different methods from European warfare was foundational.
People's war and the revolutionary tradition
The twentieth century's decisive turn was the fusion of irregular warfare with revolutionary politics. Mao Zedong's writings from the 1930s—especially On Guerrilla Warfare (1937) and On Protracted War (1938)—set out a theory of people's war: insurgents move among the population like fish in water, build political support in base areas, pass through phases from terrorism and guerrilla harassment to mobile warfare and finally conventional battle, and win by exhausting the enemy's will rather than destroying his army6. Mao's framework was not merely military; it was a theory of revolutionary state-building. It was enormously influential, adapted by the Viet Minh against France and the United States, by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara in Cuba (whose Guerrilla Warfare, 1960, argued for small focos—insurgent nuclei—rather than Mao's long political preparation), and by anticolonial movements across Africa and Asia67.
The Maoist model also produced its own critique. Guevara's foco theory failed in Bolivia in 1967, where the insurgents found no popular base; the lesson drawn by later analysts was that Mao's emphasis on political mobilization could not be skipped. Meanwhile, the Cold War turned irregular war into a global contest: the Soviet Union and China backed "wars of national liberation," while the United States backed governments fighting them. This is the era of proxy warfare—conflicts in which outside powers supply money, arms, advisers, and sometimes combatants to local factions, pursuing their rivalry without direct confrontation8. The Greek Civil War (1946–49), Korea, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Afghanistan all combined local grievances with superpower patronage8. Proxy war is not new—Britain and France had fought by proxy in eighteenth-century India—but the Cold War made it the dominant form of great-power competition in the periphery.
Counterinsurgency: from Malaya to the modern doctrine
Against people's war, states developed counterinsurgency (COIN): the set of political, economic, and military measures to defeat an insurgency and build legitimate authority9. The British campaign in Malaya (1948–1960) became the canonical success. Its key figure, General Gerald Templer, combined military pressure with "hearts and minds"—winning population support through resettlement, economic development, and political reform—and the Briggs Plan of 1950 relocated hundreds of thousands of rural Chinese into guarded "new villages" to cut the insurgents off from their base. The French in Algeria (1954–62) developed a different model: the guerre révolutionnaire school, with its emphasis on intelligence, population control, and the "battle of the cities" (the Battle of Algiers, 1957), but it was accompanied by torture and ultimately failed politically. The American experience in Vietnam produced both the strategic-hamlet program and, in the aftermath, a bitter debate: did the United States lose because it fought the wrong war, or because it fought the right war badly10?
The post-Vietnam period saw COIN fall out of fashion in the US military, which turned toward conventional warfare. It returned with force after 2001. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq produced a new doctrine, codified in the US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24, 2006), drafted under General David Petraeus and informed by scholars such as John Nagl (whose Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 2002, compared British and American COIN learning)11. FM 3-24 emphasized protecting the population, understanding local politics, and integrating civilian and military effort. Its influence was real but contested: the "surge" in Iraq (2007) was credited with reducing violence, while critics argued that COIN's promise of population protection was often unmet and that its costs in troops and time were unsustainable11. The doctrine's later retreat—and the Taliban's return to power in 2021—left the field's central question open: whether liberal states can win protracted irregular wars at all.
New wars, hybrid war, and the postcolonial critique
From the 1990s, scholars began to argue that the nature of irregular conflict had changed. Mary Kaldor's New and Old Wars (1999) described "new wars"—conflicts in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Africa—characterized by identity politics, criminal economies, and violence against civilians rather than battles between states12. The thesis was influential but criticized: critics such as Stathis Kalyvas argued that many "new" features were old, and that the label obscured continuities. The debate sharpened the field's attention to the political economy of violence—how warlords, smuggling, and diaspora funding sustain armed groups.
A second late-twentieth-century concept was hybrid warfare: the blending of regular and irregular methods, including information operations, cyber attacks, and deniable "little green men," as in Russia's 2014 annexation of Crimea1314. The term is contested—some analysts see it as a rebranding of longstanding practice—but it captured a real shift in how states such as Russia and Iran have used proxies, militias, and information campaigns alongside conventional forces1314.
Alongside these, a postcolonial critique reshaped the field's self-understanding. Scholars from the Global South and their allies argued that the historiography of irregular war had been written largely from the perspective of imperial powers, that "terrorism" and "insurgency" were labels applied selectively, and that the experiences of anticolonial fighters deserved study on their own terms rather than as case studies in counterinsurgency. This critique drew attention to the violence of colonial "small wars" and to the ways in which COIN doctrine has been used to legitimize repression.
The field today
Irregular warfare history now draws on several approaches that descend directly from this past. The Maoist and revolutionary-tradition literature remains central to understanding insurgency, while COIN studies have become more skeptical of quick victories and more attentive to local politics. Proxy-war scholarship has grown with the study of contemporary conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Ukraine, where state and non-state actors blur. The "new wars" debate has matured into a broader inquiry into the political economy of armed groups, and hybrid-war analysis has pushed the field to integrate cyber and information dimensions. Historians increasingly work across archives in multiple languages, recover insurgent voices, and treat irregular war as a global phenomenon rather than a Western problem. The open questions are the old ones in new form: why do weak actors so often prevail or endure, what makes counterinsurgency succeed or fail, and how should the history of irregular war be written when the powerful have kept most of the records?
References
- Irregular warfare (Other definitions, Activities, Examples, Early usage), Wikipedia
- Guerrilla warfare, Wikipedia
- Irregular military (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Guerrilla warfare in the Peninsular War, Wikipedia
- Partisan (military) (History before 1939), Wikipedia
- People's war, Wikipedia
- Foco, Wikipedia
- Proxy war, Wikipedia
- Counterinsurgency, Wikipedia
- Strategic Hamlet Program, Wikipedia
- FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, Wikipedia
- New wars, Wikipedia
- Hybrid warfare, Wikipedia
- Russian hybrid warfare, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Irregular Warfare History
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1808-Present
- 1896-1945
- 1937-Present
- 1947-Present
- 1948-Present
Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency
How do states win population support against insurgents?
- 1954-1962
- 1960-1975
- 1990-Present
Postcolonial Critique
Whose perspective has irregular war history served?
- 1999-Present
- 2005-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency reacted against People's War
Hearts and minds counterinsurgency defined itself against Maoist people's war, answering its population-based strategy with competing claims to win the population's support rather than merely to defeat guerrillas militarily.
Carried by Gerald Templer; Briggs Plan (1950).
Foco grew out of People's War
Guevara's foco theory grew out of Mao's people's war but simplified it, arguing that a small insurgent nucleus could create the conditions for popular support rather than requiring Mao's long political preparation.
Carried by Che Guevara; Guerrilla Warfare (1960).
Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency influenced by Small Wars School
British counterinsurgency in Malaya drew on the colonial small wars tradition, and the Briggs Plan's resettlement of rural Chinese adapted earlier small-wars methods of population control to a communist insurgency.
Carried by Gerald Templer; Briggs Plan (1950).
Postcolonial Critique reacted against Small Wars School
Postcolonial scholars drew attention to the violence of colonial small wars and rejected the racial and technological assumptions that had underpinned Callwell's doctrine.
Guerre Révolutionnaire reacted against People's War
The French guerre révolutionnaire school in Algeria developed its doctrine of intelligence, population control and urban battle as a response to the Viet Minh's Maoist people's war in Indochina.
Postcolonial Critique reacted against Hearts and Minds Counterinsurgency
Postcolonial critique attacked the counterinsurgency tradition for writing irregular war history from the imperial perspective and for using labels like 'terrorism' and 'insurgency' selectively to legitimize repression.
Beyond the field
Where Irregular Warfare History's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 28 links.
Partisan Warfare influenced Irregular warfare in Military History
Mid-twentieth-century studies of partisan warfare in occupied Europe supplied the historical cases and vocabulary that the later irregular warfare literature generalized. Writers on irregular war drew on partisan experience to define resistance and guerrilla conflict.
Partisan Warfare influenced by Sovereign Right to Wage War in Use Of Force
Partisan warfare doctrine rests on the legal distinction between lawful sovereign war and irregular combatants, which the Westphalian sovereign right to wage war and its later codification framed. The Spanish guerrilla of 1808 forced jurists and commanders to reason about who could lawfully bear arms, a question inherited from that sovereign-war framework.
Carried by Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
Partisan Warfare influenced Counterinsurgency Strategy in Strategic History
Partisan and guerrilla warfare experience, from the Spanish guerrilla and later resistance movements, supplied the model of irregular enemy that counterinsurgency theory was written to defeat. Counterinsurgency doctrine took its problems and terminology from that literature.
Small Wars School influenced by Official and Campaign History in War And Society
The Small Wars School built its doctrine largely from official and campaign histories of colonial expeditions, which supplied the case material for its manuals. Callwell's Small Wars (1896) and later Marine Corps doctrine distilled lessons directly from such campaign narratives.
Carried by Charles Callwell; Small Wars (1896).
Small Wars School influenced Air Power in Irregular and Asymmetric War in Air Power History
Air power in colonial and irregular war drew on the small wars school of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which codified the conduct of campaigns against irregular opponents. That school's principles of colonial policing and punitive expedition shaped how aircraft were used in imperial control.
Carried by Charles Callwell.
Small Wars School influenced Irregular warfare in Military History
The small-wars school of Callwell and later colonial practitioners supplied the case material and maxims that the post-1960 irregular warfare literature reworked for Cold War insurgency. Writers on irregular war cited colonial small-war experience as precedent.
Carried by C. E. Callwell.
People's War influenced by Classical Chinese Military Thought in Strategic History
Mao Zedong drew explicitly on classical Chinese military texts such as Sunzi for ideas of deception, morale, and the relation of politics to war. These concepts shaped his writings on protracted people's war.
Carried by Mao Zedong; Sunzi.
People's War influenced by On War in History Of Political Violence
Mao read and cited Clausewitz's On War, taking from it the primacy of politics over war and the notion of war as a continuation of policy. These ideas structured his account of protracted people's war.
Carried by Mao Zedong; On War (1832).
People's War influenced by Total War in War And Society
People's War doctrine absorbed the total-war idea that whole societies, not just armies, are the instrument and target of conflict. Mao's mobilization of the entire population and economy for protracted war generalised the total-war experience of 1914-1918.
Carried by Mao Zedong.
People's War influenced by Clausewitzian theory of war in Military History
Mao's people's war doctrine took up Clausewitzian ideas of the political nature of war and the moral forces of the people. His essays on protracted war apply these concepts to revolutionary insurgency.
Carried by Mao Zedong; Carl von Clausewitz.
People's War influenced Irregular warfare in Military History
Maoist people's war doctrine supplied the model of protracted insurgent mobilization that the post-1960 irregular warfare literature took as its central case. Analysts of irregular war built their typologies around Mao's stages of guerrilla struggle.
Carried by Mao Zedong.
Proxy war influenced by Realism in Security Studies
Security-studies realism provided the framework in which proxy wars were interpreted as indirect great-power contests. Concepts of deterrence, credibility, and the security dilemma shaped how proxy conflicts were analysed.

Irregular Warfare History is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Irregular Warfare HistoryRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Strategic History 7 links
- Military History 5 links
- History Of Political Movements 3 links
- Use Of Force 2 links
- War And Society 2 links
- History Of Political Violence 2 links
- Security Studies 2 links
- Human Rights Law 1 link
- Air Power History 1 link
- Military Technology History 1 link
- Diplomatic History 1 link
- International Relations 1 link
More in Military History
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- Operational History
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- War And Society
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