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Informal Logic And Argumentation
Informal logic is the study of arguments as people actually make them—in editorials, courtrooms, scientific papers, classrooms, and everyday disputes—rather than as idealized formulas in a formal language.
10 frameworks, from 450 BCE to today · Logic · Philosophy
- Classical rhetoric and dialectic 450 BCE-300 BCE
- Nyāya and Buddhist logic 200-700
- New Rhetoric 1958-Present
- Toulmin Model 1958-Present
- Formal Dialectic 1970-2000
- Informal logic 1977-Present
- Pragma-Dialectics 1984-Present
- Empirical Argumentation Research 1990-Present
- Argumentation scheme 1996-Present
- Computational Argumentation 2000-Present
Overview
Informal logic is the study of arguments as people actually make them—in editorials, courtrooms, scientific papers, classrooms, and everyday disputes—rather than as idealized formulas in a formal language12. Its central question is not "is this argument deductively valid?" but "is this argument good?"—does it give adequate support for its conclusion, given the context, the audience, and the kind of claim being made? That question turns out to be far messier than validity, and the history of the field is a long series of attempts to answer it with tools precise enough to be useful but flexible enough to fit real reasoning.
Classical Roots: Rhetoric and Dialectic
The field's oldest ancestors are Aristotle's Rhetoric and Topics. The Topics treats dialectic: reasoning from premises that are generally accepted (endoxa) rather than from self-evident first principles. Aristotle catalogued "topics"—places to look for arguments—and distinguished argument types by the kind of question at issue. The Rhetoric analyzed persuasion through ethos (character), pathos (emotion), and logos (argument), and identified enthymemes, arguments with a premise left unstated because the audience supplies it. These ideas matter because they treat argument as addressed to an audience and embedded in a situation, not as a timeless chain of propositions.
A parallel tradition developed in India. Nyāya logic, systematized in the Nyāya Sūtras (roughly the early centuries CE), analyzed inference and debate, including five-membered arguments: thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. Its practitioners debated the conditions under which a reason genuinely supports a claim, and catalogued fallacies and illegitimate debate tactics. Buddhist logicians, especially Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (c. 6th–7th century CE), developed a theory of inference grounded in causal relations and "exclusion" (apoha), and their debate with Nyāya over what makes an inference reliable is one of the great sustained arguments about evidence in world intellectual history. These traditions were not "informal logic" in the modern sense, but they shared its central concern: what makes a reason a good reason in practice.
The Formalist Interlude and Its Discontents
From the late nineteenth century, logic was transformed by Frege, Russell, and their successors into a formal science of validity. This was enormously successful, but it left a gap. A valid argument can be worthless if its premises are false or if it begs the question; an invalid argument can be persuasive and reasonable if it is an inductive generalization, an argument from authority, or an inference to the best explanation. Formal logic had little to say about these.
In the 1950s, Stephen Toulmin, a British philosopher, published The Uses of Argument (1958), arguing that the mathematical model of argument had distorted how we think about reasoning in ordinary life. His model broke arguments into components: a claim, the data supporting it, a warrant licensing the move from data to claim, backing for the warrant, a qualifier (such as "probably"), and a rebuttal stating conditions under which the claim would fail. The model's virtue was that it made explicit what real arguments leave implicit—the warrant and its backing—and it allowed for arguments that are strong without being deductively valid. Toulmin's model became widely used in education, law, and communication studies, and it remains one of the field's most recognizable tools.
The New Rhetoric and the Turn to Audience
Around the same time, in Brussels, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca published La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l'argumentation (1958; English translation The New Rhetoric, 1969). Perelman, a philosopher of law, had found that formal logic could not account for legal reasoning, where arguments are judged by audiences and by what they will accept. Their New Rhetoric analyzed argument as aimed at gaining the adherence of an audience, distinguishing universal audiences (addressed by arguments claiming to be valid for all rational beings) from particular audiences. They catalogued argumentative techniques—appeals to precedent, analogy, example, authority—and treated values and hierarchies as legitimate premises. The work revived rhetoric as a serious object of study and gave argumentation theory a vocabulary for analyzing persuasion without reducing it to manipulation.
Informal Logic as a Movement
The term "informal logic" crystallized in the 1970s, largely in North America, driven by teachers who found that their students could manipulate truth tables but could not evaluate the arguments in newspaper editorials. Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, at the University of Windsor, founded the Informal Logic Newsletter in 1978 (later the journal Informal Logic) and argued that informal logic was a distinct discipline, not merely applied formal logic. Their textbook Logical Self-Defense (1977) taught students to identify arguments, diagram their structure, and assess them for relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability of premises—a triad that became a standard framework.
The movement's central claim was that argument evaluation requires attention to context, audience, and the type of argument, and that many arguments are reasonable without being valid. This raised a hard problem: if not validity, what standard? The field's answer, developed over the following decades, was the argumentation scheme.
Argumentation Schemes
An argumentation scheme is a pattern of defeasible reasoning—reasoning that holds provisionally and can be defeated by counterevidence. Douglas Walton, a Canadian philosopher, catalogued dozens of schemes in works such as Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996) and, with Chris Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes (2008). Examples include argument from expert opinion, argument from example, argument from analogy, argument from cause to effect, and argument from sign. Each scheme comes with critical questions: for argument from expert opinion, is the expert genuinely expert in the relevant field? Is there disagreement among experts? Is the expert's claim consistent with other evidence? An argument is good if it instantiates a scheme and survives the critical questions. This gave the field a middle path between formal validity and mere persuasion.
Pragma-Dialectics
In Amsterdam, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst developed pragma-dialectics, first presented in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984). Their idea was to treat argumentation as a speech act aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. They proposed an ideal model of a critical discussion with four stages: confrontation (acknowledging the disagreement), opening (agreeing on rules and starting points), argumentation (advancing arguments), and concluding (determining whether the dispute is resolved). They also identified fallacies as violations of discussion rules—for example, attacking the person rather than the argument, or shifting the burden of proof. Pragma-dialectics gave the field a normative theory of argumentative procedure and a systematic account of fallacies as rule violations rather than mere errors of form.
Formal Dialectic
A related strand sought to model argumentation as a rule-governed dialogue. In the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers such as Else Barth and Erik Krabbe developed formal dialectic, treating argument as a game with moves, commitments, and rules for winning. The aim was to make precise what it means for a party to defend a thesis successfully. These models influenced later work in artificial intelligence and in the study of legal reasoning, where dialogue structure matters.
Empirical and Computational Turns
From the 1990s, argumentation research became increasingly empirical and computational. Scholars in communication studies, psychology, and education studied how people actually argue—how they identify arguments, how they respond to counterarguments, and how argument skills develop. Empirical work on argument identification showed that even trained readers disagree about what counts as an argument in a text, which complicated the normative theories.
Computational argumentation emerged as a field in its own right, with researchers building systems that extract arguments from text, map argument structure, and evaluate arguments automatically. The Argument Interchange Format (AIF), developed in the mid-2000s by Chris Reed and colleagues, provided a shared ontology for representing argument structures, and argument mining became a recognized subfield of natural language processing. These developments connected informal logic to artificial intelligence and to the design of systems that can reason with and about arguments.
The Present
Today the field is plural. Walton's schemes, pragma-dialectics, Toulmin's model, and the New Rhetoric all remain in use, often in combination. Empirical research on argumentation continues in psychology and education, and computational argumentation is a growing area with applications in legal reasoning, online deliberation, and AI. The open questions are substantial: how to evaluate arguments across cultures and genres, how to handle multimodal and online argumentation, and how to reconcile normative theories of good argument with the empirical realities of how people reason. The field's history is a record of attempts to answer the question Aristotle first posed—what makes an argument good?—with tools that keep pace with the arguments people actually make.
References
- Informal logic, Wikipedia
- Logic, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Informal Logic And Argumentation
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 450 BCE-300 BCE
Classical rhetoric and dialectic
How does an argument persuade an audience?
- 200-700
- 1958-Present
- 1958-Present
- 1970-2000
- 1977-Present
- 1984-Present
- 1990-Present
Empirical Argumentation Research
How do people actually identify and respond to arguments?
- 1996-Present
- 2000-Present
Computational Argumentation
How can machines extract and evaluate arguments?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
New Rhetoric revived Classical rhetoric and dialectic
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca deliberately revived classical rhetoric and Aristotelian topics, treating argument as addressed to an audience and cataloguing techniques like example, analogy and authority. Their New Rhetoric is an explicit modern restatement of the classical rhetorical tradition.
Carried by Chaïm Perelman; Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca; The New Rhetoric (1969).
Argumentation scheme grew out of Informal logic
Argumentation schemes were developed as informal logic's answer to the question of what standard replaces validity. Walton's schemes grew directly out of the movement's triad of relevance, sufficiency and acceptability, supplying defeasible patterns with critical questions.
Carried by Douglas Walton; Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996).
Formal Dialectic influenced by Classical rhetoric and dialectic
Formal dialectic took the classical notion of dialectical argument as a game of question and answer and made its rules explicit. Barth and Krabbe's dialogue models descend from the Aristotelian conception of defending a thesis against objections.
Carried by Else Barth; Erik Krabbe.
Pragma-Dialectics influenced by Classical rhetoric and dialectic
Pragma-dialectics modelled argumentation on the classical dialectical idea of reasoning from accepted starting points in a rule-governed exchange. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst's critical discussion is a modern reconstruction of Aristotelian dialectic as speech acts.
Carried by Frans van Eemeren; Rob Grootendorst; Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984).
Informal logic influenced by Toulmin Model
Informal logic textbooks adopted Toulmin's layout of claim, data and warrant as a way to diagram and assess real arguments. The model supplied the movement with a non-formal vocabulary for argument structure.
Carried by Stephen Toulmin; Logical Self-Defense (1977).
Argumentation scheme influenced by Toulmin Model
Walton's argumentation schemes generalised Toulmin's insight that warrants come in defeasible kinds, each licensing a claim only provisionally. The scheme-plus-critical-questions apparatus refines Toulmin's warrant and rebuttal into catalogued patterns.
Carried by Douglas Walton; Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996).
Pragma-Dialectics influenced by Formal Dialectic
Pragma-dialectics built on formal dialectic's treatment of argument as rule-governed dialogue with commitments and moves. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst turned the formal game into a normative model of critical discussion with stages and rules.
Carried by Frans van Eemeren; Rob Grootendorst.
Computational Argumentation influenced by Formal Dialectic
Computational argumentation adopted dialogue-game models from formal dialectic for representing multi-agent argument. Protocols of moves, commitments and rules from Barth and Krabbe's tradition were reused in argumentation-based AI systems.
Carried by Erik Krabbe.
Pragma-Dialectics rival of Informal logic
Informal logic and pragma-dialectics arose as contemporary, competing answers to how real arguments should be evaluated, one centred on premise adequacy and the other on procedural rules of discussion. They developed in parallel from the late 1970s and 1980s and argued over norms.
Carried by Ralph Johnson; Frans van Eemeren.
Empirical Argumentation Research influenced by Informal logic
Empirical argumentation research took up informal logic's question of how people identify and assess arguments and tested it experimentally. Studies of argument identification and counterargument response grew out of the movement's pedagogical concerns.
Computational Argumentation influenced by Argumentation scheme
Computational argumentation encoded Walton's schemes and their critical questions in machine-readable ontologies and argument-mining systems. Scheme identification became a standard task in automatic argument analysis.
Carried by Douglas Walton; Argument Interchange Format.
Informal logic influenced by New Rhetoric
The informal logic movement drew on the New Rhetoric's insistence that argument is judged by audience adherence rather than formal validity. Perelman's catalogue of argumentative techniques fed into textbook treatments of real arguments.
Carried by Chaïm Perelman.
Pragma-Dialectics influenced by New Rhetoric
Pragma-dialectics took from the New Rhetoric the idea that argument aims at gaining adherence and that audience and starting points matter. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst incorporated Perelman's audience-oriented view into their procedural model.
Carried by Frans van Eemeren.
Computational Argumentation influenced by Toulmin Model
Computational argumentation representations adopted Toulmin's six-part layout as a basic ontology for argument structure. Argument mapping and interchange formats routinely encode claim, data, warrant and rebuttal.
Carried by Argument Interchange Format.
Computational Argumentation influenced by Informal logic
Computational argumentation inherited informal logic's task of extracting and evaluating arguments from ordinary texts. Argument mining and automatic evaluation apply the movement's criteria of relevance and sufficiency to machine processing.
Empirical Argumentation Research influenced by Pragma-Dialectics
Empirical argumentation research tested pragma-dialectical claims about discussion stages and fallacies against observed argumentative practice. Communication scholars used van Eemeren's model as a framework for empirical study.
Carried by Frans van Eemeren.
Beyond the field
Where Informal Logic And Argumentation's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 39 links.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic revived by New Rhetoric and Argumentation Theory in Rhetorical Studies
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca built the New Rhetoric by reviving Aristotle's Topics, rhetorical syllogism and the classical audience-centred account of proof against Cartesian logic; their treatise explicitly returns to Aristotelian dialectic and rhetoric as the model for reasoning about values.
Carried by Chaïm Perelman; Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca; Traité de l'argumentation (1958).
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Neo-Aristotelian Criticism in Rhetorical Studies
The classical rhetorical-dialectical corpus, above all Aristotle's Rhetoric, was the direct source of the Neo-Aristotelian critical apparatus.
Carried by Aristotle; Rhetoric.
Pragma-Dialectics influenced by New Rhetoric and Argumentation Theory in Rhetorical Studies
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's New Rhetoric (1958) supplied pragma-dialectics with the idea that argumentation is addressed to an audience and aims at adherence; van Eemeren and Grootendorst built their dialectical model partly in response to this rhetorical tradition.
Carried by Chaïm Perelman; Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca; The New Rhetoric (1958).
Argumentation scheme grew out of Informal logic in Logic
Walton's argumentation schemes were developed within and out of the informal logic tradition, generalising its study of everyday argument into catalogues of defeasible inference patterns.
Carried by Douglas N. Walton; Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996).
Computational Argumentation grew out of Computational Argumentation and AI and Law in Legal Reasoning
Computational argumentation grew directly out of the AI and law work on argumentation, extending its formal models of defeasible legal argument to general computational settings.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Scottish Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres in Rhetorical Studies
Scottish rhetoricians inherited the classical rhetorical-dialectical tradition, including its treatment of argument and arrangement, and adapted it to polite letters.
Carried by Hugh Blair; George Campbell.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Organon in Philosophy Of Logic
Aristotle's Topics and Sophistical Refutations systematised the dialectical and rhetorical argument practices of earlier Greek rhetoric and dialectic, treating their argument forms within his logical corpus.
Carried by Aristotle.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Rhetoric of the Trivium and Sacred Oratory in Rhetorical Studies
The classical rhetorical-dialectical corpus, especially Cicero and Quintilian, was absorbed into the trivium and furnished the doctrine taught in grammar, dialectic and rhetoric through the Middle Ages.
Carried by Cicero; Quintilian.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Ancient Grammar and Semantics in Philosophy Of Language
Rhetorical and dialectical teaching on definition, ambiguity and argument supplied the categories later grammatical and semantic writers used; Aristotle's Topics and Rhetoric fed into the Hellenistic grammatical tradition's treatment of language.
Carried by Aristotle.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Term logic in Philosophical Logic
Aristotle's treatment of dialectical argument and topoi in the Topics drew on and reworked the practice of rhetorical and dialectical argumentation current in fourth-century Athens.
Carried by Aristotle; Topics.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Dramatism in Rhetorical Studies
Burke drew on the classical rhetorical-dialectical tradition, especially its treatment of argument and audience, while recasting rhetoric as identification.
Carried by Kenneth Burke; Aristotle.
Classical rhetoric and dialectic influenced Boethian logic and the liberal arts curriculum in Medieval Philosophy
Boethius drew on Greek and Latin rhetorical and dialectical handbooks, especially Aristotle's Topics and Cicero, in composing his own treatises on topical argument and the categories.
Carried by Boethius; Cicero.

Informal Logic And Argumentation is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Informal Logic And ArgumentationRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Rhetorical Studies 11 links
- Logic 11 links
- Legal Reasoning 4 links
- Philosophy Of Language 2 links
- Buddhist Philosophy 1 link
- Narratology 1 link
- Mathematical Logic 1 link
- Ancient Philosophy 1 link
- Indian Philosophy 1 link
- Medieval Philosophy 1 link
- Philosophical Logic 1 link
- Philosophy Of Logic 1 link
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