Informal Logic And Argumentation

Informal logic is the study of arguments as people actually make them—in editorials, courtrooms, scientific papers, classrooms, and everyday disputes—rather than as idealized formulas in a formal language.

10 frameworks, from 450 BCE to today · Logic · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Informal logic is the study of arguments as people actually make them—in editorials, courtrooms, scientific papers, classrooms, and everyday disputes—rather than as idealized formulas in a formal language12. Its central question is not "is this argument deductively valid?" but "is this argument good?"—does it give adequate support for its conclusion, given the context, the audience, and the kind of claim being made? That question turns out to be far messier than validity, and the history of the field is a long series of attempts to answer it with tools precise enough to be useful but flexible enough to fit real reasoning.

Classical Roots: Rhetoric and Dialectic

The field's oldest ancestors are Aristotle's Rhetoric and Topics. The Topics treats dialectic: reasoning from premises that are generally accepted (endoxa) rather than from self-evident first principles. Aristotle catalogued "topics"—places to look for arguments—and distinguished argument types by the kind of question at issue. The Rhetoric analyzed persuasion through ethos (character), pathos (emotion), and logos (argument), and identified enthymemes, arguments with a premise left unstated because the audience supplies it. These ideas matter because they treat argument as addressed to an audience and embedded in a situation, not as a timeless chain of propositions.

A parallel tradition developed in India. Nyāya logic, systematized in the Nyāya Sūtras (roughly the early centuries CE), analyzed inference and debate, including five-membered arguments: thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. Its practitioners debated the conditions under which a reason genuinely supports a claim, and catalogued fallacies and illegitimate debate tactics. Buddhist logicians, especially Dignāga (c. 480–540 CE) and Dharmakīrti (c. 6th–7th century CE), developed a theory of inference grounded in causal relations and "exclusion" (apoha), and their debate with Nyāya over what makes an inference reliable is one of the great sustained arguments about evidence in world intellectual history. These traditions were not "informal logic" in the modern sense, but they shared its central concern: what makes a reason a good reason in practice.

The Formalist Interlude and Its Discontents

From the late nineteenth century, logic was transformed by Frege, Russell, and their successors into a formal science of validity. This was enormously successful, but it left a gap. A valid argument can be worthless if its premises are false or if it begs the question; an invalid argument can be persuasive and reasonable if it is an inductive generalization, an argument from authority, or an inference to the best explanation. Formal logic had little to say about these.

In the 1950s, Stephen Toulmin, a British philosopher, published The Uses of Argument (1958), arguing that the mathematical model of argument had distorted how we think about reasoning in ordinary life. His model broke arguments into components: a claim, the data supporting it, a warrant licensing the move from data to claim, backing for the warrant, a qualifier (such as "probably"), and a rebuttal stating conditions under which the claim would fail. The model's virtue was that it made explicit what real arguments leave implicit—the warrant and its backing—and it allowed for arguments that are strong without being deductively valid. Toulmin's model became widely used in education, law, and communication studies, and it remains one of the field's most recognizable tools.

The New Rhetoric and the Turn to Audience

Around the same time, in Brussels, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca published La Nouvelle Rhétorique: Traité de l'argumentation (1958; English translation The New Rhetoric, 1969). Perelman, a philosopher of law, had found that formal logic could not account for legal reasoning, where arguments are judged by audiences and by what they will accept. Their New Rhetoric analyzed argument as aimed at gaining the adherence of an audience, distinguishing universal audiences (addressed by arguments claiming to be valid for all rational beings) from particular audiences. They catalogued argumentative techniques—appeals to precedent, analogy, example, authority—and treated values and hierarchies as legitimate premises. The work revived rhetoric as a serious object of study and gave argumentation theory a vocabulary for analyzing persuasion without reducing it to manipulation.

Informal Logic as a Movement

The term "informal logic" crystallized in the 1970s, largely in North America, driven by teachers who found that their students could manipulate truth tables but could not evaluate the arguments in newspaper editorials. Ralph Johnson and J. Anthony Blair, at the University of Windsor, founded the Informal Logic Newsletter in 1978 (later the journal Informal Logic) and argued that informal logic was a distinct discipline, not merely applied formal logic. Their textbook Logical Self-Defense (1977) taught students to identify arguments, diagram their structure, and assess them for relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability of premises—a triad that became a standard framework.

The movement's central claim was that argument evaluation requires attention to context, audience, and the type of argument, and that many arguments are reasonable without being valid. This raised a hard problem: if not validity, what standard? The field's answer, developed over the following decades, was the argumentation scheme.

Argumentation Schemes

An argumentation scheme is a pattern of defeasible reasoning—reasoning that holds provisionally and can be defeated by counterevidence. Douglas Walton, a Canadian philosopher, catalogued dozens of schemes in works such as Argumentation Schemes for Presumptive Reasoning (1996) and, with Chris Reed and Fabrizio Macagno, Argumentation Schemes (2008). Examples include argument from expert opinion, argument from example, argument from analogy, argument from cause to effect, and argument from sign. Each scheme comes with critical questions: for argument from expert opinion, is the expert genuinely expert in the relevant field? Is there disagreement among experts? Is the expert's claim consistent with other evidence? An argument is good if it instantiates a scheme and survives the critical questions. This gave the field a middle path between formal validity and mere persuasion.

Pragma-Dialectics

In Amsterdam, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst developed pragma-dialectics, first presented in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984). Their idea was to treat argumentation as a speech act aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. They proposed an ideal model of a critical discussion with four stages: confrontation (acknowledging the disagreement), opening (agreeing on rules and starting points), argumentation (advancing arguments), and concluding (determining whether the dispute is resolved). They also identified fallacies as violations of discussion rules—for example, attacking the person rather than the argument, or shifting the burden of proof. Pragma-dialectics gave the field a normative theory of argumentative procedure and a systematic account of fallacies as rule violations rather than mere errors of form.

Formal Dialectic

A related strand sought to model argumentation as a rule-governed dialogue. In the 1970s and 1980s, philosophers such as Else Barth and Erik Krabbe developed formal dialectic, treating argument as a game with moves, commitments, and rules for winning. The aim was to make precise what it means for a party to defend a thesis successfully. These models influenced later work in artificial intelligence and in the study of legal reasoning, where dialogue structure matters.

Empirical and Computational Turns

From the 1990s, argumentation research became increasingly empirical and computational. Scholars in communication studies, psychology, and education studied how people actually argue—how they identify arguments, how they respond to counterarguments, and how argument skills develop. Empirical work on argument identification showed that even trained readers disagree about what counts as an argument in a text, which complicated the normative theories.

Computational argumentation emerged as a field in its own right, with researchers building systems that extract arguments from text, map argument structure, and evaluate arguments automatically. The Argument Interchange Format (AIF), developed in the mid-2000s by Chris Reed and colleagues, provided a shared ontology for representing argument structures, and argument mining became a recognized subfield of natural language processing. These developments connected informal logic to artificial intelligence and to the design of systems that can reason with and about arguments.

The Present

Today the field is plural. Walton's schemes, pragma-dialectics, Toulmin's model, and the New Rhetoric all remain in use, often in combination. Empirical research on argumentation continues in psychology and education, and computational argumentation is a growing area with applications in legal reasoning, online deliberation, and AI. The open questions are substantial: how to evaluate arguments across cultures and genres, how to handle multimodal and online argumentation, and how to reconcile normative theories of good argument with the empirical realities of how people reason. The field's history is a record of attempts to answer the question Aristotle first posed—what makes an argument good?—with tools that keep pace with the arguments people actually make.

References

  1. Informal logic, Wikipedia
  2. Logic, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Informal Logic And Argumentation

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 450 BCE-300 BCE

    Classical rhetoric and dialectic

    How does an argument persuade an audience?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  2. 200-700

    Nyāya and Buddhist logic

    What makes a reason genuinely support a claim?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 1958-Present

    New Rhetoric

    How do arguments gain an audience's adherence?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 1958-Present

    Toulmin Model

    What parts make up a real argument?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 1970-2000

    Formal Dialectic

    What rules govern a successful defence of a thesis?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  6. 1977-Present

    Informal logic

    When is an everyday argument good?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  7. 1984-Present

    Pragma-Dialectics

    How can a dispute be resolved by discussion?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  8. 1990-Present

    Empirical Argumentation Research

    How do people actually identify and respond to arguments?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1996-Present

    Argumentation scheme

    What patterns make defeasible reasoning reliable?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 2000-Present

    Computational Argumentation

    How can machines extract and evaluate arguments?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Classical rhetoric and dialecticNyāya and Buddhist logicNew RhetoricToulmin ModelFormal DialecticInformal logicPragma-DialecticsEmpirical Argumentation ResearchArgumentation schemeComputational Argumentation

Beyond the field

Where Informal Logic And Argumentation's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 39 links.

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Informal Logic And Argumentation is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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