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Philosophy Of Race
Political philosophy of race asks how political institutions, concepts, and ideals have been shaped by the idea of race—and how they should be reshaped in light of racial injustice.
13 frameworks, from 1735 to today · Political Philosophy · Philosophy
- Scientific racism 1735-1900
- Colonizationism 1816-1865
- Proslavery and Colonization Thought 1816-1865
- Proslavery thought 1830-1865
- Abolitionist Natural-Rights Theory 1845-1870
- Black Political Thought and the Color Line 1895-Present
- Decoloniality 1950-Present
- Remedial Theory of Racial Justice 1970-Present
- Intersectionality 1989-Present
- Racial Constructivism 1990-Present
- Racism in the History of Political Thought 1990-Present
- Racial Eliminativism 1992-Present
- Racial Contract Theory 1997-Present
Overview
Political philosophy of race asks how political institutions, concepts, and ideals have been shaped by the idea of race—and how they should be reshaped in light of racial injustice. Its central questions are blunt: What is race, and does it exist at all? How have the canonical concepts of political philosophy (the social contract, the rights of man, the rule of law, the nation) been built on racial exclusion? What does justice require when the injustice is racial—recognition, redistribution, repair, or abolition of the categories themselves? The stakes are concrete: who counts as a full member of the polity, who is owed what, and whether the tools of political philosophy are adequate to the task or themselves part of the problem.
Race-Making in the Enlightenment and the Science of Racial Typology
The philosophical career of race begins with the Enlightenment's attempt to classify humanity. Carl Linnaeus's Systema Naturae (1735, with later editions) divided Homo sapiens into varieties—European, American, Asiatic, African—and attached behavioral descriptions to each. Johann Friedrich Blumenbach's On the Natural Variety of Mankind (1775) introduced the term "Caucasian" and arranged human "varieties" in a hierarchy with Europeans at the apex. These were not marginal curiosities: they were produced by the same intellectual culture that gave political philosophy its modern vocabulary of natural rights and universal reason.
The nineteenth century hardened classification into hierarchy. Samuel George Morton's craniometric measurements (published in Crania Americana, 1839) claimed to show fixed differences in skull capacity among races; Josiah Nott and George Gliddon's Types of Mankind (1854) argued for separate origins of the races (polygenism). This "scientific racism" was not fringe—it was taught in universities, cited in parliaments, and used to justify slavery and colonial rule. Its political function was to resolve a contradiction: how could a polity founded on universal natural rights hold some people as property? The answer was that the "universal" was never meant to be universal.
Proslavery Thought, Colonization, and the Abolitionist Counterattack
The most explicit political philosophy of race in the antebellum United States came from defenders of slavery. John C. Calhoun's Disquisition on Government and his Senate speeches (notably 1837) argued that slavery was a "positive good," a civilizing institution, and that the natural equality of the Declaration of Independence applied only to the "civilized" races. This was a self-conscious political theory: it claimed that hierarchy was the natural order and that abolition would destroy civilization.
A distinct but related current was colonizationism—the view, associated with the American Colonization Society (founded 1816) and figures like Henry Clay, that free Black people could never be integrated and should be resettled in Africa. This was not proslavery in the Calhoun sense, but it shared the premise that racial difference was politically fundamental.
The abolitionist response was the first sustained natural-rights theory of race. Frederick Douglass's Narrative (1845) and his speeches—especially "What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?" (1852)—argued that the Declaration's principles condemned slavery and that the Constitution, rightly read, was an antislavery document. Douglass's The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery? (1860) made the case explicitly. This was political philosophy in the public sphere: an argument that the founding ideals, taken seriously, required abolition.
Black Political Thought and the Color Line
After emancipation, Black political thought became a distinct tradition. W. E. B. Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk (1903) introduced two ideas that reshaped the field. The first was the "color line"—the claim that "the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line," meaning that racial division was the central political fact of the modern world, not a regional or temporary problem. The second was "double consciousness"—the experience of seeing oneself through the eyes of a hostile society, of being "two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings" in one body. Du Bois's later Black Reconstruction in America (1935) argued that Reconstruction failed not because of Black incapacity but because of a "counter-revolution of property"—a political-economic analysis of racial rule.
Booker T. Washington's "Atlanta Compromise" (1895) offered a different strategy: accommodation, vocational education, and economic self-help, which critics like Du Bois saw as accepting second-class citizenship. Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (founded 1914) and his "Africa for the Africans" slogan pushed toward Black nationalism and diaspora solidarity. These were competing political philosophies of how a racially subordinated people should act.
Anti-Colonial and Decolonial Theory
The twentieth century's great racial-political transformation was decolonization, and its theorists made race central. Frantz Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks (1952) analyzed the psychology of colonial racism—how the colonized internalize the colonizer's gaze—and The Wretched of the Earth (1961) argued that decolonization is necessarily violent because the colonial order is maintained by force. Aimé Césaire's Discourse on Colonialism (1950) made the case that colonialism and Nazism were continuous, not opposed. Albert Memmi's The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957) described the "portrait" of the colonized as a projection that justifies domination.
These thinkers did not simply apply European political philosophy; they argued that its universalism was a particularism in disguise. The "decolonial" turn—later associated with Latin American thinkers like Aníbal Quijano (whose "coloniality of power" concept dates from 1992) and Enrique Dussel—extended the critique to the entire modern/colonial world-system, arguing that race was constitutive of modernity itself, not an aberration within it.
The Racial Contract and the Critique of the Canon
In the late twentieth century, political philosophy began to turn its tools on its own history. Charles W. Mills's The Racial Contract (1997) argued that the social contract tradition—Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant—was shadowed by a racial contract: an unspoken agreement among whites to establish and maintain a racial hierarchy. Mills's point was not that these thinkers were merely racist, but that their theories presupposed a racial order. Kant's anthropology lectures, Locke's involvement in the Carolina colony's slave constitution, and Hume's footnote on "negroes" were not incidental; they were part of the structure.
This "racism in the history of political thought" scholarship—carried forward by figures like Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (whose Race and the Enlightenment, 1997, collected the primary texts) and later by Robert Bernasconi—showed that the canon's universalism was produced alongside and through racial exclusion. The question was whether the tradition could be salvaged or whether it needed reconstruction from the ground up.
Constructivism, Eliminativism, and the Metaphysics of Race
A parallel debate concerned what race is. Racial constructivism holds that races are real but socially constructed—they exist because societies treat people as members of races, not because of biological essence. This view, developed in different forms by thinkers like Anthony Appiah (who nonetheless leaned toward eliminativism), Ron Mallon, and Sally Haslanger, made race a legitimate object of political analysis without biological commitment. Haslanger's work (from the 1990s onward) argued that race is a social position defined by perceived ancestry and treated as a marker of status.
Racial eliminativism—associated with Appiah's In My Father's House (1992) and later Kwame Anthony Appiah's broader work—argues that race is a fiction with no biological basis and that retaining the category, even for anti-racist purposes, risks reifying it. The debate between constructivists and eliminativists is not merely academic: it bears on whether race-conscious remedies (affirmative action, majority-minority districts) are justified or whether the goal should be the abolition of racial categories altogether.
Intersectionality and the Expansion of the Field
Kimberlé Crenshaw's 1989 article "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex" introduced "intersectionality"—the idea that race and gender (and other axes) interact in ways that cannot be captured by treating them separately12. A Black woman's experience of discrimination, Crenshaw argued, is not the sum of "race discrimination" plus "sex discrimination"; it is a distinct position that legal doctrine and political theory had failed to see. The concept migrated from legal theory into political philosophy and became a general framework for analyzing how multiple systems of oppression compound.
This expansion connected the philosophy of race to feminist political philosophy and to global justice theory, where questions of racial and colonial injustice became central to debates about reparations, historical injustice, and the legacies of empire.
Racial Justice and Remedial Theory
The final major strand is remedial theory: what does justice require in response to racial injustice? This includes debates over affirmative action (from the 1970s onward), reparations (given new philosophical attention by figures like Bernard Boxill and later by Ta-Nehisi Coates's 2014 essay "The Case for Reparations," which drew on a long scholarly tradition), and the broader question of whether color-blind principles can remedy color-conscious wrongs. The "black reparations" debate in political philosophy—carried by thinkers like Boxill, Howard McGary, and later Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò—asks whether compensation is owed for slavery, Jim Crow, and ongoing structural disadvantage, and what form it should take.
The Field Today
Contemporary political philosophy of race is plural. The Millsian critique of the canon continues in work on the racial contract and on the racial dimensions of liberal theory. Constructivism and eliminativism remain live metaphysical debates with direct political stakes. Intersectionality has become a standard analytic tool, though its migration from legal theory has generated debate about whether it has been diluted. Decolonial and anti-colonial theory has moved from the periphery to the center of debates about global justice and the history of political thought. And remedial theory—reparations, affirmative action, and the question of what a racially just society would look like—remains the field's most publicly consequential edge.
The open questions are real: Is race a category to be preserved, transformed, or abolished? Can the liberal tradition be repaired, or does it require reconstruction? What does justice owe to the descendants of the enslaved, and to the colonized? And how should political philosophy reckon with the fact that its own canon was built, in part, on the racial contract it now seeks to critique?
References
- Critical race theory (Tenets), Wikipedia
- Black feminism, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Philosophy Of Race
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1735-1900
- 1816-1865
- 1816-1865
- 1830-1865
- 1845-1870
- 1895-Present
- 1950-Present
- 1970-Present
- 1989-Present
- 1990-Present
- 1990-Present
- 1992-Present
- 1997-Present

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