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Justice Theory
Justice theory is the part of political philosophy that asks what people are owed—by one another, by the institutions they live under, and by the world at large—and why.
19 frameworks, from 380 BCE to today · Political Philosophy · Philosophy
- Classical Virtue and Natural Law Justice 380 BCE-1650
- Social contract 1651-Present
- Utilitarianism 1789-Present
- Desert 1970-Present
- Feminist Justice Theory 1970-Present
- Historical Injustice and Rectification 1970-Present
- Rawlsian Justice as Fairness 1971-Present
- Entitlement theory 1974-Present
- Global justice 1979-Present
- Capability approach 1980-Present
- Communitarianism 1981-2000
- Luck Egalitarianism 1981-Present
- Complex Equality 1983-Present
- Sufficientarianism 1987-Present
- Feminist Justice Theory 1989-Present
- Prioritarianism 1991-Present
- Recognition justice 1992-Present
- Republican Non-Domination Theory 1997-Present
- Relational (Democratic) Egalitarianism 1999-Present
Overview
Justice theory is the part of political philosophy that asks what people are owed—by one another, by the institutions they live under, and by the world at large—and why. Its questions are deceptively simple. Should goods be distributed equally? According to need, effort, or contribution? What makes a distribution fair rather than merely fortunate? And what do we do about the injustices already baked into the present? What is at stake is not abstract: every answer implies a vision of what human beings are like, what they deserve, and what a legitimate society looks like. The history of the subfield is a sequence of attempts to answer these questions, each responding to problems the previous answers could not solve.
Virtue and Cosmic Order: Justice as Harmony
For Plato and Aristotle, justice was first a quality of persons and of political communities, not a principle for distributing goods. In the Republic, Plato argued that justice consists in each part of a thing—a soul, a city—performing its proper function1. A just city is one in which rulers rule wisely, soldiers defend courageously, and producers produce, each according to nature. Justice is harmony, an order in which each element does its own work1. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, distinguished distributive justice (the fair allocation of honors and goods among citizens according to merit) from corrective justice (restoring equality when someone has been wronged). His distributive formula was proportional: shares should reflect relevant differences in merit2. Both thinkers embedded justice in a teleological cosmos—a world with purposes built in—and in a conception of the good life that political arrangements were meant to serve.
This virtue-centered, order-oriented view dominated for centuries. It was carried forward by Stoic and later Christian thought, and it fused with natural law theory. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, systematized the idea that justice is a matter of conforming to a rational order discernible by reason—the natural law—which human positive law must approximate. For Aquinas, justice concerned right relations among persons and toward God, and distributive justice meant giving each what is due according to a hierarchy of worth and need. Natural law theory gave justice a universal, rational foundation independent of any particular legislator, and it remained the dominant framework for centuries.
The Social Contract: Justice as Mutual Agreement
The decisive break came in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when thinkers began to ground political obligation and justice not in cosmic order or divine command but in agreement among free and equal persons. Thomas Hobbes, writing in the shadow of civil war, argued in Leviathan (1651) that without a sovereign to enforce rules, life would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Justice, for Hobbes, is whatever the sovereign commands; before the state there is no justice, only force. John Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1689) offered a different contract: government exists to protect natural rights to life, liberty, and property, and it loses legitimacy when it violates them. Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762) added a further twist: legitimate authority rests on the general will, the collective will of citizens aimed at the common good.
The contract tradition's power lay in its answer to a fundamental question: why should anyone obey political authority? Because they would agree to it under the right conditions. But the tradition left the content of justice underdetermined. What exactly would parties agree to? And what makes an agreement binding?
Utilitarianism: Justice as Aggregate Welfare
The late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries brought a rival framework. Jeremy Bentham, in An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789), proposed that the right action is the one that maximizes overall happiness, understood as pleasure minus pain. Justice, on this view, is simply the arrangement that produces the greatest total welfare. John Stuart Mill refined the doctrine in Utilitarianism (1861), arguing that higher pleasures (intellectual, moral) count for more than lower ones and that utilitarianism could accommodate individual liberty through the "harm principle."
Utilitarianism's appeal was its simplicity and its apparent impartiality: every person's welfare counts equally. Its problem, critics charged, was that it could justify sacrificing individuals for the greater good. If torturing one innocent person produced enough aggregate happiness, utilitarianism seemed to permit it. Justice, critics argued, must protect individuals against such calculations. This objection—that utilitarianism fails to take seriously the separateness of persons—became a central theme of twentieth-century justice theory.
Rawls and the Revival of Contract
The most important turning point in modern justice theory came in 1971, when John Rawls published A Theory of Justice345. Rawls revived the social contract but transformed it. He asked what principles of justice free and equal persons would agree to if they chose behind a "veil of ignorance"—that is, without knowing their own talents, social position, conception of the good, or even their generation. This "original position" was designed to ensure impartiality: since no one knows who they will be, no one can tailor principles to their own advantage1.
Rawls argued that parties would choose two principles. First, each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others1. Second, social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both attached to positions open to all under fair equality of opportunity and to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society1. This second clause is the "difference principle": inequalities are justified only if they improve the position of the worst off3. Rawls also insisted that his theory was a form of "justice as fairness," and that it treated citizens as free and equal moral persons with two "moral powers"—a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good.
Rawls's book reshaped the field. It made distributive justice the central question of political philosophy and set the terms of debate for decades. It also provoked a wave of responses that defined the landscape of the subfield.
Libertarian Entitlement: Justice as Historical Process
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) offered the most direct libertarian reply. Nozick argued that justice in holdings is historical and procedural, not patterned1. A distribution is just if it arose through just acquisition and just transfer, regardless of whether it matches any preferred pattern (equality, need, merit)1. His "entitlement theory" held that people are entitled to what they acquire through voluntary exchange and original appropriation, provided they leave "enough and as good" for others (a Lockean proviso)67. Nozick's famous "Wilt Chamberlain" argument showed that any patterned distribution would be disrupted by voluntary transactions—fans voluntarily paying to see Chamberlain play—and that preserving the pattern would require constant interference with liberty. For Nozick, justice is about how people came to hold what they hold, not about the shape of the final distribution1.
Communitarian Critique: Justice and the Good
The 1980s brought a sustained challenge to Rawlsian liberalism from communitarian thinkers. Michael Sandel, in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), argued that Rawls's "unencumbered self"—a self stripped of its particular attachments and conceptions of the good—was incoherent. Persons are constituted by their communities, loyalties, and traditions; justice cannot be prior to the good in the way Rawls claimed. Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue (1981) argued that modern moral philosophy had fragmented into incommensurable fragments and that justice could only be understood within a living tradition of practices and virtues. Charles Taylor's work emphasized the social embeddedness of selves and the importance of recognition. The communitarian critique did not defeat liberalism, but it forced liberals to attend more carefully to the social conditions of selfhood and to the plurality of goods.
Equality and Its Critics: Luck Egalitarianism and Its Discontents
The 1980s and 1990s saw the rise of "luck egalitarianism," the view that inequalities are unjust when they reflect brute luck (circumstances beyond one's control) but permissible when they reflect choices for which one is responsible. Ronald Dworkin's Sovereign Virtue (2000) developed an elaborate "equality of resources" framework, using hypothetical insurance markets to model fair shares. G. A. Cohen argued that the difference principle required an "egalitarian ethos" in citizens' choices, not just in state institutions. Richard Arneson and Gerald Cohen developed "equality of opportunity for welfare" and "equal access to advantage" respectively.
Luck egalitarianism drew sharp criticism. Elizabeth Anderson's "What Is the Point of Equality?" (1999) argued that luck egalitarianism was obsessed with the distinction between choice and circumstance and that it humiliated the unlucky by treating their disadvantages as grounds for pity rather than support. She proposed "democratic equality" instead: the aim should be to enable all citizens to stand as equals in civil society, not to compensate for bad luck. This critique helped launch "relational egalitarianism," the view that equality is fundamentally about the quality of relationships among persons—whether they relate as equals—rather than about the distribution of goods. Thinkers such as Samuel Scheffler and Jonathan Wolff developed related positions, and the relational view became a major strand of contemporary egalitarian thought.
Desert, Sufficiency, and Priority
Alongside equality, other distributive principles competed. Desert-based justice holds that goods should be distributed according to what people deserve—typically in virtue of effort, contribution, or moral worth. The idea is ancient (Aristotle's proportional justice) but was given new life in contemporary debates by thinkers such as Joel Feinberg and, more recently, Fred Feldman and Shelly Kagan. Critics argued that desert is difficult to measure and that many "deserts" are themselves products of luck.
Sufficientarianism holds that what matters is not equality but ensuring that everyone has "enough"—a threshold of sufficiency below which no one should fall. Harry Frankfurt's "Equality as a Moral Ideal" (1987) argued that economic equality was not intrinsically valuable; what mattered was sufficiency. Prioritarianism, developed by Derek Parfit and others, holds that benefits to the worse off matter more, not because equality is valuable, but because improving the lot of the worse off has greater moral weight. Both views offered alternatives to strict egalitarianism and to Rawls's difference principle, and both remain live positions.
Capabilities: Justice as Human Flourishing
A major alternative to resource-based theories emerged from Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Sen argued that measuring justice by resources or income was inadequate because people differ in their ability to convert resources into valuable functioning—a disabled person needs more resources to achieve the same mobility as an able-bodied person. He proposed focusing on "capabilities"—the real freedoms people have to achieve the kinds of lives they have reason to value. Nussbaum developed a list of ten central human capabilities (life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses and imagination, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and political and material control over one's environment) that she argued are required for a life of human dignity. The capabilities approach shifted attention from what people have to what they are able to do and be, and it became influential in development economics and global justice.
Recognition and Republicanism
Two further strands reshaped the field. Recognition theory, associated with Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, and Nancy Fraser, holds that justice is not only about distribution but about recognition—the acknowledgment of persons as full members of society. Honneth argued that struggles for justice are fundamentally struggles for recognition, and Fraser proposed a "two-dimensional" view in which redistribution and recognition are distinct but intertwined axes of justice. Republican non-domination theory, revived by Quentin Skinner and developed by Philip Pettit, holds that freedom consists not in non-interference but in non-domination—the absence of arbitrary power over one. Pettit's Republicanism (1997) argued that this conception of freedom grounds a distinctive theory of justice and legitimate government, one that emphasizes the rule of law, civic virtue, and the dispersion of power.
Historical Injustice and Global Justice
In recent decades, justice theory has increasingly turned to questions of history and borders. Historical injustice and rectification address what is owed to those who have been wronged—and to their descendants—by past injustices such as slavery, colonialism, and dispossession. The debate concerns whether present persons can owe reparations for wrongs they did not commit, how to identify victims and perpetrators across generations, and what forms of rectification (compensation, apology, structural change) are appropriate. Thinkers such as Bernard Boxill and, more recently, Ta-Nehisi Coates in public discourse have shaped this conversation.
Global justice theory extends distributive questions beyond the state. If Rawls's principles apply within a society, why not across the world? Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge argued that global economic interdependence creates obligations of justice among all persons, while others (such as Rawls himself in The Law of Peoples) argued that the scope of distributive justice is properly bounded by political community. The debate over open borders, global inequality, and the responsibilities of wealthy nations remains one of the most active areas of the subfield.
The Present: Plural Approaches, Open Questions
Contemporary justice theory is plural. Rawlsian liberalism remains a reference point, but it is now one position among many. Luck egalitarianism, relational egalitarianism, sufficientarianism, prioritarianism, capabilities, republicanism, recognition theory, and global justice theory all have active defenders. Feminist justice theory has transformed the field by insisting that the personal is political—that justice must address the family, care work, bodily autonomy, and the gendered division of labor, not only the public distribution of goods. The legacies of colonialism and slavery have pushed questions of historical injustice and reparations to the center. And the rise of global interdependence has made the question of what we owe strangers across borders unavoidable.
The open questions are substantial. How should we weigh equality against sufficiency and priority? Can relational equality provide a complete theory of distributive justice? What does justice require in a world of climate change, migration, and deep global inequality? How should we rectify historical wrongs without creating new ones? The argument continues, as it has for millennia, because the stakes are nothing less than how we should live together.
References
- Justice (Platonic justice, Fairness, Property rights), Wikipedia
- Social justice (History), Wikipedia
- Justice as Fairness (introduction, Difference principle), Wikipedia
- A Theory of Justice, Wikipedia
- John Rawls, Wikipedia
- Entitlement theory, Wikipedia
- Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Justice Theory
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 380 BCE-1650
Classical Virtue and Natural Law Justice
What makes a person or city just?
- 1789-Present
- 1970-Present
- 1970-Present
Feminist Justice Theory
How does gender shape justice?
About Feminist Justice Theory
Feminist Justice Theory emerged in the late 1980s as a critical response to the dominant frameworks of justice theory, particularly Justice as Fairness and the social contract tradition. Its central organizing question is: how do gender hierarchies, patriarchal structures, and the devaluation of care work shape our understanding of justice, and what would a truly just society look like when these dimensions are taken seriously? Unlike earlier frameworks that assumed a gender-neutral subject, Feminist Justice Theory insists that justice must be analyzed through the lens of gender, power, and the concrete experiences of women and other marginalized groups. It challenges the public-private distinction that has historically excluded domestic life, caregiving, and reproductive labor from the scope of justice, and it reorients the conversation toward relationality, vulnerability, and interdependence.Core CurriculumThe first course in Feminist Justice Theory typically begins with the concept of the personal as political, which argues that seemingly private matters—such as domestic violence, childcare, and household labor—are deeply political and subject to standards of justice. This leads to a critique of the public-private distinction that has long excluded the family and intimate life from the purview of justice theory. Students then encounter the ethics of care, a moral framework that prioritizes relationships, responsibility, and responsiveness over abstract principles and individual rights. This is contrasted with justice as fairness and other contractarian models, which are criticized for their abstract individualism—the assumption that persons are independent, self-sufficient, and unencumbered by relationships or embodiment. From there, the curriculum explores gendered division of labor, which shows how the systematic assignment of care work to women perpetuates economic and social inequality. The concept of intersectionality is introduced to analyze how gender intersects with race, class, sexuality, and other axes of oppression to produce distinct experiences of injustice. Students then examine reproductive justice, which frames reproductive rights and access to healthcare as matters of social justice, not merely individual choice. The framework also addresses vulnerability and dependency, arguing that all humans are vulnerable and dependent at various life stages, and that just institutions must account for this rather than pretending we are all autonomous agents. The concept of domination and subordination is used to analyze power relations within families, workplaces, and the state. Finally, the curriculum considers transformative remedies, which go beyond redistribution to challenge the underlying structures and norms that produce gender injustice. A representative exemplar: the ethics of care, as developed by Carol Gilligan, suggests that moral reasoning based on care and connection is not inferior to reasoning based on abstract rights, but rather offers a complementary and often more adequate approach to real-world dilemmas.Intellectual HistoryFeminist Justice Theory emerged in the late 1980s as a distinct framework within political philosophy, building on earlier feminist critiques of liberalism and the welfare state. Its immediate precursor was the second-wave feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which raised consciousness about systemic gender inequality but often lacked a systematic philosophical articulation. The framework's local dominance window begins around 1988, with the publication of key works that synthesized feminist insights into a coherent critique of mainstream justice theory. The most influential early figure is Iris Marion Young (1949–2006), whose 1990 book Justice and the Politics of Difference argued that justice must attend to group-based oppression and the politics of difference, not merely distribution. Nancy Fraser (born 1947) developed a theory of justice that integrates redistribution and recognition, arguing that gender injustice requires both economic and cultural remedies. Martha Nussbaum (born 1947), though more closely associated with the Capabilities Approach, contributed to feminist justice theory by insisting that women's capabilities—their real opportunities to flourish—must be central to any adequate theory of justice. Susan Moller Okin (1946–2004) published Justice, Gender, and the Family in 1989, which systematically criticized Justice as Fairness for ignoring the family as a site of injustice. Carol Gilligan (born 1936) introduced the ethics of care in her 1982 work In a Different Voice, which, though slightly before the local window, became a foundational text for the framework. Eva Feder Kittay (born 1946) developed the concept of dependency and care in her 1999 book Love's Labor, arguing that justice must account for the work of caring for dependents. The framework coexists with and has influenced neighboring frameworks such as Recognition Theory and Relational Egalitarianism, while also challenging Justice as Fairness, Libertarian Entitlement Theory, and Luck Egalitarianism for their neglect of gender and care. Feminist Justice Theory has been absorbed into broader discussions of global justice, where scholars like Alison Jaggar (born 1942) have applied its insights to transnational care chains and global gender inequality. Its legacy includes a transformed understanding of what counts as a question of justice—expanding the scope to include the family, care work, and the body—and a lasting insistence that justice theory must be attentive to power, difference, and the concrete lives of those it claims to serve.The 10 concepts its tower teaches
- Abstract Individualism
- Domination and Subordination
- Ethics of Care
- Gendered Division of Labor
- Intersectionality
- Public-Private Distinction
- Reproductive Justice
- The Personal as Political
- Transformative Remedies
- Vulnerability and Dependency
- 1970-Present
Historical Injustice and Rectification
How should past wrongs be rectified?
- 1971-Present
Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
What principles would free and equal people agree to?
- 1974-Present
- 1979-Present
- 1980-Present
Capability approach
What are people actually able to do and be?
About Capability approach
The Capabilities Approach reframes the central question of justice from "what resources do people have?" to "what are people actually able to do and be?" It asks whether individuals possess the genuine freedom—the capability—to achieve functionings they have reason to value, such as being adequately nourished, participating in community life, or having self-respect. This shift moves justice theory beyond measuring inputs like income or primary goods and toward evaluating the real opportunities people have to live flourishing lives. The approach emerged in the late 1970s as a direct challenge to resourcist and utilitarian frameworks, and it has since become a major alternative in debates about distributive justice, human development, and social evaluation.Core Curriculum- Capabilities and Functionings: Functionings are the beings and doings that people actually achieve—being healthy, working, resting. Capabilities are the real freedoms or opportunities to achieve those functionings. The capability set is the full range of combinations of functionings a person can choose from.
- Conversion Factors: Personal, social, and environmental factors that determine how effectively a person can convert resources (like income or goods) into actual functionings. A wheelchair user may have the same income as a non-disabled person but needs different resources to achieve the functioning of mobility.
- Basic Capabilities, Internal Capabilities, and Combined Capabilities: Basic capabilities are the foundational freedoms necessary for survival and minimal functioning. Internal capabilities are personal states (skills, health) that enable functionings. Combined capabilities add the external conditions—social, political, economic—that make internal capabilities genuinely exercisable.
- Human Development and Agency: Human development is the process of expanding people's capabilities and freedoms. Agency is the ability to act on one's own values and goals, not merely to achieve well-being. The approach values both well-being (the functionings a person achieves) and agency (the freedom to pursue what matters to them).
- Threshold of Sufficiency: A minimum level of capability that every person should be guaranteed as a matter of justice. Below this threshold, individuals lack the basic freedoms needed for a minimally decent life. This concept distinguishes the capabilities approach from strict equality of capabilities.
- Valuational Frameworks and Social Choice and Capabilities: Because capabilities are plural and incommensurable, the approach requires explicit valuational frameworks—methods for deciding which capabilities matter and how to weigh them. Social choice theory provides tools for aggregating diverse individual valuations into public judgments about capability priorities.
- Justice as Capability Equality: The claim that justice requires equalizing capabilities across persons, not resources or welfare. This is the most directly distributive principle within the approach, though many capability theorists endorse sufficiency or prioritarian versions rather than strict equality.
Intellectual HistoryThe Capabilities Approach was pioneered by economist and philosopher Amartya Sen in a series of lectures and essays beginning in 1979, most notably his 1979 Tanner Lecture "Equality of What?" and his 1980 book Poverty and Famines. Sen argued that existing theories of justice—utilitarianism, resourcism (as in Rawls's primary goods), and libertarianism—all failed to account for human diversity. People differ in their ability to convert resources into valuable functionings, so equalizing resources does not equalize real freedom. Sen's early work focused on poverty, famine, and development, showing that famines often occur not from food shortages but from failures in people's capabilities to access food.Martha Nussbaum became the second major architect of the approach, beginning with her 1988 article "Nature, Function, and Capability" and culminating in her 2000 book Women and Human Development. Nussbaum offered a more systematic, Aristotelian version that specifies a list of ten central capabilities—including life, bodily health, practical reason, and affiliation—as a minimal threshold for a just society. While Sen remained deliberately pluralist and procedural, Nussbaum argued for a substantive, universal list grounded in human dignity.Precursors include Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia (flourishing) and his analysis of human functioning, as well as Karl Marx's early writings on species-being and the critique of commodity fetishism. Adam Smith also influenced Sen through his analysis of necessities and the social conditions required for appearing in public without shame. John Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1971) provided the immediate target: Sen argued that Rawls's primary goods (rights, liberties, income, wealth) are merely means to freedom, not freedom itself.Successor and parallel frameworks include Cosmopolitan Justice, which extends capability reasoning to global justice; Human Development as a policy framework (the UN Human Development Index, launched in 1990, was directly inspired by Sen's work); and Feminist Justice Theory, which uses capabilities to analyze gender inequality. The approach also competes with Justice as Fairness (Rawls), Libertarian Entitlement Theory (Nozick), and Utilitarianism, each of which offers a different metric for evaluating social arrangements.The approach's legacy in justice theory is twofold: it introduced a richer, more human-centered metric for interpersonal comparisons, and it forced theorists to attend to the diversity of human needs and circumstances. It remains a living tradition, with ongoing debates about whether capabilities should be equalized, sufficed, or prioritized, and about how to specify and measure them in practice.The 14 concepts its tower teaches
- Agency
- Basic Capabilities
- Capabilities
- Capability Set
- Combined Capabilities
- Conversion Factors
- Functionings
- Human Development
- Internal Capabilities
- Justice as Capability Equality
- Social Choice and Capabilities
- Threshold of Sufficiency
- Valuational Frameworks
- Well-being
- 1981-2000
- 1981-Present
- 1983-Present
- 1987-Present
- 1989-Present
Feminist Justice Theory
How do gender and other identities intersect in justice?
- 1991-Present
- 1992-Present
- 1997-Present
Republican Non-Domination Theory
What makes power over others arbitrary?
- 1999-Present
Relational (Democratic) Egalitarianism
What makes social relations equal?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Social contract reacted against Classical Virtue and Natural Law Justice
Hobbes's Leviathan rejected the Aristotelian-Thomistic grounding of justice in cosmic order and natural law, replacing it with sovereign command and mutual agreement among free and equal persons.
Carried by Thomas Hobbes; Leviathan (1651).
Rawlsian Justice as Fairness revived Social contract
Rawls revived the social contract tradition, transforming it with the veil of ignorance and original position to derive principles of justice as fairness.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).
Rawlsian Justice as Fairness reacted against Utilitarianism
Rawls framed his theory as a systematic alternative to utilitarianism, arguing that it fails to take seriously the separateness of persons and cannot secure the priority of liberty.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).
Entitlement theory reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Nozick's entitlement theory directly attacked Rawlsian patterned principles, arguing that historical acquisition and transfer, not end-state patterns, determine justice in holdings.
Carried by Robert Nozick; Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974).
Communitarianism reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Communitarians such as MacIntyre and Sandel attacked Rawls's unencumbered self and the priority of justice over the good, arguing that selves are constituted by communal attachments.
Carried by Alasdair MacIntyre; After Virtue (1981); Michael Sandel.
Utilitarianism reacted against Social contract
Bentham's utilitarianism displaced contract and natural-rights justifications of political obligation with the principle of aggregate welfare, defining right action by its consequences rather than by agreement.
Carried by Jeremy Bentham; An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789).
Global justice grew out of Social contract
Global justice theory extended the social contract framework beyond the nation-state, asking what principles of justice apply among all persons worldwide.
Carried by Charles Beitz; Thomas Pogge.
Capability approach reacted against Utilitarianism
Sen's capability approach challenged utilitarian welfare metrics, arguing that well-being should be measured by capabilities rather than utility or resources.
Carried by Amartya Sen.
Prioritarianism grew out of Utilitarianism
Prioritarianism modified utilitarianism by assigning greater weight to benefits to the worse off, rejecting the utilitarian indifference to distribution.
Carried by Derek Parfit.
Feminist Justice Theory reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Feminist justice theory criticized Rawlsian liberalism for ignoring gender and the family as a basic structure, challenging the supposedly gender-neutral original position.
Carried by Susan Moller Okin.
Global justice grew out of Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Theorists of global justice applied Rawls's original position and difference principle to the global basic structure, asking what distributive obligations hold across borders.
Carried by Charles Beitz; Thomas Pogge.
Capability approach reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
The capability approach, developed by Sen and Nussbaum, criticized Rawlsian primary goods for focusing on resources rather than what people are actually able to do and be.
Carried by Amartya Sen; Martha Nussbaum.
Luck Egalitarianism grew out of Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Luck egalitarianism grew out of Rawls's distinction between morally arbitrary contingencies and responsible choice, refining the difference principle's concern with the least advantaged.
Carried by Ronald Dworkin; G. A. Cohen.
Complex Equality reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Walzer's complex equality rejected Rawls's unified set of distributive principles, arguing that justice depends on the distinct social meanings of goods in separate spheres.
Carried by Michael Walzer; Spheres of Justice (1983).
Prioritarianism grew out of Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Prioritarianism refined the Rawlsian concern for the worst off by giving extra weight to benefits to the less advantaged without insisting on maximin.
Carried by Derek Parfit.
Recognition justice reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Recognition justice theorists such as Taylor and Honneth criticized Rawlsian distributive justice for neglecting the struggle for recognition and identity.
Carried by Charles Taylor; Axel Honneth.
Republican Non-Domination Theory reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Pettit's republican theory criticized Rawlsian liberalism for insufficiently addressing domination and arbitrary power, offering non-domination as the core political ideal.
Carried by Philip Pettit.
Relational (Democratic) Egalitarianism reacted against Rawlsian Justice as Fairness
Relational egalitarianism shifted focus from Rawlsian distribution of goods to the quality of social relations, arguing that equality matters as a relation among persons.
Carried by Elizabeth Anderson.
Relational (Democratic) Egalitarianism reacted against Luck Egalitarianism
Relational egalitarianism arose as a critique of luck egalitarianism, arguing that equality is about social relations and status rather than compensating for brute luck.
Carried by Elizabeth Anderson.
Beyond the field
Where Justice Theory's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 111 links.
Classical Virtue and Natural Law Justice revived by Virtue ethics in Normative Ethics
Virtue ethics as a modern normative position grew directly out of the classical arete tradition, revived by Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' (1958) and developed by MacIntyre and Foot, who drew on Aristotle and Aquinas.
Carried by G. E. M. Anscombe; Alasdair MacIntyre; Philippa Foot.
Classical Virtue and Natural Law Justice influenced Just war theory in Use Of Force
Cicero's Stoic natural law and just-war passages, recovered in the Renaissance, supplied the framework for Vitoria's and Suárez's treatment of just war. Grotius then built his just-war doctrine on the same natural-law and virtue premises.
Carried by Cicero; Francisco de Vitoria; Hugo Grotius.
Social contract influenced by Natural Law in Political Obligation And Civil Disobedience
The natural-law tradition (Cicero through Aquinas and Grotius) supplied the concepts of natural obligation and the law of nature that Hobbes and Locke recast as the grounds of the social contract.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas; Hugo Grotius; Thomas Hobbes.
Social contract influenced Contractualism in Normative Ethics
Rawls's contractualism is a direct development of the social-contract tradition in political and justice theory, using the original position to justify principles of justice. The later contractualist literature in ethics grew out of that Rawlsian reconstruction.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).
Social contract influenced Social contract in Rights Theory
Rawls's revival of the social contract in A Theory of Justice (1971) drew directly on the Hobbesian and Lockean contract tradition, recasting it as a device of hypothetical justification.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).
Utilitarianism led to Utilitarian and Naturalistic Compatibilism in Free Will
Utilitarian compatibilism is the application of utilitarian moral theory to the free will problem: responsibility, blame and punishment are justified by their utility in shaping conduct, not by metaphysical desert. Mill's defence of determinism is explicitly utilitarian in its account of sanctions.
Carried by John Stuart Mill; An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865).
Utilitarianism led to Consequentialism in Normative Ethics
Consequentialism grew out of utilitarianism as its generalisation, retaining the primacy of consequences while loosening the commitment to hedonistic welfare. Mill's utilitarianism was the immediate source of the broader doctrine.
Utilitarianism led to Consequentialism in Ethics
Consequentialism is the generalisation of the classical utilitarian criterion: later writers abstracted the structure of judging acts by their consequences from Bentham's and Mill's specific hedonistic version.
Carried by Jeremy Bentham; John Stuart Mill.
Feminist Justice Theory influenced by Feminist Theory in Gender & Sexuality Studies
Second-wave feminist theory, crystallised in de Beauvoir's The Second Sex (1949) and later work, supplied the concepts of gendered power and the public/private split that feminist justice theory applied to law and distribution.
Carried by Simone de Beauvoir; The Second Sex (1949).
Rawlsian Justice as Fairness provoked Non-ideal theory in Global Justice
Non-ideal theory was defined by contrast with Rawlsian ideal theory, arguing that idealised assumptions about compliance and feasibility cannot guide action under injustice. Its central problem is set by the gap that Rawlsian justice as fairness leaves open.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).
Rawlsian Justice as Fairness led to Law of Peoples in Global Justice
Justice as fairness provides the domestic theory that the Law of Peoples extends internationally, with the two-stage original position presupposing the domestic one. The international framework is unintelligible without the domestic justice theory it generalises.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).
Rawlsian Justice as Fairness led to Liberal Egalitarianism in Legal Theory
Liberal egalitarianism in legal theory grew directly out of Rawls's A Theory of Justice, taking over the difference principle and the priority of liberty as its working framework.
Carried by John Rawls; A Theory of Justice (1971).

Justice Theory is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 19 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Justice TheoryRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Political Philosophy 24 links
- Global Justice 17 links
- Normative Ethics 7 links
- Authority And Legitimacy 5 links
- Welfare Economics 5 links
- Legal Theory 4 links
- Jurisprudence 3 links
- Rights Theory 3 links
- Ethics 3 links
- Property And Political Economy 3 links
- Penology 2 links
- Development Geography 2 links