Secularism And Secularization

Secularism and secularization are two words that sound alike but ask different questions.

13 frameworks, from 1689 to today · Religious Studies · Religions

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Overview

Secularism and secularization are two words that sound alike but ask different questions. Secularization is a process: the decline of religion's social power, or its retreat from public life, or the way institutions like schools and courts stop being governed by religious authority1. Secularism is a doctrine or project: the view that the state and public life should be organized on non-religious grounds, and that people of different faiths and none should share a political order without one religion dictating to the rest2. The two are entangled but not identical—a society can secularize without adopting secularism as an ideology, and a state can be secularist while its population remains devout.

What is at stake is large. If religion is fated to fade as societies modernize, then secularism is simply the political form of an inevitable trend. If it is not, then secularism is a deliberate arrangement that must be defended, revised, or criticized on its own merits. Much of the history of this subfield is a long argument about which of these is true, and about who gets to define "religion" and "the secular" in the first place.

Toleration and the Enlightenment Case for a Non-Confessional State

The intellectual roots of secularism lie in the European wars of religion and the response to them. The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which ended the Thirty Years' War, is often treated as a landmark in the emergence of a states system in which rulers' confessional choices were a matter of territorial politics rather than imperial enforcement. But the deeper argument was philosophical. John Locke's A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689) argued that the magistrate's authority extends only to civil goods—life, liberty, property—and not to the care of souls, because belief cannot be compelled by force. Locke's toleration was broad for its time but not universal; it excluded Catholics and atheists from its protection, a limit later thinkers pressed against.

The Enlightenment widened the case. Voltaire's campaigns against religious cruelty, and the French Revolution's reorganization of the Catholic Church—the Civil Constitution of the Clergy (1790) and the dechristianization of 1793–94—pushed the question from toleration to institutional separation. The revolutionaries' aim was not merely to let minorities worship freely but to subordinate the Church to the nation and, in radical phases, to replace it with a civic religion. This is where secularism as a political program, rather than a plea for tolerance, becomes visible.

Liberal Disestablishment and the Separation of Church and State

In the nineteenth century the question became constitutional. Liberal disestablishment meant removing the official privileges of a state church while leaving religion free in civil society. Britain's gradual dismantling of Anglican privilege—Catholic Emancipation (1829), the disestablishment of the Church of Ireland (1869), and the Welsh disestablishment (1914, implemented 1920)—is a case of slow, legislative secularization. The United States took a different route: the First Amendment (1791) forbade Congress to establish a religion or prohibit its free exercise, and the later "wall of separation" language, drawn from Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptists, became a touchstone for strict separation. France's 1905 law separating Church and State was more confrontational, born of a struggle between republicans and the Catholic Church after the Dreyfus affair.

The liberal model's claim was that a neutral state could guarantee equal freedom to all faiths by refusing to favor any. Its critics—then and now—asked whether "neutrality" was itself a substantive position, and whether the public square could really be emptied of religious reasoning.

Positivism, Marxism, and the First Theories of Religion's Decline

The idea that religion would fade was given systematic form by two very different nineteenth-century traditions. Auguste Comte's positivism proposed a law of three stages: humanity passes through theological, metaphysical, and positive (scientific) stages of thought, and religion belongs to the first. Comte's own "Religion of Humanity," complete with rituals and a calendar of secular saints, shows how easily the prediction of religion's decline could itself become a quasi-religion.

Karl Marx offered a more material account. In his critique of Hegel (1843) and in Capital (1867), religion appears as "the opium of the people"—a consolation and a protest generated by conditions of exploitation, which would lose its function once those conditions were overcome. Marx's theory located the cause of religion in social relations rather than in error, and predicted its withering alongside class society. Both positivism and Marxism shared the assumption that modernization and religion were on a collision course; both were wrong about the timing and completeness of the outcome, but they set the terms for a century of debate.

Laïcité: The French Model and Its Exports

The French term laïcité names a specific, assertive version of secularism: the state is not merely neutral toward religion but actively organizes public life on non-religious principles, and the public sphere is expected to be free of religious display23. Its legal foundations are the 1905 separation law and the earlier Jules Ferry laws (1881–82) that made primary education free, compulsory, and laïque. The model was exported and adapted—Turkey's Kemalist reforms after 1923, for instance, imposed a similarly assertive secularism from above, though with state control of religion rather than separation from it.

Laïcité has been the most contested of the secularist models, because its insistence on a religion-free public sphere has repeatedly collided with the visible religious practice of minorities. The 2004 French law banning conspicuous religious symbols in state schools, and the 2010 ban on face coverings in public, are the most cited flashpoints. Defenders frame these as protecting equality and the neutrality of public institutions; critics see them as targeting Islam in particular and as revealing that laïcité's "neutrality" has a cultural content.

Weber, Durkheim, and the Sociological Turn

The decisive move from philosophy to social science came with Max Weber and Émile Durkheim. Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904–05) argued that ascetic Protestantism helped generate the disciplined rationality on which capitalism depended—and that this rationality, once loosed, no longer needed its religious source. His later work developed the idea of rationalization: the replacement of tradition, magic, and charismatic authority by calculable, bureaucratic, means-ends reasoning. The associated term disenchantment (Entzauberung) describes the world's loss of magical and sacred significance under this process4. Weber's famous phrase about the "iron cage" (more precisely, "steel-hard casing," stahlhartes Gehäuse) captures the ambivalence: rationalization is not simply liberation from superstition but a new constraint.

Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) took a different path5. Studying totemism in Australian Aboriginal societies, he argued that religion is society worshipping itself: the sacred is whatever a community sets apart as untouchable and transcendent, and the profane is ordinary life. Religion's function is to bind the group together through collective ritual. This made secularization a puzzle: if religion is the symbolic form of social solidarity, what happens to solidarity when the traditional symbols fade? Durkheim's answer, in effect, was that the sacred does not disappear but migrates—to the nation, to the individual, to "the cult of man." The sacred–profane distinction remains one of the most durable tools in the field, even where its functionalist framing is rejected.

Classical Secularization Theory and Its High Tide

The mid-twentieth century produced what is now called classical secularization theory: the claim that modernization—industrialization, urbanization, differentiation of institutions, scientific rationality—inevitably reduces religion's social significance. Its major figures include Bryan Wilson, who documented the decline of religion in Britain; Peter Berger, whose The Sacred Canopy (1967) argued that pluralism undermines religion's taken-for-granted plausibility; and Karel Dobbelaere, who distinguished secularization at the societal, organizational, and individual levels. The theory's core mechanism was differentiation: as schools, hospitals, welfare, and law separate from ecclesiastical control, religion loses its public functions and retreats to private preference.

The theory was convincing because it described real trends in Western Europe—church attendance, vocations, and the public authority of churches all fell sharply across the twentieth century. Its problem was that the rest of the world did not follow. The United States remained highly religious despite advanced modernization, and the late twentieth century saw explosive religious growth in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia. By the 1990s the classical theory was in trouble.

Rational Choice and the Supply-Side Counterattack

The most direct challenge came from rational choice theory, associated with Rodney Stark, Roger Finke, and Laurence Iannaccone. Borrowing from economics, it treated religious participation as a matter of costs and benefits: people "consume" religious goods, and religious "firms" compete for adherents. The key claim was that religious vitality depends not on modernization but on the structure of the religious market. Where one church holds a monopoly (as in much of Europe), religion grows lazy and attendance falls; where many compete (as in the United States), religion stays vigorous. This "supply-side" account explained the American exception and predicted that deregulation would revive religion elsewhere.

The theory was influential and productive, but it was also heavily criticized: for treating religious commitment as a simple preference, for ignoring the ways religion can be obligatory rather than chosen, and for empirical problems with its market measures. Its lasting contribution was to make the field take religious competition and pluralism seriously as variables, rather than assuming a single path to decline.

Neo-Secularization Theory and the Return of the Debate

Classical theory did not die; it was revised. Neo-secularization theory—associated with scholars such as José Casanova, whose Public Religions in the Modern World (1994) is central—accepted that religion had not disappeared but redefined secularization as the differentiation of spheres rather than the decline of belief. Casanova distinguished three meanings: decline of religious belief and practice, privatization of religion, and differentiation of religious from secular institutions. He argued that the third is the core of secularization, and that the second is not inevitable: religions can re-enter public life as "public religions" without undoing differentiation. This reframing allowed the theory to survive the evidence of religious vitality by narrowing its claims.

Critical Secularism Studies: Interrogating the Secular

A more radical turn came from scholars who asked not whether secularization was happening but what "the secular" itself was. Critical secularism studies, associated with Talal Asad (Formations of the Secular, 2003), Saba Mahmood, and others, argued that secularism is not a neutral framework but a historically specific, culturally loaded formation—one that defines religion in Protestant terms (as private belief), thereby marginalizing traditions that do not fit that mold. Asad's point was that the secular state does not simply separate from religion; it actively constructs what counts as religion, and in doing so reshapes the traditions it governs. This line of critique drew on postcolonial and feminist theory and shifted the field's attention from the fact of decline to the politics of the categories themselves.

Post-Secularism and the Persistence of Religion in Public Life

The term post-secularism, popularized by Jürgen Habermas in the 2000s, names a condition rather than a theory: the recognition that religion has not left the public sphere and that secular citizens must learn to engage religious arguments rather than assume their irrelevance. Habermas argued that religious traditions contain semantic resources that secular reason cannot simply discard, and that a well-functioning democracy requires translation between religious and secular vocabularies. The concept has been criticized as vague and as describing a Western European experience rather than a global one, but it captured a real shift: the assumption that religion was a disappearing residue no longer held.

Multiple Secularities and the Present

The most recent framework, multiple secularities, associated with the research group around Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, argues that secularism takes different forms in different cultural and historical contexts, and that these differences are not deviations from a European norm but distinct formations with their own logics. The project compares how societies in Asia, Africa, and Europe draw the boundary between religious and secular, and finds that the boundary is drawn differently—and for different reasons—in each. This framework descends from both the critical turn (which insisted that "the secular" is constructed) and the comparative tradition (which insisted that no single path defines modernity).

Today the field is plural. Sociologists continue to measure religious change and debate whether secularization is real, stalled, or regionally specific. Historians and anthropologists trace how secular governance reshapes religious life in particular places. Critical and postcolonial scholars interrogate the categories of religion and secularism themselves. The open questions are substantial: whether secularism can be genuinely neutral toward religion or is always a particular cultural settlement; how to compare secularisms across societies without smuggling in a European yardstick; and whether the apparent religious resurgence of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is a reversal of secularization or a transformation of it. The argument that began with Locke and Voltaire is not settled—it has simply become global.

References

  1. Secularization, Wikipedia
  2. Secularism (introduction, State secularism, Variations, Frameworks), Wikipedia
  3. Secularism in France, Wikipedia
  4. Disenchantment, Wikipedia
  5. Émile Durkheim, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Secularism And Secularization

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1689-1850
  2. 1791-Present
  3. 1830-1900
  4. 1843-1980
  5. 1881-Present
  6. 1904-Present
  7. 1912-Present
  8. 1950-1990
  9. 1980-Present
  10. 1994-Present
  11. 2001-Present
  12. 2003-Present
  13. 2009-Present
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