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Philosophical Pragmatics
Philosophical pragmatics is the study of how speakers mean more than, other than, or something different from what their words literally say, and how hearers recover that meaning from context.
10 frameworks, from 1945 to today · Philosophy Of Language · Philosophy
- Ordinary Language Philosophy 1945-1975
- Presupposition 1950-Present
- Speech act 1955-Present
- Gricean Intention-Based Semantics 1957-Present
- Gricean Conversational Implicature 1967-Present
- Common Ground and Scorekeeping 1974-Present
- Neo-Gricean Pragmatics 1979-Present
- Dynamic Semantics 1981-Present
- Relevance Theory 1986-Present
- Experimental Pragmatics 1995-Present
Overview
Philosophical pragmatics is the study of how speakers mean more than, other than, or something different from what their words literally say, and how hearers recover that meaning from context1. When someone at dinner says "Can you pass the salt?", the literal question is about ability, but the real point is a request2. When a professor writes a letter saying a student's English is excellent and attendance is regular, the reader is meant to notice what is not said. Pragmatics asks how such things work: what a speaker intends, what a hearer infers, what is presupposed rather than stated, and what social business is transacted when someone promises, warns, or apologizes1. The field matters because literal meaning alone almost never tells us what was communicated, and because the mechanisms involved—intention, inference, shared background, social action—touch logic, law, ethics, and the theory of mind1.
Ordinary Language Philosophy and the Priority of Use
Philosophical pragmatics grew out of a revolt against the idea that language could be understood as a formal calculus of meanings. In the 1940s and 1950s, Ludwig Wittgenstein's later work argued that the meaning of a word is its use in the stream of life—in "language games" embedded in practices. Around the same time, J. L. Austin at Oxford began attending closely to what speakers do with words1. In How to Do Things with Words (delivered as lectures in 1955, published 1962), Austin observed that many utterances are not descriptions at all13. Saying "I promise to pay you Tuesday" does not describe a promise; it makes one1. He called such utterances performatives and distinguished them from constatives, which describe1. He later generalized the point: every utterance has an aspect of action.
Austin introduced a threefold distinction that remains foundational1. The locutionary act is the act of saying something with a certain sense and reference24. The illocutionary act is what one does in saying it—promising, warning, ordering, asserting24. The perlocutionary act is the effect produced on the hearer—persuading, alarming, amusing54. The illocutionary level is where pragmatics lives: it is the level of force, not just content. Austin's student John Searle developed this into a systematic speech act theory in Speech Acts (1969), proposing that illocutionary acts are governed by constitutive rules and classifying them into categories such as assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. Searle also argued that the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention is what makes an illocutionary act the act it is—a claim that set the agenda for the next generation.
Grice: Meaning, Intention, and Implicature
The decisive turn came from H. P. Grice, whose 1957 paper "Meaning" distinguished natural meaning (smoke means fire) from non-natural meaning (a word or gesture means something because someone intends it to be recognized as so intended). Grice's analysis of speaker meaning in terms of reflexive intention—the speaker intends the hearer to recognize the intention—gave pragmatics its central explanatory tool.
In "Logic and Conversation" (delivered as lectures in 1967, published 1975), Grice asked how hearers get from what is said to what is meant1. His answer was conversational implicature1. He proposed that conversation is governed by a general Cooperative Principle—make your contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs—and by four maxims: Quantity (be as informative as needed, not more), Quality (be truthful), Relation (be relevant), and Manner (be clear)16. When a speaker visibly flouts a maxim, the hearer assumes cooperation and infers an extra meaning16. If A asks "Where's the petrol?" and B replies "There's a garage around the corner," B has said nothing about petrol being sold there; the hearer infers it by assuming relevance. Grice distinguished conventional implicature (attached to particular words, like the contrast carried by but) from conversational implicature (derived from maxims and context), and noted that implicatures are cancellable—one can add "but I don't mean to suggest that" without contradiction, which marks them off from entailments.
Grice's framework made it possible to explain how communication succeeds despite the gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, and it did so without abandoning truth-conditional semantics: implicature could be layered on top of literal content.
Presupposition and the Common Ground
A parallel strand concerned what is taken for granted rather than asserted1. Saying "The king of France is bald" seems to presuppose that there is a king of France; saying "Have you stopped beating your wife?" presupposes that you have been beating her. P. F. Strawson's 1950 reply to Bertrand Russell's theory of descriptions argued that such sentences fail to be true or false rather than being simply false, because their presuppositions fail. The 1970s saw intensive work on presupposition—its triggers (definite descriptions, factive verbs like know, change-of-state verbs like stop), its projection behavior in complex sentences, and whether it is semantic or pragmatic. Lauri Karttunen's work on presupposition projection and the "common ground" metaphor, developed further by Robert Stalnaker, reframed presupposition as what speakers assume to be shared background—what is taken for granted by participants in a conversation. This idea fed directly into later dynamic accounts.
Neo-Gricean Pragmatics
From the late 1970s, several theorists sought to simplify and sharpen Grice's maxims. Laurence Horn (1984) reduced them to two competing principles: a Q-principle (say enough—hearers infer that if the speaker had a stronger term available, they would have used it) and an R-principle (say no more than necessary—hearers enrich what is said by assuming stereotypical interpretations). Stephen Levinson developed a related framework with three principles (Quantity, Informativeness, Manner) and applied it to anaphora and other grammatical phenomena. The neo-Griceans shared a conviction that many pragmatic inferences are default or preferred interpretations, computed unless context blocks them. Their debates with context-driven theorists over whether such inferences are default or wholly context-dependent remain live.
Relevance Theory
In Relevance: Communication and Cognition (1986), Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson proposed a radical alternative7. They argued that a single principle—relevance—suffices. Relevance is defined in terms of cognitive effects and processing effort: an input is relevant to an individual to the extent that processing it yields positive cognitive effects for relatively little effort. Communicators, they claimed, work on the presumption that an utterance is optimally relevant7. Hearers follow a path of least effort, testing interpretations in order of accessibility and stopping when expectations of relevance are satisfied. This ostensive-inferential model treats all communication as a matter of the speaker making manifest an intention and the hearer inferring it, with implicature as one outcome among several. Relevance theory generated extensive empirical work on lexical narrowing and broadening (how "flat" in "flat tyre" is understood), on irony and metaphor as echoic or loose uses, and on the development of pragmatic abilities in children7.
Dynamic Semantics and the Common Ground
A further development treated meaning as context change rather than static truth conditions8. In dynamic semantics, associated with Irene Heim's file-change semantics (1982) and Hans Kamp's discourse representation theory (1981), the meaning of a sentence is its potential to update the information state of a conversation. This handled pronouns and definiteness across discourse in ways static semantics struggled with8. Robert Stalnaker's notion of the common ground—the set of propositions mutually assumed for the purposes of conversation—and David Lewis's work on scorekeeping in conversations (1979) gave pragmatics a way to model how assertions add to shared information and how presuppositions constrain what can be felicitously said. The common-ground framework now underlies much work on assertion, presupposition, and the social dynamics of conversation9.
Experimental Pragmatics
From the 1990s and 2000s, researchers began testing pragmatic theories with controlled experiments. Experimental pragmatics uses reaction times, eye-tracking, and developmental studies to ask, for instance, how quickly hearers derive scalar implicatures (inferences from "some" to "not all"), whether children compute them as adults do, and how context shapes interpretation. Work by Ira Noveck and others on scalar implicature, and studies of metaphor and irony comprehension, brought pragmatic theory into contact with psycholinguistics and cognitive science, sometimes confirming and sometimes challenging the armchair predictions of the major frameworks.
The Present
Philosophical pragmatics today is a meeting point of philosophy, linguistics, and cognitive science. Speech act theory continues to be developed in work on assertion, on the norms governing what we may say, and on slurs and other socially loaded expressions. Gricean and neo-Gricean accounts compete with relevance-theoretic and game-theoretic models of communication. Presupposition and common ground remain central to debates about assertion, accommodation, and the ethics of what is taken for granted. Experimental methods increasingly test long-standing theoretical claims. Open questions include how far pragmatic inference is automatic versus deliberate, how pragmatic abilities develop and break down, how the social and normative dimensions of speech acts should be modeled, and whether a single unified theory of communication is achievable or whether pragmatics is irreducibly plural.
References
- Pragmatics (introduction, Areas of interest, History, The performative), Wikipedia
- Illocutionary act, Wikipedia
- Performative utterance, Wikipedia
- Locutionary act, Wikipedia
- Perlocutionary act, Wikipedia
- Cooperative principle, Wikipedia
- Relevance theory, Wikipedia
- Dynamic semantics, Wikipedia
- Common ground (linguistics), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Philosophical Pragmatics
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1945-1975
- 1950-Present
- 1955-Present
- 1957-Present
Gricean Intention-Based Semantics
How does intention fix what a speaker means?
- 1967-Present
Gricean Conversational Implicature
How do hearers infer what is meant beyond what is said?
- 1974-Present
Common Ground and Scorekeeping
How does shared background shape conversation?
- 1979-Present
- 1981-Present
- 1986-Present
- 1995-Present
Experimental Pragmatics
How do hearers actually compute pragmatic meaning?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Speech act grew out of Ordinary Language Philosophy
Austin's ordinary-language attention to what speakers do with words produced the performative/constative distinction and the locutionary-illocutionary-perlocutionary analysis in How to Do Things with Words. Searle, Austin's student, systematized this into speech act theory in Speech Acts (1969).
Carried by J. L. Austin; How to Do Things with Words (1962); John Searle.
Common Ground and Scorekeeping grew out of Presupposition
Strawson's 1950 treatment of presupposition failure and the 1970s work on presupposition triggers and projection fed into Stalnaker's reframing of presupposition as what is taken for granted in the common ground. The common-ground model grew directly out of the presupposition literature.
Carried by P. F. Strawson; Robert Stalnaker; Lauri Karttunen.
Gricean Conversational Implicature grew out of Gricean Intention-Based Semantics
Grice's intention-based account of speaker meaning in 'Meaning' (1957) was extended in 'Logic and Conversation' (1967 lectures) into the theory of conversational implicature, explaining how hearers infer meant content beyond what is said.
Carried by H. P. Grice; Logic and Conversation (1975).
Neo-Gricean Pragmatics grew out of Gricean Conversational Implicature
Neo-Gricean pragmatics grew directly out of Grice's maxims, with Horn (1984) reducing them to Q- and R-principles and Levinson developing a three-principle framework. Both sought to simplify and sharpen Grice's conversational implicature machinery.
Carried by Laurence Horn; Stephen Levinson.
Relevance Theory reacted against Gricean Conversational Implicature
Sperber and Wilson's Relevance (1986) defined itself against Grice's cooperative maxims, arguing that a single cognitive principle of relevance, not a set of maxims, explains implicature and communication. They replaced the maxim-based derivation with an ostensive-inferential model.
Carried by Dan Sperber; Deirdre Wilson; Relevance: Communication and Cognition (1986).
Gricean Intention-Based Semantics influenced by Ordinary Language Philosophy
Grice's 1957 paper 'Meaning' worked within the Oxford ordinary-language milieu and its concern with use, but redirected attention from use-in-practice to speaker intention as the core of non-natural meaning.
Carried by H. P. Grice; Meaning (1957).
Experimental Pragmatics influenced by Gricean Conversational Implicature
Experimental pragmatics took Grice's scalar implicature (from 'some' to 'not all') as its central test case, using reaction times and developmental studies to ask whether hearers compute implicatures as Grice described. Noveck's work on scalar implicature carried the Gricean question into the lab.
Carried by Ira Noveck.
Dynamic Semantics influenced by Common Ground and Scorekeeping
Stalnaker's common-ground model of conversation as updating shared assumptions provided the pragmatic motivation for dynamic semantics, in which sentence meaning is a context-change potential. Heim's file-change semantics and Kamp's discourse representation theory operationalized this update picture.
Carried by Robert Stalnaker; Irene Heim; Hans Kamp.
Experimental Pragmatics influenced by Relevance Theory
Relevance theory's claims about processing effort and the path of least effort in interpretation supplied testable predictions that experimental pragmatics put to work in studies of metaphor, irony, and children's pragmatic development.
Carried by Dan Sperber; Deirdre Wilson.
Beyond the field
Where Philosophical Pragmatics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 35 links.
Ordinary Language Philosophy reacted against Logical positivism in Philosophy Of Language
Ordinary language philosophy defined itself against logical positivism's programme of ideal logical reconstruction, arguing that the actual uses of everyday language were the proper object of philosophical attention. The later Wittgenstein and Oxford philosophers such as Austin and Ryle framed their work as a rejection of the positivist demand for formal regimentation.
Carried by Ludwig Wittgenstein; Gilbert Ryle; J. L. Austin.
Gricean Intention-Based Semantics influenced Politeness Theory in Pragmatics
Brown and Levinson's model treats politeness as the strategic exploitation of Gricean maxims and of speaker meaning, so that face-work is calculated as a departure from maxim-based inference. Grice's intention-based account of communication supplied the mechanism their theory presupposes.
Carried by H. P. Grice; Penelope Brown; Stephen C. Levinson.
Gricean Conversational Implicature led to Neo-Gricean Pragmatics in Pragmatics
Neo-Gricean pragmatics took Grice's conversational implicature and developed it into a systematic account of generalised and default implicatures.
Carried by Stephen Levinson.
Gricean Conversational Implicature influenced Experimental Pragmatics in Pragmatics
Experimental pragmatics takes Grice's account of conversational implicature as its core object of study, operationalising the distinction between what is said and what is implicated. The implicature construct is what the experiments measure.
Carried by H. P. Grice.
Neo-Gricean Pragmatics grew out of Gricean Pragmatics in Semantics
Neo-Gricean pragmatics is a direct refinement of Gricean conversational implicature, reworking the maxims into scaled principles. The semantic-side entry names the same Gricean body of ideas the neo-Griceans built on.
Carried by H. Paul Grice; Laurence Horn.
Neo-Gricean Pragmatics grew out of Gricean Pragmatics in Pragmatics
Neo-Gricean pragmatics grew directly out of Grice's theory of conversation, taking his cooperative principle and implicature and revising them into principles such as Horn's Q- and R-principles and Levinson's heuristics. The later school is a refinement of Grice's framework, not a rejection of it.
Carried by H. Paul Grice; Laurence Horn; Stephen Levinson.
Neo-Gricean Pragmatics grew out of Gricean Intention and Implicature in Philosophy Of Language
Neo-Gricean pragmatics descends from Grice's account of intention and implicature, keeping his distinction between what is said and what is implicated while revising the maxims. Grice's 1957 and 1967 work is the direct ancestor of the later school.
Carried by H. Paul Grice.
Neo-Gricean Pragmatics grew out of Gricean Pragmatics in Context And Indexicality
The neo-Gricean programme is a revision of Grice's theory of meaning and implicature as developed in philosophy of language. It preserves Grice's speaker-intention analysis while replacing the maxims with general principles.
Carried by H. Paul Grice.
Dynamic Semantics grew out of Formal Semantics in Linguistics
Dynamic semantics arose within formal semantics as a revision of static truth-conditional meaning, replacing truth conditions with context-change potential. It is a branch of the formal-semantic tradition, developed by Kamp and Heim.
Carried by Irene Heim; Hans Kamp.
Relevance Theory reacted against Gricean Pragmatics in Pragmatics
Relevance theory defined itself against Gricean pragmatics, keeping the idea of implicature but rejecting the cooperative principle and maxims in favour of a single principle of relevance. Sperber and Wilson's 1986 book is framed as a critique and replacement of the Gricean programme.
Carried by Dan Sperber; Deirdre Wilson; Relevance (1986).
Relevance Theory reacted against Gricean Pragmatics in Context And Indexicality
Relevance theory was built as a critique of Grice's account of meaning and implicature, retaining speaker intention but replacing the maxims with a single principle of relevance. Sperber and Wilson's 1986 work is explicitly framed against the Gricean framework.
Carried by Dan Sperber; Deirdre Wilson; Relevance (1986).
Relevance Theory influenced Experimental Pragmatics in Pragmatics
Relevance Theory supplied experimental pragmatics with predictions about processing effort and contextual effects that were tested in comprehension and reference-resolution experiments. The theory's claims about effort and inference were a principal target of the early experimental work.
Carried by Dan Sperber; Deirdre Wilson.

Philosophical Pragmatics is a planet in Nousfarer
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Land on Philosophical PragmaticsRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Pragmatics 21 links
- Context And Indexicality 6 links
- Philosophy Of Language 3 links
- Linguistics 2 links
- Semantics 2 links
- Metaphysics 1 link
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