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Meaning And Understanding
What is it for a word or a sentence to mean something?
13 frameworks, from 1150 to today · Philosophy Of Language · Philosophy
- Supposition Theory 1150-1500
- Semantic Triangle 1600-1900
- Idea Theory of Meaning 1690-1930
- Fregean Semantics 1892-Present
- Theory of descriptions 1905-1970
- Picture theory of language 1921-1953
- Ordinary Language Philosophy 1945-1980
- Meaning as Use 1953-Present
- Chomskyan Mentalism 1957-Present
- Intention-Based Semantics 1957-Present
- Montague Grammar 1970-Present
- Inferential role semantics 1994-Present
- Experimental Philosophy of Language 2004-Present
Overview
What is it for a word or a sentence to mean something? And what is it to understand an utterance—to grasp what a speaker meant? These two questions are the heart of this subfield. They are not the same question. One asks about the standing significance of expressions, the other about the act of a mind meeting a sign. Much of the history below is the story of philosophers trying to hold these together, or deciding that one must give way to the other. The stakes are large: if meaning is a matter of convention, or of intention, or of inferential role, or of truth-conditions, then translation, law, logic, and everyday communication look different.
Medieval Supposition and the Logic of Terms
Before "meaning" was a single topic, medieval logicians studied how terms stand for things in a proposition1. Supposition theory, developed from the twelfth century onward in the Latin schools, distinguished what a term signifies from what it supposes for in a given context. In "Socrates is a man," the term "man" supposes for Socrates; in "man is a species," it supposes for the concept or the universal. The theory gave a systematic account of how the same word shifts its referential role with the sentence around it—an early recognition that context matters. Its practitioners, including William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, used it to handle quantification, predication, and the puzzles of terms that stand for themselves, as when we say "'man' has three letters." The problem it solved was how to keep logic rigorous while natural language kept sliding between uses.
The Semantic Triangle and the Idea Theory
A persistent alternative located meaning in the mind. The semantic triangle—often associated with C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards' The Meaning of Meaning (1923), though with older roots—pictures meaning as a relation among a word, a concept, and a thing: the word symbolizes the concept, the concept refers to the thing, and the word relates to the thing only indirectly2. This crystallized an older idea theory of meaning, on which words signify ideas in the speaker's mind34. John Locke had put it plainly in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690): words are the signs of ideas. The appeal is obvious—it explains how we understand words we have never heard by connecting them to thoughts. The difficulty is equally obvious: whose idea, and how does a hearer get at it? The theory threatens to make communication a kind of telepathy.
Frege: Sense, Reference, and the Birth of Modern Semantics
Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung), set out in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892), reframed the whole problem5. The reference of a name is the object it picks out; its sense is the mode of presentation of that object—the way it is given5. "The morning star" and "the evening star" have the same reference (Venus) but different senses, which is why "the morning star is the evening star" is informative while "the morning star is the morning star" is not. Frege extended this to whole sentences: a sentence's reference is its truth-value, its sense a thought5. Meaning, on this picture, is objective and shareable, not a private mental image. This solved the informativeness puzzle and grounded a compositional semantics—the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts36.
Russell and the Logical Analysis of Descriptions
Bertrand Russell took a different route to the same puzzles3. In "On Denoting" (1905) he offered the theory of descriptions: a sentence like "The present King of France is bald" is not about a nonexistent object but has a hidden logical form—roughly, "There is exactly one present King of France, and that thing is bald." Definite descriptions are thus not names but quantified predicates7. This dissolved problems about empty names and false presuppositions that had troubled Frege, and it made logical analysis the philosopher's tool for revealing what a sentence really means beneath its surface grammar. Russell's approach, developed with Alfred North Whitehead in Principia Mathematica (1910–13), set the agenda for analytic philosophy: clarify meaning by translating into a precise logical notation.
The Picture Theory and Its Collapse
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) pushed the logicist picture to its limit. On the picture theory of meaning, a proposition is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs; it shares a structure with what it depicts, and meaning is this structural correspondence38. Language's job is to represent the world, and the limits of language are the limits of what can be said. What cannot be pictured—ethics, the mystical—must be passed over in silence. The theory was austere and influential, but it could not account for the ordinary work language does: commanding, joking, asking. Wittgenstein himself came to reject it8.
Ordinary Language and Meaning as Use
The later Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (published 1953) reversed the picture89. Meaning is not a hidden object behind the word; it is the word's use in a language-game—a practice governed by rules, embedded in a form of life310. "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use."11 Understanding a word is being able to operate with it, as a player knows the moves in chess3. This ordinary language philosophy, pursued at Oxford by J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle, treated careful attention to how words are actually used as the cure for philosophical confusion9. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (1962) added that utterances do things—promising, naming, marrying—not merely describe. The approach's strength was its fidelity to real speech; its weakness, critics charged, was a reluctance to systematize.
Grice: Meaning as Intention
H. P. Grice supplied the systematization in "Meaning" (1957) and later essays. Intention-based semantics holds that what an utterance means is grounded in what the speaker intends to produce in the hearer by means of the hearer's recognition of that intention3. Meaning is a special case of acting on another's mind. Grice then explained how hearers bridge the gap between literal content and intended content through conversational implicature—inferences from general expectations of cooperativeness1213. His maxims of conversation gave pragmatics a framework, and his account of speaker meaning versus sentence meaning became foundational1214. It answered the ordinary-language philosophers' call for attention to use while restoring theoretical order.
Mentalism and the Chomskyan Turn
Noam Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (1957) and later work redirected attention to the mind15. Chomskyan mentalism treats a language as a body of knowledge internalized by a speaker—a grammar realized in the brain—and linguistics as the study of that competence1617. Meaning, in this frame, is part of the speaker's cognitive endowment, and the task is to characterize the representations and rules that generate it. The move made language a natural object of scientific study and provoked a long debate with philosophers, including W. V. O. Quine, over whether such internal states could be pinned down3. Quine's Word and Object (1960) pressed the indeterminacy of translation; the exchange sharpened what it means to say a theory of meaning is empirical.
Montague: Meaning Made Formal
Richard Montague's essays of the late 1960s and early 1970s, collected in Formal Philosophy (1974), showed that natural language could be given the same rigorous treatment as artificial logic. Montague grammar assigns every expression a type and a model-theoretic interpretation, building sentence meaning compositionally from the meanings of parts186. A sentence like "Every student reads a book" gets a precise truth-conditional analysis with quantifiers scoping over predicates. The achievement was to make semantics a branch of mathematics while respecting the subtleties of English. It founded modern formal semantics and remains the backbone of the field.
Inferentialism: Meaning as Role in Reasoning
A later challenge came from inferentialism, most associated with Robert Brandom's Making It Explicit (1994). On this view, the meaning of an expression is its role in inference—what it licenses and what follows from it319. To grasp "red" is to know, among other things, that from "x is red" one may infer "x is colored."3 Meaning is normative: it consists in commitments and entitlements in the practice of giving and asking for reasons3. The approach connects semantics to logic and to social practice, and it offers an alternative to both truth-conditional and intention-based accounts.
Experimental Philosophy of Language
Most recently, the experimental philosophy of language movement has brought empirical methods to bear. Beginning in the early 2000s, philosophers such as Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich tested whether ordinary speakers' intuitions match the armchair judgments on which theories of reference and meaning had relied. Their studies of how people apply names in hypothetical cases suggested that intuitions vary with culture and context, unsettling the assumption that a single intuitive verdict settles a semantic question. The movement does not replace the older approaches but pressures them to say whose understanding—and whose intuitions—a theory of meaning is answerable to.
The Present
Today the field is plural. Formal semantics in the Montague tradition continues to model truth-conditions and composition; pragmatics in the Gricean line studies implicature and context; inferentialists and use-theorists insist that meaning is grounded in practice and normativity; mentalists treat meaning as cognitive structure; and experimentalists test the intuitions the others trade on6. The old tension between standing meaning and speaker understanding has not been resolved so much as distributed across these programs3. Open questions remain: how far meaning is determined by convention versus intention, whether semantic content can be cleanly separated from pragmatic enrichment, and what empirical evidence should count for or against a theory of what we mean when we speak.
References
- Supposition theory, Wikipedia
- Triangle of reference, Wikipedia
- Meaning (philosophy) (Based on mind and abstract objects, Other concepts, Modern and contemporary, Based on reference and truth conditions, Based on use, introduction, Speaker, conventional, and figurative), Wikipedia
- Semantics, Wikipedia
- Sense and reference (introduction, Background), Wikipedia
- Formal semantics (natural language) (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- Theory of descriptions, Wikipedia
- Picture theory of language, Wikipedia
- Ordinary language philosophy, Wikipedia
- Philosophical Investigations (Meaning as use), Wikipedia
- Speech act (History), Wikipedia
- Cooperative principle (Grice's maxims), Wikipedia
- Implicature (Conversational implicature), Wikipedia
- Paul Grice, Wikipedia
- Noam Chomsky, Wikipedia
- Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Wikipedia
- Universal grammar, Wikipedia
- Montague grammar, Wikipedia
- Inferential role semantics, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Meaning And Understanding
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1150-1500
- 1600-1900
- 1690-1930
- 1892-Present
Fregean Semantics
How can two names for the same thing differ in meaning?
- 1905-1970
Theory of descriptions
What is the logical form of a definite description?
- 1921-1953
- 1945-1980
- 1953-Present
- 1957-Present
- 1957-Present
Intention-Based Semantics
Does speaker intention ground utterance meaning?
- 1970-Present
- 1994-Present
- 2004-Present
Experimental Philosophy of Language
What do ordinary speakers intuit about meaning?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Fregean Semantics reacted against Idea Theory of Meaning
Frege's sense-reference distinction was framed against the idea theory: senses are objective modes of presentation, not private mental images, so communication is not telepathy. His 1892 essay defined modern semantics by rejecting the Lockean picture of meaning as ideas in the mind.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892).
Theory of descriptions reacted against Fregean Semantics
Russell's theory of descriptions was offered as a solution to puzzles about empty names and substitution that Frege's sense-reference distinction left unresolved. Russell rejected Frege's treatment of definite descriptions as referring expressions and replaced it with a quantificational analysis.
Carried by Bertrand Russell; On Denoting (1905).
Montague Grammar grew out of Fregean Semantics
Montague grammar built directly on Frege's principle of compositionality, treating sentence meaning as a function of the meanings of parts. Montague applied Fregean semantics to natural language using model theory and type theory.
Carried by Richard Montague; Formal Philosophy (1974).
Ordinary Language Philosophy reacted against Picture theory of language
Ordinary language philosophy arose as a rejection of the Tractatus's austere picture of language as logical representation. Wittgenstein's later work and Oxford philosophers insisted that meaning is found in the varied uses of words in practice, not in a hidden logical structure.
Carried by Ludwig Wittgenstein; Philosophical Investigations (1953); J. L. Austin.
Picture theory of language influenced by Theory of descriptions
Wittgenstein's Tractatus took over Russell's method of logical analysis, treating surface grammar as concealing a hidden logical form. The picture theory extends the logicist project of revealing what a proposition really says beneath its ordinary wording.
Carried by Ludwig Wittgenstein; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921).
Montague Grammar influenced by Theory of descriptions
Montague's treatment of quantifiers and definite descriptions in natural language formalized Russell's insight that surface grammar hides logical structure. Montague grammar gave Russell's quantificational analysis a precise type-theoretic implementation.
Carried by Richard Montague.
Intention-Based Semantics influenced by Ordinary Language Philosophy
Grice's intention-based semantics answered the ordinary-language philosophers' demand to attend to actual use while restoring theoretical order. His distinction between speaker meaning and sentence meaning systematized the pragmatic phenomena Austin and others had described.
Carried by H. P. Grice; Meaning (1957).
Intention-Based Semantics rival of Meaning as Use
Grice's account of meaning as intention competed with the use theory by explaining the same pragmatic phenomena through speaker intentions rather than communal practice. Both arose in the 1950s as answers to how utterances carry meaning beyond literal content.
Carried by H. P. Grice; Meaning (1957).
Inferential role semantics influenced by Meaning as Use
Brandom's inferentialism takes up the later Wittgenstein's idea that meaning is a matter of use, specifically the role an expression plays in the practice of giving and asking for reasons. It develops the use theory into a normative account of inferential commitments.
Carried by Robert Brandom; Making It Explicit (1994).
Experimental Philosophy of Language influenced by Ordinary Language Philosophy
Experimental philosophy of language revived ordinary language philosophy's method of testing intuitions about cases, but replaced armchair reflection with empirical surveys. Early work on reference intuitions directly engaged the ordinary-language tradition's reliance on what we would say.
Carried by Edouard Machery; Ron Mallon; Shaun Nichols.
Beyond the field
Where Meaning And Understanding's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 44 links.
Supposition Theory grew out of Term logic in Philosophical Logic
Medieval supposition theory grew out of ancient term logic: the analysis of categorical propositions into subject and predicate terms, transmitted through Boethius and the Latin logical tradition, was extended into a theory of the reference of terms.
Carried by Aristotle; Boethius.
Supposition Theory grew out of Aristotelian syllogistic in Logic
Supposition theory is a medieval development of Aristotelian syllogistic, adding a semantic account of how terms stand for things within the categorical propositions that syllogistic had analysed syntactically.
Carried by Aristotle; Boethius.
Fregean Semantics led to Truth-Conditional Semantics in Reference And Truth
Truth-conditional semantics grew out of Frege's semantics: the composition of senses and the reference of sentences to truth values provided the basis for later truth-conditional accounts of meaning.
Carried by Gottfried Frege; Gottlob Frege.
Fregean Semantics influenced Truth-Conditional Semantics in Reference And Truth
Frege's separation of sense from reference and his principle of compositionality supplied the foundation on which truth-conditional semantics was built. Davidson and later truth-conditionalists took over Frege's insight that a sentence's meaning is its truth-condition.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Donald Davidson.
Fregean Semantics provoked Causal-Historical Theory of Reference in Reference And Truth
The causal-historical theory of reference arose as a rejection of Fregean semantics, denying that names carry descriptive senses that determine their reference. Kripke's and Putnam's accounts replaced the Fregean picture with a causal chain of transmission.
Carried by Saul Kripke; Hilary Putnam.
Fregean Semantics reacted against Idea Theory of Meaning in Philosophy Of Language
Frege's sense/reference distinction was framed against the idea theory of meaning: he argued that the Bedeutung of a proper name is its object, not a mental idea, and that sense is objective rather than private.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; On Sense and Reference (1892).
Theory of descriptions influenced by Fregean predicate logic in Logic
The theory of descriptions depends on Frege's predicate logic: Russell used quantification, variables and predicate letters to paraphrase away definite descriptions, a technique made possible by Frege's Begriffsschrift.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Begriffsschrift (1879).
Ordinary Language Philosophy reacted against Logical analysis in Metaphysics
Ordinary language philosophy defined itself against the logical analysis of Russell, Carnap and the early Wittgenstein, rejecting ideal-language reconstruction in favour of describing actual usage. The later Wittgenstein and Oxford philosophers made this rejection their programme.
Carried by Ludwig Wittgenstein; Gilbert Ryle; J. L. Austin.
Montague Grammar led to Formal Semantics in Linguistics
Montague grammar is the founding source of formal semantics in linguistics: Montague's model-theoretic treatment of English fragments was taken up by Partee and others and became the basis of the field.
Carried by Richard Montague; Barbara Partee.
Montague Grammar grew out of Truth-Conditional Semantics in Reference And Truth
Montague grammar is a development of truth-conditional semantics, extending the Fregean and Tarskian programme of assigning truth conditions compositionally to natural-language sentences.
Carried by Richard Montague.
Montague Grammar influenced by Model-theoretic semantics in Philosophy Of Logic
Montague grammar applies Tarski's model-theoretic semantics to natural language, interpreting English expressions in set-theoretic models. The method passed directly from Tarski's work through Montague's papers.
Carried by Richard Montague; Alfred Tarski.
Inferential role semantics reacted against Truth-Conditional Semantics in Philosophy Of Language
Inferential role semantics arose as an attack on truth-conditional semantics, arguing that meaning is fixed by inferential connections among sentences rather than by truth conditions. Brandom's Making It Explicit defines itself against the truth-conditional tradition.
Carried by Robert Brandom; Making It Explicit (1994).

Meaning And Understanding is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 13 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Meaning And UnderstandingRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Philosophy Of Language 9 links
- Reference And Truth 8 links
- Analytic Philosophy 4 links
- Mental Representation 3 links
- Semantics 2 links
- Syntax 2 links
- Logic 2 links
- Metaphysics 2 links
- Communication 1 link
- Linguistics 1 link
- Neurolinguistics 1 link
- Psycholinguistics 1 link
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