Meaning And Understanding

What is it for a word or a sentence to mean something?

13 frameworks, from 1150 to today · Philosophy Of Language · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

What is it for a word or a sentence to mean something? And what is it to understand an utterance—to grasp what a speaker meant? These two questions are the heart of this subfield. They are not the same question. One asks about the standing significance of expressions, the other about the act of a mind meeting a sign. Much of the history below is the story of philosophers trying to hold these together, or deciding that one must give way to the other. The stakes are large: if meaning is a matter of convention, or of intention, or of inferential role, or of truth-conditions, then translation, law, logic, and everyday communication look different.

Medieval Supposition and the Logic of Terms

Before "meaning" was a single topic, medieval logicians studied how terms stand for things in a proposition1. Supposition theory, developed from the twelfth century onward in the Latin schools, distinguished what a term signifies from what it supposes for in a given context. In "Socrates is a man," the term "man" supposes for Socrates; in "man is a species," it supposes for the concept or the universal. The theory gave a systematic account of how the same word shifts its referential role with the sentence around it—an early recognition that context matters. Its practitioners, including William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, used it to handle quantification, predication, and the puzzles of terms that stand for themselves, as when we say "'man' has three letters." The problem it solved was how to keep logic rigorous while natural language kept sliding between uses.

The Semantic Triangle and the Idea Theory

A persistent alternative located meaning in the mind. The semantic triangle—often associated with C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards' The Meaning of Meaning (1923), though with older roots—pictures meaning as a relation among a word, a concept, and a thing: the word symbolizes the concept, the concept refers to the thing, and the word relates to the thing only indirectly2. This crystallized an older idea theory of meaning, on which words signify ideas in the speaker's mind34. John Locke had put it plainly in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690): words are the signs of ideas. The appeal is obvious—it explains how we understand words we have never heard by connecting them to thoughts. The difficulty is equally obvious: whose idea, and how does a hearer get at it? The theory threatens to make communication a kind of telepathy.

Frege: Sense, Reference, and the Birth of Modern Semantics

Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung), set out in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892), reframed the whole problem5. The reference of a name is the object it picks out; its sense is the mode of presentation of that object—the way it is given5. "The morning star" and "the evening star" have the same reference (Venus) but different senses, which is why "the morning star is the evening star" is informative while "the morning star is the morning star" is not. Frege extended this to whole sentences: a sentence's reference is its truth-value, its sense a thought5. Meaning, on this picture, is objective and shareable, not a private mental image. This solved the informativeness puzzle and grounded a compositional semantics—the meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings of its parts36.

Russell and the Logical Analysis of Descriptions

Bertrand Russell took a different route to the same puzzles3. In "On Denoting" (1905) he offered the theory of descriptions: a sentence like "The present King of France is bald" is not about a nonexistent object but has a hidden logical form—roughly, "There is exactly one present King of France, and that thing is bald." Definite descriptions are thus not names but quantified predicates7. This dissolved problems about empty names and false presuppositions that had troubled Frege, and it made logical analysis the philosopher's tool for revealing what a sentence really means beneath its surface grammar. Russell's approach, developed with Alfred North Whitehead in Principia Mathematica (1910–13), set the agenda for analytic philosophy: clarify meaning by translating into a precise logical notation.

The Picture Theory and Its Collapse

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) pushed the logicist picture to its limit. On the picture theory of meaning, a proposition is a logical picture of a possible state of affairs; it shares a structure with what it depicts, and meaning is this structural correspondence38. Language's job is to represent the world, and the limits of language are the limits of what can be said. What cannot be pictured—ethics, the mystical—must be passed over in silence. The theory was austere and influential, but it could not account for the ordinary work language does: commanding, joking, asking. Wittgenstein himself came to reject it8.

Ordinary Language and Meaning as Use

The later Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations (published 1953) reversed the picture89. Meaning is not a hidden object behind the word; it is the word's use in a language-game—a practice governed by rules, embedded in a form of life310. "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use."11 Understanding a word is being able to operate with it, as a player knows the moves in chess3. This ordinary language philosophy, pursued at Oxford by J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle, treated careful attention to how words are actually used as the cure for philosophical confusion9. Austin's How to Do Things with Words (1962) added that utterances do things—promising, naming, marrying—not merely describe. The approach's strength was its fidelity to real speech; its weakness, critics charged, was a reluctance to systematize.

Grice: Meaning as Intention

H. P. Grice supplied the systematization in "Meaning" (1957) and later essays. Intention-based semantics holds that what an utterance means is grounded in what the speaker intends to produce in the hearer by means of the hearer's recognition of that intention3. Meaning is a special case of acting on another's mind. Grice then explained how hearers bridge the gap between literal content and intended content through conversational implicature—inferences from general expectations of cooperativeness1213. His maxims of conversation gave pragmatics a framework, and his account of speaker meaning versus sentence meaning became foundational1214. It answered the ordinary-language philosophers' call for attention to use while restoring theoretical order.

Mentalism and the Chomskyan Turn

Noam Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (1957) and later work redirected attention to the mind15. Chomskyan mentalism treats a language as a body of knowledge internalized by a speaker—a grammar realized in the brain—and linguistics as the study of that competence1617. Meaning, in this frame, is part of the speaker's cognitive endowment, and the task is to characterize the representations and rules that generate it. The move made language a natural object of scientific study and provoked a long debate with philosophers, including W. V. O. Quine, over whether such internal states could be pinned down3. Quine's Word and Object (1960) pressed the indeterminacy of translation; the exchange sharpened what it means to say a theory of meaning is empirical.

Montague: Meaning Made Formal

Richard Montague's essays of the late 1960s and early 1970s, collected in Formal Philosophy (1974), showed that natural language could be given the same rigorous treatment as artificial logic. Montague grammar assigns every expression a type and a model-theoretic interpretation, building sentence meaning compositionally from the meanings of parts186. A sentence like "Every student reads a book" gets a precise truth-conditional analysis with quantifiers scoping over predicates. The achievement was to make semantics a branch of mathematics while respecting the subtleties of English. It founded modern formal semantics and remains the backbone of the field.

Inferentialism: Meaning as Role in Reasoning

A later challenge came from inferentialism, most associated with Robert Brandom's Making It Explicit (1994). On this view, the meaning of an expression is its role in inference—what it licenses and what follows from it319. To grasp "red" is to know, among other things, that from "x is red" one may infer "x is colored."3 Meaning is normative: it consists in commitments and entitlements in the practice of giving and asking for reasons3. The approach connects semantics to logic and to social practice, and it offers an alternative to both truth-conditional and intention-based accounts.

Experimental Philosophy of Language

Most recently, the experimental philosophy of language movement has brought empirical methods to bear. Beginning in the early 2000s, philosophers such as Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich tested whether ordinary speakers' intuitions match the armchair judgments on which theories of reference and meaning had relied. Their studies of how people apply names in hypothetical cases suggested that intuitions vary with culture and context, unsettling the assumption that a single intuitive verdict settles a semantic question. The movement does not replace the older approaches but pressures them to say whose understanding—and whose intuitions—a theory of meaning is answerable to.

The Present

Today the field is plural. Formal semantics in the Montague tradition continues to model truth-conditions and composition; pragmatics in the Gricean line studies implicature and context; inferentialists and use-theorists insist that meaning is grounded in practice and normativity; mentalists treat meaning as cognitive structure; and experimentalists test the intuitions the others trade on6. The old tension between standing meaning and speaker understanding has not been resolved so much as distributed across these programs3. Open questions remain: how far meaning is determined by convention versus intention, whether semantic content can be cleanly separated from pragmatic enrichment, and what empirical evidence should count for or against a theory of what we mean when we speak.

References

  1. Supposition theory, Wikipedia
  2. Triangle of reference, Wikipedia
  3. Meaning (philosophy) (Based on mind and abstract objects, Other concepts, Modern and contemporary, Based on reference and truth conditions, Based on use, introduction, Speaker, conventional, and figurative), Wikipedia
  4. Semantics, Wikipedia
  5. Sense and reference (introduction, Background), Wikipedia
  6. Formal semantics (natural language) (History, introduction), Wikipedia
  7. Theory of descriptions, Wikipedia
  8. Picture theory of language, Wikipedia
  9. Ordinary language philosophy, Wikipedia
  10. Philosophical Investigations (Meaning as use), Wikipedia
  11. Speech act (History), Wikipedia
  12. Cooperative principle (Grice's maxims), Wikipedia
  13. Implicature (Conversational implicature), Wikipedia
  14. Paul Grice, Wikipedia
  15. Noam Chomsky, Wikipedia
  16. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Wikipedia
  17. Universal grammar, Wikipedia
  18. Montague grammar, Wikipedia
  19. Inferential role semantics, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Meaning And Understanding

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1150-1500

    Supposition Theory

    How does a term stand for things in a sentence?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  2. 1600-1900

    Semantic Triangle

    How do words, thoughts, and things connect?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 1690-1930

    Idea Theory of Meaning

    Are words signs of ideas in the mind?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 1892-Present

    Fregean Semantics

    How can two names for the same thing differ in meaning?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 1905-1970

    Theory of descriptions

    What is the logical form of a definite description?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  6. 1921-1953
  7. 1945-1980
  8. 1953-Present

    Meaning as Use

    Is meaning just the use of a word?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1957-Present

    Chomskyan Mentalism

    Is language knowledge in the mind?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1957-Present

    Intention-Based Semantics

    Does speaker intention ground utterance meaning?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  11. 1970-Present

    Montague Grammar

    Can natural language be given a formal semantics?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  12. 1994-Present
  13. 2004-Present

    Experimental Philosophy of Language

    What do ordinary speakers intuit about meaning?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Supposition TheorySemantic TriangleIdea Theory of MeaningFregean SemanticsTheory of descriptionsPicture theory of languageOrdinary Language PhilosophyMeaning as UseChomskyan MentalismIntention-Based SemanticsMontague GrammarInferential role semanticsExperimental Philosophy of Language

Beyond the field

Where Meaning And Understanding's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 44 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Meaning And Understanding is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 13 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

Land on Meaning And Understanding

Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

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