Context And Indexicality

Ask what "here" means and the answer depends on where you are standing.

13 frameworks, from 300 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Language · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Ask what "here" means and the answer depends on where you are standing. Ask what "now" means and it depends on when you speak. "I" picks out whoever is talking1. These small words—called indexicals, from the Latin index, a pointer—are the clearest window onto a large question: how much of what a sentence means depends on the situation in which it is uttered, and how should a theory of meaning represent that dependence? The stakes are not merely technical. If meaning shifts with context, then truth, communication, and even the possibility of a shared language need careful accounting. The history of this subfield is the story of philosophers and logicians learning to separate what a sentence says from the circumstances that fix what it says, and then arguing about where the line falls.

Pronouns and Pointers in Ancient and Medieval Grammar

Ancient grammarians noticed pronouns before philosophers theorized them. Greek and Latin grammatical traditions classified pronouns as a distinct part of speech, and the Stoics drew a contrast between deictic words—those that point, like "this" and "that"—and names, which signify by convention. The distinction mattered because pointing words seemed to mean something only in use, a puzzle for any theory that located meaning in the word itself.

Medieval logicians took up the problem under the heading of suppositio, the way a term stands for things in a proposition. They distinguished cases where a term stands for what it signifies from cases where it depends on context, and they worried about pronouns whose reference shifts with the speaker. The medieval grammarian's treatment of "I," "you," "this," and "here" as termini relativi—relative terms whose signification is completed by the utterance situation—anticipated much later work, though in a vocabulary of scholastic logic rather than formal semantics. What the tradition lacked was a systematic way to represent context in a formal language; that would wait for the twentieth century.

Frege's Sense, and the Problem of Shifting Thoughts

Gottlob Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung)—the mode of presentation of an object versus the object itself—gave philosophy of language its most durable tool2. "The morning star" and "the evening star" have different senses but the same reference, Venus. Frege held that senses are objective and timeless, which created a difficulty for indexicals. If "I" has a sense, that sense cannot be the same for every speaker, since it must present a different person each time. Frege suggested that indexical expressions are incomplete and require the context of utterance to yield a complete thought, but he never developed a full theory.

The problem sharpened in the twentieth century. If "I am hungry" said by Alice and "I am hungry" said by Bob express different thoughts, then the thought expressed depends on who speaks—yet the sentence type is the same. Frege's framework, built for eternal thoughts, strained to accommodate this. The challenge for successors was to explain how context enters without collapsing meaning into mere occasion of use.

Egocentric Particulars and the Early Analytic Turn

Bertrand Russell introduced the phrase egocentric particulars for words like "this," "I," "here," and "now," which he treated as logically basic—closer to the raw data of experience than ordinary names. Russell's interest was epistemological: such words anchor language in acquaintance with immediate experience. But his treatment remained programmatic.

The decisive step came from Rudolf Carnap and, more influentially, from the logician and philosopher Yehoshua Bar-Hillel. In the 1950s, working within the tradition of formal semantics, Bar-Hillel proposed that indexical expressions be handled by treating a sentence's truth as relative to a context of utterance—a tuple specifying speaker, time, place, and possibly audience. "It is raining" is not true or false simpliciter; it is true relative to a context. This was a clean formal move: indexicality became a parameter in the semantics rather than a defect to be explained away. Bar-Hillel's indexical theory made context a first-class object of logical analysis and set the agenda for everything that followed.

Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives

The most influential single contribution came from David Kaplan, whose work on demonstratives, circulated in the 1970s and published as "Demonstratives" in 1989, gave the field its standard framework. Kaplan distinguished two levels of meaning. The character of an indexical is a rule that takes a context and delivers a content—roughly, what the expression contributes to what is said. The character of "I" is the rule "the speaker of the context"; its content in a given utterance is the speaker. Character is stable across contexts; content varies.

Kaplan modeled this with a formal language containing context parameters and showed how truth could be defined relative to both a context of utterance and a circumstance of evaluation. He also distinguished the context of utterance from the circumstance of evaluation—the possible world and time at which the content is assessed. This separation, though it looks technical, resolved puzzles: "It is raining now" said at noon is true at noon, but the content it expresses can be evaluated at other times. Kaplan's framework made indexicality tractable and became the baseline against which later theories defined themselves.

Common Ground, Scorekeeping, and the Pragmatic Turn

Kaplan's semantics treated context as a fixed input. A parallel tradition asked how context is built and maintained in conversation. Paul Grice's theory of meaning and implicature, developed from the 1950s onward, showed that speakers communicate far more than their words literally say, and that hearers recover this through assumptions about cooperative intent. Grice's work founded modern pragmatics and made the gap between sentence meaning and speaker meaning a central topic.

Robert Stalnaker's notion of common ground—the set of propositions speakers treat as shared and mutually assumed—gave context a dynamic, conversational character. David Lewis's work on scorekeeping in conversation, developed in the late 1970s, modeled conversation as a game in which assertions, presuppositions, and other moves update a shared record3. On this picture, context is not a static tuple but a changing body of information. This scorekeeping model, together with Stalnaker's common ground, made context something speakers actively construct, not merely occupy.

Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's relevance theory, from the 1980s, offered a cognitively oriented account of how hearers infer speaker meaning by seeking maximal relevance for minimal processing effort. Alongside Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics, it treated context as selected and extended by the hearer in the act of interpretation—another way context became dynamic.

Dynamic Semantics

If context changes as conversation proceeds, a semantics that treats meaning as truth conditions relative to a fixed context may seem incomplete. Dynamic semantics, developed from the 1980s by Irene Heim, Hans Kamp, and others, reconceived meaning as a relation between contexts: the meaning of a sentence is its context change potential, the way it updates the common ground45. On this view, an utterance does not merely describe; it transforms the conversational state.

The classic case is presupposition. "The king of France is bald" presupposes there is a king of France; in dynamic terms, the sentence can only be uttered in a context where that presupposition is already accepted, and it filters or projects in complex ways. Dynamic semantics made such effects formally tractable and influenced work on anaphora, where pronouns pick up referents introduced earlier in discourse. It also connected indexicality to information flow: context is both what fixes indexicals and what utterances change.

Contextualism and Minimalism

By the 1990s, a dispute crystallized over how much context enters content. Contextualists, associated with philosophers such as Charles Travis and later François Recanati, argued that the truth-conditional content of an utterance is often fixed only by context, beyond what the standing meaning of the words supplies. "The leaf is green" may be true in one context and false in another depending on what counts as green for the purpose at hand. On this view, semantic content is not fully determined by sentence meaning plus a Kaplan-style context; pragmatic enrichment is pervasive.

Semantic minimalists, notably Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, pushed back. They held that sentences have a minimal semantic content fixed by their standing meaning and a limited set of context-sensitive elements, and that apparent contextual variation belongs to pragmatics, not semantics. The debate turned on what counts as part of what is said versus what is merely conveyed—a distinction inherited from Grice but now applied to the boundary between semantics and pragmatics itself.

Relativism and Assessment Sensitivity

A further challenge came from relativism about predicates of personal taste and epistemic modals. John MacFarlane's work on assessment sensitivity, developed from the 2000s, proposed that the truth of some utterances depends not only on the context of utterance but on the context of assessment—the perspective from which the claim is evaluated. "This chili is tasty" might be true relative to the speaker's standards and false relative to an assessor's. This added a third parameter to the Kaplanian picture and reopened questions about whether truth is absolute or perspective-dependent. The debate remains active, with defenders of orthodox contextualism, relativism, and minimalism still contesting the terrain.

The Present State of the Question

Contemporary work in context and indexicality is plural. Kaplan's framework remains the reference point, but it has been extended and challenged by dynamic semantics, by contextualist accounts of pragmatic enrichment, and by assessment-sensitive treatments of evaluative language. Formal semanticists continue to refine the logic of context-dependent expressions, while philosophers of language debate the boundary between semantics and pragmatics and the nature of the common ground. Experimental work tests how speakers actually resolve indexicals and presuppositions. The open questions are old ones in new dress: what exactly is a context, how much of meaning is fixed before use, and whether truth can be relative to a perspective. The small words that point—"I," "here," "now"—remain the sharpest tools for asking them.

References

  1. Indexicality, Wikipedia
  2. Sense and reference, Wikipedia
  3. Conversational scoreboard, Wikipedia
  4. Dynamic semantics, Wikipedia
  5. Discourse representation theory, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Context And Indexicality

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 300 BCE-1500
  2. 1892-1950

    Sense and reference

    How does a word's mode of presentation differ from what it names?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 1918-1955

    Egocentric Particulars

    Which words anchor language in immediate experience?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 1954-1975
  5. 1957-Present

    Gricean Pragmatics

    How do hearers infer what speakers mean beyond their words?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  6. 1970-Present

    Common Ground and Scorekeeping

    How do conversations build and update shared assumptions?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  7. 1977-Present

    Logic of Demonstratives

    How should context enter the semantics of demonstratives?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  8. 1979-Present

    Essential Indexicality

    Why can't 'I' be replaced by a description?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1981-Present

    Dynamic Semantics

    How does an utterance change the conversational context?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1985-Present

    Contextualism

    How much of what is said depends on context?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  11. 1986-Present

    Relevance Theory

    How do hearers find the most relevant interpretation?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  12. 2004-Present

    Semantic Minimalism

    Is there a context-free core to sentence meaning?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  13. 2005-Present

    Assessment Sensitivity

    Does truth depend on the assessor as well as the speaker?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Stoic and Medieval Grammar of Deixis …Sense and referenceEgocentric ParticularsIndexical Theory of Context ParametersGricean PragmaticsCommon Ground and ScorekeepingLogic of DemonstrativesEssential IndexicalityDynamic SemanticsContextualismRelevance TheorySemantic MinimalismAssessment Sensitivity

Beyond the field

Where Context And Indexicality's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 48 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
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Context And Indexicality is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 13 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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