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Reference And Truth
Two questions drive this subfield.
13 frameworks, from 380 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Language · Philosophy
- Ancient Semantics of Names and Statements 380 BCE-200
- Supposition Theory 1150-1500
- Coherence Theory of Truth 1880-1930
- Fregean sense and reference 1892-Present
- Truth-Conditional Semantics 1892-Present
- Correspondence Theory of Truth 1900-Present
- Descriptivist theory of names 1905-1980
- Deflationary theory of truth 1927-Present
- Semantic conception of truth 1933-Present
- Anti-Realism about Truth 1959-Present
- Causal-Historical Theory of Reference 1970-Present
- Skeptical Solution to Rule-Following 1982-Present
- Two-dimensionalism 1990-Present
Overview
Two questions drive this subfield. First, how does a word get attached to a thing in the world—how does "Aristotle" or "water" manage to be about something? Second, what is it for a sentence to be true, and what makes it so? The two questions are entangled: a theory of reference tells you what truth-bearers are about, and a theory of truth tells you what it is for those aboutnesses to be correct. The stakes are large. If reference is fixed by descriptions, then what we believe about a thing determines what we are talking about; if it is fixed by causal contact, then we can be massively wrong about a thing and still refer to it. If truth is correspondence to reality, truth is objective and independent of us; if it is coherence or warranted assertibility, truth is bound up with our practices and beliefs. These choices ripple into metaphysics, epistemology, and logic.
Ancient Foundations: Names, Statements, and What Makes Them True
Plato's Cratylus stages the first sustained debate. Are names conventional—arbitrary labels assigned by agreement—or natural, encoding the essence of what they name? Hermogenes defends convention; Cratylus defends nature. Socrates steers toward the view that names are tools for dividing reality, useful insofar as they cut nature at its joints. The dialogue sets a template: reference is either a matter of social convention or of some real fit between word and world.
Aristotle's De Interpretatione supplies the framework that dominated for two millennia. Spoken sounds are symbols of affections in the soul, written marks symbols of spoken sounds; these affections are likenesses of things. A name (onoma) signifies by convention and has no tense; a verb (rhēma) carries time; a statement (logos apophantikos) is a complex that can be true or false. Truth and falsity belong to statements, not to names. Aristotle also gives the classic formulation of the correspondence intuition: a statement is true when it says of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not1. The Categories adds the distinction between what is said of a subject and what is in a subject, the seed of the later subject–predicate analysis.
Stoic logicians sharpened the picture. They distinguished the lekton—the sayable, an incorporeal content—from the utterance and from the thing, and they treated truth as a property of the axiōma, the complete assertible proposition. This is an early move toward treating truth-bearers as abstract contents rather than sentences.
Medieval Supposition Theory: What a Term Stands For
Medieval logicians, especially from the twelfth century onward, developed the most elaborate pre-modern theory of reference. Supposition (suppositio) is what a term stands for in a propositional context2. The same word "man" supposits differently in different sentences. In personal supposition it stands for the things it signifies—individual men. In simple supposition it stands for the universal or concept. In material supposition it stands for the word itself, as in "man is a three-letter word."
William of Ockham, in the early fourteenth century, built a systematic theory on this basis, distinguishing suppositio discreta (a proper name or demonstrative standing for one thing), determinata (as in "some man runs," where the term stands for at least one man and the proposition is true if any man runs), and confusa et distributiva (as in "every man runs," where the term is distributed over all). The theory was a working instrument for analyzing quantification, ambiguity, and inference, and it anticipated the modern distinction between use and mention. It also carried a metaphysical payload: Ockham's nominalism held that only individuals exist, so universals have no real being, and supposition theory was the logical machinery for talking about many things with general terms.
Frege: Sense, Reference, and the Semantic Conception of Truth
Gottlob Frege's Über Sinn und Bedeutung (1892) is the hinge on which modern philosophy of language turns. Frege distinguished sense (Sinn) from reference (Bedeutung)34. The reference of a singular term is the object it designates; its sense is the mode of presentation of that object34. "The morning star" and "the evening star" have the same reference—Venus—but different senses, which is why "The morning star is the evening star" is informative while "The morning star is the morning star" is not54. For whole sentences, Frege held that the reference is a truth-value (the True or the False) and the sense is the thought (Gedanke) expressed34. This is the origin of truth-conditional semantics: to know the meaning of a sentence is to know the conditions under which it is true6.
Frege's logicism—the project of deriving arithmetic from logic—required a precise notion of truth. His Begriffsschrift (1879) introduced the quantifier and the function–argument analysis that made modern logic possible. Truth, for Frege, is not a property to be defined but a primitive; the laws of logic are the laws of truth, and the sense of a sentence is the condition under which it is true. This semantic conception of truth—truth as the reference of sentences, built into the compositional semantics—became the backbone of twentieth-century formal semantics.
Correspondence, Coherence, and the Deflationary Turn
The correspondence theory holds that truth consists in a relation between a truth-bearer and reality: a proposition is true when it corresponds to a fact71. Its classic modern statement is in Bertrand Russell's early work and in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), where Wittgenstein held that a proposition is a picture of a possible state of affairs and is true when the picture agrees with reality. The theory's difficulty is specifying the correspondence relation without circularity—what is a fact, and what is it for a proposition to "correspond" to one?
The coherence theory, associated with British idealism (F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet) and later with some logical positivists, holds that a belief is true when it coheres with a system of other beliefs. Its appeal is that it explains how truth is connected to justification and to the holistic character of knowledge; its cost is that a coherent system of falsehoods would count as true.
Against both, deflationism holds that truth is not a substantive property at all78. To say "It is true that snow is white" is just to say "Snow is white"—the truth predicate is a device for disquotation, for endorsing or generalizing over propositions9. Frank Ramsey's 1927 remark that "it is true that Caesar was murdered" means no more than "Caesar was murdered" is the locus classicus. Alfred Tarski's 1933 paper gave deflationism a rigorous form: a truth definition for a formal language must entail, for each sentence, a T-schema instance—"Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white—and Tarski showed how to construct such a definition for formalized languages. Whether Tarski's semantic conception is itself a form of deflationism or a correspondence theory in disguise is still debated; Tarski himself was cautious.
Descriptivism and Its Causal-Historical Rival
The descriptivist picture, dominant in the mid-twentieth century, held that the reference of a name is fixed by a description or cluster of descriptions associated with it. "Aristotle" refers to whoever satisfies the descriptions "student of Plato," "teacher of Alexander," and so on. This view, associated with Frege and Russell and systematized by John Searle and P. F. Strawson, explains how we can refer to things we have never met and how reference can be inherited through a linguistic community.
Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity (1980, from 1970 lectures) attacked descriptivism with a now-famous argument. If "Aristotle" meant "the teacher of Alexander," then "Aristotle might not have taught Alexander" would be a contradiction; but it is not—it is a contingent truth that Aristotle taught Alexander. Kripke concluded that names are rigid designators: they pick out the same individual in every possible world, and their reference is fixed not by descriptions but by an initial baptism and a causal-historical chain of transmission. Hilary Putnam extended the idea to natural-kind terms in "The Meaning of 'Meaning'" (1975): "water" refers to whatever substance bears the same underlying nature as the stuff we originally dubbed "water," which is why we can discover that water is H₂O and why a Twin Earth duplicate with XYZ would not be water. This causal-historical theory made reference a matter of external, often unknown, facts—a view with the striking consequence that meaning "ain't in the head."
Anti-Realism and the Limits of Truth
Michael Dummett, from the 1950s onward, argued that a truth-conditional semantics is committed to a realist metaphysics: it assumes every statement is determinately true or false independent of our capacity to verify it. Dummett proposed instead that meaning be given in terms of verification conditions—what would count as evidence for or against a statement—and that truth be understood as warranted assertibility. This anti-realist theory of truth draws on intuitionist mathematics, where a statement is true only when a proof exists10. The debate between realism and anti-realism about truth became one of the central fault lines of late twentieth-century philosophy of language.
Two-Dimensional Semantics and the Kripkenstein Puzzle
Two-dimensional semantics, developed by David Chalmers and others from the 1990s, offers a framework for reconciling the descriptive and causal-historical insights. It distinguishes two dimensions of meaning: the primary intension, which fixes reference given how the actual world turns out (the "epistemic" dimension), and the secondary intension, which gives the extension across possible worlds once reference is fixed (the "metaphysical" dimension). This apparatus is used to analyze a priori knowledge, the necessary a posteriori, and the semantics of indexicals.
Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) posed a skeptical puzzle: any finite set of uses of a word is compatible with infinitely many rules, so what fact determines that I mean plus rather than quus (a rule that agrees with plus on all cases I have actually computed but diverges on new ones)? Kripke's skeptical solution abandons the search for a fact that constitutes meaning and instead locates correctness in communal agreement—in the practice of a community that holds one another to norms. Whether this is Wittgenstein's own view or a Kripkean construction is disputed, but the puzzle reshaped debates about rule-following, meaning, and normativity11.
The Present
Today the field is plural. Truth-conditional and formal semantics, descended from Frege and Tarski and extended by Montague grammar, remains the dominant framework in linguistics and logic. Deflationism about truth has powerful contemporary defenders and is a live option in metaphysics. The causal-historical theory of reference is standard for proper names and natural kinds, though hybrid and descriptive elements are widely acknowledged. Two-dimensional semantics is a major tool in the philosophy of mind and language. Anti-realism survives in verificationist and pragmatist forms. Open questions include how reference works for empty names and fictional entities, whether truth is a single property or a family of notions, how context and indexicality interact with reference-fixing, and whether the normativity of meaning can be naturalized. The history of the subfield is, in large part, a history of arguments about which of these frameworks can accommodate the most recalcitrant cases.
References
- Correspondence theory of truth (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- Supposition theory, Wikipedia
- Philosophy of language (Reference), Wikipedia
- Sense and reference, Wikipedia
- Proper name (philosophy), Wikipedia
- Truth-conditional semantics, Wikipedia
- Truth, Wikipedia
- Deflationary theory of truth, Wikipedia
- Redundancy theory of truth, Wikipedia
- Anti-realism, Wikipedia
- Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Kripkenstein: Kripke's skeptical Wittgenstein), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Reference And Truth
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 380 BCE-200
Ancient Semantics of Names and Statements
How do names and statements signify and become true?
- 1150-1500
- 1880-1930
Coherence Theory of Truth
When is a belief true if not by correspondence?
- 1892-Present
Fregean sense and reference
How does a term's sense differ from its reference?
- 1892-Present
Truth-Conditional Semantics
What are the truth conditions of a sentence?
- 1900-Present
Correspondence Theory of Truth
What is the relation between a true proposition and reality?
- 1905-1980
- 1927-Present
Deflationary theory of truth
Is truth a substantive property or a logical device?
- 1933-Present
Semantic conception of truth
How can truth be rigorously defined for a language?
- 1959-Present
Anti-Realism about Truth
Is every statement determinately true or false?
- 1970-Present
Causal-Historical Theory of Reference
How does a name get attached to its object?
- 1982-Present
Skeptical Solution to Rule-Following
What makes following a rule correct or incorrect?
- 1990-Present
Two-dimensionalism
How do meaning and reference vary across possible worlds?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Truth-Conditional Semantics grew out of Fregean sense and reference
Truth-conditional semantics is a direct development of Frege's idea that the sense of a sentence is the condition under which it is true and its reference is a truth-value, a framework later formalized by Davidson and others.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Donald Davidson.
Anti-Realism about Truth reacted against Truth-Conditional Semantics
Dummett's anti-realism about truth arose as a critique of truth-conditional semantics, arguing that it presupposes a realist metaphysics of determinate truth-values and proposing instead that meaning is tied to verification conditions.
Carried by Michael Dummett.
Causal-Historical Theory of Reference reacted against Descriptivist theory of names
Kripke's causal-historical theory of reference was formulated as a direct attack on the descriptivist theory, using modal arguments to show that names are rigid designators whose reference is fixed by an initial baptism and a causal chain.
Carried by Saul Kripke; Naming and Necessity (1980).
Supposition Theory grew out of Ancient Semantics of Names and Statements
Medieval logicians built supposition theory on Aristotle's De Interpretatione and Categories, taking over the distinction between names and statements and the subject–predicate analysis to explain what terms stand for in propositions.
Carried by Aristotle; Boethius.
Correspondence Theory of Truth influenced by Ancient Semantics of Names and Statements
The correspondence intuition that a statement is true when it says of what is that it is, formulated by Aristotle, was taken up by Russell and Wittgenstein as the core of the modern correspondence theory.
Carried by Aristotle; Bertrand Russell; Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Correspondence Theory of Truth rival of Coherence Theory of Truth
The coherence theory of truth, associated with British idealism, arose as a rival to the correspondence theory, rejecting the notion of a relation between proposition and fact in favor of holistic coherence.
Carried by F. H. Bradley; Bernard Bosanquet.
Descriptivist theory of names grew out of Fregean sense and reference
The descriptivist theory of names grew out of Frege's sense–reference distinction and Russell's theory of descriptions, which held that the sense of a name is given by a definite description.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Bertrand Russell.
Causal-Historical Theory of Reference reacted against Fregean sense and reference
The causal-historical theory rejected the Fregean idea that the sense of a name determines its reference, arguing instead that reference is fixed by causal contact and historical transmission.
Carried by Saul Kripke; Hilary Putnam.
Deflationary theory of truth reacted against Correspondence Theory of Truth
Deflationism arose as a reaction against substantive theories of truth, including the correspondence theory, arguing that truth is not a property but a device for disquotation.
Carried by Frank Ramsey.
Two-dimensionalism grew out of Causal-Historical Theory of Reference
Two-dimensionalism was developed by David Chalmers and others as a framework that incorporates Kripke's causal-historical insights about rigid designation while adding a distinction between primary and secondary intensions to handle epistemic and modal dimensions.
Carried by David Chalmers; Saul Kripke.
Beyond the field
Where Reference And Truth's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 47 links.
Supposition Theory grew out of Term logic in Philosophical Logic
Aristotelian term logic as transmitted through Boethius and the Categories and De Interpretatione supplied the vocabulary of subject, predicate and term on which supposition theory was built. The medieval suppositionists extended term logic to cover reference under a term's occurrence in a proposition.
Carried by Aristotle; Boethius.
Coherence Theory of Truth influenced Coherentism in Justification Theory
The coherence theory of truth, associated with Bradley and the British idealists, supplied coherentism with its central claim that a belief is justified by its place in a mutually supporting system rather than by foundations.
Carried by F. H. Bradley; Brand Blanshard.
Fregean sense and reference provoked Causal-Historical Theory of Reference in Philosophy Of Language
The causal-historical theory defined itself by rejecting Frege's sense and reference distinction for proper names, replacing descriptive sense with a chain of communication; Kripke's lectures explicitly target the Fregean picture.
Carried by Saul Kripke.
Fregean sense and reference influenced Truth-conditional semantics in Semantics
Frege's distinction between sense and reference, and his principle of compositionality, are the foundation of truth-conditional semantics. Davidson and Montague both took up Frege's analysis of how the reference of a sentence depends on the references of its parts.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Donald Davidson; Richard Montague.
Fregean sense and reference influenced Truth-Conditional Semantics in Philosophy Of Language
Frege's distinction between sense and reference and his compositionality principle are the direct ancestors of truth-conditional semantics; Davidson's programme is a systematic development of Frege's idea that a sentence's meaning is its truth condition.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Donald Davidson.
Truth-Conditional Semantics influenced by Sense and reference in Philosophy Of Language
The sense-and-reference distinction is the direct source of truth-conditional semantics: identifying a sentence's meaning with its truth-condition extends Frege's account of reference to whole statements. Davidson explicitly built on Frege.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Donald Davidson.
Truth-Conditional Semantics grew out of Fregean Semantics in Meaning And Understanding
Truth-conditional semantics grew out of Frege's semantics: the composition of senses and the reference of sentences to truth values provided the basis for later truth-conditional accounts of meaning.
Carried by Gottfried Frege; Gottlob Frege.
Truth-Conditional Semantics influenced by Fregean Semantics in Meaning And Understanding
Frege's separation of sense from reference and his principle of compositionality supplied the foundation on which truth-conditional semantics was built. Davidson and later truth-conditionalists took over Frege's insight that a sentence's meaning is its truth-condition.
Carried by Gottlob Frege; Donald Davidson.
Truth-Conditional Semantics led to Dynamic Semantics in Semantics
Dynamic semantics grew directly out of truth-conditional semantics, keeping the truth-conditional core but recasting meaning as a relation between information states rather than a set of truth conditions. Kamp's and Heim's systems were proposed as refinements of the truth-conditional framework to handle discourse and anaphora.
Carried by Hans Kamp; Irene Heim.
Truth-Conditional Semantics influenced Dynamic Semantics in Context And Indexicality
Dynamic semantics is a development within truth-conditional semantics, preserving truth conditions while adding a context-change dimension to sentence meaning.
Carried by Irene Heim; Hans Kamp.
Truth-Conditional Semantics led to Indexical Theory of Context Parameters in Context And Indexicality
The indexical theory of context parameters is a branch of truth-conditional semantics, extending the truth-conditional apparatus to context-dependent expressions by relativising truth to parameters. The later framework grew directly out of that tradition.
Truth-Conditional Semantics led to Montague Grammar in Meaning And Understanding
Montague grammar is a development of truth-conditional semantics, extending the Fregean and Tarskian programme of assigning truth conditions compositionally to natural-language sentences.
Carried by Richard Montague.

Reference And Truth is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 13 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Reference And TruthRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Philosophy Of Language 10 links
- Meaning And Understanding 8 links
- Context And Indexicality 5 links
- Philosophical Logic 4 links
- Semantics 3 links
- Philosophy Of Logic 3 links
- Metaphysics 2 links
- Christian Philosophy 1 link
- Epistemology 1 link
- Justification Theory 1 link
- Skepticism 1 link
- Analytic Philosophy 1 link
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