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Free Will
Free will is the power, if we have it, to make choices that are genuinely our own—choices for which we can be held responsible because we could have done otherwise.
20 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Metaphysics · Philosophy
- Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character 350 BCE-Present
- Stoic Compatibilism 300 BCE-200
- Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Now 400-Present
- Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace 400-1300
- Islamic Occasionalism and Aristotelian Causation 1050-1200
- Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation 1250-Present
- Cartesian Voluntarism 1640-1700
- Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism 1650-Present
- Spinozist Necessitarianism 1670-1800
- Leibnizian Sufficient Reason and Best-World Freedom 1690-1750
- Kantian Two Standpoints 1780-Present
- Utilitarian and Naturalistic Compatibilism 1800-1900
- Hard determinism 1850-Present
- Conditional Analysis of Could Have Done Otherwise 1900-1970
- Agent causation 1960-Present
- Frankfurtian Hierarchical Mesh Theory 1970-Present
- Consequence argument 1975-Present
- Event-Causal Libertarianism 1980-Present
- Reasons-Responsive and Semi-Compatibilism 1990-Present
- Experimental philosophy 2000-Present
Overview
Free will is the power, if we have it, to make choices that are genuinely our own—choices for which we can be held responsible because we could have done otherwise1. The puzzle is that two pictures of ourselves seem to fit the world, and they pull in opposite directions. One picture is the everyday one: you weigh reasons, decide, and the decision is yours; had you judged differently, you would have acted differently. The other is the scientific one: your body and brain are physical systems governed by causes, and those causes trace back to a past you did not choose. If everything you do is the upshot of prior causes, in what sense was it ever up to you? This tension—between freedom and determinism, the thesis that every event is fixed by prior causes—has driven the history of the subject1. Around it cluster the questions of responsibility, punishment, divine foreknowledge, and what a person really is.
Ancient Beginnings: Voluntariness, Character, and Fate
Greek philosophy first made the problem explicit by distinguishing voluntary from involuntary action. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, analyzed when an act counts as voluntary—roughly, when its source is in the agent and the agent knows what he is doing—and when it is compelled or done in ignorance. He also asked how character forms: we become just by doing just acts, and once a stable character is in place, our choices flow from it. This raised a lasting question, since a settled character can make some actions feel inevitable while still being genuinely ours. Aristotle's answer located freedom in rational choice shaped by character rather than in a mysterious uncaused act.
The Stoics took a different route2. They held that the cosmos is governed by an all-encompassing rational order, heimarmene or fate, and that everything happens by necessity. Yet they insisted that human action is our own. Their key move was to distinguish external compulsion from internal assent: a stone cannot resist being pushed, but a rational being can assent to or withhold assent from an impression. What happens is fated, but it happens through our natures, and a wise person aligns his will with the order of things. This is an early form of compatibilism—the view that freedom and determinism can both be true—though the Stoic version ties freedom to cosmic reason rather than to the ability to do otherwise.
Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace
The encounter between Greek philosophy and monotheism sharpened the problem. If God knows in advance what you will do, can you do otherwise1? If God's providence orders all things, is your sin really yours? Augustine and later Boethius offered a celebrated solution: God does not foresee the future as we foresee it, from a standpoint before events, but sees all time from eternity. Boethius's image in the Consolation of Philosophy is of an observer on a high vantage who sees a whole road at once; the traveler still walks it freely. On this account God's knowledge is not causal foreknowledge but a timeless seeing, so divine omniscience does not compel. The idea of God's eternal now—a timeless present embracing all times—became a standard resource for reconciling foreknowledge with freedom.
Medieval Islamic and Christian thought developed the issue further. Islamic theology included occasionalist currents, associated especially with al-Ashʿarī and his school, which held that God creates each event directly and that apparent natural causes are only customary regularities; on such a view human power to act required careful theological handling. Against this, the Aristotelian tradition transmitted through Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and others defended real causal powers in nature. In the Latin West, Thomas Aquinas worked out an account in which God is the primary cause of everything, yet secondary causes—including human wills—are genuine causes in their own right12. God moves the will, but moves it according to its nature, so that free choice is not abolished but established by the first cause1. This Thomistic synthesis long framed Catholic teaching on freedom and grace, and it set the terms for later debates about predestination and divine concurrence.
Early Modern Determinism and Its Critics
The seventeenth century rebuilt the problem on new foundations. René Descartes, a dualist who held mind and body to be distinct substances, located freedom in the will's power to affirm or deny, and he thought the will so free that it could resist the clearest evidence—a voluntarism that made freedom almost boundless. Thomas Hobbes rejected this. For Hobbes, liberty simply means the absence of external impediments to motion; a man is free when nothing outside him stops him from doing what he is inclined to do1. On this external-obstacle view, internal causes—desires, deliberations—do not threaten freedom at all, and determinism is no obstacle. Hobbes thus gave compatibilism a lean, naturalistic form that later thinkers would refine.
Baruch Spinoza pushed necessity to its limit3. In his Ethics, everything follows from the nature of God or substance with geometric necessity; there are no free decrees, not even in God. Human freedom is not exemption from causation but understanding: the person who grasps the necessity of things is less passively tossed about by external causes. This necessitarianism denied libertarian freedom outright while offering a redefined ideal of liberation through knowledge.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz tried to keep both necessity and contingency. He held that God, being perfect, must create the best of all possible worlds, so the actual world is necessary in the sense that it is the best—yet the truths about what free creatures do are contingent, not logically necessary. His principle of sufficient reason demands a reason for everything, and his account of freedom tried to show that a choice can be certain without being compelled. The tension in his system—how a world chosen by a perfect God leaves room for genuine alternatives—became a standing challenge.
Kant's Two Standpoints
Immanuel Kant reframed the whole debate4. In the Critique of Pure Reason he argued that the world as we experience it, the phenomenal world, is governed by causal law through and through; determinism is a condition of possible experience. Yet he held that we must also think of ourselves as noumenal beings, members of an intelligible world, capable of acting from the moral law. Freedom belongs to this second standpoint. We cannot know that we are free, but morality requires us to act as if we were, and the moral law itself is the law of a free will. Kant's two standpoints—the empirical and the intelligible—let him affirm both universal causal determinism and genuine moral responsibility, at the price of placing freedom beyond theoretical knowledge. This move shaped German idealism and much subsequent debate.
The Nineteenth Century: Naturalism and Its Discontents
Nineteenth-century science and philosophy pressed determinism hard. The success of mechanistic physics and, later, Darwinian biology encouraged a naturalistic picture in which human behavior is part of nature and subject to its laws. Utilitarian thinkers, notably John Stuart Mill, treated freedom in compatibilist terms: a person acts freely when acting according to his own desires, and the fact that those desires have causes is irrelevant to responsibility. Mill's On Liberty and his System of Logic carried forward the Hobbesian idea that determinism and freedom are compatible, while Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian framework tied responsibility to the calculation of consequences rather than to metaphysical liberty. Against this, "hard determinists" and skeptics argued that if determinism is true, no one is ever responsible in the strong sense required for desert and punishment. The nineteenth century thus set the pattern that persists: naturalistic compatibilism on one side, free-will skepticism on the other.
The Analytic Problem: Consequence and Conditional Analysis
Twentieth-century analytic philosophy made the problem precise. The pivotal figure was Peter van Inwagen, whose 1975 essay "The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism" and later book An Essay on Free Will (1983) formulated the consequence argument. Its core idea: if determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past; but we have no power over the laws or the remote past; therefore we have no power over our acts5. The argument gave incompatibilism—the denial that freedom and determinism can coexist—a rigorous form, and much subsequent work consists of replies to it.
Compatibilists had their own classic tool: the conditional analysis of "could have done otherwise."1 If "you could have done otherwise" means "if you had chosen otherwise, you would have acted otherwise," then determinism does not rule it out1. This analysis, associated with G. E. Moore and others, was influential but ran into trouble with cases where a person's choice itself is constrained; later compatibilists replaced it with more sophisticated accounts.
Two major compatibilist programs emerged. One is reasons-responsive theory, developed by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, which holds that a person acts freely when his action is responsive to reasons in the right way—when, had there been sufficient reason to do otherwise, he would have. Fischer paired this with semi-compatibilism: the claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, only the right kind of control. The other is Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical account, in which freedom consists in acting on desires you endorse at a higher level, so that a willing addict differs from an unwilling one even if both are caused to act1. Frankfurt also devised famous counterexamples to the principle that responsibility requires alternative possibilities—cases where a person would have been forced to act had he not chosen to act on his own.
Libertarian Alternatives: Event-Causal and Agent-Causal
Incompatibilists who affirm free will are libertarians, and they split over what kind of causation freedom requires. Event-causal libertarianism holds that free actions are caused by prior mental events—beliefs, desires, deliberations—but that this causation is indeterministic, so the outcome is not fixed in advance1. Robert Kane developed an influential version in which self-forming actions occur at moments of indeterminacy, and the agent's effort settles which way the indeterminacy resolves. The difficulty is to show that indeterminism adds control rather than mere randomness: if the outcome is not determined, what makes it the agent's act rather than a lucky event1?
Agent-causal libertarianism answers by positing a distinctive kind of causation in which the agent, as a substance, causes an action directly, not by way of prior events16. Roderick Chisholm defended such a view, and Timothy O'Connor later developed it in detail. On this account the agent is an uncaused cause of the action, which secures ultimate responsibility but raises the question of how such causation fits into the natural order and whether it is intelligible at all.
Experimental Philosophy and the Present
Late in the twentieth century, a new empirical turn appeared. Experimental philosophy began probing ordinary people's intuitions about free will and responsibility—whether they are compatibilists or incompatibilists, how they react to deterministic scenarios, and whether those reactions shift with emotion or context7. Work by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, among others, found that ordinary intuitions are complex and sometimes inconsistent, and that they can be manipulated by framing. These findings do not settle the metaphysical question, but they bear on the method of appealing to intuition, which had long been a standard tool in the debate.
Today the field is divided along recognizable lines. Compatibilists—reasons-responsive theorists, hierarchical theorists, and others—argue that responsibility survives determinism and that the consequence argument can be answered. Incompatibilists divide into libertarians, who defend event-causal or agent-causal freedom, and skeptics, who conclude that free will in the strong sense is an illusion and that our practices of blame and punishment need rethinking. The consequence argument remains a central testing ground, and the relation between freedom and the sciences of mind and brain continues to press on the old questions. What remains open is whether any account can do justice both to the causal order of nature and to the felt authority of the first-person standpoint from which we deliberate, choose, and hold one another responsible.
References
- Free will (introduction, Philosophical approaches, Omniscience, Free will according to Thomas Aquinas, Free will as lack of physical restraint, Free will as a psychological state, Event-causal theories, Agent/substance-causal theories), Wikipedia
- Compatibilism (History), Wikipedia
- Necessitarianism, Wikipedia
- Immanuel Kant, Wikipedia
- Consequence argument, Wikipedia
- Agent causation, Wikipedia
- Experimental philosophy, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Free Will
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 350 BCE-Present
Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character
When is an action voluntary rather than forced?
- 300 BCE-200
- 400-Present
Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Now
How can God know the future without compelling it?
- 400-1300
Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace
How do providence and grace leave room for free choice?
- 1050-1200
Islamic Occasionalism and Aristotelian Causation
Does God create every event directly?
- 1250-Present
Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation
How can God move the will without forcing it?
- 1640-1700
- 1650-Present
Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism
Is freedom just the absence of external obstacles?
- 1670-1800
Spinozist Necessitarianism
Is everything necessary, and what is freedom then?
- 1690-1750
Leibnizian Sufficient Reason and Best-World Freedom
How can a best possible world contain free choices?
- 1780-Present
- 1800-1900
Utilitarian and Naturalistic Compatibilism
Does causation of desire undermine freedom?
- 1850-Present
- 1900-1970
Conditional Analysis of Could Have Done Otherwise
What does 'could have done otherwise' really mean?
- 1960-Present
- 1970-Present
Frankfurtian Hierarchical Mesh Theory
When do desires mesh into a free will?
- 1975-Present
Consequence argument
Does determinism rob us of alternative possibilities?
- 1980-Present
Event-Causal Libertarianism
Can free actions be caused by reasons alone?
- 1990-Present
Reasons-Responsive and Semi-Compatibilism
Does responsibility require the ability to do otherwise?
- 2000-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation grew out of Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace
Aquinas built his account of primary and secondary causation directly on the patristic and early medieval problem of reconciling providence and grace with free choice.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas.
Consequence argument reacted against Conditional Analysis of Could Have Done Otherwise
Van Inwagen's consequence argument was formulated as a direct challenge to the conditional analysis, aiming to show that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise.
Carried by Peter van Inwagen; An Essay on Free Will (1983).
Stoic Compatibilism influenced by Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character
Stoic ethics took over Aristotle's distinction between voluntary and involuntary action and his analysis of choice, recasting it within a deterministic cosmos where assent replaces unconstrained choice.
Carried by Aristotle; Zeno of Citium.
Islamic Occasionalism and Aristotelian Causation influenced by Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character
Islamic theologians and philosophers debated Aristotle's account of causal powers and voluntary action; occasionalists denied natural causal efficacy while Averroes defended it, shaping the terms of the dispute.
Carried by al-Ashʿarī; Ibn Rushd.
Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation influenced by Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character
Aquinas drew on Aristotle's account of voluntary action and practical reason in the Nicomachean Ethics to explain how the will is moved by its object while remaining a genuine secondary cause.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas; Aristotle.
Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace influenced by Stoic Compatibilism
Augustine and later Christian writers adopted the Stoic distinction between external compulsion and inner assent to reconcile divine providence with human sin and responsibility.
Carried by Augustine.
Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation influenced by Islamic Occasionalism and Aristotelian Causation
Aquinas knew the Islamic debate over occasionalism and divine causation, especially through Averroes, and formulated his primary/secondary causation scheme partly in response to it.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas; Ibn Rushd.
Cartesian Voluntarism reacted against Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation
Descartes's voluntarism rejected the Thomistic picture of the will as moved by the good known to the intellect, making the will instead indifferent and self-determining.
Carried by René Descartes.
Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism rival of Cartesian Voluntarism
Hobbes defined liberty as the absence of external impediments, directly opposing Descartes's account of a boundless will free from causal determination.
Carried by Thomas Hobbes.
Utilitarian and Naturalistic Compatibilism grew out of Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism
Mill carried forward Hobbes's external-obstacle compatibilism, treating a person as free when acting according to his own desires regardless of their causes.
Carried by John Stuart Mill; System of Logic (1843).
Leibnizian Sufficient Reason and Best-World Freedom reacted against Spinozist Necessitarianism
Leibniz rejected Spinoza's necessitarianism, insisting that the actual world is contingent and chosen by a perfect God, and used the principle of sufficient reason to distinguish certainty from necessity.
Carried by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
Kantian Two Standpoints reacted against Leibnizian Sufficient Reason and Best-World Freedom
Kant framed his two standpoints against Leibnizian rationalism, denying that theoretical reason can know a free will while preserving freedom as a postulate of practical reason.
Carried by Immanuel Kant; Critique of Pure Reason (1781).
Hard determinism reacted against Kantian Two Standpoints
Nineteenth-century hard determinists rejected Kant's noumenal freedom, arguing that naturalistic causation leaves no room for the kind of responsibility Kant tried to secure.
Hard determinism reacted against Utilitarian and Naturalistic Compatibilism
Hard determinists defined themselves against the utilitarian and naturalistic compatibilism of Mill and Bentham, denying that causal explanation of desire leaves genuine desert.
Conditional Analysis of Could Have Done Otherwise grew out of Utilitarian and Naturalistic Compatibilism
G. E. Moore's conditional analysis refined the naturalistic compatibilism of Mill by giving a precise meaning to 'could have done otherwise' in terms of what would happen if one chose otherwise.
Carried by G. E. Moore.
Consequence argument influenced by Hard determinism
Van Inwagen's consequence argument gave rigorous analytic form to the hard determinist intuition that if the past and laws fix our acts, we lack power over them.
Carried by Peter van Inwagen.
Frankfurtian Hierarchical Mesh Theory influenced by Conditional Analysis of Could Have Done Otherwise
Frankfurt's hierarchical mesh theory built on compatibilist analyses of freedom while shifting the focus from alternative possibilities to the structure of the agent's desires.
Carried by Harry Frankfurt.
Event-Causal Libertarianism reacted against Agent causation
Event-causal libertarians rejected agent causation, arguing that free actions can be caused by events such as reasons and volitions without a special substance-causal power.
Reasons-Responsive and Semi-Compatibilism grew out of Frankfurtian Hierarchical Mesh Theory
Reasons-responsive and semi-compatibilist accounts developed Frankfurt's insight that responsibility does not require alternative possibilities, adding responsiveness to reasons as the key condition.
Carried by John Martin Fischer.
Reasons-Responsive and Semi-Compatibilism reacted against Consequence argument
Semi-compatibilism was framed as a reply to the consequence argument, conceding that determinism may rule out alternative possibilities while denying that responsibility requires them.
Carried by John Martin Fischer.
Spinozist Necessitarianism rival of Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism
Spinoza's necessitarianism and Hobbes's compatibilism were contemporary seventeenth-century attempts to make freedom compatible with universal causation, differing over whether freedom is absence of impediment or understanding of necessity.
Carried by Baruch Spinoza; Thomas Hobbes.
Experimental philosophy influenced by Frankfurtian Hierarchical Mesh Theory
Experimental philosophers tested ordinary intuitions about responsibility and alternative possibilities, often using scenarios and distinctions drawn from Frankfurt-style compatibilism.
Beyond the field
Where Free Will's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 100 links.
Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character influenced Voluntary action in Moral Responsibility
The Aristotelian distinction between voluntary and involuntary action, and the role of choice and character in ascribing responsibility, supplied the conceptual vocabulary later action theory inherited. Twentieth-century accounts of voluntary action, including those in the analytic philosophy of action, took up Aristotle's questions about what makes an action voluntary and how character bears on responsibility.
Carried by Aristotle; Nicomachean Ethics.
Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Now influenced Scholastic and Theological Time Theory in Philosophy Of Time
The problem of divine foreknowledge and the eternal now, formulated by Augustine and Boethius, set the agenda for scholastic time theory: how a timeless God knows temporal events and how created time relates to eternity. Scholastic discussions of time in the schools grew directly out of this patristic and late antique problem.
Carried by Augustine; Boethius; Consolation of Philosophy (524).
Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace grew out of Patristic Christianity in Christianity
The providence, foreknowledge and grace framework is the core of patristic Christianity's Latin theology, defined in the Pelagian controversy. It is the same body of doctrine at the level of the wider tradition.
Carried by Augustine.
Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace grew out of Patristic Philosophy in Christian Philosophy
The providence-and-grace framework is a central strand of patristic philosophy, worked out by Augustine against Pelagius and carried into the Latin tradition. The framework is the patristic debate itself.
Carried by Augustine.
Islamic Occasionalism and Aristotelian Causation grew out of Islamic Philosophy of Religion in Philosophy Of Religion
Occasionalism arose within Islamic philosophy of religion, in al-Ghazali's critique of the philosophers' necessary causation in the Tahafut al-Falasifa. The framework is a chapter of that broader enterprise.
Carried by al-Ghazali; Tahafut al-Falasifa.
Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation grew out of Scholastic Aristotelianism in Medieval Philosophy
The primary/secondary causation distinction is a product of scholastic Aristotelianism, built on Aristotle's causes and the Arabic commentators. The framework is one of its core metaphysical doctrines.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas.
Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causation influenced by Theological Free Will Tradition in Moral Responsibility
Aquinas's account of primary and secondary causation was devised to reconcile divine omnipotence and grace with creaturely free will, taking up the earlier theological free-will tradition. The framework is a refinement of that tradition's problem.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas.
Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism led to Classical Compatibilism in Moral Responsibility
Classical compatibilism grew directly out of Hobbes's account in Leviathan, which defined liberty as absence of external impediment and made it compatible with necessity.
Carried by Thomas Hobbes; Leviathan (1651).
Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism influenced Determinism in Moral Responsibility
Hobbes's liberty-of-the-body account, developed in Of Liberty and Necessity (1654) and Leviathan, was a direct intervention in the seventeenth-century determinism debate and shaped how later determinists framed the compatibilist option.
Carried by Thomas Hobbes; Of Liberty and Necessity (1654).
Spinozist Necessitarianism grew out of Determinism in Moral Responsibility
Spinoza's necessitarianism is a thoroughgoing determinism: everything follows from the necessity of the divine nature, and the will is not a free cause but a mode determined like any other. The Ethics presents this as the consequence of his metaphysics of substance.
Carried by Baruch Spinoza; Ethics (1677).
Leibnizian Sufficient Reason and Best-World Freedom grew out of Leibnizian possible worlds in Modality
Leibniz's account of freedom in the best of all possible worlds is built on his doctrine of possible worlds and the principle that God chooses the best among them. The Theodicy and the Monadology make freedom consist in acting according to one's nature within the world God selected.
Carried by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Theodicy (1710).
Kantian Two Standpoints influenced Libertarianism in Moral Responsibility
Agent-causal and non-naturalist libertarianism about free will drew directly on Kant's two standpoints, retaining the intelligible self as the locus of genuine spontaneity.
Carried by Immanuel Kant.

Free Will is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 20 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Free WillRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Moral Responsibility 53 links
- Philosophy Of Religion 11 links
- Christian Ethics 6 links
- Philosophy Of Causation 4 links
- Philosophy Of Action 4 links
- Christianity 2 links
- Epistemology 2 links
- Modality 2 links
- Political Philosophy 2 links
- Christian Philosophy 1 link
- Law And Economics 1 link
- Metaethics 1 link