Free Will

Free will is the power, if we have it, to make choices that are genuinely our own—choices for which we can be held responsible because we could have done otherwise.

20 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Metaphysics · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Free will is the power, if we have it, to make choices that are genuinely our own—choices for which we can be held responsible because we could have done otherwise1. The puzzle is that two pictures of ourselves seem to fit the world, and they pull in opposite directions. One picture is the everyday one: you weigh reasons, decide, and the decision is yours; had you judged differently, you would have acted differently. The other is the scientific one: your body and brain are physical systems governed by causes, and those causes trace back to a past you did not choose. If everything you do is the upshot of prior causes, in what sense was it ever up to you? This tension—between freedom and determinism, the thesis that every event is fixed by prior causes—has driven the history of the subject1. Around it cluster the questions of responsibility, punishment, divine foreknowledge, and what a person really is.

Ancient Beginnings: Voluntariness, Character, and Fate

Greek philosophy first made the problem explicit by distinguishing voluntary from involuntary action. Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics, analyzed when an act counts as voluntary—roughly, when its source is in the agent and the agent knows what he is doing—and when it is compelled or done in ignorance. He also asked how character forms: we become just by doing just acts, and once a stable character is in place, our choices flow from it. This raised a lasting question, since a settled character can make some actions feel inevitable while still being genuinely ours. Aristotle's answer located freedom in rational choice shaped by character rather than in a mysterious uncaused act.

The Stoics took a different route2. They held that the cosmos is governed by an all-encompassing rational order, heimarmene or fate, and that everything happens by necessity. Yet they insisted that human action is our own. Their key move was to distinguish external compulsion from internal assent: a stone cannot resist being pushed, but a rational being can assent to or withhold assent from an impression. What happens is fated, but it happens through our natures, and a wise person aligns his will with the order of things. This is an early form of compatibilism—the view that freedom and determinism can both be true—though the Stoic version ties freedom to cosmic reason rather than to the ability to do otherwise.

Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace

The encounter between Greek philosophy and monotheism sharpened the problem. If God knows in advance what you will do, can you do otherwise1? If God's providence orders all things, is your sin really yours? Augustine and later Boethius offered a celebrated solution: God does not foresee the future as we foresee it, from a standpoint before events, but sees all time from eternity. Boethius's image in the Consolation of Philosophy is of an observer on a high vantage who sees a whole road at once; the traveler still walks it freely. On this account God's knowledge is not causal foreknowledge but a timeless seeing, so divine omniscience does not compel. The idea of God's eternal now—a timeless present embracing all times—became a standard resource for reconciling foreknowledge with freedom.

Medieval Islamic and Christian thought developed the issue further. Islamic theology included occasionalist currents, associated especially with al-Ashʿarī and his school, which held that God creates each event directly and that apparent natural causes are only customary regularities; on such a view human power to act required careful theological handling. Against this, the Aristotelian tradition transmitted through Ibn Rushd (Averroes) and others defended real causal powers in nature. In the Latin West, Thomas Aquinas worked out an account in which God is the primary cause of everything, yet secondary causes—including human wills—are genuine causes in their own right12. God moves the will, but moves it according to its nature, so that free choice is not abolished but established by the first cause1. This Thomistic synthesis long framed Catholic teaching on freedom and grace, and it set the terms for later debates about predestination and divine concurrence.

Early Modern Determinism and Its Critics

The seventeenth century rebuilt the problem on new foundations. René Descartes, a dualist who held mind and body to be distinct substances, located freedom in the will's power to affirm or deny, and he thought the will so free that it could resist the clearest evidence—a voluntarism that made freedom almost boundless. Thomas Hobbes rejected this. For Hobbes, liberty simply means the absence of external impediments to motion; a man is free when nothing outside him stops him from doing what he is inclined to do1. On this external-obstacle view, internal causes—desires, deliberations—do not threaten freedom at all, and determinism is no obstacle. Hobbes thus gave compatibilism a lean, naturalistic form that later thinkers would refine.

Baruch Spinoza pushed necessity to its limit3. In his Ethics, everything follows from the nature of God or substance with geometric necessity; there are no free decrees, not even in God. Human freedom is not exemption from causation but understanding: the person who grasps the necessity of things is less passively tossed about by external causes. This necessitarianism denied libertarian freedom outright while offering a redefined ideal of liberation through knowledge.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz tried to keep both necessity and contingency. He held that God, being perfect, must create the best of all possible worlds, so the actual world is necessary in the sense that it is the best—yet the truths about what free creatures do are contingent, not logically necessary. His principle of sufficient reason demands a reason for everything, and his account of freedom tried to show that a choice can be certain without being compelled. The tension in his system—how a world chosen by a perfect God leaves room for genuine alternatives—became a standing challenge.

Kant's Two Standpoints

Immanuel Kant reframed the whole debate4. In the Critique of Pure Reason he argued that the world as we experience it, the phenomenal world, is governed by causal law through and through; determinism is a condition of possible experience. Yet he held that we must also think of ourselves as noumenal beings, members of an intelligible world, capable of acting from the moral law. Freedom belongs to this second standpoint. We cannot know that we are free, but morality requires us to act as if we were, and the moral law itself is the law of a free will. Kant's two standpoints—the empirical and the intelligible—let him affirm both universal causal determinism and genuine moral responsibility, at the price of placing freedom beyond theoretical knowledge. This move shaped German idealism and much subsequent debate.

The Nineteenth Century: Naturalism and Its Discontents

Nineteenth-century science and philosophy pressed determinism hard. The success of mechanistic physics and, later, Darwinian biology encouraged a naturalistic picture in which human behavior is part of nature and subject to its laws. Utilitarian thinkers, notably John Stuart Mill, treated freedom in compatibilist terms: a person acts freely when acting according to his own desires, and the fact that those desires have causes is irrelevant to responsibility. Mill's On Liberty and his System of Logic carried forward the Hobbesian idea that determinism and freedom are compatible, while Jeremy Bentham's utilitarian framework tied responsibility to the calculation of consequences rather than to metaphysical liberty. Against this, "hard determinists" and skeptics argued that if determinism is true, no one is ever responsible in the strong sense required for desert and punishment. The nineteenth century thus set the pattern that persists: naturalistic compatibilism on one side, free-will skepticism on the other.

The Analytic Problem: Consequence and Conditional Analysis

Twentieth-century analytic philosophy made the problem precise. The pivotal figure was Peter van Inwagen, whose 1975 essay "The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism" and later book An Essay on Free Will (1983) formulated the consequence argument. Its core idea: if determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events in the remote past; but we have no power over the laws or the remote past; therefore we have no power over our acts5. The argument gave incompatibilism—the denial that freedom and determinism can coexist—a rigorous form, and much subsequent work consists of replies to it.

Compatibilists had their own classic tool: the conditional analysis of "could have done otherwise."1 If "you could have done otherwise" means "if you had chosen otherwise, you would have acted otherwise," then determinism does not rule it out1. This analysis, associated with G. E. Moore and others, was influential but ran into trouble with cases where a person's choice itself is constrained; later compatibilists replaced it with more sophisticated accounts.

Two major compatibilist programs emerged. One is reasons-responsive theory, developed by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, which holds that a person acts freely when his action is responsive to reasons in the right way—when, had there been sufficient reason to do otherwise, he would have. Fischer paired this with semi-compatibilism: the claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, only the right kind of control. The other is Harry Frankfurt's hierarchical account, in which freedom consists in acting on desires you endorse at a higher level, so that a willing addict differs from an unwilling one even if both are caused to act1. Frankfurt also devised famous counterexamples to the principle that responsibility requires alternative possibilities—cases where a person would have been forced to act had he not chosen to act on his own.

Libertarian Alternatives: Event-Causal and Agent-Causal

Incompatibilists who affirm free will are libertarians, and they split over what kind of causation freedom requires. Event-causal libertarianism holds that free actions are caused by prior mental events—beliefs, desires, deliberations—but that this causation is indeterministic, so the outcome is not fixed in advance1. Robert Kane developed an influential version in which self-forming actions occur at moments of indeterminacy, and the agent's effort settles which way the indeterminacy resolves. The difficulty is to show that indeterminism adds control rather than mere randomness: if the outcome is not determined, what makes it the agent's act rather than a lucky event1?

Agent-causal libertarianism answers by positing a distinctive kind of causation in which the agent, as a substance, causes an action directly, not by way of prior events16. Roderick Chisholm defended such a view, and Timothy O'Connor later developed it in detail. On this account the agent is an uncaused cause of the action, which secures ultimate responsibility but raises the question of how such causation fits into the natural order and whether it is intelligible at all.

Experimental Philosophy and the Present

Late in the twentieth century, a new empirical turn appeared. Experimental philosophy began probing ordinary people's intuitions about free will and responsibility—whether they are compatibilists or incompatibilists, how they react to deterministic scenarios, and whether those reactions shift with emotion or context7. Work by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe, among others, found that ordinary intuitions are complex and sometimes inconsistent, and that they can be manipulated by framing. These findings do not settle the metaphysical question, but they bear on the method of appealing to intuition, which had long been a standard tool in the debate.

Today the field is divided along recognizable lines. Compatibilists—reasons-responsive theorists, hierarchical theorists, and others—argue that responsibility survives determinism and that the consequence argument can be answered. Incompatibilists divide into libertarians, who defend event-causal or agent-causal freedom, and skeptics, who conclude that free will in the strong sense is an illusion and that our practices of blame and punishment need rethinking. The consequence argument remains a central testing ground, and the relation between freedom and the sciences of mind and brain continues to press on the old questions. What remains open is whether any account can do justice both to the causal order of nature and to the felt authority of the first-person standpoint from which we deliberate, choose, and hold one another responsible.

References

  1. Free will (introduction, Philosophical approaches, Omniscience, Free will according to Thomas Aquinas, Free will as lack of physical restraint, Free will as a psychological state, Event-causal theories, Agent/substance-causal theories), Wikipedia
  2. Compatibilism (History), Wikipedia
  3. Necessitarianism, Wikipedia
  4. Immanuel Kant, Wikipedia
  5. Consequence argument, Wikipedia
  6. Agent causation, Wikipedia
  7. Experimental philosophy, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Free Will

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 350 BCE-Present

    Aristotelian Voluntariness and Character

    When is an action voluntary rather than forced?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  2. 300 BCE-200

    Stoic Compatibilism

    How can action be free within a fated cosmos?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 400-Present

    Divine Foreknowledge and Eternal Now

    How can God know the future without compelling it?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 400-1300

    Providence, Foreknowledge, and Grace

    How do providence and grace leave room for free choice?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 1050-1200
  6. 1250-Present
  7. 1640-1700

    Cartesian Voluntarism

    Is the will free to resist any evidence?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  8. 1650-Present

    Hobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibilism

    Is freedom just the absence of external obstacles?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1670-1800

    Spinozist Necessitarianism

    Is everything necessary, and what is freedom then?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1690-1750
  11. 1780-Present

    Kantian Two Standpoints

    How can we be free if nature is deterministic?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  12. 1800-1900
  13. 1850-Present

    Hard determinism

    Can anyone be responsible if determinism is true?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  14. 1900-1970
  15. 1960-Present

    Agent causation

    Are agents themselves the causes of their actions?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  16. 1970-Present
  17. 1975-Present

    Consequence argument

    Does determinism rob us of alternative possibilities?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  18. 1980-Present

    Event-Causal Libertarianism

    Can free actions be caused by reasons alone?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  19. 1990-Present

    Reasons-Responsive and Semi-Compatibilism

    Does responsibility require the ability to do otherwise?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  20. 2000-Present

    Experimental philosophy

    What do ordinary people intuit about freedom?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Aristotelian Voluntariness and Charac…Stoic CompatibilismDivine Foreknowledge and Eternal NowProvidence, Foreknowledge, and GraceIslamic Occasionalism and Aristotelia…Thomistic Primary and Secondary Causa…Cartesian VoluntarismHobbesian External-Obstacle Compatibi…Spinozist NecessitarianismLeibnizian Sufficient Reason and Best…Kantian Two StandpointsUtilitarian and Naturalistic Compatib…Hard determinismConditional Analysis of Could Have Do…Agent causationFrankfurtian Hierarchical Mesh TheoryConsequence argumentEvent-Causal LibertarianismReasons-Responsive and Semi-Compatibi…Experimental philosophy

Beyond the field

Where Free Will's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 100 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Free Will is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 20 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

Land on Free Will

Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

More in Metaphysics

See where Free Will sits on the Map of Human Knowledge