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Problem Of Evil And Divine Hiddenness
The problem of evil is the oldest sustained argument against the goodness or existence of God, and divine hiddenness is its modern sibling.
10 frameworks, from 400 to today · Philosophy Of Religion · Philosophy
- Augustinian Theodicy 400-Present
- Best of all possible worlds 1710-1800
- Logical Problem of Evil 1955-1980
- Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense 1965-Present
- Epistemic Distance Defense 1966-Present
- Irenaean theodicy 1966-Present
- Evidential Problem of Evil 1979-Present
- Skeptical Theism 1984-Present
- Evolutionary and Animal Suffering Problem 1990-Present
- Argument from nonbelief 1993-Present
Overview
The problem of evil is the oldest sustained argument against the goodness or existence of God, and divine hiddenness is its modern sibling. Both begin from ordinary experience: the world contains terrible suffering, and the experience of God's presence is, for many sincere people, absent. The philosophical question is what these facts imply about the God of classical theism—a being said to be all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good1. If such a God exists, why is there so much pain? And why does belief come so easily to some and not at all to others? The history of this subfield is the history of attempts to answer those questions, and of the counter-moves that keep the answers from settling the matter.
Evil as a Challenge in Ancient and Medieval Thought
The problem is not originally a modern puzzle. The Book of Job, probably composed in the first millennium BCE, stages the question directly: a righteous man suffers catastrophically, and his friends insist the suffering must be deserved. Job rejects their explanations, and the book ends not with a solution but with a divine speech that reframes the question. The text is a landmark because it treats the demand for a moral explanation of suffering as itself something to be interrogated.
Greek philosophy supplied the conceptual vocabulary. Epicurus, as reported by later writers such as Lactantius, posed the dilemma that still structures the debate: if God is willing but unable to prevent evil, he is weak; if able but unwilling, he is malevolent; if both willing and able, where does evil come from? The argument's force depends on assuming that a good God would want to eliminate evil and could do so. Much of the later history is an argument about that assumption.
Augustine of Hippo, writing around 400 CE, gave the first systematic Christian response. His move was to deny that evil is a positive thing2. Evil, on his account, is a privation—a lack of good—rather than a substance created by God13. This "Augustinian theodicy" (a theodicy is an attempt to justify God's goodness in the face of evil) also located moral evil in the misuse of free will: God gave humans freedom, and freedom is a genuine good, but it can be turned away from God12. The price of a world with free creatures is a world in which those creatures can do harm. Augustine's framework dominated Western Christian thought for centuries and remains the ancestor of the free will defense.
A different strand runs through the medieval period. Anselm and, more famously, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in 1710 argued that God, being perfect, must have created the best of all possible worlds. Leibniz's Theodicy coined the term and argued that apparent evils are compatible with an optimal creation, since a world with free beings and the goods that depend on them may be better than any alternative. Voltaire's Candide (1759) made this "best of all possible worlds" optimism a byword for complacency, and the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 gave the satire its real-world force. The Leibnizian position is not dead—it survives in the idea that God's permission of evil is justified by greater goods—but it lost its cultural authority in the eighteenth century.
The Logical Problem and the Free Will Defense
The modern analytic phase begins with J. L. Mackie's 1955 essay "Evil and Omnipotence." Mackie formulated what became known as the logical problem of evil: the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God4. If God could prevent evil and would want to, no evil should exist; yet it does. Mackie's argument was powerful because it claimed not that evil makes God unlikely but that it makes the theistic set of beliefs contradictory.
The decisive response came from Alvin Plantinga, developed through the 1960s and 1970s and crystallized in God, Freedom, and Evil (1974). Plantinga's free will defense argued that Mackie's contradiction only holds if there is no possible reason God might permit evil. Plantinga proposed one: a world containing free creatures who do good is better than a world of automatons, but God cannot actualize a world in which free creatures always choose rightly, because their choices are not up to God. The existence of moral evil is therefore consistent with omnipotence and goodness. The defense does not claim to know God's actual reasons; it claims only that a possible reason exists, which is enough to defeat the charge of logical inconsistency1.
The logical problem is now widely regarded as answered in its strict form, though not everyone agrees the defense is complete1. The debate shifted to the evidential problem1.
The Evidential Problem and the Turn to Probability
William Rowe's 1979 essay "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism" reframed the issue. Even if evil is logically compatible with God, the sheer amount and distribution of suffering—especially intense suffering that seems to serve no purpose, such as a fawn trapped in a forest fire—makes God's existence improbable1. Rowe's argument is inductive: some evils appear pointless, and a good God would have reasons for permitting evil, so the existence of apparently pointless evil counts as evidence against God1.
This evidential problem is harder to defeat because it does not require a contradiction, only a balance of evidence. The responses multiplied. One line argues that we are not in a position to judge whether an instance of suffering is pointless, since we see only a fragment of the whole1. Another appeals to soul-making.
Soul-Making and the Value of Struggle
John Hick's Evil and the God of Love (1966) developed the soul-making theodicy, drawing on the early church father Irenaeus rather than Augustine56. Hick argued that the point of human existence is not comfort but moral and spiritual growth, and that growth requires a world with genuine challenges, dangers, and the possibility of failure1. A world designed for soul-making would contain suffering, because virtues such as courage and compassion cannot exist without something to overcome. Hick also introduced the idea of epistemic distance: God must be hidden from us, because a world in which God's presence was overwhelming would leave no room for free, mature faith1. This is the ancestor of the "hiddenness as necessary epistemic distance" response to divine hiddenness.
The soul-making approach has been criticized for making suffering instrumental to a good that many sufferers never reach, and for seeming to justify too much1. But it remains a major strand, and it connects the problem of evil to the problem of hiddenness.
Skeptical Theism and the Limits of Our Knowledge
A more recent and influential response is skeptical theism, associated with Stephen Wykstra's 1984 essay "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering." Wykstra argued that Rowe's inference from "we see no reason for this evil" to "there is no reason for this evil" is unreliable, because a finite human perspective cannot survey the range of goods a God might be pursuing. The analogy is a child who cannot see why a parent allows a painful medical procedure7. Skeptical theism does not claim to know God's reasons; it claims that our inability to see reasons is not evidence of their absence1.
Skeptical theism has become one of the central positions in the field, defended by Michael Bergmann and others. Its critics argue that it proves too much: if we cannot judge God's reasons, we also cannot trust our moral judgments about anything, and the position threatens to undermine the very moral seriousness that motivates the problem1. The debate over this "skeptical theism" objection is one of the liveliest in contemporary philosophy of religion.
Divine Hiddenness as a Distinct Problem
The problem of divine hiddenness was given its modern form by John Schellenberg in Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993)8. Schellenberg's argument is not about suffering but about the absence of belief. If a perfectly loving God existed, such a God would want a relationship with every person capable of it8. A relationship requires the other party to be aware of one's presence8. Yet there are many people who are capable of relationship with God but who do not believe God exists, through no fault of their own8. Therefore, a perfectly loving God does not exist8.
The argument is powerful because it turns on the nature of love rather than on the amount of evil. Its central premise—that a loving God would ensure that everyone capable of belief has it—is what the responses contest. The most prominent response is the epistemic distance defense, which holds that God must remain hidden to preserve human freedom and the authenticity of faith1. If God's existence were as obvious as the sun, belief would be compelled rather than freely given, and the value of a relationship with God would be lost1. Schellenberg replies that a loving relationship does not require total obscurity, and that a God could make presence known without overwhelming freedom.
Other responses appeal to the value of a "dark night of the soul," to the idea that hiddenness is a trial that builds character, and to the possibility that non-resistant unbelief is rarer than Schellenberg assumes. The debate remains open, and it has become one of the fastest-growing areas of philosophy of religion.
Evolutionary and Animal Suffering
A newer challenge comes from evolutionary biology and the scale of animal suffering1. If evolution is the means by which life developed, then suffering is not an incidental feature of a fallen world but is built into the process from the beginning: predation, disease, and mass extinction precede human existence by hundreds of millions of years. This undercuts the free will defense as an explanation for natural evil, since animal suffering cannot be attributed to human choices1. The problem is not new—Darwin himself felt its force—but it has become a major focus in recent decades, with philosophers such as Christopher Southgate and Michael Murray addressing it. Responses include the idea that animal suffering is a necessary byproduct of a world with laws and evolution, and the claim that the goods of creation may include animal flourishing that outweighs animal pain. The debate is unresolved and increasingly central.
The Present State of the Field
Contemporary work on the problem of evil is divided among several approaches. The free will defense remains the most widely taught response to the logical problem. Skeptical theism dominates the response to the evidential problem, though it is contested. Soul-making theodicies and best-of-all-possible-worlds arguments persist in modified forms. The hiddenness debate has grown into a distinct literature, with Schellenberg's argument and its responses now standard fare. Evolutionary and animal suffering have pushed the field toward questions about the scale and distribution of pain across the history of life.
What unites these debates is a single underlying question: what would a good God be like, and what would such a God permit? The history of the subfield is the history of refining that question—from Epicurus's dilemma to Mackie's contradiction to Rowe's probability to Schellenberg's hiddenness—and of the increasingly sophisticated attempts to answer it. The questions remain open, and the field shows no sign of exhausting them.
References
- Problem of evil (introduction, Formulation, Privation theory of evil, Free will defense, Defenses and theodicies, Discussion, Evidential problem of evil, Skeptical theism, Soul-making or Irenaean theodicy, Critique, Problem of evil and animal suffering, Natural evil), Wikipedia
- Augustinian theodicy, Wikipedia
- Absence of good, Wikipedia
- Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense, Wikipedia
- Theodicy (History), Wikipedia
- Irenaean theodicy, Wikipedia
- Skeptical theism, Wikipedia
- Argument from nonbelief, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Problem Of Evil And Divine Hiddenness
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 400-Present
- 1710-1800
- 1955-1980
- 1965-Present
Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense
Could free will justify God permitting evil?
- 1966-Present
- 1966-Present
- 1979-Present
Evidential Problem of Evil
Does suffering make God's existence unlikely?
About Evidential Problem of Evil
The evidential problem of evil asks a deceptively simple question: does the sheer amount and distribution of suffering in the world make belief in God unreasonable? Unlike the logical problem of evil, which claimed that any evil at all contradicts God's existence, the evidential version concedes that theism might be logically consistent but argues that the actual patterns of pain and pleasure we observe give us strong probabilistic grounds for preferring atheism. This shift from logical impossibility to probabilistic weight transformed the debate after 1979, forcing theists to engage not just with abstract possibility but with the concrete character of earthly suffering.Core CurriculumThe teaching spine of the evidential problem of evil typically begins with the distinction between the logical and evidential formulations. From there, students learn the following concepts in roughly this order:- Gratuitous evil – evil that an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being would have no justifying reason to permit. The evidential argument turns on whether such evil probably exists.
- Inscrutable evil – evil whose purpose we cannot discern. The evidentialist argues that inscrutability itself is evidence of gratuitousness, while the skeptical theist replies that our inability to see a reason does not mean no reason exists.
- The Noseeum inference – the informal reasoning that if we cannot see a justifying reason for a particular instance of suffering, we are entitled to infer that no such reason exists. This is a central point of contention.
- Theism vs. naturalism – the evidential argument is often framed as a comparative hypothesis test: given the data of evil, which worldview makes that data more probable?
- Bayesian reasoning – formal probabilistic tools used to calculate how much the evidence of evil lowers the probability of theism. Paul Draper's 1989 paper made Bayesian arguments central to the debate.
- The inductive argument from evil – the general form of the evidential problem, which treats evil as evidence that counts against theism in a cumulative way.
- Moral evil vs. natural evil – the standard distinction between suffering caused by human free choices and suffering caused by natural processes (disease, earthquakes, animal predation). The evidential argument often focuses on natural evil because it is harder to justify.
- Animal suffering – a particularly powerful sub‑argument: the vast evolutionary history of pain among non‑human animals seems especially gratuitous and difficult to reconcile with a benevolent creator.
- Horrendous evil – evils so extreme that they seem to defy any possible justification, such as the prolonged torture of a child. These cases are often used as intuitive anchors for the evidential argument.
- Skeptical theism – the main theistic response, which denies that our cognitive limitations allow us to judge whether an evil is truly gratuitous. It is a parallel framework that emerged in the mid‑1990s.
- The role of background evidence – the evidential argument does not operate in a vacuum; it weighs the evidence of evil against other evidence for theism (e.g., religious experience, design).
- Reasonable belief – the epistemic target: the argument aims to show that belief in God is not reasonable, not that it is impossible.
Intellectual HistoryThe evidential problem of evil emerged directly from the failure of the logical problem. After Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense (1974) showed that the logical incompatibility was not proven, philosophers realized that the real challenge was not formal contradiction but probabilistic weight. The decisive break came in 1979 with William L. Rowe's article "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism." Rowe presented a simple but powerful argument: there exist instances of intense suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without losing some greater good or permitting some equal or worse evil. Since we can point to such apparently pointless suffering, it is reasonable to believe that gratuitous evil exists, and therefore that the God of classical theism does not.Rowe's argument sparked an immediate and sustained response. The most influential reply was skeptical theism, developed by Stephen Wykstra (1984) and later codified by Michael Bergmann (2001). Wykstra introduced the CORNEA principle (Condition of ReasoNable Epistemic Access), arguing that we are not in a position to recognize a justifying good even if one exists. This shifted the debate to epistemology: how much can we infer from our ignorance?A second major contribution came from Paul Draper in 1989 with "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists." Draper reframed the argument as a Bayesian comparison between theism and the hypothesis of indifference (the idea that the distribution of pain and pleasure is what we would expect if the universe were indifferent to sentient beings). He argued that the evidence of pain and pleasure strongly favors the hypothesis of indifference over theism. This probabilistic approach became a standard tool in the literature.The evidential problem of evil coexists with and partly overlaps the Divine Hiddenness Argument (J. L. Schellenberg, 1993), which argues that God's hiddenness itself is evidence against his existence. While distinct, both arguments share a probabilistic, evidential structure and are often taught together in advanced courses. The evidential problem remains active today, with ongoing refinements concerning animal suffering, horrendous evils, and the epistemology of skeptical theism.The 11 concepts its tower teaches
- Animal suffering
- Bayesian reasoning
- Evidential vs. logical problem distinction
- Gratuitous evil
- Horrendous evil
- Inductive argument from evil
- Inscrutable evil
- Moral evil vs. natural evil
- Noseeum inference
- Rowe's argument from gratuitous evil
- Theism vs. naturalism
- 1984-Present
- 1990-Present
Evolutionary and Animal Suffering Problem
Why does nature cause so much animal pain?
- 1993-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense influenced by Augustinian Theodicy
Plantinga's free will defense revives Augustine's core move: moral evil originates in the misuse of free will, which is a genuine good God could not remove without loss. Plantinga cites Augustine's privation account and free-will emphasis as the ancestor of his defense.
Carried by Alvin Plantinga.
Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense reacted against Logical Problem of Evil
Plantinga's free will defense was developed directly as a reply to Mackie's logical problem, arguing that Mackie's contradiction fails because God may have a possible reason for permitting evil, namely free creatures who can choose wrongly.
Carried by Alvin Plantinga.
Evidential Problem of Evil replaced Logical Problem of Evil
Rowe's evidential problem replaced the logical problem as the central form of the argument from evil, granting that evil is logically compatible with God but arguing that the amount and distribution of suffering makes God's existence improbable.
Carried by William Rowe; The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism (1979).
Argument from nonbelief reacted against Epistemic Distance Defense
Schellenberg's argument from nonbelief was developed as a challenge to the epistemic distance defense, arguing that a perfectly loving God would not leave sincere nonbelievers in obscurity, since a relationship does not require total hiddenness.
Carried by John Schellenberg; Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason (1993).
Skeptical Theism reacted against Evidential Problem of Evil
Wykstra's skeptical theism was formulated directly against Rowe's evidential argument, arguing that the inference from 'we see no reason for this evil' to 'there is no reason' is unreliable given the limits of human knowledge.
Carried by Stephen Wykstra; The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering (1984).
Best of all possible worlds influenced by Augustinian Theodicy
Leibniz's Theodicy (1710) took up Augustine's project of reconciling evil with a good creator, but replaced the privation doctrine with the claim that God must create the best possible world. Leibniz explicitly engaged Augustine's authority while recasting the argument in terms of optimality.
Carried by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Theodicy (1710).
Irenaean theodicy reacted against Augustinian Theodicy
Hick's soul-making theodicy was explicitly presented as an alternative to the Augustinian tradition, drawing instead on Irenaeus and arguing that the purpose of creation is moral and spiritual growth rather than the preservation of a primal free will.
Carried by John Hick; Evil and the God of Love (1966).
Evolutionary and Animal Suffering Problem reacted against Irenaean theodicy
The evolutionary and animal suffering problem extends the soul-making framework's focus on a world of challenge and growth to non-human suffering, asking whether the evolutionary history of predation and pain can be justified by goods available to animals.
Beyond the field
Where Problem Of Evil And Divine Hiddenness's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 18 links.
Best of all possible worlds influenced by Leibnizian possible worlds in Modality
Leibniz's doctrine of possible worlds, developed in the 1680s, supplied the modal machinery for his claim that this world is the best of all possible worlds in the Theodicy.
Carried by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Theodicy (1710).
Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense influenced by Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Philosophy Of Religion
Plantinga's free-will defense was constructed as a reply to Mackie's logical problem of evil, arguing that God and evil are not logically inconsistent.
Carried by Alvin Plantinga; J. L. Mackie.
Evidential Problem of Evil provoked Skeptical Theism in Philosophy Of Theism
Skeptical theism arose as a direct reply to Rowe's evidential argument from evil, which claims that pointless suffering makes God's existence improbable. The skeptical theist concedes our inability to judge whether any suffering is pointless, thereby attacking the argument's key premise.
Carried by William L. Rowe; Stephen Wykstra.
Evidential Problem of Evil grew out of Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Philosophy Of Religion
The evidential problem of evil grew directly out of the older problem of evil and theodicy tradition, recasting the argument in probabilistic terms. William Rowe's 1979 formulation drew on the long-running debate over whether evil counts against God's existence.
Carried by William L. Rowe.
Skeptical Theism reacted against Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Philosophy Of Religion
Skeptical theism arose as a response to the problem of evil, denying that humans can infer God's purposes from the evils they observe. It defined itself against evidential arguments from evil.
Carried by Stephen Wykstra.
Evolutionary and Animal Suffering Problem grew out of Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Philosophy Of Religion
The evolutionary and animal suffering problem is a branch of the general problem of evil, extending it to the suffering of non-human animals and to natural evolutionary processes. It grew out of the older theodicy debate.
Argument from nonbelief grew out of Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Philosophy Of Religion
The argument from nonbelief is a branch of the problem of evil, replacing suffering with the fact of unbelief as the evidence against God. It grew directly out of the evidential problem of evil tradition.
Carried by Theodore Drange.
Augustinian Theodicy influenced Providential and Moral Explanation in Disaster History
Augustine's theodicy, set out in City of God, treated calamities as either punishment, testing or part of a providential order, and this scheme supplied the standard moral reading of disaster in early modern Europe. Later providential explanations of earthquakes and floods repeated his framework.
Carried by Augustine of Hippo; City of God (426).
Best of all possible worlds influenced by Problem of Evil and Theodicy in Philosophy Of Religion
Leibniz wrote the Theodicy as a response to the problem of evil as posed by Bayle and others, and his best-world solution became a standard target and reference point in later philosophy of religion.
Carried by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Pierre Bayle.
Logical Problem of Evil influenced by Logical analysis in Metaphysics
The logical problem of evil applied the methods of logical analysis developed by Russell, Moore, and the early analytic tradition to the traditional theological problem.
Carried by J. L. Mackie; Bertrand Russell.
Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense influenced Skeptical Theism in Philosophy Of Theism
Plantinga's free-will defence established that unknown goods may justify God in permitting evil, and skeptical theists extended this into a general thesis about the limits of human knowledge of goods. Wykstra and others built on that defence's strategy of positing reasons beyond our ken.
Carried by Alvin Plantinga; Stephen Wykstra.
Alvin Plantinga's free-will defense influenced Consequence argument in Free Will
Van Inwagen developed the consequence argument in the context of free will defense debates, where the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and freedom raised parallel issues. Plantinga's free-will defense sharpened the question of whether freedom and determinism can coexist, motivating the formal argument.
Carried by Peter van Inwagen; Alvin Plantinga.

Problem Of Evil And Divine Hiddenness is a planet in Nousfarer
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Fields its ideas are linked to
- Philosophy Of Religion 8 links
- Philosophy Of Theism 3 links
- Christian Philosophy 1 link
- Disaster History 1 link
- Moral Responsibility 1 link
- Free Will 1 link
- Metaphysics 1 link
- Modality 1 link
- Animal Behavior 1 link
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