Moral Responsibility

Moral responsibility is the idea that a person can be answerable for what she does — that praise, blame, punishment, and resentment can be directed at her because the action was, in some meaningful sense, hers.

16 frameworks, from 390 to today · Ethics · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Moral responsibility is the idea that a person can be answerable for what she does — that praise, blame, punishment, and resentment can be directed at her because the action was, in some meaningful sense, hers1. The subfield of ethics that studies this idea asks what conditions must hold for such answerability: must the person have been able to do otherwise1? Must she have acted freely, or knowingly, or from her own settled character? And what happens to responsibility if everything she does is the product of causes stretching back before her birth2?

These questions matter because almost everything else in ethics and law depends on them. Criminal punishment, moral criticism, gratitude, and the ordinary texture of human relationships all assume that people are responsible agents. The history of the subfield is largely a history of attempts to make that assumption coherent — and of repeated challenges to whether it can be.

Ancient Roots: Fate, Character, and the Voluntary

The problem is as old as philosophy. Greek tragedy already stages the collision between what a person does and what fate or the gods have decreed. But it was Aristotle, in the Nicomachean Ethics (4th century BCE), who gave the first systematic account. Aristotle distinguished voluntary from involuntary action: an action is voluntary when its source is in the agent and the agent knows what she is doing. Involuntary actions — done under compulsion or through ignorance — are not fitting objects of praise or blame in the same way. He also distinguished acting from character (a settled disposition) versus acting on impulse, a distinction that later theories would revive.

Crucially, Aristotle did not treat determinism as the central threat. The Stoics did3. They held that everything happens by an unbreakable chain of causes — fate — and yet insisted that human actions are still "in our power" because they flow from our own assent. The Epicureans took the opposite route, positing an unpredictable "swerve" of atoms to make room for freedom. This ancient disagreement — whether freedom requires escaping causation or can be reconciled with it — set the template for everything that followed.

The Theological Problem of Free Will

Christian theology sharpened the issue. If God is omniscient, he knows what you will do; if omnipotent, he ordains it. Augustine (late 4th–early 5th century) argued that foreknowledge does not compel: God knows eternally what we freely choose, and his knowledge does not cause the choice. But the harder problem came from grace. If salvation depends on divine grace, how can a person be responsible for rejecting it? The medieval debate — most famously between Boethius's account of eternity as a "simultaneous whole" and later Scholastic distinctions — produced the framework in which the free-will problem became a standard philosophical puzzle rather than a purely theological one.

Erasmus and Luther clashed directly over whether the will is bound; Luther's De servo arbitrio (1525) argued that the fallen will is in bondage to sin and cannot freely choose the good, while Erasmus defended a genuine freedom of the will. The disputes were theological, but their structure — an external determining power versus genuine human agency — is recognizably the same problem that secular philosophy would later pose in terms of causation.

Determinism and the Classical Compatibilist Response

The scientific revolution made determinism a live philosophical threat in a new way. If the physical world is governed by laws, and human bodies are part of that world, then every human action seems to be the inevitable outcome of prior causes2. The question became: can responsibility survive this?

The classical compatibilists answered yes4. Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651) defined liberty not as the absence of causes but as the absence of external impediment: a person is free when she does what she wants and is not physically constrained. David Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature, 1739–40; An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748) went further, arguing that "liberty of indifference" — the power to act without any cause at all — is both impossible and undesirable. What we call free action is action caused by the agent's own desires and character. Necessity, Hume argued, is actually required for responsibility: if actions were uncaused, they would not be attributable to the person at all. This is the core of classical compatibilism: freedom is compatible with determinism because freedom means acting according to one's own will, not acting without causes4.

The incompatibilist counter-tradition was equally old. The intuition that if your action was determined, you could not have done otherwise, and therefore are not responsible, has never gone away1. It became the explicit thesis of hard determinism — determinism is true, so no one is genuinely responsible — and later of hard incompatibilism, which adds that even if determinism were false, the kind of indeterminism available (randomness) would not help, since a random action is no more under the agent's control than a determined one54.

Kant and Transcendental Freedom

Immanuel Kant offered the most ambitious reconciliation. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), he argued that the world as it appears to us (the phenomenal world) is governed by causal laws, but that reason also gives us access to a noumenal order — things as they are in themselves — in which the will can be genuinely free. Transcendental freedom is this capacity to initiate a causal chain from outside the deterministic order of appearances. Kant's move is notoriously difficult, but its historical importance is enormous: it made freedom a metaphysical condition of morality rather than a psychological fact, and it framed the debate for German idealism (Fichte, Schelling) and for later libertarian theories.

Libertarianism and Voluntary Action

Libertarianism in this context (not the political doctrine) is the view that genuine free will exists and is incompatible with determinism, so determinism must be false, at least where human action is concerned6. It is not one theory but a family. Some libertarians appeal to agent causation — the idea that persons, as substances, can originate actions without being caused to do so1. Others appeal to indeterministic quantum or neural processes at the moment of decision. The central difficulty, pressed by critics from Hume onward, is the "luck" problem: if an undetermined event makes the difference between choosing A and choosing B, that difference looks like chance rather than control1.

Voluntary action theory — the philosophical study of what distinguishes intentional, willed behavior from mere bodily movement — grew alongside these debates7. It asks what it is for an action to be mine in the sense required for responsibility: the role of intention, deliberation, and the will. This literature, developed in the 20th century by philosophers of action, supplied the conceptual machinery that later responsibility theories would use.

Frankfurt Cases and the Attack on Alternate Possibilities

A pivotal turning point came in 1969, when Harry Frankfurt published "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." Frankfurt described a scenario — now called a Frankfurt case — in which a person acts on her own, but an external mechanism would have forced her to act that way had she shown signs of doing otherwise. Since she acts on her own and the intervention never occurs, she seems responsible — yet she could not have done otherwise8. Frankfurt concluded that the "principle of alternate possibilities" (responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise) is false8. What matters is whether the action issued from the agent's own will, not whether other options were open3.

Frankfurt cases became one of the most intensely debated devices in the field8. Defenders of the principle of alternate possibilities responded with refinements: some argued the cases beg the question or that the agent's inability to do otherwise must itself be relevant. But the cases shifted the center of gravity: compatibilists no longer needed to defend "could have done otherwise," and the question became what kind of control or ownership makes an action attributable to a person.

Hierarchical and Higher-Order Desire Theories

One influential answer came from Harry Frankfurt himself3. In "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" (1971), he distinguished first-order desires (wanting to do something) from second-order desires (wanting to have a certain desire). A person acts freely when her effective first-order desire is one she endorses at the second order — when her will matches her higher-order volitions3. An addict who wants the drug but does not want to want it acts unfreely; an addict who wholeheartedly endorses the craving acts freely. This hierarchical or higher-order desire theory gave compatibilism a psychological criterion of freedom3.

Gary Watson (1975) and others pressed the question of which order of desire should count and whether higher-order endorsement could itself be alien. Later versions multiplied the levels or appealed to "wholeheartedness" and the agent's "real self." The theory's appeal was that it located freedom in the structure of the person's attitudes rather than in metaphysics — but its critics argued it could not explain what makes the endorsing attitude authoritative.

Attributionism and the Reactive Attitudes

A parallel strand asked about responsibility's social dimension. P. F. Strawson's landmark essay "Freedom and Resentment" (1962) reframed the whole debate. Rather than asking whether determinism is true, Strawson examined the reactive attitudes — resentment, indignation, gratitude, forgiveness — that structure our interpersonal lives1. To hold someone responsible, on his view, is to participate in these attitudes toward her; to regard her as a responsible agent is to see her as a fitting target of them1. The question of determinism, Strawson suggested, is largely beside the point: the practices of holding responsible are constitutive of human society and would survive any metaphysical discovery.

Strawson's reactive-attitude theory inspired later "attributionist" accounts. Attributionism, associated with philosophers such as T. M. Scanlon and Angela Smith, holds that a person is responsible for an action when it reflects her judgments, values, or evaluative commitments — when it is attributable to her as expressing what she stands for. On this view, blame is not fundamentally about desert or punishment but about the meaning of the action for the relationship. Smith's "rational relations" view (2005) and Scanlon's Moral Dimensions (2008) developed this line: to blame someone is to modify one's attitudes toward her in light of what her action reveals about her.

Historical versus Non-Historical Accounts

A more recent dividing line concerns history. Historical accounts of responsibility hold that whether a person is responsible for her present character and actions depends on how she came to be the way she is. If someone's cruel character was deliberately cultivated by herself, she is responsible for it; if it was implanted by manipulation, she may not be. Robert Kane and, in a different register, Alfred Mele and others developed historical conditions to handle cases of manipulation. Non-historical compatibilism, by contrast, holds that responsibility depends only on the current structure of the agent's will — her desires, values, and capacity for reflective self-control — regardless of how she acquired them. The disagreement is sharpest in "manipulation cases," where an agent is psychologically identical to a normal person but was designed that way by neuroscientists. Non-historical accounts must explain why such an agent is responsible; historical accounts must explain exactly which histories matter.

Moral Luck

In 1979, Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel independently published essays on moral luck — the uncomfortable fact that we hold people responsible for outcomes that depend on factors beyond their control. Nagel distinguished several kinds: luck in the circumstances one faces, in one's constitution, and in the results of one's actions. A driver who is sober and careful but whose pedestrian steps out unexpectedly is blamed differently from one whose pedestrian does not1. Williams argued that this is not a marginal anomaly but a deep feature of our practices, and that it exposes a tension in the very concept of responsibility. The debate forced philosophers to ask how much of responsibility is genuinely within the agent's control — and whether the answer could be "less than we assume."

Social and Collective Responsibility

The late 20th century also widened the scope. Social and collective responsibility concerns groups — corporations, nations, institutions — and the ways individuals are implicated in harms produced by collective action19. Can a collective be responsible as a collective, or only its members1? What is the responsibility of an ordinary citizen for her government's injustices, or of a consumer for systemic harms1? These questions, pressed by philosophers of law and political philosophy but continuous with the ethics of responsibility, extended the subfield beyond the individual will.

The Present: Four Live Approaches

Today the field is organized around a few broad positions. Compatibilists — including non-historical and historical varieties, hierarchical theorists, and attributionists — hold that responsibility is compatible with determinism and locate its basis in the agent's psychology, values, or self-governance. Libertarians insist that genuine responsibility requires a freedom incompatible with determinism and continue to develop agent-causal and event-causal accounts. Hard incompatibilists, most prominently Derk Pereboom, argue that no such freedom is available, that we should therefore abandon desert-based blame and punishment, and that a life without them is possible. And a fourth strand — Strawsonian and attributionist — continues to shift the question away from metaphysics toward the social and evaluative practices of holding one another responsible1.

The open questions remain recognizably those of the whole history: whether determinism is true, whether freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, whether responsibility can survive manipulation and luck, and what responsibility demands of us as members of groups. What has changed is the sophistication of the conceptual tools and the range of cases — from neuroscience to corporate law — that the debate now must accommodate.

References

  1. Moral responsibility (introduction, Metaphysical libertarianism, Hard incompatibilism, Argument from luck, Compatibilism, Collective), Wikipedia
  2. Determinism (Causal), Wikipedia
  3. Compatibilism (History), Wikipedia
  4. Incompatibilism (introduction, Hard incompatibilism), Wikipedia
  5. Hard determinism, Wikipedia
  6. Libertarianism (metaphysics), Wikipedia
  7. Voluntary action, Wikipedia
  8. Frankfurt cases, Wikipedia
  9. Collective responsibility, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Moral Responsibility

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 390-1500

    Theological Free Will Tradition

    How can humans be free if God foreknows and ordains all things?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  2. 1650-Present

    Determinism

    Are all events, including human actions, fixed by prior causes?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 1651-1900

    Classical Compatibilism

    Can freedom and responsibility survive universal causation?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 1750-Present

    Incompatibilism

    Does responsibility require the ability to do otherwise?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 1781-1850

    Transcendental Idealism

    How can the will be free in a causally determined world?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  6. 1880-Present

    Libertarianism

    What kind of free will could exist without determinism?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  7. 1940-Present

    Voluntary action

    What makes a bodily movement an intentional action?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  8. 1962-Present

    Reactive-Attitude Theory

    When are resentment and blame fitting responses to a person?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1969-Present

    Frankfurt Cases

    Can someone be responsible for what they could not avoid doing?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1970-Present

    Collective Responsibility

    When is a group answerable for what its members do?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  11. 1971-Present

    Hierarchical Desire Theory

    When does a person's will reflect her true self?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  12. 1979-Present

    Moral Luck

    Does luck beyond our control affect what we deserve?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  13. 1980-Present

    Historical Accounts of Responsibility

    Does how a person came to be matter to her responsibility?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  14. 1980-Present

    Non-Historical Compatibilism

    Can present attitudes alone make an agent responsible?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  15. 1990-Present

    Attributionism

    When does an action express the agent's own judgments?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  16. 2001-Present

    Hard Incompatibilism

    Is responsibility possible even without determinism?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Theological Free Will TraditionDeterminismClassical CompatibilismIncompatibilismTranscendental IdealismLibertarianismVoluntary actionReactive-Attitude TheoryFrankfurt CasesCollective ResponsibilityHierarchical Desire TheoryMoral LuckHistorical Accounts of ResponsibilityNon-Historical CompatibilismAttributionismHard Incompatibilism

Beyond the field

Where Moral Responsibility's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 78 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
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Moral Responsibility is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 16 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

Land on Moral Responsibility

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