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Scientific Explanation
Scientific explanation is the part of philosophy of science that asks what it is to explain something scientifically—why the kettle boils, why the tides follow the Moon, why a mutation causes a disease—and what makes one answer to such a "why" better than another.
10 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Science · Philosophy
- Posterior Analytics 350 BCE-1600
- Deductive-nomological model 1948-1975
- Inductive-statistical model 1962-1980
- Statistical-relevance model 1971-1990
- Explanatory unification 1974-Present
- Pragmatic account of explanation 1980-Present
- Causal-process account 1984-2005
- Explanatory pluralism 1990-Present
- Mechanist account 2000-Present
- Interventionist theory of explanation 2003-Present
Overview
Scientific explanation is the part of philosophy of science that asks what it is to explain something scientifically—why the kettle boils, why the tides follow the Moon, why a mutation causes a disease—and what makes one answer to such a "why" better than another12. The stakes are not merely academic. Scientific explanation is what science offers in place of myth and bare prediction: a theory that forecasts eclipses but cannot say why they happen seems to be missing something. The history of the subfield is a long argument about what that "something" is—a law, a cause, a mechanism, a unification of many phenomena under few principles, or simply an answer to a question someone actually asked.
Aristotle's demonstrative science
The founding text is Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (fourth century BCE). Aristotle held that scientific understanding (epistēmē) consists in demonstrative knowledge: a body of propositions organized so that conclusions follow deductively from premises that are true, primary, and explanatory of the conclusion. The premises must state the cause—the "middle term" that makes the conclusion necessary. His stock example: knowing that the planets are near the Earth explains why they do not twinkle, because nearness is the reason for the absence of twinkling. Explanation and demonstration were thus fused: to explain was to show that a fact follows necessarily from its grounds. This ideal—a deductive structure anchored in causes—set the terms of debate for two millennia, and its descendants reappear whenever philosophers demand that explanation be an argument.
The covering-law model
The modern subfield begins with logical positivism and Carl Hempel13. In 1948 Hempel and Paul Oppenheim published "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," proposing what became the deductive-nomological (D-N) model: an explanation is a deductive argument whose premises include at least one law of nature plus statements of initial conditions, and whose conclusion is the event to be explained (the explanandum)12. Why does the mercury in a thermometer rise when heated? Because mercury expands when heated (a law), and this thermometer was heated (initial conditions); therefore it rose. The model's great virtue was precision: it made explanation a matter of logical form, checkable and comparable across sciences.
Hempel soon extended it to the inductive-statistical (I-S) model for probabilistic cases: an explanation makes the explanandum highly probable given laws and conditions, rather than deducing it. He also insisted on the symmetry thesis—an explanation and a prediction have the same logical structure, differing only in whether we know the outcome in advance2. This was a bold, unifying claim, and it is where the trouble started.
The failures of the covering-law model
Three counterexamples, all well known, broke the model's grip. First, irrelevance: from the law that all men who take birth-control pills fail to get pregnant, plus the fact that a particular man took the pills, one can deduce that he did not get pregnant—yet this explains nothing2. Second, the flagpole (due to Sylvain Bromberger, discussed by Wesley Salmon): from the height of a flagpole and the angle of the Sun one can deduce the length of its shadow, and from the shadow's length and the angle one can deduce the pole's height. Both are valid D-N arguments, but only the first explains; the second merely predicts. Third, the barometer: a falling barometer reading lets us predict a storm, but does not explain it—both are effects of low pressure. The common diagnosis: the D-N model captures inferential relations but not explanatory ones. Something about causes, or about which facts are the right ones to cite, was missing.
Causation returns: Salmon and the statistical-relevance model
Wesley Salmon, in Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (1971) and later Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (1984), argued that an explanation should cite statistically relevant factors—partition the reference class so that the probability of the explanandum changes—and, more deeply, that explanation is a matter of exhibiting the causal processes and interactions that produce the event. His mark-transmission account of causality (a causal process is one able to carry a mark, such as a scratch on a moving billiard ball) was an attempt to make causation respectable for empiricists. The flagpole and barometer cases now had a principled answer: explanation traces the causal arrow, prediction need not.
The pragmatic turn
A different response came from Bas van Fraassen. In The Scientific Image (1980) he argued that explanations are not arguments at all but answers to why-questions, and a why-question has a context-dependent structure: a topic, a contrast class ("why this rather than that*?"), and a relevance relation supplied by the background theory and the questioner's interests. The same fact can be explained differently depending on the contrast. This pragmatic account dissolved the search for a single logical form: explanation is an activity, and what counts as explanatory depends on what is being asked. Van Fraassen's view also fit his constructive empiricism—explanation was not a guide to truth about unobservables4.
Unification
Michael Friedman (1974) and later Philip Kitcher ("Explanatory Unification", 1981; The Advancement of Science, 1993) offered a rival to causal accounts: science explains by unifying—by reducing the number of independent assumptions needed to derive a body of facts. A theory explains well when it covers many phenomena with few argument patterns. Newtonian mechanics explains the tides and the fall of apples because one scheme derives both. Kitcher's version made explanation a matter of instantiating a small set of "argument patterns" that the scientific community accepts. Unificationism captured a real feature of theory choice—Kepler's laws being explained by Newton's—but critics asked whether unification is genuinely explanatory or merely economical.
Mechanisms
From the 1990s, philosophers of biology and neuroscience pressed a mechanist account. Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver's "Thinking about Mechanisms" (2000) defined a mechanism as a system of entities and activities organized so as to produce a phenomenon. To explain a phenomenon is to describe the mechanism responsible: the ion channels and neurotransmitter release behind a neuron's firing, the molecular steps of DNA replication. This was a deliberate move away from laws—much of biology has few exceptionless laws—and toward the detailed, hierarchical, often multi-level descriptions working scientists actually give. The mechanist programme became the dominant account in philosophy of the life sciences, with Craver's Explaining the Brain (2007) as a landmark.
Interventionism
A parallel development sharpened the causal idea. James Woodward's Making Things Happen (2003) advanced an interventionist theory: a causal claim is a claim about what would happen under an idealized intervention—if we could set a variable to a value while holding others fixed, how would the outcome change? This gave a precise, manipulability-based semantics for causation that meshed with experimental practice and with the causal-modeling literature in statistics and computer science (Pearl's work on causal graphs). It also supplied a criterion for explanatory relevance: a factor explains an outcome if intervening on it would change the outcome.
Explanation in practice and the present
The field today is pluralist in temper. Causal and mechanistic accounts dominate philosophy of biology and neuroscience; interventionism connects explanation to causal inference and to the sciences of experiment; unificationism survives as an account of theory-driven explanation in physics; and the pragmatic tradition reminds everyone that "why" questions are asked by people with purposes. A recurring live question is whether there is one thing—explanation—at all, or a family of explanatory practices (deductive, causal, mechanistic, statistical, functional) suited to different sciences. Another is the relation between explanation and understanding: does an explanation produce a distinct cognitive state, or is it just a well-supported account1? And the old Aristotelian demand for necessity—that a genuine explanation show why the outcome had to happen—still divides those who think explanation is about causes from those who think it is about laws, and both from those who think it is about answering questions. The argument Aristotle started is not over.
References
- Models of scientific inquiry (introduction, Logical empiricism), Wikipedia
- Deductive-nomological model, Wikipedia
- Carl Gustav Hempel, Wikipedia
- Scientific realism (History), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Scientific Explanation
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 350 BCE-1600
- 1948-1975
Deductive-nomological model
When does a law plus conditions explain an event?
- 1962-1980
Inductive-statistical model
How do probabilistic laws explain an outcome?
- 1971-1990
Statistical-relevance model
Which statistical factors are explanatory rather than irrelevant?
- 1974-Present
Explanatory unification
Does explaining mean unifying many facts under few principles?
- 1980-Present
Pragmatic account of explanation
How does the question asked shape what explains?
- 1984-2005
Causal-process account
Does explanation require tracing the causal process?
- 1990-Present
- 2000-Present
Mechanist account
How do organized parts and activities produce a phenomenon?
- 2003-Present
Interventionist theory of explanation
Does a factor explain if intervening on it changes the outcome?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Inductive-statistical model grew out of Deductive-nomological model
Hempel himself extended the deductive-nomological schema to probabilistic cases, replacing the deductive step with an inductive one that makes the explanandum highly probable; the inductive-statistical model is a branch of the same covering-law programme.
Carried by Carl Hempel.
Statistical-relevance model reacted against Deductive-nomological model
Salmon built the statistical-relevance model against the covering-law model's failure to handle irrelevance and its symmetry thesis, arguing that explanation requires statistically relevant partitions rather than high probability under laws.
Carried by Wesley Salmon; Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance (1971).
Pragmatic account of explanation reacted against Deductive-nomological model
Van Fraassen's pragmatic account arose as a direct rejection of the covering-law idea that explanations are arguments with a single logical form, recasting them as context-dependent answers to why-questions.
Carried by Bas van Fraassen; The Scientific Image (1980).
Causal-process account grew out of Statistical-relevance model
Salmon's statistical-relevance model developed into his causal-process account, which added the mark-transmission theory of causal processes to the earlier statistical-relevance criterion so that explanation traces the causal structure producing the event.
Carried by Wesley Salmon; Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (1984).
Explanatory unification reacted against Deductive-nomological model
Friedman and Kitcher offered explanatory unification as an alternative to the covering-law model, arguing that science explains by reducing the number of independent assumptions needed to derive a body of facts rather than by subsuming events under laws.
Carried by Michael Friedman; Philip Kitcher; Explanatory Unification (1981).
Explanatory pluralism influenced by Pragmatic account of explanation
Van Fraassen's pragmatic account supplied explanatory pluralism with its central idea that what counts as an explanation depends on the question asked and the context, which pluralists extended to differences across scientific fields.
Carried by Bas van Fraassen.
Mechanist account grew out of Causal-process account
The mechanist account grew out of the causal-process tradition, replacing Salmon's abstract causal processes with concrete systems of entities and activities organized to produce a phenomenon, as in Machamer, Darden and Craver's 'Thinking about Mechanisms'.
Carried by Peter Machamer; Lindley Darden; Carl Craver.
Interventionist theory of explanation grew out of Causal-process account
Woodward's interventionist theory refined the causal-process account by giving a manipulability-based semantics for causal claims, so that a factor explains an outcome if an idealized intervention on it would change the outcome.
Carried by James Woodward; Making Things Happen (2003).
Explanatory pluralism reacted against Explanatory unification
Explanatory pluralism arose partly in reaction to unificationist claims that one scheme of argument patterns explains a whole body of facts, insisting instead that different sciences employ distinct explanatory practices.
Beyond the field
Where Scientific Explanation's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 37 links.
Posterior Analytics provoked Baconian method in Philosophy Of Science
Bacon attacked the Posterior Analytics model of demonstration, contrasting the spider-like spinning of axioms from axioms with the bee-like collection and digestion of particulars.
Carried by Francis Bacon; Novum Organum (1620).
Deductive-nomological model provoked Causal Theory of Explanation in Mathematical Explanation
The causal theory of explanation arose as a rejection of the deductive-nomological model, arguing that subsumption under laws is neither necessary nor sufficient and that citing causes is what explains.
Carried by Wesley Salmon.
Causal-process account grew out of Causal Theory of Explanation in Mathematical Explanation
Wesley Salmon's causal theory of explanation, developed from the 1970s, supplied the causal-connexion requirement that the causal-process account of explanation built on and refined. The later account treats causal processes and interactions as the explanatory core, extending Salmon's programme.
Carried by Wesley C. Salmon.
Causal-process account reacted against Deductive-nomological model in Philosophy Of History
The causal-process account arose as a direct attack on the deductive-nomological model, arguing that subsumption under laws misses the causal connections that do the explanatory work. Salmon framed his account explicitly as a replacement for Hempel's covering-law model.
Carried by Wesley C. Salmon.
Explanatory pluralism led to Pluralism about Explanation in Mathematical Explanation
Pluralism about explanation in mathematics grew out of the broader explanatory pluralism debate, extending the claim that different sciences need different explanatory forms to the case of mathematical explanation.
Interventionist theory of explanation influenced by Causal model in Philosophy Of Causation
Causal models and the structural-equations framework, developed by Pearl and others, supplied the formal apparatus of interventions and directed graphs on which the interventionist theory of explanation rests.
Carried by Judea Pearl.
Inductive-statistical model provoked Causal Theory of Explanation in Mathematical Explanation
Hempel's inductive-statistical model of explanation was the target against which Salmon's statistical-relevance account and the subsequent causal theory defined themselves.
Carried by Wesley Salmon.
Inductive-statistical model grew out of Deductive-Nomological Model in Mathematical Explanation
Hempel's inductive-statistical model was framed as an extension of the deductive-nomological model to probabilistic laws, defining itself by modifying the earlier account.
Carried by Carl Hempel.
Inductive-statistical model grew out of Deductive-nomological model in Philosophy Of Science
The inductive-statistical model arose as a revision of the deductive-nomological model, replacing deductive with inductive argument for statistical explanations.
Carried by Carl Hempel.
Statistical-relevance model led to Causal Theory of Explanation in Mathematical Explanation
Wesley Salmon's statistical-relevance model was put forward as a rival to the covering-law account and was then itself revised toward causal relevance, feeding directly into the causal theory of explanation.
Carried by Wesley Salmon.
Statistical-relevance model reacted against Deductive-Nomological Model in Mathematical Explanation
The statistical-relevance model was put forward by Salmon as a replacement for the deductive-nomological account of statistical explanation, which he argued failed on cases of irrelevant premises.
Carried by Wesley Salmon.
Statistical-relevance model grew out of Causal Theory of Explanation in Mathematical Explanation
The statistical-relevance model and the causal theory of explanation were contemporaries competing to answer what makes a statistical explanation good, one appealing to relevance relations and the other to causal structure.
Carried by Wesley Salmon.

Scientific Explanation is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Scientific ExplanationRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Mathematical Explanation 19 links
- Philosophy Of Science 6 links
- Philosophy Of Causation 4 links
- Philosophy Of History 2 links
- Philosophy Of Social Science 2 links
- Logic 1 link
- Confirmation And Evidence 1 link
- Philosophy Of Chemistry 1 link
- Scientific Realism 1 link
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