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Philosophy Of Science
Philosophy of science asks what science is, how it works, and what it can tell us about the world.
30 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Science · Philosophy
- Aristotelian Demonstration and Natural Philosophy 350 BCE-1650
- Aristotelian demonstrative science 350 BCE-1600
- Mechanical philosophy 1600-1750
- Baconian method 1620-1800
- Inductivism 1620-1900
- Newtonian methodology 1687-1800
- Hypothetico-Deductivism 1830-Present
- Positivism 1830-1950
- Whewellian colligation and consilience 1840-1900
- Mill's methods 1843-1900
- Conventionalism 1902-Present
- Logical positivism 1920-1960
- Falsificationism 1934-1980
- Deductive-nomological model 1948-1980
- Bayesian confirmation theory 1950-Present
- Bayesian Confirmation Theory 1950-Present
- Scientific realism 1960-Present
- Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions 1962-Present
- Abductive reasoning 1965-Present
- Naturalism 1969-Present
- Feminist philosophy of science 1970-Present
- Methodology of scientific research programmes 1970-1990
- Philosophy of the Special Sciences 1970-Present
- Epistemological anarchism 1975-1995
- Sociology of scientific knowledge 1976-2000
- Causal-Mechanical Explanation 1980-Present
- Constructive empiricism 1980-Present
- Social Epistemology of Science 1980-Present
- Scientific pluralism 1983-Present
- Causal-mechanical explanation 1984-Present
Overview
Philosophy of science asks what science is, how it works, and what it can tell us about the world12. It is not a branch of science but a reflective discipline that stands beside it, examining the logic of evidence, the structure of theories, the meaning of explanation, and the social conditions under which knowledge is made1. The stakes are practical as well as abstract: if we can say what makes a scientific claim credible, we can defend science against superstition and pseudoscience—and also understand its limits. The field's history is a long argument about whether there is a single scientific method, what that method is, and whether science progresses toward truth or merely changes its fashions13.
Aristotle and the Origins of Demonstrative Science
The Western tradition begins with Aristotle (384–322 BCE), who set out in the Posterior Analytics a model of what he called demonstrative science (epistēmē apodeiktikē). Scientific knowledge, for Aristotle, was knowledge of why things are as they are, derived by valid deduction from premises that are themselves necessary and explanatory. A demonstration is a syllogism whose premises state the causes of the conclusion: to know scientifically that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles, one must grasp the cause, not merely the fact. The premises must be true, primary, and better known than the conclusion. This ideal shaped natural philosophy for nearly two millennia. It also created a problem: where do the first premises come from? Aristotle answered that they are grasped by nous, an intellectual intuition of essences, which left empirical inquiry in an ambiguous position—observation could suggest universal principles but could not prove them.
The Mechanical Philosophy and the New Experimentalism
The Aristotelian synthesis broke down in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries4. The mechanical philosophy—associated with René Descartes, Robert Boyle, and others—replaced Aristotelian forms and final causes with matter in motion: all natural phenomena were to be explained by the size, shape, and motion of particles. This was a metaphysical program as much as a methodological one, and it raised a new question: if the underlying corpuscles are invisible, how can we know hypotheses about them are true? Boyle's answer was the experimental method: carefully reported experiments, witnessed by credible gentlemen, could establish matters of fact even when the underlying causes remained conjectural.
Francis Bacon (1561–1626) supplied an influential methodological vision in the Novum Organum (1620)1567. His Baconian inductive method proposed that the investigator should ascend from particulars to general axioms by a graduated process, using "tables of discovery" to organize observations and eliminate false generalizations7. Bacon was sharply critical of the deductive ideal, arguing that it bred endless verbal disputes. His program was more a manifesto than a working method—he did not himself make major discoveries—but it gave lasting prestige to the idea that science should proceed by systematic observation and induction rather than by speculation.
Newton and the Problem of Method
Isaac Newton's Principia (1687) became the model of successful science, and Newton himself offered methodological pronouncements that shaped later debate14. His famous phrase hypotheses non fingo—"I frame no hypotheses"—expressed a refusal to speculate about the cause of gravity while insisting that the mathematical description was derived from phenomena. Newton's methodology combined mathematical deduction from observed regularities with a cautious empiricism about causes. His "Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy" included the principle that we should admit no more causes than are true and sufficient to explain the phenomena, and that like effects should be assigned like causes. This was read by many as a license for inductive generalization from observation, and it set the terms for the next century's debates about whether scientific reasoning could be reduced to induction.
Whewell, Mill, and the Inductive Debate
In the nineteenth century the question of method became a live philosophical controversy1. William Whewell (1794–1866) argued in The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840) that discovery involves what he called the colligation of facts: the mind imposes a conception—a unifying idea—on otherwise disconnected observations, and the fit between conception and fact is judged by a "consilience of inductions," when a theory successfully predicts phenomena of a kind not used in its construction. Whewell's account was Kantian in spirit: the mind contributes the conceptual framework. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), in A System of Logic (1843), defended a more austere empiricism. His methods of experimental inquiry—the methods of agreement, difference, concomitant variation, and residues—were canons for inferring causal relationships from observed correlations. Mill held that all inference is ultimately inductive and that the uniformity of nature is the ultimate premise. The Whewell–Mill exchange framed the central tension that would persist: does science discover facts or construct interpretations?
Positivism and the Logical Empiricists
Auguste Comte (1798–1857) gave the name positivism to the view that genuine knowledge is confined to observable phenomena and their laws, and that metaphysical speculation belongs to an earlier stage of human development18. This outlook was radicalized in the early twentieth century by the Vienna Circle, a group of philosophers and scientists including Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Hans Hahn. Logical empiricism (or logical positivism) combined empiricism with the new logic of Frege and Russell1910. Its central project was the logical analysis of scientific language: to show how theoretical statements are related to observation, and to eliminate metaphysics by a criterion of meaningfulness1. The verification principle—that a statement is meaningful only if it can be verified by experience—was its most famous weapon, though it proved difficult to state without self-refutation.
The logical empiricists made lasting contributions: the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification (Reichenbach), the analysis of confirmation, and the project of formalizing scientific theories as axiomatic systems. But their program faced internal difficulties19. The verification principle excluded universal laws, which cannot be conclusively verified. The analytic–synthetic distinction, on which their account of logic depended, was attacked by W. V. O. Quine in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (1951)11112. And the attempt to reduce theoretical terms to observation terms proved elusive.
Falsificationism and the Demarcation Problem
Karl Popper (1902–1994) offered a response that reshaped the field. In The Logic of Scientific Discovery (first published in German in 1934), Popper argued that falsificationism solves the problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience: a scientific theory is one that forbids certain observations, and is therefore testable. Einstein's relativity made risky predictions; Freudian psychoanalysis, Popper claimed, could accommodate any observation and so was not scientific. Science proceeds by conjecture and refutation: we propose bold hypotheses and try to falsify them13. Popper's account captured something important about the critical spirit of science, but it faced the Duhem–Quine problem—a failed prediction never refutes a single hypothesis in isolation, because auxiliary assumptions can always be adjusted114. And it seemed to leave no room for the ordinary confirmation that scientists rely on.
Explanation: The Deductive-Nomological Model and Its Rivals
A parallel tradition asked not how theories are confirmed but what it means to explain1. Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim's deductive-nomological model (1948) held that an explanation is a deductive argument whose premises include at least one law of nature and whose conclusion is the event to be explained. To explain why a particular pendulum has a certain period, one deduces it from the law of pendulum motion and the initial conditions. The model was elegant and unified explanation with prediction, but it had counterintuitive consequences: a flagpole's shadow can be deduced from the law of light propagation and the flagpole's height, yet we do not think the shadow explains the height15. Wesley Salmon and others pressed this asymmetry problem, and alternative accounts emerged116. The causal-mechanical approach, developed by Salmon and later by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver, holds that to explain is to identify the mechanism that produces the phenomenon—to show how the parts and their activities bring it about. This view proved especially congenial to biology and neuroscience, where explanations often cite mechanisms rather than laws.
Kuhn and the Historical Turn
The most disruptive intervention came from Thomas Kuhn, a historian of science, whose The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) introduced the concept of the paradigm: a shared body of exemplars, methods, and assumptions that defines a scientific community's problems and standards11718. Kuhn argued that science alternates between "normal science," in which researchers solve puzzles within an accepted paradigm, and revolutionary periods, in which anomalies accumulate and a new paradigm displaces the old11920. Crucially, Kuhn denied that theory choice is governed by a fixed algorithm: rival paradigms are often incommensurable, meaning their proponents disagree about what counts as a problem, a solution, and even the meaning of shared terms17. This was read by many as a threat to scientific rationality, and it provoked a long debate19. Imre Lakatos responded with the methodology of scientific research programmes (1970), which sought to preserve rational standards by distinguishing a "hard core" of protected assumptions from a "protective belt" of auxiliary hypotheses that can be revised, and by judging programmes by their progressive or degenerating problem-shifting. Paul Feyerabend went further, arguing in Against Method (1975) for epistemological anarchism: there is no universal method, and the history of science shows that great advances often violated the rules philosophers proposed12122.
Realism, Empiricism, and the Social Turn
The realism debate crystallized in the 1960s and after. Scientific realism holds that successful scientific theories are approximately true and that their theoretical terms refer to real entities—electrons, genes, black holes111. Its central argument is the "no miracles" argument: it would be a miracle if theories that predict novel phenomena so successfully were not at least approximately true1. Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism (1980) offered a rival: science aims at empirical adequacy, not truth1123. We should accept theories that save the phenomena, but we need not believe in the unobservable entities they posit111. The debate turned on what counts as observable and on the historical record of theories once thought true and later abandoned.
Meanwhile, a sociological challenge emerged1. The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), associated with the "strong programme" of David Bloor and Barry Barnes at Edinburgh in the 1970s, argued that the content of scientific knowledge—not just its institutional setting—could be explained by social causes242526. Bloor's symmetry principle held that true and false beliefs should be explained in the same way, without assuming that truth is its own explanation2526. This was radical and controversial, and it fed into the "science wars" of the 1990s127. Feminist philosophy of science, developing from the 1970s onward, raised related questions about whose knowledge counts and how values shape inquiry, arguing that the ideal of value-free science obscured the role of background assumptions and social position in theory choice.
Naturalism, Pluralism, and the Special Sciences
By the late twentieth century, philosophy of science had become increasingly naturalistic: rather than prescribing how science ought to proceed, philosophers increasingly described how it actually does, drawing on history, psychology, and sociology. This was reinforced by the growth of philosophy of the special sciences—biology, neuroscience, economics, and the social sciences—each raising problems that the physics-centered models did not address. Scientific pluralism, defended by philosophers such as Nancy Cartwright and Helen Longino, holds that there may be no single correct account of a domain, and that multiple models can be legitimately useful for different purposes28. Cartwright's How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983) argued that fundamental laws are idealizations that rarely hold in the messy world, while phenomenological models do the explanatory work.
Bayesian Confirmation and Inference to the Best Explanation
Two approaches to confirmation have dominated recent decades. Bayesian confirmation theory, developed from the eighteenth century onward and formalized in the twentieth by philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and later Jon Dorling and Colin Howson, treats confirmation probabilistically: evidence confirms a hypothesis to the extent that it raises the hypothesis's probability, as calculated by Bayes' theorem. The approach is powerful and precise, but it faces the problem of where prior probabilities come from and how to handle the old evidence problem. Inference to the best explanation, articulated by Gilbert Harman (1965) and developed by Peter Lipton, holds that we infer the truth of a hypothesis because it provides the best explanation of the evidence—where "best" is judged by explanatory virtues such as scope, simplicity, and unification. This captures a form of reasoning that scientists clearly use, though critics ask whether "best explanation" can be defined without circularity1.
The Present
Philosophy of science today is a plural field. Formal epistemology and Bayesian methods continue to refine confirmation theory. The causal-mechanical approach dominates philosophy of biology and neuroscience, where mechanisms are the explanatory currency. Social epistemology, feminist philosophy of science, and the study of values in science have moved from the margins to the center, asking how scientific communities should be organized and how non-epistemic values legitimately enter inquiry. The realism debate persists in new forms, including structural realism and the question of how to interpret quantum mechanics. And the naturalistic turn has brought philosophy of science into closer contact with the sciences themselves, so that the boundary between philosophical and scientific reflection on method is often blurred2930. The old questions—what is a good explanation, when does evidence support a theory, is there a scientific method—remain open, but they are now asked with a richer sense of how science actually works.
References
- Philosophy of science (introduction, Modern, Philosophy of social science, Logical positivism, Thomas Kuhn, Coherentism, Scientific explanation, Anything goes methodology, The purpose of science, Sociology of scientific knowledge methodology, Justifying science), Wikipedia
- History and philosophy of science, Wikipedia
- Scientific method (History), Wikipedia
- Scientific Revolution, Wikipedia
- Works by Francis Bacon, Wikipedia
- Baconian method, Wikipedia
- Novum Organum, Wikipedia
- Positivism, Wikipedia
- Logical positivism, Wikipedia
- Vienna Circle, Wikipedia
- Scientific realism (History, introduction), Wikipedia
- Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Wikipedia
- Problem of induction, Wikipedia
- Falsifiability, Wikipedia
- Deductive-nomological model, Wikipedia
- Wesley C. Salmon, Wikipedia
- Thomas Kuhn, Wikipedia
- Paradigm shift, Wikipedia
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Wikipedia
- Normal science, Wikipedia
- Paul Feyerabend (Anarchist phase), Wikipedia
- Against Method, Wikipedia
- Constructive empiricism, Wikipedia
- Sociology of scientific knowledge, Wikipedia
- Strong programme, Wikipedia
- Science studies (History of the field), Wikipedia
- Science wars, Wikipedia
- Scientific pluralism (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Naturalized epistemology, Wikipedia
- Naturalism (philosophy), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Philosophy Of Science
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 350 BCE-1650
Aristotelian Demonstration and Natural Philosophy
How can we deduce why things are as they are?
- 350 BCE-1600
Aristotelian demonstrative science
What makes a body of knowledge a science?
- 1600-1750
- 1620-1800
- 1620-1900
- 1687-1800
- 1830-Present
- 1830-1950
- 1840-1900
Whewellian colligation and consilience
How does the mind unify observations into a theory?
- 1843-1900
- 1902-Present
Conventionalism
Which parts of a theory are chosen rather than discovered?
- 1920-1960
- 1934-1980
- 1948-1980
- 1950-Present
Bayesian confirmation theory
How much should evidence raise our confidence?
- 1950-Present
Bayesian Confirmation Theory
How should belief change with new evidence?
- 1960-Present
- 1962-Present
Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
How does scientific knowledge change over time?
- 1965-Present
- 1969-Present
- 1970-Present
Feminist philosophy of science
How do social values shape scientific knowledge?
- 1970-1990
Methodology of scientific research programmes
How do research programs progress or stagnate?
- 1970-Present
Philosophy of the Special Sciences
How does explanation work in biology and psychology?
- 1975-1995
- 1976-2000
Sociology of scientific knowledge
How is scientific consensus actually produced?
- 1980-Present
- 1980-Present
- 1983-Present
- 1984-Present
Causal-mechanical explanation
How do parts and activities bring about an outcome?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Mechanical philosophy reacted against Aristotelian Demonstration and Natural Philosophy
The mechanical philosophers rejected Aristotelian substantial forms and final causes, replacing them with matter in motion as the explanatory basis of natural philosophy.
Carried by René Descartes; Robert Boyle.
Baconian method reacted against Aristotelian Demonstration and Natural Philosophy
Bacon attacked the deductive ideal of demonstration as breeding verbal disputes and proposed instead a graduated ascent from particulars to axioms.
Carried by Francis Bacon; Novum Organum (1620).
Inductivism grew out of Baconian method
Bacon's program of ascending from particulars by tables of discovery became the core of the inductivist tradition that later writers systematized.
Carried by Francis Bacon; Novum Organum (1620).
Whewellian colligation and consilience grew out of Inductivism
Whewell defined his account of colligation and consilience against the bare inductivism of his day, insisting that the mind contributes the conception that unifies facts.
Carried by William Whewell; The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (1840).
Mill's methods grew out of Inductivism
Mill's canons of experimental inquiry were a refinement of the inductivist program, turning the general demand for induction into specific methods for inferring causes from correlations.
Carried by John Stuart Mill; A System of Logic (1843).
Logical positivism grew out of Positivism
The Vienna Circle radicalized Comtean positivism by combining its confinement of knowledge to observable phenomena with the new logic of Frege and Russell.
Carried by Moritz Schlick; Rudolf Carnap; Otto Neurath.
Falsificationism reacted against Logical positivism
Popper defined falsificationism against the verification principle, arguing that universal laws cannot be verified and that testability by refutation, not confirmation, demarcates science.
Carried by Karl Popper; The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1934).
Deductive-nomological model grew out of Logical positivism
Hempel and Oppenheim's model of explanation grew out of the logical empiricist project of formalizing scientific arguments, treating explanation as a deductive argument containing a law.
Carried by Carl Hempel; Paul Oppenheim.
Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions reacted against Falsificationism
Kuhn's paradigms and revolutions were framed against Popper's picture of science as continuous conjecture and refutation, stressing normal science and theory change that is not simply falsification.
Carried by Thomas Kuhn; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).
Causal-Mechanical Explanation reacted against Deductive-nomological model
The causal-mechanical approach arose from the asymmetry and irrelevance objections to the deductive-nomological model, holding that explanation is identifying the mechanism that produces the phenomenon.
Carried by Wesley Salmon; Peter Machamer; Lindley Darden.
Causal-mechanical explanation reacted against Deductive-nomological model
The later causal-mechanical program continued the reaction against law-covered deduction, developing mechanism accounts especially for biology and neuroscience.
Carried by Peter Machamer; Lindley Darden; Carl Craver.
Bayesian Confirmation Theory grew out of Bayesian confirmation theory
The two labels name the same Bayesian confirmation program; the later entry is a restatement of the earlier one rather than a distinct development.
Constructive empiricism reacted against Scientific realism
Constructive empiricism was framed against scientific realism, arguing that science aims only at empirical adequacy rather than truth about unobservables.
Carried by Bas van Fraassen; The Scientific Image (1980).
Causal-mechanical explanation grew out of Causal-Mechanical Explanation
The later entry is the same causal-mechanical explanation program, restated and extended to the special sciences; the two labels name one approach.
Carried by Wesley Salmon; Carl Craver.
Newtonian methodology reacted against Aristotelian Demonstration and Natural Philosophy
Newton's methodological pronouncements set mathematical deduction from phenomena against the Aristotelian demand for demonstration from causes, refusing to feign hypotheses about gravity's cause.
Carried by Isaac Newton; Principia (1687).
Newtonian methodology influenced by Mechanical philosophy
Newton's corpuscularian matter theory and his caution about hidden causes came out of the mechanical philosophy, while his mathematical method replaced its speculative hypotheses.
Carried by Isaac Newton.
Newtonian methodology influenced by Inductivism
Newton's rules of reasoning, especially the demand for no more causes than are true and sufficient, were read as licensing inductive generalization from observation and shaped the next century's induction debates.
Carried by Isaac Newton.
Logical positivism influenced by Inductivism
Logical empiricism inherited the inductivist concern with how universal claims are supported by observation, recasting it as the logical analysis of confirmation.
Carried by Rudolf Carnap.
Conventionalism reacted against Newtonian methodology
Duhem's conventionalist reading of physical theory attacked the Newtonian-inductivist picture of deriving laws directly from phenomena, stressing the role of theoretical choice.
Carried by Pierre Duhem.
Falsificationism influenced by Hypothetico-Deductivism
Popper's conjecture-and-refutation account took up the hypothetico-deductive scheme of proposing hypotheses and testing their consequences, while denying that confirmation confers probability.
Carried by Karl Popper.
Abductive reasoning influenced by Hypothetico-Deductivism
The revival of abductive reasoning took up the hypothetico-deductive idea of generating hypotheses to explain observations, recasting it as inference to the best explanation.
Carried by Gilbert Harman.
Conventionalism reacted against Positivism
Conventionalism, associated with Poincaré and Duhem, rejected the positivist claim that laws are simply read off observation, arguing that some principles are conventions chosen for convenience.
Carried by Henri Poincaré; Pierre Duhem.
Mill's methods rival of Whewellian colligation and consilience
Whewell's Kantian account of discovery and Mill's austere empiricism competed directly over whether science discovers facts or constructs interpretations.
Carried by William Whewell; John Stuart Mill.
Constructive empiricism influenced by Conventionalism
Constructive empiricism inherited the conventionalist point that theories need only be empirically adequate, not literally true, extending it to the realism debate.
Carried by Bas van Fraassen.
Bayesian confirmation theory grew out of Logical positivism
Bayesian confirmation theory developed the logical empiricists' analysis of confirmation, replacing their qualitative criteria with probability calculus.
Carried by Rudolf Carnap.
Bayesian Confirmation Theory grew out of Logical positivism
The later Bayesian program continued the logical empiricist project of analyzing evidential support, formalizing it as conditional probability.
Carried by Rudolf Carnap.
Scientific realism reacted against Logical positivism
Scientific realism arose in opposition to the logical empiricist treatment of theoretical terms, arguing that successful theories are true of unobservable entities.
Carried by Wilfrid Sellars; Grover Maxwell.
Naturalism reacted against Logical positivism
Naturalism in philosophy of science rejected the logical empiricist project of a priori logical reconstruction, treating scientific inquiry as continuous with empirical science.
Carried by W. V. O. Quine.
Methodology of scientific research programmes grew out of Falsificationism
Lakatos developed research programmes out of Popper's falsificationism, keeping the critical testing of conjectures while allowing auxiliary assumptions to protect a hard core.
Carried by Imre Lakatos.
Epistemological anarchism reacted against Falsificationism
Feyerabend turned Popper's critical rationalism against itself, denying that falsification supplies a universal method and defending counterinduction.
Carried by Paul Feyerabend.
Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions reacted against Deductive-nomological model
Kuhn's historical account challenged the deductive-nomological ideal by showing explanation and puzzle-solving as internal to a paradigm rather than as law-covered deduction.
Carried by Thomas Kuhn.
Feminist philosophy of science influenced by Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
Feminist philosophy of science drew on Kuhn's attention to communities and values to argue that social and gendered assumptions shape scientific knowledge.
Carried by Helen Longino; Sandra Harding.
Methodology of scientific research programmes reacted against Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
Lakatos's methodology of scientific research programmes was built as a refinement of Kuhn's paradigms, replacing the single paradigm with competing research programmes governed by a hard core and protective belt.
Carried by Imre Lakatos.
Epistemological anarchism reacted against Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism attacked the idea of a fixed method or paradigm rule, arguing that scientific progress has depended on violating methodological norms.
Carried by Paul Feyerabend; Against Method (1975).
Sociology of scientific knowledge influenced by Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
The sociology of scientific knowledge took up Kuhn's emphasis on paradigms and communities, turning it into an empirical study of how consensus is negotiated.
Carried by David Bloor; Barry Barnes.
Social Epistemology of Science influenced by Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
Social epistemology of science drew on Kuhn's account of scientific communities to study the social organization of inquiry and testimony.
Carried by Steve Fuller.
Scientific pluralism influenced by Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
Scientific pluralism took from Kuhn's historical cases the lesson that rival frameworks can coexist without a single winner, generalizing it into a pluralist stance.
Carried by Nancy Cartwright.
Bayesian confirmation theory influenced by Mill's methods
Bayesian confirmation theory absorbed Mill's concern with how evidence bears on causal hypotheses, recasting it in probabilistic terms.
Philosophy of the Special Sciences reacted against Deductive-nomological model
Philosophers of the special sciences pressed the deductive-nomological model with cases from biology and psychology where laws are scarce, motivating domain-specific accounts.
Philosophy of the Special Sciences influenced by Kuhnian paradigms and revolutions
The philosophy of the special sciences took from Kuhn's historical and paradigm-based approach a concern with how particular disciplines, especially biology, actually work.
Beyond the field
Where Philosophy Of Science's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 188 links.
Aristotelian Demonstration and Natural Philosophy influenced Aristotelian physics in Physics
Aristotelian demonstration, the theory of scientific proof from necessary premises in the Posterior Analytics, was the methodological core of his natural philosophy.
Carried by Aristotle; Posterior Analytics.
Aristotelian demonstrative science influenced Islamic demonstrative epistemology in Epistemology
Al-Farabi and later Islamic philosophers built their demonstrative epistemology on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, adopting its account of demonstration and its requirements on premises.
Carried by Aristotle; Al-Farabi.
Aristotelian demonstrative science influenced Scholastic Aristotelian epistemology in Epistemology
Scholastic epistemologists such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas built on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and De Anima for their accounts of demonstration and abstraction.
Carried by Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas; Albert the Great.
Mechanical philosophy influenced Reflex Doctrine in Neuroscience
Mechanical philosophy supplied the billiard-ball causation and clockwork imagery by which Descartes turned the animal-spirit discharge into an automatic, non-mental reflex. The reflex doctrine is a direct application of mechanical explanation to the nervous system.
Carried by René Descartes.
Mechanical philosophy reacted against Aristotelian natural philosophy in Philosophy Of Physics
The mechanical philosophy defined itself by rejecting Aristotelian natural philosophy's substantial forms and final causes, replacing them with matter and motion.
Carried by René Descartes; Robert Boyle; Thomas Hobbes.
Mechanical philosophy reacted against Aristotelian physics in Classical Mechanics
The mechanical philosophy arose as a rejection of Aristotelian physics, discarding its natural places and qualitative elements for matter in motion.
Carried by René Descartes; Thomas Hobbes.
Mechanical philosophy influenced Cartesian dualism in Metaphysics
Descartes built his dualism on the mechanical philosophy's exclusion of substantial forms and souls from body, leaving mind as the only non-mechanical residue. His Meditations and Principles apply the mechanical account of matter to define body as extension.
Carried by René Descartes; Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
Baconian method reacted against Posterior Analytics in Scientific Explanation
Bacon attacked the Posterior Analytics model of demonstration, contrasting the spider-like spinning of axioms from axioms with the bee-like collection and digestion of particulars.
Carried by Francis Bacon; Novum Organum (1620).
Baconian method reacted against Demonstrative Science in Justification Theory
Bacon's method was framed against demonstrative science, arguing that syllogistic demonstration from received axioms cannot yield new knowledge and must give way to gradual induction.
Carried by Francis Bacon; Novum Organum (1620).
Baconian method reacted against Aristotelian demonstrative science in Epistemology
The Baconian method was defined as a replacement for Aristotelian demonstrative science, rejecting its deductive ordering of knowledge in favour of inductive ascent.
Carried by Francis Bacon.
Inductivism influenced Inductive Logic in Logic
Mill's inductive logic built directly on the early modern inductivist account of scientific method, adopting Bacon's eliminative ideal and Newton's rules of reasoning as its model.
Carried by Francis Bacon; John Stuart Mill.
Newtonian methodology grew out of Newtonian mechanics in History Of Scientific Ideas
Newton's methodological rules of reasoning in philosophy, stated in the Principia, were abstracted by later natural philosophers into a general account of scientific method. The framework is the methodological reading of Newton's own practice.
Carried by Isaac Newton; Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687).

Philosophy Of Science is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 30 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Philosophy Of ScienceRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Scientific Realism 19 links
- Epistemology 13 links
- Confirmation And Evidence 11 links
- Philosophy Of Physics 11 links
- Scientific Change And Theory Choice 11 links
- Social Epistemology 8 links
- Physics 8 links
- Philosophy Of Social Science 7 links
- Formal Epistemology 6 links
- Scientific Explanation 6 links
- Science And Society 5 links
- Sociology Of Science 5 links
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