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Models And Representation
Scientific knowledge rarely arrives as bare theory.
11 frameworks, from 1950 to today · Philosophy Of Science · Philosophy
- Received view of theories 1950-1970
- Semantic View of Theories 1960-Present
- Idealization 1968-Present
- Capacities and Nomological Machines 1983-Present
- Models as Instruments and Credible Worlds 1983-Present
- Similarity Account of Representation 1988-Present
- Surrogative Reasoning 1991-Present
- Models as Mediators 1999-Present
- Fictionalism 2002-Present
- Epistemology of Computer Simulation 2004-Present
- Opacity and Machine-Learning Models 2015-Present
Overview
Scientific knowledge rarely arrives as bare theory. It arrives in models: the double helix, the billiard-ball gas, the Lotka–Volterra predator–prey equations, a climate simulation, a trained neural network1. Models and representation is the part of philosophy of science that asks what these objects are, how they connect to the world, and what it means for one thing to stand for another2. The stakes are large. If models are the working units of science, then an account of science built only on theories and evidence will miss most of what scientists actually do. And if representation is not a simple copying relation, then the authority of a model—why we trust a simulation, or refuse to trust a black box—needs explaining rather than assuming.
Models as useful fictions in logical empiricism
The story begins inside logical empiricism, the mid-twentieth-century movement that sought to reconstruct science in formal logic. Its central target was the theory: a set of axioms in a formal language, connected to observation by correspondence rules3. Models had a modest place in this picture. In the 1950s and 1960s, philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and Ernest Nagel treated a model as an interpretation of a formal calculus—an assignment of meanings that makes the abstract axioms concrete. A model of the axioms of geometry might be points and lines on a plane; a model of a physical theory might be a mechanical system. This "model heuristic" was pedagogically useful but philosophically secondary: the theory was the real bearer of content, and the model was a ladder to be discarded.
The limitation was practical. Working scientists did not seem to reason from axioms down. They built simplified systems—frictionless planes, ideal gases, isolated populations—and manipulated them. The logical-empiricist picture had no room for this middle layer between abstract theory and messy data.
The semantic view: theories as families of models
The first major break came with the semantic view of theories, developed from the 1960s onward by Patrick Suppes, Bas van Fraassen, Frederick Suppe, and others. On this account, a theory is not a linguistic object at all but a collection of models—typically mathematical structures—together with a specification of which real systems they are intended to represent. Van Fraassen's The Scientific Image (1980) made the view prominent: to present a theory is to specify a class of structures, and to accept a theory is to believe that the world is (or can be described as) one of them.
The change mattered because it put models first. A classical mechanics problem—say, a pendulum—is handled by constructing a model: a point mass on a massless rod, with equations of motion. The theory supplies a repertoire of such structures; the scientist selects and adjusts one. This fit actual practice far better than axiomatic reconstruction, and it made the question of how a model hooks onto a real system unavoidable. The semantic view answered it thinly, usually by appeal to an "intended application" or an isomorphism between model and system. That thinness set up the next generation of problems.
Isomorphism and its discontents: the similarity account
If representation is isomorphism—a structure-preserving mapping between model and world—then representation looks precise. But real models are rarely isomorphic to anything. The billiard-ball model of a gas does not preserve the structure of molecules; it deliberately distorts it. In the 1990s and 2000s, Ronald Giere proposed that representation is instead a matter of similarity, understood as sharing certain specified respects and degrees. A model represents a system in virtue of being similar to it in the ways the modeler intends and the user specifies. Giere's account, developed in Explaining Science (1988) and later work, made representation a three-place relation: model, real system, and the respects in which they are alike.
Similarity solved the rigidity of isomorphism but raised a worry: similarity is cheap. Any two things are similar in some respect. The account needed the "specified respects" to do real work, and critics pressed on whether those specifications are themselves part of the model or supplied by users. The debate pushed philosophers toward accounts that foreground use, purpose, and practice.
Models as mediators and as instruments
A parallel line of work, rooted in close study of scientific practice, treated models as tools rather than as pictures. Mary Morgan and Margaret Morrison's edited volume Models as Mediators (1999) argued that models are autonomous intermediaries: they are constructed from a mix of theory, data, and mathematical formalism, and they mediate between theory and the world rather than merely instantiating either. A model can be investigated in its own right—its behavior explored, its assumptions varied—before any claim about reality is made. This "models as mediators" framing drew on detailed case studies from economics, biology, and physics, and it shifted attention to what modelers do with models.
A related strand treated models as instruments for intervention and prediction. Robert Sugden's account of models as "credible worlds" in economics, and earlier work by Nancy Cartwright, emphasized that models earn trust by being manipulated and by surviving use. Cartwright's How the Laws of Physics Lie (1983) and later The Dappled World (1999) went further: she argued that fundamental laws rarely hold of real systems, and that what does the explanatory work are capacities—stable dispositions of things—realized in nomological machines: arrangements of components that, when assembled, produce regular behavior. A laser is her recurring example: the regularity of laser light is produced by a carefully engineered setup, not by a law that holds everywhere. On this view, models describe the machines, and representation is a matter of capturing the capacities that the machine realizes.
Fictions, idealization, and the epistemology of modeling
If models distort, what is the epistemic status of a distortion? A prominent answer came from the "models as fictions" literature. Nancy Cartwright and others had already noted that models involve deliberate falsehood. In the 2000s, philosophers such as Roman Frigg and, in a different register, Mauricio Suárez developed fictionalist accounts: models are like literary fictions, and our engagement with them involves imaginative participation governed by rules. Frigg's work on fiction and scientific modeling argued that model systems are stipulated entities, and that claims about them are true within the fiction. The payoff is an explanation of how false models can yield true predictions and genuine understanding: the fiction is a controlled construction, and its relation to the world is managed by the modeler.
A complementary line concerned idealization and its costs. Work by Ernan McMullin, and later by Michael Weisberg, analyzed how models simplify—through omission, abstraction, and idealization—and asked when such simplification is legitimate. Weisberg's Simulation and Similarity (2013) offered a taxonomy of modeling strategies and a similarity-based account of representation that tried to absorb the lessons of the earlier debates.
Surrogative reasoning: what models let us do
A distinct question is not what models are but what they enable. The surrogative reasoning account, associated with Chris Swoyer and developed by Mauricio Suárez and others, holds that a model represents a target when it can be used as a surrogate for it: we reason about the model and transfer conclusions to the target. Representation is thus tied to inference. If a model supports reliable inferences about a system—predictions, explanations, interventions—it represents that system for those purposes. This account connects the metaphysics of representation to the epistemology of model use, and it accommodates the fact that the same model can represent different systems for different purposes.
Computer simulation and the opacity problem
The rise of computer simulation from the mid-twentieth century onward—weather models, molecular dynamics, Monte Carlo methods—forced new questions. A simulation is a model run on a machine, and its outputs are often not analytically tractable. Philosophers such as Paul Humphreys, in Extending Ourselves (2004), and later Eric Winsberg, in Science in the Age of Computer Simulation (2010), examined how simulation changes the epistemology of science: results are produced by computational processes that no one fully traces, and trust must be distributed across code, hardware, and model assumptions. The question of whether simulation is a distinct kind of scientific method, or an extension of modeling, remains live.
The most recent turn concerns machine learning. A trained neural network is a model, but its internal structure is not interpretable in the way a differential equation is4. The opacity of such models—the difficulty of saying why they produce the outputs they do—raises sharp questions for representation4. If representation requires a grasp of the model's structure and its relation to the target, opaque models seem to represent without being understood. Philosophers have responded by distinguishing kinds of opacity (architectural, epistemic, explanatory) and by asking whether prediction alone can ground representation. This work is young, and its shape is still being contested.
The present
Today the field is plural. The semantic view remains a reference point, though few hold its original form; similarity and surrogative-reasoning accounts are widely used; fictionalism and the models-as-mediators tradition inform practice-oriented studies; and the simulation and machine-learning literatures are expanding fastest. The open questions are recognizable descendants of the old ones: what makes a distortion legitimate, whether representation can be separated from use, and how to hold on to epistemic responsibility when the model's workings outrun our understanding.
References
- Scientific modelling (Types), Wikipedia
- Philosophy of science, Wikipedia
- Received view of theories, Wikipedia
- Black box, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Models And Representation
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1950-1970
- 1960-Present
Semantic View of Theories
Are theories sets of models or sets of sentences?
- 1968-Present
- 1983-Present
Capacities and Nomological Machines
Where do regularities in nature come from?
- 1983-Present
Models as Instruments and Credible Worlds
Why should we trust a model's predictions?
- 1988-Present
Similarity Account of Representation
What makes a model stand for a system?
- 1991-Present
- 1999-Present
- 2002-Present
- 2004-Present
Epistemology of Computer Simulation
How do we trust results no one can check by hand?
- 2015-Present
Opacity and Machine-Learning Models
Can we understand a model we cannot read?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Semantic View of Theories reacted against Received view of theories
The semantic view was formulated as a direct alternative to the received view's axiomatic, linguistic reconstruction of theories. Suppes, van Fraassen and Suppe argued that theories should be identified with families of models rather than with formal axioms plus correspondence rules.
Carried by Patrick Suppes; Bas van Fraassen; Frederick Suppe.
Similarity Account of Representation reacted against Semantic View of Theories
Giere's similarity account was framed against the semantic view's reliance on isomorphism between model and system. He argued that real models represent by sharing specified respects and degrees of similarity rather than by structure-preserving mapping.
Carried by Ronald Giere; Explaining Science (1988).
Surrogative Reasoning influenced by Semantic View of Theories
The semantic view made the model–target relation the central problem, and surrogative reasoning took up that question by analysing how conclusions drawn in a model are transferred to its target. Suárez developed the account explicitly as a way of handling representation within a models-first picture.
Carried by Mauricio Suárez; Chris Swoyer.
Fictionalism influenced by Idealization
Work on idealization established that models deliberately distort their targets, and fictionalist accounts took up that observation to argue that model systems are stipulated entities about which claims are true within a fiction. Frigg and Suárez built on the idealization literature's picture of deliberate falsehood.
Carried by Roman Frigg; Mauricio Suárez.
Models as Mediators influenced by Models as Instruments and Credible Worlds
The treatment of models as tools for intervention and prediction fed into Morgan and Morrison's claim that models are autonomous mediators between theory and world. Their volume drew on practice-oriented work that had already recast models as instruments rather than pictures.
Carried by Mary Morgan; Margaret Morrison; Models as Mediators (1999).
Surrogative Reasoning influenced by Similarity Account of Representation
The similarity account's emphasis on specified respects and on the user's role in fixing representation carried into surrogative reasoning, which recast representation as the capacity to support inference. Suárez developed surrogative reasoning partly in response to similarity-based accounts.
Carried by Mauricio Suárez.
Opacity and Machine-Learning Models grew out of Epistemology of Computer Simulation
The epistemology of computer simulation raised the problem of trust in computational processes that no one fully traces, and the opacity literature extended that problem to machine-learning models whose internal structure resists interpretation. The later work grew out of the simulation literature's concern with distributed trust in code and model assumptions.
Carried by Paul Humphreys; Eric Winsberg.
Similarity Account of Representation influenced by Idealization
The idealization literature's point that models simplify and distort fed into Giere's rejection of isomorphism in favour of similarity in specified respects. The similarity account was designed to accommodate models that are deliberately unlike their targets.
Carried by Ronald Giere.
Fictionalism influenced by Similarity Account of Representation
Fictionalist accounts of modeling took up the similarity tradition's problem of how a model that is not like its target can still represent it. They answered by treating the model system as a stipulated fiction whose relation to the world is managed by the modeler.
Carried by Roman Frigg.
Epistemology of Computer Simulation influenced by Surrogative Reasoning
The surrogative-reasoning picture of representation as inference-supporting carried into the epistemology of simulation, where the question became how far conclusions drawn from a computational model can be transferred to its target. Humphreys and Winsberg treated simulation as a form of model-based inference whose reliability must be established.
Carried by Paul Humphreys; Eric Winsberg.
Beyond the field
Where Models And Representation's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 16 links.
Received view of theories grew out of Logical positivism in Scientific Change And Theory Choice
The received view of theories was the late form of logical positivist philosophy of science, systematised by Carnap, Hempel and Nagel. Its central construal of theories as axiomatic calculi with correspondence rules grew directly out of the Vienna Circle programme.
Carried by Rudolf Carnap; Carl Hempel; Ernest Nagel.
Semantic View of Theories influenced by Model theory in Logic
The semantic view reconceived theories as classes of models in the technical sense of model theory, taking the notion of a model as a structure satisfying axioms. Suppes and later van Fraassen and Suppe drew directly on Tarskian model theory for this.
Carried by Patrick Suppes; Bas van Fraassen; Frederick Suppe.
Semantic View of Theories influenced by Model Theory in Mathematical Logic
The semantic view's central move, treating a theory as a family of set-theoretic structures, rests on the mathematical model theory developed by Tarski and his successors. Suppes's set-theoretic predicate approach applied this machinery to philosophy of science.
Carried by Patrick Suppes; Alfred Tarski.
Received view of theories grew out of Logical positivism in Scientific Realism
The received view inherited from logical positivism its syntactic, axiomatic treatment of theories and its sharp analytic-synthetic and theoretical-observational distinctions. Hempel and Nagel carried these commitments into the standard post-war account of theories.
Carried by Carl Hempel; Ernest Nagel.
Semantic View of Theories influenced by Model-theoretic semantics in Philosophy Of Logic
Model-theoretic semantics, especially Tarski's definition of truth in a model, provided the formal apparatus the semantic view borrowed for its account of theories. The shared vocabulary of models, structures and satisfaction carried over directly.
Carried by Alfred Tarski.
Semantic View of Theories influenced by Classical Model Theory in Model Theory
Classical model theory supplied the precise notions of structure, satisfaction and isomorphism that the semantic view used to define theoretical representation. The later account of theories as models is unintelligible without this mathematical background.
Carried by Alfred Tarski.
Idealization influenced Models and Representation in Chemistry in Philosophy Of Chemistry
Philosophical work on idealization in models was applied by philosophers of chemistry to quantum-chemical and molecular-mechanical models, asking how idealized models represent real molecules.
Idealization influenced by Ideal type in Comparative History
Weber's ideal type is a deliberate simplification and accentuation of reality used as an analytical construct, and later philosophical accounts of idealization in science drew on this notion. The idea that models distort deliberately to be informative descends in part from this sociological source.
Carried by Max Weber.
Models as Instruments and Credible Worlds influenced Models and Representation in Chemistry in Philosophy Of Chemistry
The models-as-instruments and credible-worlds account was taken up in philosophy of chemistry to argue that computational and quantum-chemical models are representational tools rather than literal pictures.
Models as Instruments and Credible Worlds influenced by Formal Theory and Game-Theoretic Modeling in Political Methodology
Formal game-theoretic modelling in political science supplied the paradigm case for the claim that models are instruments rather than descriptions of reality. The philosophical account of models as autonomous mediators was developed largely through reflection on this modelling practice.
Carried by Mary Morgan.
Fictionalism influenced by Fictionality and Make-Believe in Philosophy Of Literature
Fictionalist accounts of scientific modelling, notably in the philosophy of science after 2000, drew on Walton's make-believe theory of fiction to explain how models can be used as props in games of pretence without commitment to their truth.
Carried by Kendall Walton; Roman Frigg.
Opacity and Machine-Learning Models influenced by Machine learning in Philosophy Of Artificial Intelligence
Philosophical work on the opacity of machine-learning models grew out of the broader philosophy of machine learning, taking up its questions about what trained models represent and whether their outputs can be explained.

Models And Representation is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 11 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Models And RepresentationRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Machine Learning 2 links
- Philosophy Of Chemistry 2 links
- Knowledge Representation Reasoning 1 link
- Comparative History 1 link
- Model Theory 1 link
- Mathematical Logic 1 link
- Philosophy Of Literature 1 link
- Logic 1 link
- Philosophy Of Logic 1 link
- Scientific Change And Theory Choice 1 link
- Scientific Realism 1 link
- Philosophy Of Artificial Intelligence 1 link
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