- Atlas
- Philosophy
- Philosophy Of Physics
Philosophy Of Physics
Philosophy of physics asks what physics is actually telling us about the world.
22 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Science · Philosophy
- Aristotelian natural philosophy 350 BCE-1600
- Absolute space and time 1687-1905
- Relationalism 1715-Present
- Kantian A Priori Foundations 1781-1900
- Statistical Mechanics and the Arrow of Time 1870-Present
- Machian Empiricism 1883-1930
- Machian positivism and relational inertia 1883-1920
- Conventionalism 1902-Present
- Spacetime Structuralism 1915-Present
- Logical positivism 1920-1960
- Copenhagen Interpretation 1927-Present
- Operationalism 1927-Present
- Hidden-variable theory 1935-Present
- Quantum Logic 1936-1980
- De Broglie–Bohm theory 1952-Present
- Many-Worlds Interpretation 1957-Present
- Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics 1972-Present
- Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory 1980-Present
- Quantum decoherence 1980-Present
- Objective-collapse theory 1986-Present
- Emergent Spacetime 1990-Present
- Quantum Information Approach 1990-Present
Overview
Philosophy of physics asks what physics is actually telling us about the world1. When a physicist writes down a wave function, a metric tensor, or a partition function, what kind of thing has been described? Does the mathematics represent reality, or only our best way of predicting measurements? These questions are not idle. They arise from within physics itself—from the strange features of quantum mechanics, the nature of spacetime, and the direction of time—and they have shaped how physicists understand their own theories.
The field's history runs from Aristotle's natural philosophy through the scientific revolution, the Kantian synthesis, the empiricist critiques of the nineteenth century, and into the foundational debates of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. What follows traces that history as a sequence of problems and responses, each turning point driven by a theory that outran the philosophical framework available to interpret it.
Aristotelian Natural Philosophy and Its Dissolution
For nearly two millennia, the dominant framework for understanding motion and change was Aristotle's. In his Physics, Aristotle distinguished natural motion (bodies seeking their proper place—earth downward, fire upward) from violent motion (imposed by an external force). Time was the measure of motion; place was the boundary of a containing body. This framework was not merely descriptive but explanatory: it told you why a stone falls, in terms of the stone's nature2.
The framework's weakness was that it could not handle projectile motion or the motion of the Earth itself without awkward contrivances. Medieval critics—notably Jean Buridan in the fourteenth century, with his theory of impetus—began to chip away at it, but the decisive break came with Galileo and Newton. Galileo's inclined-plane experiments and his principle of inertia showed that uniform motion required no explanation; only changes in motion did. Newton's Principia (1687) then supplied the mathematical framework: three laws of motion and universal gravitation, expressed in absolute space and absolute time345.
Newtonian Absolute Space and the Leibnizian Challenge
Newton's absolute space was a substance-like container in which motion occurred; absolute time flowed uniformly regardless of events. This was not a casual assumption. Newton argued for it with his bucket experiment: the water in a spinning bucket climbs the sides even when it moves uniformly relative to the bucket, suggesting rotation relative to something absolute. The argument was that true motion—as opposed to merely relative motion—must be motion with respect to absolute space.
Leibniz objected that absolute space and time were metaphysically extravagant and empirically inaccessible. His relationalism held that space is nothing over and above the relations among bodies, and time nothing over and above the order of events16. The famous Leibniz-Clarke correspondence (1715–1716) staged the debate: Clarke, defending Newton, argued that space must be real because God could have created the world with different absolute positions; Leibniz replied that such differences would be indiscernible and therefore meaningless. The exchange set the terms for centuries of debate about whether spacetime is a substance or a system of relations.
Kant's A Priori Foundations
Immanuel Kant attempted a synthesis. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) and the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), he argued that space and time are not features of things in themselves but forms of human intuition—necessary conditions of any possible experience789. Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics were, on this view, synthetic a priori: necessarily true yet informative about the world, because they structured how we could experience it.
Kant's framework made physics seem secure but at a cost: it tied the foundations of physics to the structure of human cognition. When non-Euclidean geometries were developed in the nineteenth century and Einstein's relativity replaced Newtonian mechanics in the twentieth, the Kantian a priori foundations of physics collapsed—or at least required radical revision. The question of how much of physics is conventional, how much empirical, and how much a priori became urgent.
Mach, Empiricism, and the Critique of Absolute Space
Ernst Mach, writing in the 1880s, mounted an empiricist critique of Newtonian absolute space. In The Science of Mechanics (1883), Mach argued that the bucket experiment showed only that the water rotates relative to the distant stars, not relative to absolute space. His relationalist alternative—that inertia is determined by the distribution of mass in the universe—influenced Einstein's development of general relativity10. Mach also insisted that theoretical terms be reducible to observable ones, a stance that fed into the operationalism of Percy Bridgman (who defined physical concepts by the operations used to measure them) and the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle.
The logical empiricists—Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, and others—sought to reconstruct scientific theories as formal systems whose empirical content was fixed by correspondence rules linking theoretical terms to observation. Reichenbach's Philosophy of Space and Time (1928) analyzed relativity in these terms, distinguishing the "context of discovery" from the "context of justification." The program was ambitious but ran into difficulties: the distinction between theoretical and observational terms proved hard to draw, and the holistic character of theory testing (as argued by Quine and Duhem) undermined the idea that individual hypotheses could be confirmed or falsified in isolation.
Conventionalism About Geometry
Henri Poincaré, in Science and Hypothesis (1902), argued that the geometry of physical space is not determined by experiment alone. Any experiment can be accommodated by adjusting auxiliary hypotheses—for instance, about the behavior of measuring rods or the propagation of light. The choice of geometry is therefore a convention, guided by convenience rather than truth. This conventionalism about geometry was influential but controversial: Einstein's general relativity seemed to make the geometry of spacetime an empirical matter, since the metric field is determined by the distribution of matter and energy. The debate about whether geometry is conventional or empirical—and what "empirical" means in this context—continues in the philosophy of spacetime.
The Quantum Revolution and the Copenhagen Interpretation
The development of quantum mechanics in the 1920s posed problems that no prior philosophical framework could handle. The theory's formalism—a wave function evolving according to the Schrödinger equation, with probabilities given by the Born rule—worked spectacularly well, but what did it describe1112? The Copenhagen interpretation, associated with Bohr and Heisenberg, held that quantum mechanics is a theory of measurement outcomes, not of underlying reality111. Complementarity—the idea that wave and particle descriptions are mutually exclusive but jointly necessary—was Bohr's way of avoiding contradictions111. The interpretation was pragmatic and influential, but critics (notably Einstein) objected that it was incomplete: it described probabilities without saying what the probabilities were probabilities of.
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen: The Incompleteness Argument
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen published a thought experiment arguing that quantum mechanics must be incomplete1131415. If two particles are entangled, measuring one instantly determines the state of the other, no matter how far apart they are113. Since (they assumed) no influence can travel faster than light, the second particle's properties must have been definite all along—but quantum mechanics does not assign definite values to them113. Therefore, the theory is incomplete; there must be "hidden variables" supplementing it113.
Bohr replied that the EPR argument begged the question by assuming that properties exist independently of measurement. The debate remained philosophical until John Bell, in 1964, derived inequalities that any local hidden-variable theory must satisfy. Experiments beginning with Alain Aspect's in the 1980s showed that these inequalities are violated, ruling out local hidden variables. The results were consistent with quantum mechanics but left open what the theory actually says about reality.
Rival Interpretations: Bohm, Everett, and Collapse
David Bohm's 1952 reformulation of quantum mechanics showed that hidden variables were possible if one gave up locality. In Bohmian mechanics, particles have definite positions at all times, guided by a wave function that evolves deterministically16. The theory reproduces all quantum predictions but requires a preferred frame and nonlocal influences—features many found unattractive, though the theory remains a live option.
Hugh Everett's many-worlds interpretation, developed in the 1950s, took the wave function as complete and denied collapse117. On this view, all outcomes of quantum measurements occur in branching worlds; the appearance of probability is explained by decision-theoretic arguments. The interpretation has gained adherents, especially among cosmologists, but the problem of making sense of probability in a deterministic branching universe remains contested.
Spontaneous collapse theories—proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber in 1986—modify the Schrödinger equation to include stochastic collapse events1819. These theories make different predictions from standard quantum mechanics (though the differences are tiny) and are testable in principle19. They represent an attempt to solve the measurement problem by changing the dynamics rather than the interpretation19.
Quantum Logic and the Structure of Quantum Propositions
An alternative approach, developed by Garrett Birkhoff and John von Neumann in 1936, treated quantum mechanics as requiring a non-classical logic20. In classical logic, propositions form a Boolean algebra; in quantum mechanics, the lattice of propositions is non-distributive20. This "quantum logic" was intended to resolve paradoxes like complementarity by showing that they arise from imposing classical logical structure on quantum phenomena. The program attracted interest but never became mainstream; critics argued that quantum logic merely redescribes the formalism without explaining it.
Decoherence and the Emergence of Classicality
In the 1980s and 1990s, decoherence theory—developed by H. Dieter Zeh, Wojciech Zurek, and others—showed how interaction with the environment suppresses interference between macroscopic states21. A superposition of a cat being alive and dead would rapidly decohere into a mixture because the cat's state becomes entangled with countless environmental degrees of freedom22. Decoherence explains why macroscopic objects appear classical, but it does not by itself solve the measurement problem: it explains the appearance of definite outcomes without selecting one2122. Whether decoherence plus some additional principle (such as Everettian branching or a collapse mechanism) can account for definite outcomes remains debated2122.
Spacetime Structure and the Hole Argument
Einstein's general relativity raised new philosophical questions. The hole argument, which Einstein himself wrestled with in 1913–1915, asks: if spacetime points have no intrinsic identity independent of the metric field, how can we make sense of diffeomorphism invariance? The resolution—that physical quantities must be invariant under diffeomorphisms—led to the view that spacetime is not a container but a structure defined by relations. This "spacetime structuralism" has been developed by John Earman, John Norton, and others, and remains central to debates about the ontology of general relativity.
Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory
Quantum field theory (QFT), the framework underlying the Standard Model, raised questions about what a field is, whether particles are fundamental, and how to interpret renormalization. The "particle" concept, central to quantum mechanics, becomes problematic in QFT: particles are excitations of fields, and in curved spacetime or accelerating frames, the particle content becomes observer-dependent (the Unruh effect). Philosophers such as David Wallace and Laura Ruetsche have explored whether QFT supports a particle ontology or requires a field ontology, and how to understand the success of effective field theories that are presumably approximations to a deeper theory.
Statistical Mechanics and the Arrow of Time
The foundations of statistical mechanics pose a puzzle: the fundamental laws of physics are time-symmetric, yet macroscopic systems exhibit irreversible behavior123. Boltzmann's H-theorem and the Gibbs entropy formula seemed to derive irreversibility from reversible microphysics, but the derivation requires assumptions about initial conditions (the "past hypothesis") and about the nature of probability. Philosophers such as David Albert and Barry Loewer have argued that the arrow of time is grounded in a low-entropy initial condition, while others have explored whether statistical mechanics requires a fundamentally probabilistic interpretation.
Emergent Spacetime and Quantum Gravity
The search for a theory of quantum gravity—string theory, loop quantum gravity, and other approaches—has led to speculation that spacetime itself is emergent, not fundamental. In some approaches, spacetime geometry arises from entanglement patterns in an underlying quantum state; in others, it is a coarse-grained approximation to a deeper combinatorial structure. These ideas remain speculative, but they have stimulated philosophical work on what it would mean for spacetime to be emergent, and whether such emergence is compatible with the empirical success of general relativity.
Quantum Information and Computation
The development of quantum information theory—quantum computing, quantum cryptography, and quantum error correction—has shifted the focus of foundational debates. Rather than asking what quantum mechanics means, researchers ask what quantum states do: how much information they carry, how they can be manipulated, and what computational advantages they confer24. This pragmatic turn has influenced interpretations (QBism, for instance, treats the wave function as a tool for agents' beliefs) and has opened new questions about the nature of information, computation, and the relationship between physics and mathematics.
The Present Landscape
Philosophy of physics today is a mature field with distinct sub-areas: philosophy of quantum mechanics (interpretations, measurement, entanglement), philosophy of spacetime (structuralism, the hole argument, quantum gravity), philosophy of statistical mechanics (probability, irreversibility, the arrow of time), and philosophy of quantum field theory (particles, fields, renormalization). The field remains closely tied to physics itself: foundational problems in physics generate philosophical questions, and philosophical analysis sometimes informs physical practice1. The questions that drove the field's history—what is space, what is time, what is a quantum state, what is probability—remain open, but the tools for addressing them have become more precise, and the dialogue between physics and philosophy more sustained125.
References
- Philosophy of physics (introduction, Philosophy of quantum mechanics, Leibniz, Interpretations of quantum mechanics, "Locality" and hidden variables, Philosophy of thermal and statistical physics, Philosophy of space and time), Wikipedia
- Aristotelian physics, Wikipedia
- Newtonianism (Background), Wikipedia
- Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica, Wikipedia
- Newton's laws of motion, Wikipedia
- Relational space, Wikipedia
- Transcendental idealism, Wikipedia
- Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Wikipedia
- Immanuel Kant, Wikipedia
- Mach's principle, Wikipedia
- Copenhagen interpretation (Background, introduction), Wikipedia
- Quantum superposition, Wikipedia
- Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox, Wikipedia
- Hidden-variable theory, Wikipedia
- Quantum entanglement (History), Wikipedia
- De Broglie–Bohm theory, Wikipedia
- Many-worlds interpretation (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory, Wikipedia
- Objective-collapse theory (History of collapse theories, introduction), Wikipedia
- Quantum logic (introduction, History and Philosophical Debate), Wikipedia
- Quantum decoherence (Origin of the concepts), Wikipedia
- Einselection, Wikipedia
- Arrow of time, Wikipedia
- Quantum information, Wikipedia
- Philosophy of space and time, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Philosophy Of Physics
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 350 BCE-1600
- 1687-1905
- 1715-Present
- 1781-1900
- 1870-Present
Statistical Mechanics and the Arrow of Time
Why does time have a direction?
- 1883-1930
- 1883-1920
Machian positivism and relational inertia
Is inertia fixed by distant matter?
- 1902-Present
- 1915-Present
- 1920-1960
- 1927-Present
- 1927-Present
- 1936-1980
- 1952-Present
- 1957-Present
- 1972-Present
Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics
When do quantum properties become definite?
- 1980-Present
- 1980-Present
- 1986-Present
- 1990-Present
- 1990-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Absolute space and time replaced Aristotelian natural philosophy
Newton's Principia replaced Aristotelian natural philosophy with a mathematical mechanics grounded in absolute space and time, displacing Aristotle's qualitative natural motions and places.
Carried by Isaac Newton; Principia (1687).
Relationalism reacted against Absolute space and time
Leibniz's relationalism was formulated directly against Newton's absolute space and time in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, arguing that only relations among bodies are real.
Carried by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz; Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (1715).
Machian Empiricism reacted against Absolute space and time
Mach's Science of Mechanics attacked Newton's absolute space, reinterpreting the bucket experiment as showing rotation relative to the distant stars and demanding an empiricist reconstruction of mechanics.
Carried by Ernst Mach; The Science of Mechanics (1883).
Hidden-variable theory reacted against Copenhagen Interpretation
The EPR argument was framed against the Copenhagen interpretation's claim that quantum mechanics is complete, arguing that hidden variables must supplement it to restore definite properties.
Carried by Albert Einstein; Boris Podolsky; Nathan Rosen.
De Broglie–Bohm theory grew out of Hidden-variable theory
Bohm's 1952 reformulation realized the hidden-variable program that EPR had called for, giving particles definite positions guided by a wave function while reproducing quantum predictions.
Carried by David Bohm.
Kantian A Priori Foundations influenced by Absolute space and time
Kant built his a priori foundations on Newtonian mechanics and Euclidean geometry, treating them as necessary forms of intuition that make Newtonian physics possible.
Carried by Immanuel Kant; Critique of Pure Reason (1781).
Machian Empiricism revived Relationalism
Mach revived Leibnizian relationalism against Newtonian absolutism, arguing that inertia is determined by the distribution of mass in the universe rather than by absolute space.
Carried by Ernst Mach.
Conventionalism reacted against Kantian A Priori Foundations
Poincaré's conventionalism rejected the Kantian claim that Euclidean geometry is synthetic a priori, arguing instead that the choice of geometry is a convention guided by convenience.
Carried by Henri Poincaré; Science and Hypothesis (1902).
Logical positivism influenced by Machian Empiricism
Mach's insistence that theoretical terms be reducible to observable ones shaped the Vienna Circle's logical empiricism, which sought to reconstruct theories with observation-based correspondence rules.
Carried by Ernst Mach; Vienna Circle.
Spacetime Structuralism influenced by Machian positivism and relational inertia
Mach's relational account of inertia, that inertia is determined by the distribution of mass, was a guiding heuristic for Einstein's general relativity, in which the metric field is relational and dynamical.
Carried by Ernst Mach; Albert Einstein.
Operationalism influenced by Machian positivism and relational inertia
Mach's demand that concepts be tied to observable procedures fed into Bridgman's operationalism, which defined physical concepts by the operations used to measure them.
Carried by Ernst Mach; Percy Bridgman.
Emergent Spacetime grew out of Spacetime Structuralism
Emergent spacetime grew out of spacetime structuralism and general relativity, asking whether the metric field is fundamental or arises from deeper non-spatiotemporal degrees of freedom.
Carried by John Wheeler.
Many-Worlds Interpretation reacted against Copenhagen Interpretation
Everett's many-worlds interpretation rejected the Copenhagen collapse postulate, treating the wave function as always evolving unitarily and measurement outcomes as branching relative states.
Carried by Hugh Everett.
Modal Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics reacted against Copenhagen Interpretation
Modal interpretations rejected the Copenhagen treatment of measurement as primitive, instead taking the quantum state to assign definite properties to subsystems without collapse.
Carried by Bas van Fraassen; Dennis Dieks.
Quantum decoherence influenced by Copenhagen Interpretation
Decoherence theory addressed the Copenhagen measurement problem by explaining how environmental interaction suppresses interference and yields effectively classical outcomes.
Carried by H. Dieter Zeh; Wojciech Zurek.
Objective-collapse theory reacted against Copenhagen Interpretation
Objective-collapse theories rejected the Copenhagen interpretation's vague measurement-induced collapse, proposing precise physical collapse dynamics that modify the Schrödinger equation.
Carried by GianCarlo Ghirardi; Alberto Rimini; Tullio Weber.
Quantum Information Approach influenced by Copenhagen Interpretation
The quantum information approach recast the Copenhagen interpretation's measurement-centered view in information-theoretic terms, treating quantum states as carriers of information rather than descriptions of reality.
Carried by John Archibald Wheeler; David Deutsch.
Quantum decoherence influenced by Many-Worlds Interpretation
Decoherence was developed partly to make many-worlds and no-collapse interpretations viable, explaining the appearance of definite outcomes within a unitarily evolving wave function.
Carried by H. Dieter Zeh; Wojciech Zurek.
Emergent Spacetime influenced by Philosophy of Quantum Field Theory
Work in quantum field theory and quantum gravity, especially holographic and duality ideas, supplied the technical setting in which emergent spacetime was proposed.
Carried by Gerard 't Hooft; Leonard Susskind.
Kantian A Priori Foundations influenced by Relationalism
Kant's critical philosophy engaged the Leibnizian relationalist tradition, recasting the space-and-time debate as a question about the conditions of experience rather than about substances versus relations.
Carried by Immanuel Kant.
Spacetime Structuralism influenced by Conventionalism
Poincaré's conventionalism about geometry framed the question of whether spacetime geometry is conventional or empirical, a question taken up in the philosophy of general relativity and spacetime structuralism.
Carried by Henri Poincaré.
Logical positivism influenced by Copenhagen Interpretation
Logical empiricists engaged closely with the Copenhagen interpretation, treating quantum mechanics as a test case for their program of reconstructing theories with observation-based correspondence rules.
Carried by Rudolf Carnap; Hans Reichenbach.
Quantum Logic influenced by Copenhagen Interpretation
Quantum logic arose from reflection on the Copenhagen interpretation's complementarity, treating the non-distributive structure of quantum propositions as a way to make sense of the theory's formalism.
Carried by Garrett Birkhoff; John von Neumann.
Objective-collapse theory rival of De Broglie–Bohm theory
Objective-collapse theories competed with Bohmian mechanics as rival no-observer solutions to the measurement problem, both positing definite outcomes but by different mechanisms.
Carried by GianCarlo Ghirardi.
Quantum Information Approach influenced by Quantum decoherence
Decoherence results were absorbed into the quantum information approach as the mechanism by which information becomes effectively classical, underpinning accounts of measurement and classicality.
Carried by Wojciech Zurek.
Beyond the field
Where Philosophy Of Physics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 106 links.
Aristotelian natural philosophy provoked Mechanical philosophy in Philosophy Of Science
The mechanical philosophy defined itself by rejecting Aristotelian natural philosophy's substantial forms and final causes, replacing them with matter and motion.
Carried by René Descartes; Robert Boyle; Thomas Hobbes.
Aristotelian natural philosophy provoked Mechanistic Causation in Philosophy Of Causation
The mechanical philosophy defined itself against Aristotelian natural philosophy, rejecting substantial forms and final causes in favour of matter and motion. Bacon, Descartes and Boyle framed their causal accounts as replacements for the Aristotelian scheme.
Carried by Francis Bacon; René Descartes; Robert Boyle.
Aristotelian natural philosophy provoked Copernican heliocentrism in Physics
Copernicus's heliocentrism was framed as a rejection of the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic natural philosophy of a stationary Earth at the centre.
Carried by Nicolaus Copernicus; De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (1543).
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Oxford Natural Philosophy in Medieval Philosophy
The Oxford calculatores and Grosseteste's circle worked within Aristotelian natural philosophy, taking its categories of motion, place and change as the frame for their analyses.
Carried by Robert Grosseteste; Thomas Bradwardine.
Aristotelian natural philosophy provoked Mechanical philosophy in History Of Scientific Ideas
Mechanical philosophy arose as a deliberate rejection of Aristotelian natural philosophy, substituting corpuscles and laws of motion for the four causes and the form-matter analysis of change.
Carried by René Descartes; Robert Boyle.
Absolute space and time led to Philosophy of Physics of Time in Philosophy Of Time
Einstein's 1905 special relativity attacked Newton's absolute time and absolute simultaneity, defining simultaneity operationally by light signals and clock readings. The philosophy of physics of time grew out of interpreting this replacement of absolute time.
Carried by Albert Einstein; On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies (1905).
Absolute space and time provoked Theory of relativity in History Of Scientific Ideas
The theory of relativity arose as a rejection of Newtonian absolute space and time, replacing absolute simultaneity with frame-dependent times. Einstein's 1905 paper defined itself against the absolute space and time of the Newtonian framework.
Carried by Albert Einstein; Isaac Newton.
Absolute space and time provoked Special relativity in Physics
Special relativity arose as a rejection of Newtonian absolute space and time, replacing them with frame-dependent simultaneity and invariant spacetime intervals. Einstein's 1905 paper defined the new theory against the absolute framework.
Carried by Albert Einstein.
Absolute space and time provoked Special Relativity in Relativity
Einstein's 1905 paper defined itself against Newtonian absolute space and absolute time, rejecting the notion of a privileged rest frame and simultaneity independent of observers.
Carried by Albert Einstein; On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies (1905).
Absolute space and time replaced Aristotelian physics in Classical Mechanics
Newton's absolute space and time replaced Aristotelian natural place and natural motion as the working account of motion and locality.
Carried by Isaac Newton; Principia (1687).
Statistical Mechanics and the Arrow of Time influenced by Classical phenomenological thermodynamics in Thermodynamics
Classical phenomenological thermodynamics, above all the second law and the entropy concept, posed the irreversibility problem that statistical mechanics and the arrow of time were built to explain.
Carried by Rudolf Clausius; Sadi Carnot.
Machian Empiricism influenced by British empiricism in Epistemology
Mach's empiricism drew directly on British empiricism, especially Hume's analysis of causation and Berkeley's critique of absolute space, in rejecting Newton's absolute space and atomistic metaphysics.
Carried by Ernst Mach; David Hume; George Berkeley.

Philosophy Of Physics is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 22 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Philosophy Of PhysicsRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Physics 19 links
- Quantum Mechanics 17 links
- Philosophy Of Science 11 links
- Philosophy Of Time 10 links
- Metaphysics 5 links
- History Of Scientific Ideas 4 links
- Philosophy Of Mathematics 4 links
- Mathematical Physics 4 links
- Quantum Information 4 links
- Epistemology 3 links
- Medieval Philosophy 2 links
- Philosophy Of Perception 2 links
More in Philosophy Of Science
- Confirmation And Evidence
- Models And Representation
- Philosophy Of Biology
- Philosophy Of Chemistry
- Philosophy Of Economics
- Philosophy Of Medicine
- Philosophy Of Science
- Philosophy Of Social Science
- Scientific Change And Theory Choice
- Scientific Explanation
- Scientific Realism
See where Philosophy Of Physics sits on the Map of Human Knowledge