Science And Society

Science and society is the study of science as a human activity—shaped by institutions, economies, politics, and cultures, and in turn reshaping them.

16 frameworks, from 1830 to today · History Of Science & Technology · History

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Science and society is the study of science as a human activity—shaped by institutions, economies, politics, and cultures, and in turn reshaping them. Its central question is not whether a scientific claim is true in the abstract, but why it seemed credible, useful, or desirable to the people who made and adopted it, and how knowledge and social life have been entangled. The field matters because it explains how science came to hold its peculiar authority, and why that authority has been contested. This article traces the main approaches that historians, sociologists, and philosophers have built to answer those questions, from the nineteenth-century origins of the history of science to the present.

Progress Narratives and the Whig Problem

The history of science emerged as a recognisable discipline in the nineteenth century, largely as a story of progress. Its practitioners—often scientists themselves—wrote accounts in which the present state of knowledge was the endpoint, and past ideas were judged by how far they approached it. This is what later critics called Whig history: writing the past from the standpoint of the victors, treating earlier beliefs as errors on the way to truth1. The term was applied to the history of science most influentially by the historian Herbert Butterfield, whose The Whig Interpretation of History (1931) attacked the tendency to read the past through present concerns.

Whig narratives had real appeal. They gave science a heroic lineage and justified its cultural authority. But they could not explain why intelligent people had believed things that later looked wrong, or why some claims succeeded and others failed for reasons that had little to do with evidence. That problem drove the field's next turn.

Internalism, Externalism, and the Economic Turn

A long-running debate concerned what should explain scientific change. Internalists held that the development of science is driven by its own logic—by problems, methods, and arguments internal to a discipline. Externalists argued that social, economic, and political conditions shape which questions get asked and which answers get accepted. The debate was rarely all-or-nothing; most historians combined the two, but the balance shifted over time.

A landmark externalist intervention came from the Soviet historian Boris Hessen2. In 1931, at the Second International Congress of History of Science in London, he presented a paper arguing that Isaac Newton's Principia (1687) was shaped by the economic and technical problems of seventeenth-century England—navigation, mining, and ballistics. This Hessenian economic determinism was crude by later standards, but it demonstrated that even the most canonical physics could be analysed as a product of its social context. It influenced a generation of British scientists and historians, including those who developed the social relations of science movement in the 1930s.

Merton and the Institutional Sociology of Science

The American sociologist Robert K. Merton approached science as a social institution. In his 1938 study Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, he argued that Puritan values—a disciplined, this-worldly ethic—helped legitimise scientific activity in England, linking science to the broader culture. Later, in the 1940s, he formulated the norms of science: communism (results belong to the community), universalism (claims are judged by impersonal criteria), disinterestedness, and organised scepticism3. These norms, he argued, made science a distinctive social system.

Mertonian sociology of science was enormously influential and remains a reference point. Its limitation was that it described the norms and institutions of science but said little about the content of scientific knowledge—how a particular claim came to be accepted as true. That question became central to the next generation.

Kuhn and the Paradigm

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) transformed the field45. Kuhn argued that science does not accumulate steadily; it alternates between normal science, in which researchers work within an accepted framework solving puzzles, and revolutionary periods, in which that framework—the paradigm—breaks down and is replaced56. A paradigm is the shared set of assumptions, exemplars, and methods that defines a scientific community and what counts as a legitimate problem.

Kuhn's concrete case was the Copernican revolution: the Ptolemaic system could not be patched indefinitely, and the shift to a heliocentric model was not simply a matter of new evidence but of a community changing its standards. His notion of incommensurability—that rival paradigms may not be fully translatable into each other's terms—raised the unsettling possibility that theory choice is not purely rational4. Kuhn himself resisted the relativist reading, but his book gave the sociology of science its opening.

The Strong Programme and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge

In the 1970s, a group at the University of Edinburgh—Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and others—developed what became known as the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)789. Its central principle was symmetry: the same kinds of social explanation should be applied to true and false beliefs alike79. Where earlier sociologists explained error by social factors and truth by nature, the Strong Programme insisted that both be explained symmetrically79.

Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976) set out the programme's tenets. A celebrated case study was Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), which examined the seventeenth-century dispute between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes over whether the air-pump could produce reliable experimental knowledge. The authors argued that what counted as a proper experiment was itself a social and political settlement, not a given. The book became a model of how to study the making of scientific facts.

Laboratory Studies and Actor-Network Theory

A parallel movement turned to the laboratory as a site of ethnographic study. Laboratory studies—exemplified by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979), based on fieldwork at the Salk Institute—observed scientists at work and argued that facts are constructed through inscription, persuasion, and the assembly of allies, rather than simply discovered.

Latour and others developed Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which treats humans and non-humans (instruments, microbes, documents) as actants that together form networks10. A scientific fact, on this view, is what holds when a network is stable. Latour's The Pasteurization of France (1984) traced how Louis Pasteur's laboratory work enrolled farmers, physicians, and microbes into a network that made his claims durable. ANT was controversial—critics found it evasive about truth—but it gave the field a powerful vocabulary for describing how knowledge and society are co-produced.

Social Construction of Technology and Technological Systems

Historians of technology developed their own frameworks. The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach, associated with Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker, argued that a technology's meaning and success are negotiated among relevant social groups711. Their classic case was the bicycle: the high-wheeled "penny-farthing" and the safety bicycle were not simply better and worse designs but answers to different groups' needs. Technological systems theory, developed by Thomas Hughes, analysed large systems such as electric power networks, showing how they acquire momentum—a kind of inertia from sunk investment and entrenched institutions—that shapes later choices1213.

Users, Consumption, and Publics

Attention shifted from producers to users. User studies and the idea of the consumption junction—the point where a technology meets its users—examined how people adapt, resist, or reinterpret technologies. Ruth Schwartz Cowan's More Work for Mother (1983) showed that household technologies did not simply reduce domestic labour but redistributed it. Alongside this, public understanding of science research and, later, participation studies examined how lay publics engage with scientific authority, moving from a "deficit model" (the public simply lacks knowledge) toward models that treat publics as active participants14.

Feminist and Postcolonial Turns

Feminist history and philosophy of science challenged the field's assumptions about objectivity and neutrality. Historians such as Evelyn Fox Keller and philosophers such as Sandra Harding and Helen Longino argued that scientific knowledge is shaped by gendered assumptions and that objectivity should be reconceived as achieved through critical, pluralistic communities rather than by a detached observer. Case studies ranged from the gendering of primatology to the exclusion of women from scientific institutions.

Postcolonial and global history of science decentred the European narrative15. Scholars showed that scientific knowledge was made through circulation, translation, and exchange across empires and regions—not simply exported from Europe. Work on colonial science, indigenous knowledge, and the global circulation of instruments and specimens reframed science as a networked, multi-sited activity.

Historical Epistemology and Practice Theory

Two further currents shaped the field's methods. Historical epistemology, associated with Gaston Bachelard and later Georges Canguilhem and others, studies the historical conditions that make concepts possible—how categories like "the normal" or "the organism" emerge and change16. Practice theory, drawing on thinkers such as Pierre Bourdieu and developed in science studies by historians and sociologists, focuses on what scientists actually do—their skills, routines, and material culture—rather than on abstract ideas or social structures alone17.

The Field Today

Contemporary work in science and society draws on all of these traditions. Laboratory ethnography, ANT, and SSK remain live methods; the history of technology's SCOT and systems approaches inform studies of infrastructure and innovation; feminist and postcolonial scholarship has reshaped how the field tells its stories10. Open questions persist: how to reconcile social explanation with the evident success of science; how to study knowledge-making in a global, digitally mediated world; and how the field's insights should inform public policy and science communication. The field's enduring contribution is to insist that science is neither a pure logic nor a mere social product, but a human achievement whose authority must be understood in the same terms as any other.

References

  1. Whig history, Wikipedia
  2. Boris Hessen, Wikipedia
  3. Mertonian norms, Wikipedia
  4. Thomas Kuhn, Wikipedia
  5. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Wikipedia
  6. Normal science, Wikipedia
  7. Strong programme (introduction, History), Wikipedia
  8. S. Barry Barnes, Wikipedia
  9. Science studies (History of the field), Wikipedia
  10. Actor–network theory (introduction, Background and context), Wikipedia
  11. Social construction of technology, Wikipedia
  12. Thomas P. Hughes (historian), Wikipedia
  13. Technological momentum, Wikipedia
  14. Public awareness of science, Wikipedia
  15. Warwick Anderson, Wikipedia
  16. French philosophy (Philosophy of science), Wikipedia
  17. Practice theory (introduction, History), Wikipedia

The frameworks of Science And Society

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1830-1935

    Whig history of science

    How did science progress to its present state?

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  2. 1930-1980

    Internalism and externalism

    What drives scientific change, internal logic or social context?

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  3. 1931-1960

    Hessenian economic determinism

    How do economic conditions shape scientific ideas?

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  4. 1938-Present

    Historical epistemology

    How do scientific concepts develop historically?

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  5. 1938-1975

    Mertonian sociology of science

    What norms and institutions make science work?

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  6. 1962-1990

    Kuhnian paradigm theory

    How do scientific communities change their frameworks?

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  7. 1975-Present

    Practice theory

    What do scientists actually do in practice?

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  8. 1976-2000

    Strong programme

    How are true and false beliefs explained socially?

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  9. 1979-2000

    Laboratory studies

    How are facts made in the laboratory?

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  10. 1980-Present

    Feminist history and philosophy of science

    How do gender assumptions shape scientific knowledge?

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  11. 1983-Present

    Large technical system

    How do large technological systems grow and persist?

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  12. 1983-Present
  13. 1984-Present

    Actor-Network Theory

    How do human and non-human actors form networks?

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  14. 1984-2005

    Social Construction of Technology

    How do social groups negotiate a technology's meaning?

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  15. 1985-Present

    Postcolonial and global history of science

    How did science develop across colonial and global contexts?

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  16. 1985-Present

    Public awareness of science

    How do lay publics engage with scientific authority?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Whig history of scienceInternalism and externalismHessenian economic determinismHistorical epistemologyMertonian sociology of scienceKuhnian paradigm theoryPractice theoryStrong programmeLaboratory studiesFeminist history and philosophy of sc…Large technical systemUser studies and the consumption junc…Actor-Network TheorySocial Construction of TechnologyPostcolonial and global history of sc…Public awareness of science

Beyond the field

Where Science And Society's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 93 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Science And Society is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 16 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

Land on Science And Society

Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

More in History Of Science & Technology

See where Science And Society sits on the Map of Human Knowledge