Science And Society
Science and society is the study of science as a human activity—shaped by institutions, economies, politics, and cultures, and in turn reshaping them.
16 frameworks, from 1830 to today · History Of Science & Technology · History
- Whig history of science 1830-1935
- Internalism and externalism 1930-1980
- Hessenian economic determinism 1931-1960
- Historical epistemology 1938-Present
- Mertonian sociology of science 1938-1975
- Kuhnian paradigm theory 1962-1990
- Practice theory 1975-Present
- Strong programme 1976-2000
- Laboratory studies 1979-2000
- Feminist history and philosophy of science 1980-Present
- Large technical system 1983-Present
- User studies and the consumption junction 1983-Present
- Actor-Network Theory 1984-Present
- Social Construction of Technology 1984-2005
- Postcolonial and global history of science 1985-Present
- Public awareness of science 1985-Present
Overview
Science and society is the study of science as a human activity—shaped by institutions, economies, politics, and cultures, and in turn reshaping them. Its central question is not whether a scientific claim is true in the abstract, but why it seemed credible, useful, or desirable to the people who made and adopted it, and how knowledge and social life have been entangled. The field matters because it explains how science came to hold its peculiar authority, and why that authority has been contested. This article traces the main approaches that historians, sociologists, and philosophers have built to answer those questions, from the nineteenth-century origins of the history of science to the present.
Progress Narratives and the Whig Problem
The history of science emerged as a recognisable discipline in the nineteenth century, largely as a story of progress. Its practitioners—often scientists themselves—wrote accounts in which the present state of knowledge was the endpoint, and past ideas were judged by how far they approached it. This is what later critics called Whig history: writing the past from the standpoint of the victors, treating earlier beliefs as errors on the way to truth1. The term was applied to the history of science most influentially by the historian Herbert Butterfield, whose The Whig Interpretation of History (1931) attacked the tendency to read the past through present concerns.
Whig narratives had real appeal. They gave science a heroic lineage and justified its cultural authority. But they could not explain why intelligent people had believed things that later looked wrong, or why some claims succeeded and others failed for reasons that had little to do with evidence. That problem drove the field's next turn.
Internalism, Externalism, and the Economic Turn
A long-running debate concerned what should explain scientific change. Internalists held that the development of science is driven by its own logic—by problems, methods, and arguments internal to a discipline. Externalists argued that social, economic, and political conditions shape which questions get asked and which answers get accepted. The debate was rarely all-or-nothing; most historians combined the two, but the balance shifted over time.
A landmark externalist intervention came from the Soviet historian Boris Hessen2. In 1931, at the Second International Congress of History of Science in London, he presented a paper arguing that Isaac Newton's Principia (1687) was shaped by the economic and technical problems of seventeenth-century England—navigation, mining, and ballistics. This Hessenian economic determinism was crude by later standards, but it demonstrated that even the most canonical physics could be analysed as a product of its social context. It influenced a generation of British scientists and historians, including those who developed the social relations of science movement in the 1930s.
Merton and the Institutional Sociology of Science
The American sociologist Robert K. Merton approached science as a social institution. In his 1938 study Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, he argued that Puritan values—a disciplined, this-worldly ethic—helped legitimise scientific activity in England, linking science to the broader culture. Later, in the 1940s, he formulated the norms of science: communism (results belong to the community), universalism (claims are judged by impersonal criteria), disinterestedness, and organised scepticism3. These norms, he argued, made science a distinctive social system.
Mertonian sociology of science was enormously influential and remains a reference point. Its limitation was that it described the norms and institutions of science but said little about the content of scientific knowledge—how a particular claim came to be accepted as true. That question became central to the next generation.
Kuhn and the Paradigm
Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) transformed the field45. Kuhn argued that science does not accumulate steadily; it alternates between normal science, in which researchers work within an accepted framework solving puzzles, and revolutionary periods, in which that framework—the paradigm—breaks down and is replaced56. A paradigm is the shared set of assumptions, exemplars, and methods that defines a scientific community and what counts as a legitimate problem.
Kuhn's concrete case was the Copernican revolution: the Ptolemaic system could not be patched indefinitely, and the shift to a heliocentric model was not simply a matter of new evidence but of a community changing its standards. His notion of incommensurability—that rival paradigms may not be fully translatable into each other's terms—raised the unsettling possibility that theory choice is not purely rational4. Kuhn himself resisted the relativist reading, but his book gave the sociology of science its opening.
The Strong Programme and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
In the 1970s, a group at the University of Edinburgh—Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and others—developed what became known as the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK)789. Its central principle was symmetry: the same kinds of social explanation should be applied to true and false beliefs alike79. Where earlier sociologists explained error by social factors and truth by nature, the Strong Programme insisted that both be explained symmetrically79.
Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976) set out the programme's tenets. A celebrated case study was Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer's Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985), which examined the seventeenth-century dispute between Robert Boyle and Thomas Hobbes over whether the air-pump could produce reliable experimental knowledge. The authors argued that what counted as a proper experiment was itself a social and political settlement, not a given. The book became a model of how to study the making of scientific facts.
Laboratory Studies and Actor-Network Theory
A parallel movement turned to the laboratory as a site of ethnographic study. Laboratory studies—exemplified by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979), based on fieldwork at the Salk Institute—observed scientists at work and argued that facts are constructed through inscription, persuasion, and the assembly of allies, rather than simply discovered.
Latour and others developed Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which treats humans and non-humans (instruments, microbes, documents) as actants that together form networks10. A scientific fact, on this view, is what holds when a network is stable. Latour's The Pasteurization of France (1984) traced how Louis Pasteur's laboratory work enrolled farmers, physicians, and microbes into a network that made his claims durable. ANT was controversial—critics found it evasive about truth—but it gave the field a powerful vocabulary for describing how knowledge and society are co-produced.
Social Construction of Technology and Technological Systems
Historians of technology developed their own frameworks. The Social Construction of Technology (SCOT) approach, associated with Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker, argued that a technology's meaning and success are negotiated among relevant social groups711. Their classic case was the bicycle: the high-wheeled "penny-farthing" and the safety bicycle were not simply better and worse designs but answers to different groups' needs. Technological systems theory, developed by Thomas Hughes, analysed large systems such as electric power networks, showing how they acquire momentum—a kind of inertia from sunk investment and entrenched institutions—that shapes later choices1213.
Users, Consumption, and Publics
Attention shifted from producers to users. User studies and the idea of the consumption junction—the point where a technology meets its users—examined how people adapt, resist, or reinterpret technologies. Ruth Schwartz Cowan's More Work for Mother (1983) showed that household technologies did not simply reduce domestic labour but redistributed it. Alongside this, public understanding of science research and, later, participation studies examined how lay publics engage with scientific authority, moving from a "deficit model" (the public simply lacks knowledge) toward models that treat publics as active participants14.
Feminist and Postcolonial Turns
Feminist history and philosophy of science challenged the field's assumptions about objectivity and neutrality. Historians such as Evelyn Fox Keller and philosophers such as Sandra Harding and Helen Longino argued that scientific knowledge is shaped by gendered assumptions and that objectivity should be reconceived as achieved through critical, pluralistic communities rather than by a detached observer. Case studies ranged from the gendering of primatology to the exclusion of women from scientific institutions.
Postcolonial and global history of science decentred the European narrative15. Scholars showed that scientific knowledge was made through circulation, translation, and exchange across empires and regions—not simply exported from Europe. Work on colonial science, indigenous knowledge, and the global circulation of instruments and specimens reframed science as a networked, multi-sited activity.
Historical Epistemology and Practice Theory
Two further currents shaped the field's methods. Historical epistemology, associated with Gaston Bachelard and later Georges Canguilhem and others, studies the historical conditions that make concepts possible—how categories like "the normal" or "the organism" emerge and change16. Practice theory, drawing on thinkers such as Pierre Bourdieu and developed in science studies by historians and sociologists, focuses on what scientists actually do—their skills, routines, and material culture—rather than on abstract ideas or social structures alone17.
The Field Today
Contemporary work in science and society draws on all of these traditions. Laboratory ethnography, ANT, and SSK remain live methods; the history of technology's SCOT and systems approaches inform studies of infrastructure and innovation; feminist and postcolonial scholarship has reshaped how the field tells its stories10. Open questions persist: how to reconcile social explanation with the evident success of science; how to study knowledge-making in a global, digitally mediated world; and how the field's insights should inform public policy and science communication. The field's enduring contribution is to insist that science is neither a pure logic nor a mere social product, but a human achievement whose authority must be understood in the same terms as any other.
References
- Whig history, Wikipedia
- Boris Hessen, Wikipedia
- Mertonian norms, Wikipedia
- Thomas Kuhn, Wikipedia
- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Wikipedia
- Normal science, Wikipedia
- Strong programme (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- S. Barry Barnes, Wikipedia
- Science studies (History of the field), Wikipedia
- Actor–network theory (introduction, Background and context), Wikipedia
- Social construction of technology, Wikipedia
- Thomas P. Hughes (historian), Wikipedia
- Technological momentum, Wikipedia
- Public awareness of science, Wikipedia
- Warwick Anderson, Wikipedia
- French philosophy (Philosophy of science), Wikipedia
- Practice theory (introduction, History), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Science And Society
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1830-1935
- 1930-1980
Internalism and externalism
What drives scientific change, internal logic or social context?
- 1931-1960
Hessenian economic determinism
How do economic conditions shape scientific ideas?
- 1938-Present
Historical epistemology
How do scientific concepts develop historically?
- 1938-1975
Mertonian sociology of science
What norms and institutions make science work?
- 1962-1990
Kuhnian paradigm theory
How do scientific communities change their frameworks?
- 1975-Present
- 1976-2000
- 1979-2000
- 1980-Present
Feminist history and philosophy of science
How do gender assumptions shape scientific knowledge?
- 1983-Present
Large technical system
How do large technological systems grow and persist?
- 1983-Present
User studies and the consumption junction
How do users shape the meaning of technology?
- 1984-Present
- 1985-Present
Postcolonial and global history of science
How did science develop across colonial and global contexts?
- 1985-Present
Public awareness of science
How do lay publics engage with scientific authority?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Strong programme grew out of Kuhnian paradigm theory
The Strong Programme grew directly out of Kuhn's claim that theory choice is not purely rational and that paradigms are community-bound. Bloor and Barnes generalised Kuhn's incommensurability into a symmetric sociological method for explaining true and false beliefs alike.
Carried by David Bloor; Barry Barnes; Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976).
Actor-Network Theory grew out of Laboratory studies
Actor-Network Theory grew out of laboratory studies, generalising its ethnographic findings into a vocabulary of actants and networks. Latour's fieldwork at the Salk Institute led directly to ANT's account of facts as stabilised networks.
Carried by Bruno Latour; The Pasteurization of France (1984).
Mertonian sociology of science influenced by Hessenian economic determinism
Merton's 1938 study of science in seventeenth-century England took up the Hessenian question of how economic and cultural context shaped science, though Merton emphasised Puritan values rather than economic determinism. The externalist framing passed into his institutional sociology.
Carried by Robert K. Merton; Science, Technology and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (1938).
Practice theory influenced by Kuhnian paradigm theory
Practice theory in science studies took from Kuhn the idea that scientific work is organised by shared exemplars, tacit skills, and problem-solving routines rather than explicit rules. This fed into ethnographic attention to scientific practice.
Carried by Thomas Kuhn.
Actor-Network Theory rival of Strong programme
ANT and the Strong Programme were contemporary rivals in the sociology of scientific knowledge, both explaining scientific belief socially but disagreeing over symmetry toward non-humans and the role of networks versus interests. Latour positioned ANT against the Edinburgh school's approach.
Carried by Bruno Latour; David Bloor.
Kuhnian paradigm theory influenced by Historical epistemology
Kuhn's historical epistemology drew on the French tradition of Bachelard and Koyré, which treated scientific concepts as historically developing rather than timeless. Kuhn's paradigm shifts generalised this historical-epistemological approach.
Carried by Gaston Bachelard; Alexandre Koyré.
Feminist history and philosophy of science influenced by Kuhnian paradigm theory
Feminist critics of science took from Kuhn the idea that scientific communities and their standards shape what counts as knowledge, applying it to gendered assumptions in fields such as primatology. Keller and Harding used Kuhn's community-bound rationality.
Carried by Evelyn Fox Keller; Sandra Harding.
Feminist history and philosophy of science influenced by Strong programme
Feminist history and philosophy of science drew on the Strong Programme's symmetry principle and social account of knowledge, extending it to gendered assumptions in science. Harding and Longino built on SSK's challenge to neutral objectivity.
Carried by Sandra Harding; Helen Longino.
Postcolonial and global history of science influenced by Strong programme
Postcolonial history of science drew on the Strong Programme's symmetric treatment of knowledge claims, extending it to the encounter between Western and non-Western knowledge systems. The Edinburgh school's relativising of scientific authority informed global histories of science.
Carried by David Bloor.
Social Construction of Technology rival of Large technical system
SCOT and large technical systems theory were contemporary approaches to technology, competing over whether to explain technological change through negotiated group meanings or through the momentum of large systems. Hughes's systems approach emphasised sunk investment and institutions rather than social-group negotiation.
Carried by Thomas Hughes; Wiebe Bijker.
Beyond the field
Where Science And Society's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 93 links.
Hessenian economic determinism led to Externalist history of science in History Of Science & Technology
Externalist history of science grew directly out of Hessen's 1931 economic analysis of Newton's Principia, which explained scientific content by economic and social demands; later externalists generalised that programme.
Carried by Boris Hessen; The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia (1931).
Kuhnian paradigm theory influenced Social Epistemology of Science (Popper-Kuhn) in Social Epistemology
Kuhn's paradigm theory supplied the central concepts, normal science, paradigm and revolution, around which the Popper-Kuhn social epistemology of science was organized and debated.
Carried by Thomas S. Kuhn; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).
Practice theory influenced by Bourdieusian theory in Sociological Theory
Bourdieu's theory of habitus, field and practice, above all his Outline of a Theory of Practice (1972), supplied the central concepts that practice theory in science and society took up and applied to scientific work.
Carried by Pierre Bourdieu; Outline of a Theory of Practice (1972).
Strong programme led to Reflexive Sociology of Science in Sociology Of Science
Reflexive sociology of science grew directly out of the Edinburgh strong programme, taking its symmetry and reflexivity principles and turning reflexivity into a systematic programme of self-analysis.
Carried by Steve Woolgar; Malcolm Ashmore.
Laboratory studies led to Actor-network theory in Cultural Geography
Laboratory studies produced the core insight that scientific facts are made through material and social arrangements in the lab. Latour and Callon built actor-network theory directly out of that programme, extending it from labs to society at large.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Michel Callon; Laboratory Life (1979).
Laboratory studies led to Actor-Network Theory in History Of Scientific Practices
Actor-network theory grew directly out of laboratory studies: Latour and Woolgar's ethnographic account of the Salk Institute led to the generalized program of tracing actors and networks.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Steve Woolgar; Laboratory Life (1979).
Laboratory studies led to Actor-Network Theory in History Of Technology
The laboratory studies tradition, including Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979), supplied the empirical base and the actor/inscription vocabulary from which Actor-Network Theory was built. ANT extended these laboratory findings into a general theory of heterogeneous networks.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Steve Woolgar.
Laboratory studies led to Actor-network theory in Sociological Theory
ANT grew directly out of laboratory studies, with Latour and Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979) providing the ethnographic method and the notion of inscription devices that ANT generalised.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Steve Woolgar; Laboratory Life (1979).
Laboratory studies led to Actor-network theory in Sociology
The laboratory-studies programme, including Latour and Woolgar's ethnography and Knorr-Cetina's work, was the immediate source from which actor-network theory was generalised beyond the lab.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Karin Knorr Cetina.
Laboratory studies influenced Actor-network theory in History Of Science & Technology
Laboratory studies in science and society, including Latour and Woolgar's ethnography and Knorr-Cetina's work, provided the empirical foundation from which actor-network theory was generalised into a theory of heterogeneous networks.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Karin Knorr-Cetina.
Laboratory studies led to Actor-network theory in Human Geography
Laboratory studies of scientific practice, including Latour and Woolgar's ethnography and Knorr-Cetina's work, were the direct source of actor-network theory's method and concepts.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Karin Knorr-Cetina.
Laboratory studies led to Actor-Network Theory in Information Systems
Latour and Woolgar's laboratory study at the Salk Institute, published as Laboratory Life, produced the ethnographic method and actor-centred vocabulary from which actor-network theory was built.
Carried by Bruno Latour; Steve Woolgar; Laboratory Life (1979).

Science And Society is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 16 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Science And SocietyRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- History Of Science & Technology 10 links
- Sociology Of Science 9 links
- Sociology 8 links
- History Of Scientific Practices 6 links
- Philosophy Of Science 5 links
- Sociological Theory 5 links
- Scientific Change And Theory Choice 4 links
- Social Epistemology 3 links
- Technology And Society 3 links
- Science Communication 2 links
- History Of Medicine 2 links
- History Of Technology 2 links
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See where Science And Society sits on the Map of Human Knowledge