History Of Scientific Ideas
The history of scientific ideas is the study of how people have conceived of nature—what they thought the world was made of, how it worked, and how one could know it—and how those conceptions changed over time.
16 frameworks, from 450 BCE to today · History Of Science & Technology · History
- Atomism 450 BCE-1700
- Classical element 450 BCE-1700
- Aristotelian natural philosophy 350 BCE-1650
- Mathematical astronomy 150 BCE-1600
- Great chain of being 1200-1800
- Mechanical philosophy 1620-1700
- Newtonian mechanics 1687-1900
- Phlogiston theory 1700-1790
- Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry 1770-1850
- Darwinian evolution by natural selection 1859-Present
- Quantum mechanics 1900-Present
- Theory of relativity 1905-Present
- Historical epistemology 1930-Present
- Kuhnian paradigm theory 1962-Present
- Global and postcolonial history of science 1970-Present
- Sociology of scientific knowledge 1970-Present
Overview
The history of scientific ideas is the study of how people have conceived of nature—what they thought the world was made of, how it worked, and how one could know it—and how those conceptions changed over time. It is not a chronicle of discoveries accumulating toward the present1. Its central question is why a picture of nature seemed compelling to the people who held it, what problems it solved, and what it could not explain. A theory of matter that looks absurd today may have been the most reasonable option available given the evidence and the questions of its time. Understanding that is the point.
The field's subject matter is broad: cosmology, matter theory, biology, physics, chemistry, and the methods and epistemologies that underpin them. What unites these is a focus on ideas themselves—their content, their logic, their explanatory ambitions—rather than on instruments, institutions, or social networks, though those enter the story when they change what ideas are possible.
Ancient Cosmology and the Invention of Natural Philosophy
The earliest systematic attempts to explain nature without recourse to myth come from Greek thinkers of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. The Milesian philosophers—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes—proposed that the world was made of a single underlying substance: water, the boundless, air. These claims were speculative, but they established a new kind of question: what is the world made of, and can that be answered by reason rather than narrative?
Atomism, developed by Leucippus and Democritus in the fifth century BCE, answered that the world consists of indivisible particles (atoms) moving in void12. The theory explained change as the rearrangement of atoms rather than as the transformation of substances. It was elegant but faced a serious objection: how could atoms explain the qualities we perceive—color, taste, warmth? Atomists replied that these were conventions of the perceiving body, not properties of the atoms themselves. The theory survived in Epicurus and, later, in the Roman poet Lucretius's De rerum natura, but it remained a minority position for over two millennia.
Classical element theory, systematized by Empedocles and later Aristotle, offered a rival account: all things are mixtures of four elements—earth, water, air, fire—in different proportions. This had the advantage of explaining qualitative change (wood burning becomes fire and smoke) and of grounding a theory of transformation. It became the dominant framework for understanding matter in the West and, in modified forms, in Islamic and medieval European natural philosophy.
Aristotelian natural philosophy provided the most comprehensive ancient synthesis. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) built a system in which each element had a natural place and natural motion: earth moves down, fire moves up. The cosmos was divided into the sublunary realm (where generation and corruption occur) and the celestial realm (where a fifth element, aether, moves in perfect circles). His works on physics, cosmology, biology, and meteorology set the agenda for centuries. The system's power lay in its integration: it connected motion, matter, biology, and cosmology into a single explanatory framework. Its weakness was that it explained too much too easily—any motion could be assigned a "natural" tendency—and it struggled with phenomena like projectile motion and the vacuum.
Mathematical astronomy developed alongside natural philosophy but with a different aim. Greek astronomers such as Hipparchus and Ptolemy sought to predict planetary positions using geometric models—combinations of circles—that "saved the phenomena" without necessarily claiming physical truth. Ptolemy's Almagest (second century CE) became the standard astronomical text for over a millennium. The tension between mathematical astronomy's predictive success and natural philosophy's claims about physical reality would become a recurring theme.
Medieval Synthesis and the Great Chain of Being
Medieval European scholars inherited Greek, Islamic, and Jewish learning and built a synthesis in which Aristotelian natural philosophy, Christian theology, and mathematical astronomy coexisted. Thomas Aquinas integrated Aristotle into Christian doctrine; Islamic scholars such as Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) had already done similar work in their own contexts. The result was a worldview in which the cosmos was hierarchical, purposive, and finite.
The great chain of being expressed this hierarchy: a ladder of creation from inert matter through plants, animals, humans, angels, to God3. Each link had its place and purpose. The idea was not merely descriptive but explanatory: things behaved as they did because of their position in the chain. It shaped biology, cosmology, and social thought for centuries and would later become a target for evolutionary thinking.
The Mechanical Philosophy and the New Science
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw a fundamental challenge to Aristotelian natural philosophy1. The mechanical philosophy—associated with Descartes, Gassendi, Boyle, and others—proposed that nature operates like a machine: matter is inert, motion is local, and all phenomena can be explained by the size, shape, and motion of particles. This eliminated Aristotelian "forms" and "qualities" as explanatory entities and replaced them with contact mechanics.
The mechanical philosophy solved problems that Aristotelianism could not: it explained projectile motion, the vacuum, and the behavior of gases. It also aligned with a new epistemology: knowledge of nature should be based on observation and experiment, not on authority. But it faced its own difficulties. How could mechanical particles explain gravity, magnetism, or chemical affinity? Newton's Principia (1687) seemed to describe a force—gravity—that acted at a distance without mechanical contact. Newton himself was uneasy about this and refused to "feign hypotheses" about its cause.
Newtonian mechanics became the dominant framework for physics. Its laws of motion and universal gravitation explained terrestrial and celestial motion with unprecedented precision. But Newton's work also raised questions: what is the nature of force? What is the ether? These questions would drive physics for centuries.
Chemistry and the Problem of Combustion
Chemistry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries struggled to explain combustion and calcination (the conversion of metals to "calxes" or oxides). Phlogiston theory, proposed by Georg Ernst Stahl around 1700, held that combustible substances contain a principle—phlogiston—that is released during burning. The theory explained why metals gain weight when calcined (they lose phlogiston, which has negative weight or is replaced by something else) and why air is necessary for combustion (it absorbs phlogiston). It was a coherent system, but it required phlogiston to have strange properties—sometimes weightless, sometimes negatively weighted.
Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry (1770s–1780s) replaced phlogiston with a new account: combustion is the combination of a substance with oxygen from the air45. Lavoisier's careful quantitative experiments—weighing reactants and products—showed that mass is conserved and that the gain in weight during calcination is due to oxygen uptake. The new chemistry was not immediately accepted; it required new nomenclature, new instruments, and a new way of thinking about elements as simple substances rather than principles. But it won because it explained the phenomena more simply and because its quantitative methods were reproducible.
Darwin and the Transformation of Biology
Darwinian evolution by natural selection (1859) transformed biology by providing a mechanism for the diversity of life67. Before Darwin, naturalists explained species as fixed creations or as products of a plan. Darwin proposed that variation among individuals, combined with differential survival and reproduction, could produce adaptation and new species over time86. The theory was supported by evidence from biogeography (island species), paleontology (fossil sequences), and comparative anatomy (homologies). It faced resistance from those who saw it as incompatible with design and from those who doubted that natural selection could produce complex organs. But by the early twentieth century, evolution was the organizing framework of biology.
Relativity and Quantum Theory
Relativity (Einstein, 1905 and 1915) revised the Newtonian framework by showing that space and time are not absolute but are intertwined and relative to the observer's frame of reference. Special relativity (1905) resolved problems in electrodynamics and showed that mass and energy are equivalent. General relativity (1915) reconceived gravity as the curvature of spacetime. The theory made novel predictions—the bending of light by gravity, the expansion of the universe—that were later confirmed.
Quantum theory (developed 1900–1930 by Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and others) described the behavior of matter and energy at atomic scales. It introduced fundamental indeterminacy: particles do not have definite positions and momenta simultaneously, and measurement affects the system. The theory was spectacularly successful in prediction but raised deep questions about interpretation—questions that remain open.
Kuhn and the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
In 1962, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions proposed that science does not progress by accumulation but by paradigm shifts: periods of "normal science" within a paradigm are punctuated by revolutions in which a new paradigm replaces the old. Kuhnian paradigm theory introduced concepts—paradigm, normal science, anomaly, incommensurability—that reshaped how historians and philosophers thought about scientific change. Kuhn's work was itself contested: critics argued that it made scientific change irrational or relativistic.
The sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), developed in the 1970s by Barry Barnes, David Bloor, and others, went further: it argued that the content of scientific knowledge is shaped by social factors, not just by nature. The "strong programme" proposed that true and false beliefs should be explained by the same kinds of social causes9. This approach was controversial but opened new questions about how scientific consensus is formed.
Historical Epistemology and Global Perspectives
Historical epistemology, associated with Gaston Bachelard, Georges Canguilhem, and later Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, studies the historical conditions that make knowledge possible. It asks how concepts like objectivity, observation, and evidence have changed over time. Daston and Galison's Objectivity (2007) traced the emergence of "mechanical objectivity" in the nineteenth century—the ideal of self-effacing observation—and showed how it differed from earlier ideals of truth-to-nature.
Global and postcolonial history of science has challenged the Eurocentric narrative of the field. Historians have shown that scientific ideas developed in dialogue across cultures: Islamic astronomy, Chinese natural philosophy, Indian mathematics, and African metallurgy all contributed to global knowledge. Postcolonial scholars have examined how science was entangled with empire and how indigenous knowledge was marginalized or appropriated. This work has expanded the field's scope and complicated its narratives.
The Present
Today, the history of scientific ideas draws on all these traditions. Historians study the content of scientific theories in their historical contexts, using tools from philosophy, sociology, and anthropology. They ask how ideas were made credible, how they traveled, and how they were transformed. The field remains plural: some historians focus on internal logic and conceptual change, others on social and material conditions. The questions that drive it—how do we know what we know, and why did we believe what we no longer believe—remain as urgent as ever.
References
- History of science (Approaches to history of science, Pre-socratics, introduction, Scientific Revolution and birth of New Science), Wikipedia
- Atomism, Wikipedia
- Great chain of being, Wikipedia
- Phlogiston theory, Wikipedia
- Antoine Lavoisier, Wikipedia
- On the Origin of Species, Wikipedia
- History of evolutionary thought, Wikipedia
- Natural selection, Wikipedia
- Strong programme, Wikipedia
The frameworks of History Of Scientific Ideas
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 450 BCE-1700
- 450 BCE-1700
- 350 BCE-1650
- 150 BCE-1600
- 1200-1800
- 1620-1700
- 1687-1900
- 1700-1790
- 1770-1850
- 1859-Present
Darwinian evolution by natural selection
How do species come to be adapted?
- 1900-Present
- 1905-Present
- 1930-Present
Historical epistemology
How do scientific concepts change historically?
About Historical epistemology
Historical epistemology asks how the very standards of rationality, evidence, and objectivity that make scientific knowledge possible emerge and change over time. Unlike traditional epistemology, which seeks timeless norms for justification and truth, this framework treats the categories and practices of scientific reasoning as products of history. In the history of scientific ideas, historical epistemology provides a powerful lens for examining not just what scientists believed, but the underlying conditions—the conceptual frameworks, material practices, and institutional settings—that made those beliefs possible and meaningful. This framework is distinct from neighboring approaches: unlike the Lovejoyan History of Ideas, which traces autonomous 'unit-ideas' across disciplines, historical epistemology focuses on the historically situated conditions that shape knowledge; unlike the Kuhnian Paradigm Theory, which emphasizes revolutionary breaks, it often examines slower, more gradual transformations in the very categories of thought; and unlike the Mertonian Sociology of Science, which analyzes social norms and reward systems, it investigates the conceptual and practical preconditions of scientific work.Core CurriculumThe teaching spine of historical epistemology in the history of scientific ideas centers on a set of interconnected concepts that reveal how knowledge is historically constituted.- Historical a priori: The idea that what counts as a legitimate object of knowledge, a valid question, or a sound method is not fixed but is established by the conceptual and practical frameworks of a given period. This is the foundational concept of the framework.
- Epistemic categories: The basic divisions of knowledge—such as 'fact', 'theory', 'observation', 'cause', 'law'—that are themselves historical products. Historical epistemologists study how these categories are formed, stabilized, and transformed.
- Styles of reasoning: Distinct patterns of argument and demonstration that emerge in specific historical contexts, such as the experimental style, the taxonomic style, or the statistical style. Each style carries its own criteria for what counts as a valid claim.
- Scientific objectivity: Not a single, timeless ideal, but a concept with a history. Historical epistemology traces how objectivity has been understood differently—as mechanical objectivity, trained judgment, or structural objectivity—in different periods and disciplines.
- Concepts and conceptual change: The study of how specific scientific concepts (e.g., 'force', 'gene', 'species') are formed, stabilized, and revised. This is a core unit of analysis, distinct from the Lovejoyan focus on 'unit-ideas'.
- Practices and material culture: The role of instruments, laboratories, inscriptions, and bodily techniques in shaping knowledge. Historical epistemology insists that knowledge is not just in the mind but is embedded in material practices.
- Epistemic virtues: The qualities that a community values in a knower, such as accuracy, honesty, humility, or creativity. These virtues are historically variable and shape the conduct of science.
- Experimental systems: The material and conceptual arrangements—including instruments, specimens, and protocols—that produce phenomena and make them available for investigation. This concept links epistemology to the history of laboratory practice.
- Tacit knowledge: The unarticulated skills, intuitions, and know-how that are essential to scientific work but are not fully captured in formal rules or explicit theories. This concept highlights the embodied and social dimensions of knowledge.
- Boundary work: The activities by which scientists demarcate science from non-science, or distinguish legitimate from illegitimate knowledge. This concept reveals how the boundaries of science are negotiated and maintained.
- Epistemic cultures: The different ways of knowing and doing that characterize various scientific fields or communities. This concept allows for comparative analysis across disciplines and national traditions.
- Circulation of knowledge: The movement of concepts, practices, and objects across different sites—laboratories, field stations, museums, clinics—and how this movement transforms knowledge.
Intellectual HistoryHistorical epistemology emerged in the 1930s as a distinctive approach within the history of scientific ideas, though its roots reach back to earlier debates. The framework was first articulated by the French philosopher and historian of science Gaston Bachelard (1884–1962), whose work in the 1930s and 1940s laid the foundation for the entire tradition. Bachelard's key concept was the 'epistemological break' (coupure épistémologique), the idea that scientific progress involves a rupture with common sense and with earlier scientific frameworks. He argued that science does not simply accumulate truths but creates new conceptual spaces. His seminal work The New Scientific Spirit (1934) and The Formation of the Scientific Mind (1938) are foundational texts of historical epistemology.Bachelard's contemporary Georges Canguilhem (1904–1995) extended this approach to the life sciences. In works such as The Normal and the Pathological (1943) and Knowledge of Life (1952), Canguilhem showed how concepts like 'normal', 'pathological', 'health', and 'disease' are not given by nature but are constructed through historically specific norms and practices. He emphasized the role of concepts in organizing scientific experience and the importance of studying conceptual change in its own right.A crucial precursor to historical epistemology was the Hessen Thesis (1931), which argued that Newton's physics was shaped by the economic and technical needs of 17th-century England. While Hessen's work was primarily an externalist argument about social and economic determination, it opened the door to thinking about the historical conditions of scientific knowledge. Historical epistemology, however, went further by examining the internal conceptual and practical conditions of knowledge, not just external social pressures.In the mid-20th century, historical epistemology was further developed by Michel Foucault (1926–1984), whose archaeological method (as in The Order of Things, 1966) analyzed the 'epistemes'—the underlying conceptual grids—that made knowledge possible in different historical periods. Foucault's work was a major codification and extension of Bachelard's and Canguilhem's ideas, though it also moved in a more structuralist direction.The framework was also taken up in the English-speaking world, notably by Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996), whose The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) shared many concerns with historical epistemology, especially the idea that scientific change involves transformations in the very categories and practices of research. However, Kuhn's focus on paradigms and revolutions gave his work a different emphasis from the more gradual, concept-centered approach of the French tradition.In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, historical epistemology has been revived and transformed by scholars such as Lorraine Daston (b. 1951) and Peter Galison (b. 1955). Their collaborative work, including Objectivity (2007), has traced the history of epistemic categories and virtues, showing how concepts like 'objectivity' have changed over time. This revival has brought historical epistemology into dialogue with the Practice Turn, the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, and other contemporary frameworks.Historical epistemology coexists with several parallel frameworks. It shares with the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Strong Programme) an interest in the social dimensions of knowledge, but it places more emphasis on conceptual and material conditions. It overlaps with the Practice Turn in its focus on material practices and tacit knowledge, but it retains a stronger interest in the philosophical analysis of concepts. It differs from Kuhnian Paradigm Theory in its attention to slower, more continuous conceptual change and its focus on the conditions of knowledge rather than on revolutionary breaks.The legacy of historical epistemology is substantial. It has provided historians of science with a rich vocabulary for analyzing the historical constitution of scientific knowledge, and it has influenced fields as diverse as science studies, philosophy of science, and cultural history. Its core insight—that the very standards of rationality and objectivity have a history—remains a powerful challenge to any ahistorical account of scientific knowledge.The 12 concepts its tower teaches
- Boundary work
- Circulation of knowledge
- Concepts and conceptual change
- Epistemic categories
- Epistemic cultures
- Epistemic virtues
- Experimental systems
- Historical a priori
- Practices and material culture
- Scientific objectivity
- Styles of reasoning
- Tacit knowledge
- 1962-Present
Kuhnian paradigm theory
How does scientific knowledge change over time?
About Kuhnian paradigm theory
Before Thomas Kuhn, the history of scientific ideas was largely a story of steady accumulation: new facts were added, theories refined, and knowledge grew. Kuhn asked a different question: what holds a scientific community together as a community, and what causes it to abandon its most fundamental commitments? His answer centred on the paradigm—a shared constellation of theories, methods, values, and exemplary problem-solutions that defines a field of inquiry. Kuhn argued that scientific change is not gradual but revolutionary: periods of normal, puzzle-solving work are punctuated by crises that lead to wholesale replacement of the paradigm itself. This framework gave historians a new unit of analysis—the scientific community and its collective commitments—and a powerful vocabulary for describing how knowledge is both socially maintained and cognitively transformed.A first course in Kuhnian Paradigm Theory for historians of scientific ideas typically progresses through these concepts in logical sequence:- Pre-Paradigm Period – The formative stage before a field coalesces around a single paradigm. Competing schools hold incompatible assumptions, methods, and problem choices. This period ends when one approach gains consensus and becomes the authoritative framework for normal science.
- Paradigm – The overarching set of theories, methods, values, and exemplary problem-solutions shared by a scientific community. A paradigm defines what problems are legitimate and what counts as a solution.
- Normal Science – The routine puzzle-solving activity that elaborates and extends the paradigm. Scientists work within the paradigm's assumptions, refining its applications and resolving puzzles that the paradigm itself defines.
- Puzzle-Solving – The specific activity of normal science, analogous to solving a crossword or a chess problem. The paradigm guarantees that a solution exists; the scientist's skill lies in finding it.
- Anomaly – A persistent puzzle that resists solution within the paradigm. Initially anomalies are set aside or explained away, but their accumulation can erode confidence.
- Crisis – A period when anomalies become too numerous or central to ignore. The paradigm loses its grip; scientists begin to question its foundations and explore alternatives.
- Revolutionary Science – The phase of crisis in which the community considers and eventually adopts a new paradigm. This is not a cumulative process but a transformation of the field's entire worldview.
- Paradigm Shift – The transition from one paradigm to another. Kuhn likened it to a political revolution: the old regime cannot solve its problems, and a new one takes power, bringing with it new problems, methods, and standards.
- Incommensurability – The claim that successive paradigms are not fully comparable. They use different concepts, standards, and even perceive the world differently; there is no neutral language to adjudicate between them.
- Gestalt Switch – The psychological transformation that scientists undergo when adopting a new paradigm. Like seeing a duck-rabbit figure shift from one perception to another, the world itself appears different under the new paradigm.
- Tacit Knowledge – The unarticulated, skill-based knowledge that scientists acquire through training and practice within a paradigm. Much of what holds a paradigm together cannot be fully formalized or written down.
- Exemplar – A concrete problem-solution that serves as a model for further work. Exemplars transmit the paradigm: students learn to see new problems as analogous to canonical solved cases.
- Disciplinary Matrix – Kuhn's four components: symbolic generalizations, models, values, and exemplars.
- Scientific Community – The practitioners who share a paradigm. Kuhn insisted that science is fundamentally a social activity: knowledge is produced, maintained, and transformed by a community with shared training, commitments, and exemplars.
- Textbook Science – The retrospective picture of science as a steady accumulation of facts and theories. Textbooks, Kuhn argued, rewrite history to make the current paradigm seem inevitable, obscuring the revolutions that produced it.
This curriculum is not a general introduction to Kuhn's philosophy; it is an analytic toolkit for historians tracing how scientific communities maintain, challenge, and replace their core commitments.The intellectual history of Kuhn's framework begins with its immediate predecessor, Koyrean Intellectual History of Science, which treated scientific change as the unfolding of pure ideas in a Platonic realm, disconnected from social context. Kuhn's innovation was to insist that scientific knowledge is fundamentally a social product, shaped by the practices and commitments of a community. He also drew on the Hessen Thesis (1931), which had argued that Newton's science responded to economic and technical needs, though Kuhn subsumed externalist pressures within a more complex model of community dynamics.Thomas S. Kuhn (1922–1996) was a physicist turned historian of science. His seminal work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, became the founding text of the framework. Kuhn also wrote The Copernican Revolution (1957), which provided an earlier historical case study that shaped his model. The 1962 book's central argument—that science progresses through revolutions, not accumulation—directly challenged the dominant Sartonian Positivist Historiography, which saw science as linear progress, and the Lovejoyan History of Ideas, which traced autonomous unit-ideas across disciplines.Kuhn's framework emerged during a period of intense disciplinary ferment. The Mertonian Sociology of Science (1938–) had already emphasized social norms and institutional structures, but Kuhn gave historians a cognitive dimension: paradigms are not just social conventions but substantive worldviews that shape what scientists see and do. The Externalist History of Science (1930–) provided materialist accounts of scientific change, but Kuhn's model integrated internal cognitive factors with community dynamics, offering a middle path between the Internalist–Externalist Divide that had structured the field since the 1930s.After 1962, the framework rapidly gained influence. It was adopted and critiqued by the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (Strong Programme) (1976–), which radicalized Kuhn's insights into a fully Social Constructivist account. The Practice Turn (1980–) extended Kuhn's emphasis on exemplars and tacit knowledge into broader studies of laboratory routines and embodied skills. Meanwhile, Foucauldian Archaeology (1966–) offered an alternative model of discontinuous change based on discursive formations rather than community consensus, coexisting with rather than replacing Kuhn's model.Kuhn himself refined his terms in later work, notably introducing 'disciplinary matrix' and 'exemplar' in his 1969 postscript to Structure and in subsequent essays. But the core curriculum—paradigm, normal science, crisis, revolution, incommensurability—remains the durable vocabulary for historians analyzing how scientific communities organize their cognitive labour and why they sometimes abandon entire systems of thought.The 14 concepts its tower teaches
- Anomaly
- Crisis
- Disciplinary Matrix
- Exemplar
- Gestalt Switch
- Incommensurability
- Normal Science
- Paradigm
- Paradigm Shift
- Pre-Paradigm Period
- Puzzle-Solving
- Revolutionary Science
- Scientific Community
- Tacit Knowledge
- 1970-Present
Global and postcolonial history of science
How did science develop across cultures and empires?
- 1970-Present
Sociology of scientific knowledge
How do social factors shape scientific belief?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Mechanical philosophy revived Atomism
Gassendi and Boyle revived ancient atomism to ground the mechanical philosophy, replacing Aristotelian forms with particles and void.
Carried by Pierre Gassendi; Robert Boyle.
Aristotelian natural philosophy grew out of Classical element
Aristotle built his natural philosophy on Empedocles' four elements, adding natural place and motion to explain change.
Carried by Aristotle.
Mechanical philosophy reacted against Aristotelian natural philosophy
The mechanical philosophy defined itself by rejecting Aristotelian forms, qualities, and natural motions in favour of inert matter and contact mechanics.
Carried by René Descartes; Robert Boyle.
Newtonian mechanics grew out of Mechanical philosophy
Newtonian mechanics grew out of the mechanical philosophy's programme of explaining motion by laws, while adding universal gravitation acting at a distance.
Carried by Isaac Newton; Principia (1687).
Theory of relativity replaced Newtonian mechanics
Einstein's relativity replaced Newtonian absolute space and time with spacetime, while retaining Newtonian mechanics as a low-velocity limit.
Carried by Albert Einstein.
Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry replaced Phlogiston theory
Lavoisier's oxygen chemistry replaced phlogiston by explaining combustion and calcination as combination with a component of the air, supported by quantitative mass balance.
Carried by Antoine Lavoisier.
Great chain of being influenced by Aristotelian natural philosophy
The hierarchical, purposive cosmos of Aristotelian natural philosophy, fused with Christian theology by Aquinas, supplied the framework for the great chain of being.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas.
Newtonian mechanics influenced by Mathematical astronomy
Newton's Principia took up the predictive aims and geometric methods of mathematical astronomy, showing that the same laws govern celestial and terrestrial motion.
Carried by Isaac Newton; Principia (1687).
Darwinian evolution by natural selection reacted against Great chain of being
Darwinian evolution rejected the fixed, hierarchical ladder of being, replacing it with descent with modification and natural selection.
Carried by Charles Darwin; On the Origin of Species (1859).
Quantum mechanics replaced Newtonian mechanics
Quantum mechanics arose from problems in blackbody radiation and atomic spectra that Newtonian mechanics could not solve, replacing classical determinism at small scales.
Carried by Max Planck; Niels Bohr.
Kuhnian paradigm theory influenced by Historical epistemology
Kuhn's paradigm theory drew on historical epistemology's attention to conceptual ruptures and the historical conditioning of scientific knowledge.
Carried by Thomas Kuhn; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).
Sociology of scientific knowledge influenced by Kuhnian paradigm theory
The sociology of scientific knowledge built on Kuhn's ideas of paradigms and communities, turning them toward social explanation of consensus.
Carried by David Bloor.
Beyond the field
Where History Of Scientific Ideas's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 174 links.
Atomism led to Epicureanism in Ancient Philosophy
Epicurus adopted Democritean atomism as the physical basis of his philosophy, adding the swerve to allow free action. Epicurean physics is a direct development of the earlier atomist doctrine.
Carried by Epicurus; Democritus; Lucretius.
Atomism revived by Mechanical philosophy in Chemistry
The mechanical philosophy deliberately revived ancient atomism: Gassendi's revival of Epicurean atomism and Boyle's corpuscularianism brought Democritean atoms back as the basis for explaining nature mechanically.
Carried by Pierre Gassendi; Robert Boyle.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Latin Translation and Reception of Aristotle in Medieval Philosophy
The Latin reception of Aristotle transmitted Aristotelian natural philosophy itself: the Physics, De caelo, De anima and biological works were translated and became the curriculum of the schools.
Carried by James of Venice; William of Moerbeke.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Scholastic Aristotelianism in Medieval Philosophy
Scholastic Aristotelianism took its physics, cosmology, psychology and metaphysics from Aristotelian natural philosophy as translated and taught in the schools.
Carried by Thomas Aquinas; Albert the Great.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Peripateticism in Islamic Philosophy
Arabic translations of Aristotle's Physics and De Caelo and of Greek commentaries gave the Islamic Peripatetics their natural philosophy of matter, motion and the celestial spheres.
Carried by Aristotle; Hunayn ibn Ishaq.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Thomism in Christian Philosophy
Aristotelian natural philosophy, newly translated into Latin, supplied Aquinas with the hylomorphic, causal and teleological framework he built into Thomist metaphysics and ethics.
Carried by Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Oxford Natural Philosophy in Medieval Philosophy
Oxford natural philosophy was built on Aristotelian natural philosophy: the Oxford masters commented on the Physics and De caelo and developed their questions from Aristotle's texts.
Carried by Robert Grosseteste; Roger Bacon.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Thomism in Metaphysics
Aquinas took over Aristotelian natural philosophy, including hylomorphism, the four causes and the account of motion, and made it the philosophical frame of Thomist theology.
Carried by Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas.
Aristotelian natural philosophy influenced Medieval university in History Of Scientific Institutions
The arts curriculum of the medieval university was organised around Aristotle's natural philosophy, logic and ethics as transmitted through Latin translations and commentaries. The institutional structure of the faculties presupposed this corpus.
Mathematical astronomy led to Copernican heliocentrism in Physics
Copernican heliocentrism grew directly out of the tradition of mathematical astronomy, reworking Ptolemaic epicyclic technique into a Sun-centred geometry.
Carried by Nicolaus Copernicus; De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (1543).
Mathematical astronomy led to Copernican and Newtonian Physical Astronomy in Cosmology
Copernican and Newtonian physical astronomy grew directly out of mathematical astronomy, adopting its predictive aims and geometrical methods while adding physical causation. Copernicus himself was trained in and worked within the mathematical-astronomy tradition.
Carried by Nicolaus Copernicus; De revolutionibus (1543).
Great chain of being grew out of Neoplatonism in Medieval Philosophy
The great chain of being is a medieval Christian elaboration of Neoplatonic emanation, in which all things descend in graded order from the One; the hierarchy of being is the Neoplatonic scheme recast.
Carried by Plotinus; Pseudo-Dionysius.

History Of Scientific Ideas is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 16 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on History Of Scientific IdeasRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Physics 17 links
- Classical Mechanics 10 links
- Ancient Philosophy 9 links
- Relativity 8 links
- Chemistry 7 links
- Sociology Of Science 5 links
- Astronomy & Astrophysics 4 links
- History Of Scientific Practices 4 links
- Medieval Philosophy 4 links
- Metaphysics 4 links
- Philosophy Of Physics 4 links
- Philosophy Of Science 4 links
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