Sociology Of Science

The sociology of science studies science as a social activity: not whether scientific claims are true, but how they are made, certified, contested, and used.

11 frameworks, from 1931 to today · Sociology · Social Sciences

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

The sociology of science studies science as a social activity: not whether scientific claims are true, but how they are made, certified, contested, and used1. Its practitioners ask who gets to count as a knower, how a claim becomes a fact, why some findings travel and others do not, and how laboratories, journals, funding agencies, and disciplines organize what a society treats as knowledge. The stakes are high because science is the modern world's most authoritative form of knowledge; showing how that authority is built socially can look like an attack on it or like an explanation of why it works. That tension has driven the field's history.

Precursors: Science as a Social Institution

Sociology's founders treated science as a feature of modern society rather than a topic in its own right. Karl Marx saw science bound up with productive forces; Max Weber wrote about the rationalization of knowledge and, in Science as a Vocation (1917), about the institutional conditions of scholarly life. Émile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) argued that the categories of thought are socially organized, a claim later extended to scientific classification. In the 1930s, the Polish physician and philosopher Ludwik Fleck published Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact (1935), which described thought collectives and thought styles—groups whose shared assumptions make certain observations visible and others unthinkable—using the history of syphilis research and the Wassermann test. Fleck's book was little read until the 1970s, when it became a founding reference for the field.

A parallel strand came from Robert K. Merton, who in the late 1930s turned the sociology of knowledge toward science itself. His 1938 study of seventeenth-century England linked Puritanism and the rise of experimental science, and in 1942 he described the "ethos of science": universalism, communism (communal ownership of findings), disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Merton's approach treated science as a social institution with norms, rewards, and a reward system centered on priority—the race to be first, and the disputes it generates. His students built a research program on citation patterns, multiple discoveries, and the Matthew effect, whereby eminent scientists receive disproportionate credit. This Mertonian sociology of science was the dominant approach into the 1960s, and it treated the content of science as the province of scientists and philosophers, not sociologists.

Kuhn and the Turn to Content

Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) changed the terms of debate234. Kuhn, a historian of science, argued that science normally proceeds within a paradigm—a shared set of exemplars, methods, and assumptions—that defines which puzzles are worth solving235. Anomalies accumulate until a crisis, and a revolution replaces one paradigm with another34. Crucially, Kuhn argued that competing paradigms are not fully commensurable: their terms and standards differ, so the choice between them is not settled by logic and evidence alone2. Kuhn was not a sociologist and resisted relativist readings, but his account made scientific knowledge depend on community consensus, which invited sociological explanation of how consensus forms.

The Internalism–Externalism Debate

Before Kuhn's influence spread, sociologists and historians argued over internalism versus externalism. Internalists held that the development of science is driven by its own problems and logic; externalists held that social, economic, and political conditions shape it. The debate was sharpest in the 1930s, when Boris Hessen's 1931 paper attributed Newton's Principia to the economic and technical problems of the rising bourgeoisie, and in the Marxist historiography of J. D. Bernal. The Edinburgh school later reframed the issue: rather than choosing between internal and external causes, it proposed to explain the content of science itself by social causes, dissolving the distinction.

The Strong Programme

The decisive move came from the Science Studies Unit at the University of Edinburgh, founded in the 1960s around David Bloor and Barry Barnes. Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery (1976) set out the Strong Programme in the sociology of scientific knowledge, with four tenets: causality (beliefs are to be explained by social causes), impartiality (true and false beliefs get the same kind of explanation), symmetry (the same explanatory resources apply to both), and reflexivity (the programme's own claims apply to itself). The symmetry principle was the radical part: it forbade explaining a successful theory by its truth and a failed one by its error6. Barnes and Bloor's edited collection Scientific Knowledge: A Sociological Analysis (1996) and earlier work by Barnes on interests developed the "interest" model, in which what a group accepts depends on what serves its concerns. A celebrated case was the Edinburgh study of the 1970s controversy over phrenology, and later work on the statistical mechanics of the early nineteenth century, which argued that rival mathematical styles reflected different social and institutional commitments. The programme's critics, notably philosophers, objected that it made truth a social artifact; its defenders replied that they were explaining belief, not adjudicating truth.

Laboratory Studies and the Ethnography of Science

In the late 1970s a new generation went into laboratories with notebooks and tape recorders. Karin Knorr-Cetina's The Manufacture of Knowledge (1981) and Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar's Laboratory Life (1979) observed scientists at the bench and found that facts are constructed through inscription—the transformation of messy materials into written traces, graphs, and papers—and through literary persuasion. Latour and Woolgar introduced the idea that a statement's status shifts from "claim" to "fact" as it is taken up and no longer contested; their study of a neuroendocrinology laboratory at the Salk Institute traced how a substance called TRF (thyrotropin-releasing factor) moved from conjecture to accepted entity. Michael Lynch's ethnomethodological studies of laboratory talk and Harry Collins's work on replication in physics—especially his study of the dispute over gravitational radiation in the 1970s—showed that whether an experiment has been replicated is itself a social judgment. Collins introduced the "experimenter's regress": you cannot know whether an experiment is competent until you know whether its result is correct, and vice versa.

Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis

Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, developed from the 1960s, asked how people produce and recognize orderly social action in situ. Applied to science, it examined the local, practical reasoning through which scientists make their work accountable. Michael Lynch's Art and Artifact in Laboratory Science (1985) analyzed how biologists' talk and visual displays constitute observable findings. Conversation analysis, developed by Harvey Sacks and colleagues, was extended to scientific settings to show how the order of talk—turn-taking, repair, formulations—does the work of establishing what was seen and what it means. This strand insisted on studying science's methods as practical accomplishments rather than as applications of formal logic.

Actor-Network Theory

Bruno Latour, Michel Callon, and John Law developed actor-network theory (ANT) in the 1980s7. Its central move was to treat humans and nonhumans symmetrically as "actants" in networks, and to follow the work of translation by which heterogeneous elements—samples, machines, texts, people, institutions—are aligned so that a claim holds78. Callon's 1986 study of scallop cultivation in St Brieuc Bay described how researchers, fishermen, and scallops were enrolled into a network; Latour's Science in Action (1987) and The Pasteurization of France (1984) traced how Pasteur's laboratory extended its reach into French farms and society. ANT's "principle of symmetry" and its rejection of a priori distinctions between nature and society made it influential far beyond science studies, and also a target of criticism for flattening power and for its own rhetorical style.

Reflexivity and the Science Wars

By the 1990s the field had turned its tools on itself. Reflexivity—the demand that sociology of science account for its own knowledge claims—was pursued in different ways: Steve Woolgar's edited volume Knowledge and Reflexivity (1988) and the "new literary forms" experiments, and Pierre Bourdieu's Science of Science and Reflexivity (2001), which argued for a reflexive sociology that uses the field concept to explain scientific competition. The period also saw the "science wars": physicist Alan Sokal's 1996 hoax article in Social Text, followed by his book Fashionable Nonsense (1997), attacked what he saw as postmodern relativism in science studies. The ensuing debate forced the field to clarify that studying how scientific authority is produced is not the same as denying that science works1.

Science and Technology Studies and the Sociology of Ignorance

The sociology of science became part of the broader interdisciplinary field of science and technology studies (STS), which also includes history of science, philosophy of science, and technology studies9. Within sociology, the field diversified: studies of scientific institutions, expertise, and public understanding; feminist science studies, including work on how gender shapes research; and the sociology of scientific ignorance, which asks how non-knowledge is produced and maintained—through secrecy, regulatory gaps, and deliberate non-research. The study of ignorance, sometimes called agnotology, was advanced by historians and sociologists such as Robert Proctor, who examined the tobacco industry's production of doubt about the health effects of smoking. This strand showed that the social organization of not-knowing is as much a topic as the production of knowledge10.

The Field Today

Contemporary sociology of science draws on all these traditions. Ethnographic laboratory and field studies continue, often in new settings such as data-intensive biology and climate science. ANT and its successors inform work on infrastructure and expertise. The Strong Programme's symmetry principle remains a methodological touchstone, even where its stronger claims are qualified. Mertonian questions about norms and rewards persist in studies of peer review, citation, and research evaluation. The field now also engages with science policy, public participation, and the politics of expertise, and the sociology of ignorance has become a recognized subfield in its own right. Open questions include how to study machine learning and computational science as social practices, how scientific authority fares under political contestation, and how the field's own commitments to symmetry and reflexivity should guide research on knowledge that is contested or suppressed.

References

  1. Sociology of scientific knowledge, Wikipedia
  2. Thomas Kuhn, Wikipedia
  3. Paradigm shift, Wikipedia
  4. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Wikipedia
  5. Normal science, Wikipedia
  6. Strong programme, Wikipedia
  7. Actor–network theory (introduction, Background and context), Wikipedia
  8. Translation (sociology), Wikipedia
  9. Science and technology studies, Wikipedia
  10. Sociology of scientific ignorance, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Sociology Of Science

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1931-1975

    Internalism–Externalism Debate

    Is science driven by its own logic or by society?

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  2. 1938-1975

    Mertonian Sociology of Science

    What norms and rewards organize scientific communities?

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  3. 1962-Present

    Kuhnian paradigm theory

    How do scientific communities agree on what counts as true?

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  4. 1970-Present

    Ethnomethodology and Conversation Analysis of Science

    How do scientists practically produce orderly findings in situ?

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  5. 1976-2000

    Strong Programme

    Can social causes explain the content of scientific belief?

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  6. 1979-Present

    Laboratory Studies

    How are facts made at the laboratory bench?

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  7. 1980-Present

    Feminist technoscience

    Whose knowledge counts and who is excluded?

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  8. 1984-Present

    Actor-Network Theory

    How do human and nonhuman elements align into stable claims?

    About Actor-Network Theory
    Actor-Network Theory (ANT) emerged in the 1980s as a radical response to the question that had long animated the sociology of science: how can we account for scientific knowledge as a social product without reducing it to mere social bias? Where earlier frameworks like the Strong Programme explained knowledge through social interests and Mertonian sociology focused on institutional norms, ANT proposed a different starting point. Instead of assuming that 'the social' is a distinct realm that shapes science from the outside, ANT treats the social as something that must be explained—as a pattern of associations between heterogeneous entities. Its distinctive move is to grant agency to non-human actors—laboratory instruments, natural objects, technical artifacts—alongside human ones, and to trace how these actors form networks that stabilize or destabilize knowledge claims. For the sociology of science, ANT offers a way to study the content of science without treating it as either a reflection of social forces or a purely rational enterprise.
    Core Curriculum
    1. Actor – Any entity, human or non-human, that makes a difference in a network. An actor is not a pre-existing subject but something that is defined by its relations and actions.
    2. Network – A set of relations between actors. Networks are not fixed structures but ongoing achievements that require maintenance.
    3. Translation – The process by which actors align their interests and enroll others into a network. Translation involves four moments: problematization, interessement, enrollment, and mobilization.
    4. Black Box – A stabilized network whose internal complexity is hidden. In science, a black box is a fact or artifact that is taken for granted, such as a DNA sequencing protocol or a law of physics.
    5. Inscription – The process by which a program of action is written into a material form, such as a scientific paper, a laboratory instrument, or a bureaucratic form. Inscriptions allow networks to extend across time and space.
    6. Obligatory Passage Point – A node in a network that all actors must pass through to achieve their goals. In a scientific controversy, a laboratory may become an obligatory passage point for establishing a fact.
    7. Punctualization – The temporary simplification of a network into a single actor. For example, a scientific instrument is a punctualized network of components that functions as a single entity in a larger network.
    8. Symmetry – The principle that the same analytical vocabulary should be used to explain both successful and failed knowledge claims, and both human and non-human actors. This extends the Strong Programme's symmetry principle to include non-humans.
    9. Irreduction – The claim that no entity is inherently reducible to any other; all entities are networks of relations. This is a methodological stance against treating any single factor (e.g., social interests, natural laws) as the ultimate explanation.
    10. Plasma – The unformatted, unnetworked potential that surrounds networks. Plasma is what is not yet enrolled, translated, or stabilized.
    11. Sociology of Translation – The alternative name for ANT, emphasizing that the core activity is tracing how actors translate each other's interests and form alliances.
    12. Actor-Network – A hyphenated term that refuses to separate actors from networks: an actor is always a network, and a network is always an actor. This is the central ontological claim of ANT.
    Intellectual History
    Actor-Network Theory was developed in the 1980s at the Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation (CSI) of the École des Mines in Paris. Its key figures were Bruno Latour (1947–2022), Michel Callon (1945–), and John Law (1946–). Latour's early fieldwork in a neuroendocrinology laboratory, published as Laboratory Life (1979, with Steve Woolgar), laid the groundwork by showing how scientific facts are constructed through inscription devices and literary practices. Callon's 1986 study of scallop fishing in St. Brieuc Bay became the canonical exemplar of translation: he traced how marine biologists, fishermen, and scallops were enrolled into a network that ultimately failed to stabilize. Law's work on Portuguese maritime expansion (1986) extended the framework to long-distance control and the role of material artifacts.
    The seminal text that codified ANT for the sociology of science was Latour's Science in Action (1987), which introduced the methodological injunction to 'follow the actors' and to study science 'in the making' rather than 'ready-made'. Callon's 1986 article 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation' formalized the moments of translation. Latour's The Pasteurization of France (1988) applied ANT to the history of microbiology, showing how Louis Pasteur's laboratory became an obligatory passage point for understanding anthrax.
    ANT emerged in dialogue with the Strong Programme and ethnomethodological studies of science. From the Strong Programme, it inherited the symmetry principle but radicalized it by including non-humans. From ethnomethodology, it took a focus on the practical work of scientists but rejected the exclusive focus on human interaction. ANT also drew on the semiotics of Algirdas Greimas, using the concept of actants (entities that act) to treat non-humans as semiotic actors.
    By the 1990s, ANT faced criticism from feminist and postcolonial sociologists of science, who argued that its flat ontology ignored power asymmetries and the role of gender and coloniality in shaping networks. Feminist sociologists like Donna Haraway and postcolonial scholars like Warwick Anderson pushed ANT to attend to the situatedness of actors and the exclusions that networks produce. ANT responded by incorporating concepts like 'multiplicity' and 'ontological politics', but it remained a distinct framework focused on tracing associations rather than explaining them through pre-existing social categories.
    ANT's legacy in the sociology of science is enduring. It provided a vocabulary for studying the materiality of scientific practice, the role of non-humans in knowledge production, and the processes by which facts become stabilized. Its influence extends beyond sociology into science and technology studies (STS), geography, organization studies, and anthropology. However, in the sociology of science, ANT is best understood as a methodological toolkit for tracing how scientific knowledge is assembled, rather than as a theory that explains why some knowledge succeeds over others.
    The 12 concepts its tower teaches
    • Actor
    • Actor-Network
    • Black Box
    • Inscription
    • Irreduction
    • Network
    • Obligatory Passage Point
    • Plasma
    • Punctualization
    • Sociology of Translation
    • Symmetry
    • Translation

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  9. 1985-Present

    Science and technology studies

    How are science and technology shaped by and shaping society?

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  10. 1988-2010

    Reflexive Sociology of Science

    Can sociology of science account for its own claims?

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  11. 1995-Present

    Sociology of Scientific Ignorance

    How is ignorance produced and sustained socially?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Internalism–Externalism DebateMertonian Sociology of ScienceKuhnian paradigm theoryEthnomethodology and Conversation Ana…Strong ProgrammeLaboratory StudiesFeminist technoscienceActor-Network TheoryScience and technology studiesReflexive Sociology of ScienceSociology of Scientific Ignorance

Beyond the field

Where Sociology Of Science's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 48 links.

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Sociology Of Science is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 11 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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