- Atlas
- Philosophy
- Skepticism
Skepticism
Skepticism, in epistemology, is the family of positions that question whether knowledge—or justified belief—is possible, and the family of strategies for living with that question.
10 frameworks, from 360 BCE to today · Epistemology · Philosophy
- Pyrrhonism 360 BCE-300
- Academic Skepticism 315 BCE-129 BCE
- Cartesian Doubt 1641-1800
- Humean Skepticism 1739-Present
- Here is one hand 1925-Present
- On Certainty 1969-Present
- Relevant Alternatives and Tracking 1970-Present
- Moral Skepticism 1977-Present
- Contextualism 1980-Present
- Skepticism About Disagreement 2005-Present
Overview
Skepticism, in epistemology, is the family of positions that question whether knowledge—or justified belief—is possible, and the family of strategies for living with that question12. It is not one doctrine but a long argument with several distinct branches. Some skeptics have denied that anything can be known; others have suspended judgment while continuing to inquire; others have used doubt as a tool to rebuild knowledge on firmer ground; and still others have argued that skepticism is a confusion to be dissolved rather than answered. What is at stake is not academic. If the skeptic is right, then confidence in science, testimony, memory, and perception needs a defense it may not have. If the skeptic is wrong, we should be able to say exactly why—and the history of the field is largely the history of attempts to say why.
Ancient Pyrrhonism: Suspension of Judgment as a Way of Life
The earliest systematic skepticism in the Western tradition is Pyrrhonian, named after Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BCE), who wrote nothing but whose outlook was recorded by his follower Timon. Pyrrho reportedly traveled with Alexander's expedition to India, and ancient sources connect his calm indifference to Eastern ascetic traditions—though the details are uncertain and should be treated cautiously. What is clear is the shape of the movement that took his name.
The central Pyrrhonian idea is isostheneia: the equal strength of opposing arguments1. For any claim, the skeptic can construct a case of comparable force on the other side. Faced with this equipollence, the appropriate response is epochē—suspension of judgment—and suspension, Pyrrhonians claimed, brings ataraxia, tranquility1. The skeptic does not assert that nothing can be known; that would itself be a dogmatic claim. The skeptic simply continues to inquire.
Sextus Empiricus, a physician-philosopher of the second or third century CE, gave the movement its surviving systematic form in Outlines of Pyrrhonism. There he assembled the "modes"—standard argument patterns for producing equipollence. The ten modes attributed to Aenesidemus exploit differences among animals, humans, senses, circumstances, positions, and mixtures to show that the same object appears differently and no appearance can be privileged. The later five modes, attributed to Agrippa, are more compressed and more devastating: the regress of justification (every reason needs a reason), the assumption of a starting point (dogmatism), circularity, infinite regress, and relativity. These five remain the skeleton of nearly every subsequent skeptical argument in epistemology.
Academic Skepticism: Arcesilaus, Carneades, and the Probable
Plato's Academy took a skeptical turn under Arcesilaus (c. 315–240 BCE), who turned the school's dialectical method against the Stoics134. The Stoics held that some impressions are "kataleptic"—so clear that they could not be false, and that assent to them constituted knowledge34. Arcesilaus argued that for any true impression a false one could be indistinguishable, so no impression is safe to assent to. The Academic skeptic therefore suspends judgment, but—unlike the Pyrrhonian—does so as a philosophical position defended in argument.
Carneades (c. 214–129 BCE) developed this into a more constructive program15. Since action cannot wait for certainty, he proposed that the wise person follows the "persuasive" or pithanon—impressions that survive scrutiny, are consistent with surrounding circumstances, and are not contradicted5. This is an early theory of probable reasoning, and it marks a real divergence from Pyrrhonism: the Academic skeptic can guide practice by degrees of credibility, while the Pyrrhonian claims only to follow appearances without ranking them15.
The distinction between the two schools was itself contested in antiquity. Sextus devoted much of Outlines I to arguing that the Academics were really dogmatists in disguise, since they asserted that nothing could be known. The dispute matters because it shows that "skepticism" was never a single thing: the question of whether the skeptic can consistently claim anything is as old as the movement.
Cartesian Doubt: Skepticism as a Method
René Descartes (1596–1650) transformed the subject16. In the Meditations (1641) he deployed doubt not as a destination but as a tool17. He resolved to withhold assent from anything that could be doubted, and found that the senses can deceive, that waking experience may be indistinguishable from dreaming, and—most radically—that an "evil demon" of unlimited power might be manufacturing all his experiences, including his mathematical reasoning.
The point of the exercise was constructive. Descartes argued that even in the demon scenario the doubter cannot doubt that he is thinking, and that a being who thinks exists: cogito, ergo sum18. From that foothold he attempted to prove God's existence and veracity, and thereby the reliability of clear and distinct perception, and so the external world1. Whether the proof succeeds is another matter; what matters historically is that Descartes made radical doubt a methodological device and set the agenda for the next three centuries. The "Cartesian skeptic" who doubts the external world became the standard interlocutor of epistemology.
Hume: Skepticism About Causation and Induction
David Hume (1711–1776) shifted the target from perception to inference. In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) he argued that all reasoning about matters of fact rests on the relation of cause and effect, and that this relation is never given in experience. We observe that one event follows another, never that it must9. The expectation of regularity is produced by custom and habit, not by reason19. Hence the famous problem of induction: no argument can justify the inference from observed to unobserved without presupposing that the future will resemble the past—an assumption itself grounded only in custom109.
Hume's conclusion was a "mitigated" or "academic" skepticism: we cannot justify our inductive practices by reason, but nature compels us to rely on them. He distinguished this from the "Pyrrhonian" variety, which he thought unlivable1. The distinction between a skepticism that undermines justification and one that merely describes our cognitive constitution became a template for later debates.
Moore and Common Sense: The Reversal
G. E. Moore (1873–1958) answered the Cartesian skeptic by refusing the terms of the debate. In "A Defence of Common Sense" (1925) and "Proof of an External World" (1939) he held up his hands and claimed to know that here is one hand and here is another. If the skeptic's premises entail that Moore does not know this, Moore reasoned, so much the worse for the premises. His "proof" was deliberately unimpressive as a proof; its force lay in the claim that ordinary knowledge is more certain than any philosophical argument against it.
Moore's stance raised a sharp question that still organizes the field: what is the logical structure of the skeptic's argument, and where exactly does it go wrong? The skeptic typically relies on two claims—that we cannot know we are not in a skeptical scenario (a brain in a vat, a dream, a demon's world), and that if we cannot know that, we cannot know ordinary things either1112. This second claim is an instance of epistemic closure: the principle that if you know P, and you know that P entails Q, then you know Q. Moore's response effectively denies the skeptic's first premise; later philosophers asked whether closure itself should be rejected instead11.
Closure, Context, and the Skeptical Hypothesis
Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick in the 1970s and 1980s argued that knowledge is not closed under known entailment. On their "relevant alternatives" and "tracking" accounts, you can know you have hands without knowing you are not a brain in a vat, because the vat scenario is not a relevant alternative in ordinary contexts. The cost is that knowledge becomes sensitive to which possibilities are salient.
Contextualism, developed by Stewart Cohen, Keith DeRose, and David Lewis in the 1980s and 1990s, offered a different resolution. On this view the truth conditions of "S knows that P" shift with the conversational context: in ordinary contexts the standards are moderate and knowledge claims are true; in philosophical contexts, where skeptical hypotheses are raised, the standards rise and the same claims become false. The skeptic is right in the seminar room and wrong in the kitchen, and neither is contradicting the other. Critics pressed whether this is a satisfying answer or an evasion—whether it explains the pull of skepticism or merely relabels it.
Wittgenstein and Framework Certainty
Ludwig Wittgenstein's On Certainty, written in the last eighteen months of his life (1949–51) and published posthumously in 1969, approached the problem from a different direction13. Wittgenstein observed that doubt presupposes a background of things not doubted: to doubt that this is a hand, one must hold fixed a great deal else—that there are hands, that words mean what they do, that one is awake13. These "hinge" propositions are not known in the ordinary sense, nor are they doubted; they are the scaffolding within which inquiry and doubt operate. The skeptic who tries to doubt everything finds that doubt itself has run out of ground13.
This idea—that some commitments are exempt from justification because they make justification possible—was taken up by later "hinge epistemology," but its implications remain disputed. Does it refute the skeptic or merely describe the practice of doubting? Does it license dogmatism about framework beliefs?
Moral Skepticism and Skepticism About Disagreement
Two further branches deserve mention. Moral skepticism questions whether there are moral facts or whether moral knowledge is possible; it ranges from error theory (J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, 1977, argued that moral values are "queer" entities not fit to be known) to more modest doubts about moral justification. It is a distinct subfield, but it shares the Pyrrhonian and Humean worry that our evaluative responses may reflect sentiment rather than insight.
Skepticism about disagreement, by contrast, is a relatively recent development in analytic epistemology, emerging in the 2000s and 2010s. The core observation is that persistent, informed disagreement among epistemic peers—people with the same evidence and comparable competence—creates pressure to revise or suspend one's beliefs14. Conciliationists (such as Adam Elga and David Christensen) argue that one should move toward the other's view; steadfasters (such as Thomas Kelly) argue that one may retain one's belief if one has reason to think one's own assessment is more reliable. The debate connects back to the ancient equipollence argument: if equally competent judges disagree, what justifies confidence1?
The Present: Live Approaches and Open Questions
Skepticism today is less a single position than a set of pressure points. Closure-based arguments and their denials remain central; contextualism and its rivals (including subject-sensitive invariantism) contest how knowledge attributions work; hinge epistemology continues to develop Wittgenstein's insight; and formal epistemology has begun modeling skeptical scenarios and disagreement with probabilistic tools. The Pyrrhonian question—whether the skeptic can live without belief—has been revived by scholars of ancient philosophy and by epistemologists interested in the ethics of belief.
What unites the field is the recognition that skepticism is not an enemy to be refuted once and for all but a standing test of any theory of knowledge. A theory that cannot say why the skeptic is wrong, or why the skeptic's challenge is ill-formed, has not finished its work. The history of the subfield is the record of that work, and it is not over.
References
- Skepticism (introduction, Philosophy), Wikipedia
- Philosophical skepticism, Wikipedia
- Academic skepticism, Wikipedia
- Arcesilaus, Wikipedia
- Carneades, Wikipedia
- René Descartes, Wikipedia
- Meditations on First Philosophy, Wikipedia
- Cogito, ergo sum, Wikipedia
- David Hume, Wikipedia
- Problem of induction, Wikipedia
- Epistemic closure, Wikipedia
- Brain in a vat, Wikipedia
- On Certainty, Wikipedia
- Disagreement (epistemology), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Skepticism
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 360 BCE-300
- 315 BCE-129 BCE
- 1641-1800
- 1739-Present
- 1925-Present
- 1969-Present
- 1970-Present
Relevant Alternatives and Tracking
Which alternatives must be ruled out for knowledge?
- 1977-Present
- 1980-Present
- 2005-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Here is one hand reacted against Cartesian Doubt
Moore's defence of common sense and his proof of an external world were framed as direct replies to the Cartesian skeptic who doubts the existence of hands and the external world. He argued that ordinary knowledge is more certain than any philosophical argument against it.
Carried by G. E. Moore; A Defence of Common Sense (1925).
Academic Skepticism rival of Pyrrhonism
Arcesilaus turned the Academy against Stoic dogmatism with a dialectical method that produced suspension of judgment, a stance Sextus later attacked as dogmatic in disguise. The two schools competed over whether the skeptic can consistently claim anything.
Carried by Arcesilaus; Sextus Empiricus.
Cartesian Doubt influenced by Pyrrhonism
Descartes inherited the Pyrrhonian modes of equipollence and the goal of withholding assent, but repurposed doubt as a methodological tool to rebuild knowledge. The Meditations explicitly engage the ancient skeptical tradition.
Carried by René Descartes; Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
Humean Skepticism reacted against Cartesian Doubt
Hume rejected Descartes's attempt to ground knowledge on clear and distinct ideas and a proof of God's veracity, shifting skepticism from perception to causal inference. He argued that reason cannot justify our inductive practices, only custom and habit can.
Carried by David Hume; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).
On Certainty reacted against Cartesian Doubt
Wittgenstein rejects the Cartesian picture of doubt as a universal method, arguing that doubt presupposes certainty and that some propositions stand fast for us. He dissolves rather than answers the skeptical question by examining the role of doubt in language games.
Carried by Ludwig Wittgenstein; On Certainty (1969).
Relevant Alternatives and Tracking influenced by Cartesian Doubt
The Cartesian skeptical hypothesis of an evil demon or brain in a vat provides the standard test case for tracking and relevant alternatives theories. These accounts aim to explain why we can know ordinary things without knowing we are not in such a scenario.
Carried by Fred Dretske; Robert Nozick.
Contextualism influenced by Cartesian Doubt
Contextualism addresses the Cartesian skeptical argument by making the truth of knowledge claims depend on context, so that the skeptic is right in philosophical contexts and wrong in ordinary ones. The skeptical hypothesis remains the central case that contextualist semantics is designed to handle.
Carried by Stewart Cohen; Keith DeRose; David Lewis.
On Certainty influenced by Here is one hand
Wittgenstein's On Certainty takes up Moore's 'here is one hand' as its starting point and asks what kind of certainty such claims express. He transforms Moore's common-sense defence into an inquiry into framework propositions that cannot be doubted or justified.
Carried by Ludwig Wittgenstein; On Certainty (1969).
Relevant Alternatives and Tracking influenced by Here is one hand
Dretske and Nozick developed relevant alternatives and tracking accounts partly in response to Moore's denial of the skeptic's first premise, asking instead whether epistemic closure should be rejected. Moore's proof raised the question of the logical structure of the skeptic's argument that these theories address.
Carried by Fred Dretske; Robert Nozick.
Contextualism rival of Relevant Alternatives and Tracking
Contextualism emerged as a rival to relevant alternatives and tracking accounts, offering a different explanation of why skeptical hypotheses raise the standards for knowledge. Cohen, DeRose, and Lewis argued that knowledge attributions shift with conversational context rather than with relevant alternatives.
Carried by Stewart Cohen; Keith DeRose; David Lewis.
Skepticism About Disagreement influenced by Contextualism
Skepticism about disagreement extends contextualist and relativist ideas about how standards shift with context to the case of peer disagreement. The question of whether disagreement undermines knowledge or justification builds on contextualist treatments of shifting epistemic standards.
Humean Skepticism influenced by Pyrrhonism
Hume explicitly distinguished his mitigated skepticism from the Pyrrhonian variety, which he thought unlivable, and drew on ancient skeptical arguments about the senses and reason. He framed his own conclusion as a moderate alternative to radical doubt.
Carried by David Hume; An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748).
Cartesian Doubt influenced by Academic Skepticism
Academic arguments about the indistinguishability of true and false impressions and the fallibility of the senses fed into Descartes's methodological doubt. Carneades's probable reasoning also shaped later discussions of evidence.
Carried by Carneades; René Descartes.
Moral Skepticism influenced by Humean Skepticism
Moral skepticism draws on Humean arguments about the gap between facts and values and the role of sentiment in moral judgment. The Humean denial that reason alone can justify moral conclusions is a precursor to later moral error theories and skepticism about moral knowledge.
Carried by David Hume; J. L. Mackie.
Beyond the field
Where Skepticism's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 42 links.
Pyrrhonism led to Hellenistic Skepticism in Epistemology
Pyrrho's skepticism, transmitted by Timon, was taken up by Aenesidemus when he founded the Pyrrhonist school around the first century BCE, giving Hellenistic Skepticism its Pyrrhonian branch.
Carried by Pyrrho; Timon of Phlius; Aenesidemus.
Humean Skepticism grew out of Empiricism in Epistemology
Hume's skepticism grew directly out of the empiricism of Locke and Berkeley, pushing their principle that all ideas derive from impressions to skeptical conclusions about causation, substance and the self in the Treatise.
Carried by David Hume; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).
Contextualism influenced by Contextualism in Context And Indexicality
Epistemic contextualism about knowledge attributions was built directly on the semantics of indexicals and context-sensitivity developed in philosophy of language, with 'knows' treated as context-sensitive like 'here' or 'tall'.
Carried by David Lewis; Stewart Cohen.
Contextualism provoked Assessment Sensitivity in Context And Indexicality
MacFarlane's assessment sensitivity was developed explicitly against epistemic contextualism about knowledge attributions, which he argued mishandles retraction and disagreement. Relativism about assessment is offered as the rival account of the same data that contextualism tried to explain.
Carried by John MacFarlane.
Pyrrhonism rival of Academic Skepticism in Epistemology Of Disagreement
Pyrrhonism and Academic Skepticism were contemporary rival forms of skepticism, disagreeing over whether the skeptic may hold or merely suspend judgement. Aenesidemus and later Pyrrhonists defined their position against the Academy's perceived dogmatism.
Carried by Aenesidemus.
Pyrrhonism provoked Rationalism in Epistemology
Descartes and later rationalists defined their confidence in reason partly against Pyrrhonian skepticism, which they sought to answer through methodical doubt and indubitable foundations.
Carried by René Descartes.
Pyrrhonism influenced Moral skepticism in Metaethics
Pyrrhonian equipollence and epochē were taken up by modern moral skeptics as models for suspending judgment about moral claims, especially in discussions of moral disagreement. The transmission runs through Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
Carried by Sextus Empiricus; Outlines of Pyrrhonism.
Pyrrhonism rival of Epicureanism in Ancient Philosophy
Pyrrhonism and Epicureanism were contemporary Hellenistic schools competing over the goal of life and the reliability of sense experience. Epicurus' claim that all sensations are true was a direct target of Pyrrhonian argument.
Carried by Pyrrho; Sextus Empiricus.
Academic Skepticism influenced Skeptical and Criterion Traditions in Epistemology Of Disagreement
The criterion tradition, the question of how to decide which impressions are true, was shaped by Academic Skeptic attacks on the Stoic criterion. Arcesilaus and Carneades argued against any criterion, and this debate set the terms later skeptics inherited.
Carried by Arcesilaus; Carneades.
Academic Skepticism rival of Pyrrhonism in Epistemology Of Disagreement
Academic Skepticism under Arcesilaus and Carneades and Pyrrhonism competed as rival Hellenistic skepticisms over suspension of judgement and the criterion of truth. Aenesidemus reportedly broke from the Academy to revive a purer Pyrrhonism, defining it against the Academic position.
Carried by Arcesilaus; Carneades; Aenesidemus.
Academic Skepticism reacted against Demonstrative Science in Justification Theory
Academic skeptics attacked the Stoic and Aristotelian ideal of demonstrative science, arguing that no premises can be established with certainty and that the criterion of truth fails, thereby defining their position against it.
Carried by Arcesilaus; Carneades.
Academic Skepticism influenced by Sophistic and Socratic Dialectic in Ancient Philosophy
Academic Skepticism took over the Sophistic technique of arguing both sides of any question (antilogia) and the dialectical method of Socrates, using opposed arguments to produce equipollence and suspension of assent.
Carried by Arcesilaus; Carneades.

Skepticism is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on SkepticismRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Epistemology Of Disagreement 12 links
- Epistemology 9 links
- Ancient Philosophy 6 links
- Justification Theory 5 links
- Context And Indexicality 4 links
- Metaethics 2 links
- Ethics 1 link
- Reference And Truth 1 link
- Philosophy Of Causation 1 link
- Philosophy Of Science 1 link