Metaethics

Metaethics is the part of moral philosophy that steps back from particular moral questions to ask what is going on when we make them.

20 frameworks, from 200 to today · Ethics · Philosophy

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Overview

Metaethics is the part of moral philosophy that steps back from particular moral questions to ask what is going on when we make them1. It asks whether moral claims can be true or false, what it is for something to be good or right, what moral language means, and what could move a person to act on a moral judgment12. Where normative ethics argues that, say, lying is wrong, metaethics asks what the word "wrong" is doing there at all1. The stakes are large: if moral judgments are neither true nor false, or if moral facts are too strange to exist, then the authority we grant to morality needs another explanation. The history of the field is a long argument about whether morality is discovered, invented, felt, commanded, or projected.

Ancient Foundations: The Good, the Law, and the Sceptic

Metaethical questions appear in the earliest surviving philosophical texts, though not under that name. Plato's dialogues press the question of whether goodness is a feature of things themselves or a matter of convention and command. In the Euthyphro, Socrates asks whether the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious, or pious because it is loved by the gods—a dilemma that still frames debates about divine command theory. Plato's own answer, the Form of the Good, is an early non-naturalist realism: goodness is a real, objective feature of reality, knowable by reason but not reducible to pleasure or power.

Aristotle naturalised the picture without abandoning objectivity. In the Nicomachean Ethics, the good for a human being is eudaimonia, flourishing, understood through the characteristic function of a rational animal. This is a naturalist realism in embryo: moral facts are facts about what perfects a kind of creature. The Stoics developed a related natural law idea—that reason pervades the cosmos and human law should conform to it—which later Christian thinkers would absorb.

Ancient scepticism supplied the counterweight. Sextus Empiricus, writing around the second century CE, catalogued arguments that moral customs vary so widely that no universal standard can be inferred, and that reason cannot settle disputes about what is by nature good. These are recognisably metaethical arguments: from disagreement to the denial of objective moral truth.

Divine Command and Natural Law in the Medieval Synthesis

Medieval Christian philosophy made the question of morality's foundation explicit. Augustine and later scholastics held that the eternal law in God's reason is the ultimate standard of right and wrong. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, gave natural law its classic formulation: human beings participate in God's eternal law through reason, and the basic precepts of the natural law—that good is to be done and evil avoided, that life, knowledge, and society are goods—are knowable by anyone. Natural law theory thus claims that moral truth is objective and accessible to reason independently of revelation, while grounding it in a divine order.

The rival position, theological voluntarism, holds that actions are right or wrong because God commands or forbids them3. Its sharpest medieval defender was William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, who argued that God's absolute power could have commanded the opposite of what he did, so that the moral law depends on his will rather than on his reason or on the natures of things. The dispute mattered practically: if morality rests on command, it rests on authority; if on nature, it rests on reason. The Euthyphro dilemma returns here in Christian dress3.

Sentiment and Moral Sense: The Eighteenth-Century Turn Inward

The early modern period shifted attention from cosmic order to human nature. Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf built moral and political obligation on natural law and contract, but a different current emerged in Britain. Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, argued in the early 1700s that virtue consists in a well-ordered affection of the soul, perceived by a "moral sense." Francis Hutcheson developed the idea that we approve benevolence through an inner sense rather than by calculation.

David Hume gave moral sentimentalism its most influential form4. In A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), he argued that moral distinctions are not derived from reason but from sentiment: reason discovers facts, but the move from "is" to "ought" requires a feeling of approbation or disapprobation456. Hume's claim that moral judgments are "impressions" of feeling rather than conclusions of reason is a direct ancestor of non-cognitivism5. Adam Smith's Theory of the Moral Sentiments (1759) refined the account with the device of the impartial spectator—we judge ourselves by imagining how a well-informed, sympathetic observer would respond.

Against this, Richard Price and later Thomas Reid defended a rationalist intuitionism: moral truths are self-evident to reason, not products of feeling. The division between those who located morality in reason and those who located it in sentiment set the terms for the next century.

Kant: Autonomy, Constructivism, and the Priority of the Practical

Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy, above all the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), transformed the field. Kant rejected both sentimentalism and divine command: moral law must be binding on a rational will, and a will is bound only by a law it gives itself. This is autonomy. The categorical imperative—act only on maxims you could will as universal law—is the form such a law takes7.

Kant's metaethical significance is twofold. First, he insisted that the moral law is a fact of practical reason, not a fact about the world discovered by theoretical reason; the "ought" has its own authority. Second, his idea that moral principles are generated by the procedure of universalisation is the seed of Kantian constructivism: the thought that moral truths are not found in the world but are constituted by the requirements of rational agency. Later constructivists, notably John Rawls and Christine Korsgaard, would develop this into a full metaethical position—that moral facts are constructed by a procedure of practical reasoning rather than discovered as independent objects.

The Nineteenth Century: Naturalism, Evolution, and the Attack on Morality

Nineteenth-century thought pressed naturalistic and sceptical options. Utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill treated moral facts as facts about pleasure and pain, though Mill's Utilitarianism (1861) also contains a famous and contested "proof" of the principle of utility. Herbert Spencer and later evolutionary thinkers tried to derive moral norms from the natural history of cooperation.

The most radical challenge came from Friedrich Nietzsche18. In On the Genealogy of Morality (1887), he argued that moral values are human creations with a history—born of ressentiment and the struggle of competing value systems—and that there are no moral facts "in themselves." This is a genealogical form of moral scepticism, and it set a question that analytic philosophy would later confront in a different idiom: if moral values have a natural history, what becomes of their authority?

The Analytic Century: Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and the Is–Ought Gap

Twentieth-century metaethics in the English-speaking world organised itself around a single question: are moral judgments beliefs that can be true or false (cognitivism), or are they expressions of attitude that cannot be (non-cognitivism)?

G. E. Moore's Principia Ethica (1903) opened the analytic era with a defence of non-naturalist realism. Moore argued that "good" is a simple, indefinable property, and that any attempt to define it in natural terms commits the "naturalistic fallacy"—the mistake of identifying the good with some natural property such as pleasure156. His open-question argument: for any proposed natural definition of good, it remains an open question whether that thing is good, which shows the definition has not captured what "good" means9. Moore's realism posited a realm of non-natural moral properties, knowable by intuition1.

The emotivists replied that moral language does not describe anything at all15. A. J. Ayer, in Language, Truth and Logic (1936), held that moral statements are neither analytic nor empirically verifiable, and so are literally meaningless; they express feeling15. Charles Stevenson's Ethics and Language (1944) gave a subtler version: moral judgments express attitudes and have the function of influencing others' attitudes. Emotivism is a form of non-cognitivism, and its appeal was that it explained moral disagreement as disagreement in attitude rather than in belief.

R. M. Hare's prescriptivism, developed in The Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963), offered a more rationalist non-cognitivism. Moral judgments are universal prescriptions: to call something good is to commend it to anyone in relevantly similar circumstances17. Hare thought this logical structure, combined with the requirement of universalisability, could generate substantive moral conclusions—a striking attempt to get normative mileage out of metaethical analysis.

Against all of these, the mid-century saw a revival of naturalist realism. Philippa Foot, in essays from the 1950s onward, argued that moral evaluation is grounded in human needs and harms, and that virtues are excellences that human beings need to flourish. Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay "Modern Moral Philosophy" attacked the whole post-Enlightenment framework, arguing that the notion of moral obligation only makes sense within a law conception of ethics, and that modern philosophy had lost the divine lawgiver while keeping the law. Her essay helped revive virtue ethics and naturalism.

Error Theory and the Metaphysical Turn

J. L. Mackie's Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) gave moral scepticism its most rigorous modern statement. Mackie argued that moral judgments presuppose objective, categorically authoritative values, but that no such values exist—the "argument from queerness" holds that if they did, they would be entities of a very strange kind, and our knowledge of them would require a special faculty unlike any other. So all positive moral judgments are false1. This is error theory: moral discourse is systematically in error, though Mackie thought it might be useful to keep the fiction.

Mackie's challenge forced realists to say more precisely what moral properties are and how we know them. The 1980s and 1990s produced a wave of sophisticated realist responses. Michael Smith's The Moral Problem (1994) defended a naturalist realism on which moral facts are facts about what fully rational agents would desire. Peter Railton and Richard Boyd developed Cornell realism, holding that moral properties are natural properties discoverable by the same broadly empirical methods as other theoretical properties. David Brink and others defended moral realism as the best explanation of moral practice and moral progress.

Expressivism and the Linguistic Turn

Non-cognitivism did not disappear; it evolved. Simon Blackburn's quasi-realism, developed from the 1980s, and Allan Gibbard's norm-expressivism, in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (1990), sought to explain how moral language can behave as if it were fact-stating—supporting inferences, embedding in conditionals, and being assessed for consistency—while still expressing attitudes rather than beliefs. This expressivist programme became one of the most technically demanding areas of late twentieth-century metaethics, with the Frege–Geach problem (how to explain the logical behaviour of moral sentences in complex contexts) as its central puzzle.

Reasons, Constructivism, and Response-Dependence

A parallel strand concerned reasons for action. Reasons internalism, associated with Bernard Williams's 1981 essay "Internal and External Reasons," holds that a reason for action must connect to something in the agent's existing motivational set; externalism denies this. The debate reshaped how metaethicists thought about moral motivation and the authority of moral demands.

Kantian constructivism matured in the work of John Rawls, whose later writings and lectures presented his theory of justice as a constructivist metaethics, and Christine Korsgaard, whose The Sources of Normativity (1996) argued that the norms of practical reason are generated by the reflective structure of agency itself. On this view, moral facts are not discovered but made by the activity of rational self-legislation.

Response-dependence theories offered another route to objectivity. On these accounts, moral properties are those that would be ascribed by an ideal or appropriately situated observer—a view with roots in Hume and Smith and developed in different forms by later philosophers. The idea is that moral truth is not independent of human responses, but neither is it merely arbitrary, because the relevant responses are idealised.

The Present: Plural Approaches and Open Questions

Metaethics today is plural. Non-naturalist realism, defended in different forms by philosophers such as Derek Parfit in On What Matters (2011), remains a live option, as does naturalist realism. Expressivism continues to be refined. Error theory has found new defenders. Constructivism and response-dependence theories offer middle paths. The field has also become more empirically informed, with experimental philosophy probing ordinary intuitions about moral objectivity and disagreement, and with renewed attention to moral epistemology—how we could know moral facts if they exist.

The questions that remain open are the ones that have driven the field from the start: whether moral truth is discovered or made, whether moral language describes or expresses, whether moral facts are natural or sui generis, and what could give morality its authority over us. Each generation has answered by reworking the tools of its time—Plato's Forms, Aquinas's natural law, Hume's sentiment, Kant's autonomy, Moore's non-natural properties, Mackie's error theory—and the argument continues.

References

  1. Metaethics (introduction, Metaethical questions, Moral rationalism, Moral realism, Non-cognitivist theories, Error theory), Wikipedia
  2. Ethics, Wikipedia
  3. Divine command theory, Wikipedia
  4. Moral sense theory (introduction, History), Wikipedia
  5. Emotivism (History, introduction), Wikipedia
  6. Naturalistic fallacy, Wikipedia
  7. Universal prescriptivism, Wikipedia
  8. Moral skepticism, Wikipedia
  9. Open-question argument, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Metaethics

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 200-Present

    Moral skepticism

    Can we ever know objective moral truths?

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  2. 1200-Present

    Theological Voluntarism

    Does morality depend on God's command or God's reason?

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  3. 1250-Present

    Natural law

    Can reason discover moral law in nature?

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  4. 1300-1700

    Divine command theory

    Are actions right because God commands them?

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  5. 1739-Present

    Moral sense theory

    Do we perceive virtue through a moral sense?

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  6. 1739-Present

    Moral Sentimentalism

    Do moral judgments rest on feeling rather than reason?

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  7. 1758-Present
  8. 1903-Present

    Ethical non-naturalism

    Are moral properties simple and non-natural?

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  9. 1903-Present

    Moral realism

    Are there objective moral facts independent of us?

    About Moral realism
    Moral realism is the metaethical position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world—features independent of anyone's subjective opinion, and that some of those propositions are true. This makes it makes moral realism a form of ethical cognitivism combined with an ontological commitment to mind-independent moral facts. It stands in direct opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism, including error theory, non-cognitivism, and moral relativism. The central question moral realism addresses is: when we say something like 'torture is wrong,' are we reporting a fact about the world, or are we doing something else—expressing an emotion, issuing a command, or projecting an attitude? Moral realism insists we are reporting facts.
    Core Curriculum
    A first course in moral realism typically builds around these fundamental concepts, taught in a logical progression:
    1. Cognitivism – The thesis that moral statements express beliefs that can be true or false. This is the semantic foundation of moral realism.
    2. Truth-Aptness – The property of a statement being capable of being evaluated as true or false. Moral realists hold that moral claims are truth-apt.
    3. Mind-Independence – The claim that moral facts are not constituted by anyone's attitudes, beliefs, or conventions. They exist 'out there,' waiting to be discovered.
    4. Moral Facts – The objective states of affairs that make moral propositions true. For the realist, 'murder is wrong' is true because there is a fact of the matter about murder's wrongness.
    .
    1. Moral Properties – The features of actions, persons, or institutions that ground moral facts. Examples include rightness, wrongness, goodness, and badness.
    2. Moral Truth – The correspondence between a moral proposition and a mind-independent moral fact. Truth is not relative to a culture or individual.
    3. Moral Knowledge – The justified true belief about moral facts. Realists must explain how we come to know objective moral truths.
    4. Moral Objectivity – The idea that moral judgments are true or false independently of what anyone thinks. This is the core commitment that distinguishes realism from subjectivism and relativism.
    5. Ethical Naturalism – The view that moral properties are natural properties, accessible through empirical investigation. A prominent sub-type of moral realism.
    6. Ethical Non-Naturalism – The view that moral properties are sui generis, non-natural properties, known through a special faculty of intuition. Another major sub-type.
    7. The Naturalistic Fallacy – G.E. Moore's charge that any attempt to define 'good' in natural terms (e.g., as pleasure) commits a fallacy. This concept is central to debates between naturalists and non-naturalists.
    8. The Open Question Argument – Moore's argument that for any natural definition of 'good,' it remains an open question whether something with that natural property is actually good, showing that 'good' cannot be identical to any natural property.
    9. Moral Perception – The idea, defended by some realists, that we can perceive moral properties directly, analogous to how we perceive colors or shapes.
    10. The Moral Twin Earth Argument – A thought experiment used to defend moral realism against certain forms of relativism and to argue that moral terms refer to the same properties across different communities.
    Intellectual History
    Moral realism has ancient roots, but its modern form crystallized in the 20th century as a response to the rise of non-cognitivism and moral relativism. The immediate predecessor in the metaethics subfield was Moral Relativism (1960–present), which gained prominence through the work of anthropologists and philosophers who emphasized cross-cultural moral diversity. Moral realism emerged as a counter-position, reasserting the possibility of objective moral truth.
    The key figure in the early 20th-century revival of moral realism was G.E. Moore (1873–1958). His 1903 work Principia Ethica argued that 'good' is a simple, non-natural property that cannot be defined in natural terms. Moore's arguments—especially the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument—set the agenda for metaethics for decades. Although Moore himself was a non-naturalist, his work provided the framework within which later realists would operate.
    Moral realism as a self-conscious position gained momentum in the 1970s, during its local dominance window (1970–2026). This period saw a series of influential defenses. David Brink (b. 1958) developed a sophisticated naturalist realism in his 1989 book Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, arguing that moral facts are natural facts about human flourishing. Peter Railton (b. 1950) offered a naturalist account of moral objectivity in his 1986 paper 'Moral Realism,' grounding moral facts in what would be rational for fully informed agents to want. Richard Boyd (b. 1942) and Nicholas Sturgeon (b. 1942) defended 'Cornell Realism,' a form of naturalism that treats moral properties as homeostatic property clusters accessible to empirical science.
    On the non-naturalist side, Russ Shafer-Landau (b. 1963) provided a systematic defense in his 2003 book Moral Realism: A Defence, arguing that moral facts are objective but irreducible to natural facts. Derek Parfit (1942–2017) defended a non-naturalist realism in his monumental 2011 work On What Matters, arguing that there are objective normative truths that we can discover through reason.
    The framework's main competitors during this period have been Error Theory (1977–present), most famously articulated by J.L. Mackie in his 1977 book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, which argues that moral claims are systematically false because there are no objective moral properties; and Metaethical Constructivism (1980–present), which holds that moral truths are constituted by the outcomes of certain procedures of rational deliberation, rather than discovered as mind-independent facts. Moral realism also competes with Non-Cognitivism, including Emotivism (1933–1965) and Expressivism (1984–present), which deny that moral statements express truth-apt beliefs at all.
    Moral realism's legacy is that it remains the dominant view among professional philosophers. Surveys consistently show that a majority of philosophers accept or lean toward moral realism. Its core insight—that moral discourse aims at truth and that some moral claims are genuinely true—continues to shape debates in metaethics, applied ethics, and moral psychology.
    The 12 concepts its tower teaches
    • Cognitivism
    • Ethical Naturalism
    • Ethical Non-Naturalism
    • Mind-Independence
    • Moral Facts
    • Moral Knowledge
    • Moral Objectivity
    • Moral Properties
    • Moral Truth
    • The Naturalistic Fallacy
    • The Open Question Argument
    • Truth-Aptness

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  10. 1936-1970

    Emotivism

    Are moral statements merely expressions of feeling?

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  11. 1936-Present

    Non-cognitivism

    Can moral judgments be true or false?

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  12. 1950-Present

    Ethical naturalism

    Are moral facts natural facts about human flourishing?

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  13. 1952-1980

    Universal prescriptivism

    Are moral judgments universal prescriptions?

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  14. 1977-Present

    Error theory

    Are all moral judgments systematically false?

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  15. 1980-Present

    Constructivism

    Are moral facts constructed by practical reason?

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  16. 1980-Present

    Expressivism

    Do moral sentences express attitudes in a systematic way?

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  17. 1980-Present

    Kantian constructivism

    Are moral norms generated by rational agency?

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  18. 1980-Present

    Response-dependence

    Are moral properties fixed by human responses?

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  19. 1981-Present

    Reasons internalism

    Must moral reasons connect to our motives?

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  20. 2000-Present

    Experimental moral philosophy

    What do ordinary people's moral intuitions show?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Moral skepticismTheological VoluntarismNatural lawDivine command theoryMoral sense theoryMoral SentimentalismMoral rationalism and intuitionismEthical non-naturalismMoral realismEmotivismNon-cognitivismEthical naturalismUniversal prescriptivismError theoryConstructivismExpressivismKantian constructivismResponse-dependenceReasons internalismExperimental moral philosophy

Beyond the field

Where Metaethics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 79 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
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Metaethics is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 20 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

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