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Mental Representation
Mental representation is the idea that the mind carries something—a sign, a picture, a code, a map—that stands for things in the world.
12 frameworks, from 1250 to today · Philosophy Of Mind · Philosophy
- Intentionality 1250-Present
- Representational Theory of Mind 1600-1900
- Ordinary language philosophy 1949-1975
- Computational Theory of Mind 1960-Present
- Anti-individualism 1975-Present
- Language of thought hypothesis 1975-Present
- Informational Semantics 1981-Present
- Teleosemantics 1984-Present
- Connectionism 1986-Present
- Enactivism 1991-Present
- Extended Mind 1998-Present
- Predictive coding 2005-Present
Overview
Mental representation is the idea that the mind carries something—a sign, a picture, a code, a map—that stands for things in the world1. When you believe it will rain, your belief is about rain; when you see a dog, your perceptual state is of a dog. This aboutness is what philosophers call intentionality, and the central question of this subfield is how a physical system, such as a brain, can manage it. The stakes are large. If thoughts are representations, we can explain how minds are useful—they track the world and guide action. If they are not, it is unclear what distinguishes a thought from a stomach rumble. And if representations can be carried by silicon as well as by neurons, then minds might not be exclusively biological. The history of the subfield is a long argument about what representations are, where they get their content, and whether we need them at all.
Images, Ideas, and the Classical Picture
The oldest approach treats mental representation as a kind of inner picture or likeness. Aristotle held that perception takes on the form of the perceived object without its matter, in something like the way wax takes the shape of a seal. Medieval scholastics developed this into a theory of species—likenesses that the senses and intellect receive. The early modern period kept the picture but made it private: Descartes's ideas are mental contents directly present to the mind, and Locke's "ideas" are whatever the mind is thinking about, derived ultimately from sensation and reflection.
This representational theory of mind came with a problem. If what we directly perceive is an inner image, how do we know it resembles anything outside? The seventeenth-century occasionalists and later Berkeley pressed this worry hard. It also generated a puzzle about what does the representing. A picture in the head is just more physical stuff; something must interpret it. The classical picture struggled to say what that interpreter is, short of a little person—the notorious homunculus—which merely postpones the question.
Ordinary Language and the Attack on Inner Pictures
By the mid-twentieth century, a powerful reaction set in. Wittgenstein's later work, especially the Philosophical Investigations (published 1953), attacked the idea of a private inner object that gives a word its meaning. On his account, meaning is anchored in public use, in the practices of a community; an inner picture that no one else could check does no explanatory work. Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949) made a related point in a different idiom, arguing that talk of inner representations often rests on a category mistake—treating a disposition or a skill as if it were a hidden thing.
This ordinary-language critique did not kill the representational theory, but it changed the terms of debate. Any account of mental representation would now have to say how inner states connect to public behavior and public criteria, not just how they resemble objects.
The Computational Turn and the Language of Thought
The decisive break came with the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. The computer offered a new model: a physical system could manipulate symbols according to rules and thereby compute. If the mind works like this, representation need not be a picture; it can be a symbol in a formal system.
Hilary Putnam's early work on functionalism and his 1960 paper "Minds and Machines" helped launch this view, and Jerry Fodor gave it its most influential statement. In The Language of Thought (1975), Fodor argued that thought has a compositional structure: complex thoughts are built from simpler constituents, and the content of the whole depends on the content of the parts and their arrangement. To explain this, he posited a language of thought—an internal symbol system with a syntax, "mentalese," in which thinking literally consists in manipulating symbols12. The theory's strength was that it explained productivity (we can think infinitely many novel thoughts) and systematicity (if you can think "John loves Mary," you can think "Mary loves John").
Fodor combined this with a representational theory of mind: to have a propositional attitude such as believing that p is to stand in a computational relation to a mental representation with the content p. The theory was powerful, but it left the hardest question open: what makes a mental symbol mean something?
Naturalizing Content: Information and Teleology
The 1980s were dominated by attempts to answer that question without appeal to an interpreter—to "naturalize" intentionality.
Informational semantics, associated above all with Fred Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981), proposed that a state represents whatever it carries information about, in roughly the sense of information theory: a state covaries reliably with a condition in the world. A mental state is about dogs if it is reliably caused by dogs. The difficulty is the problem of misrepresentation. If representation is mere covariation, a state can never be wrong—but beliefs can be false. Dretske and others wrestled with this, and one influential response appealed to the function of the state.
Teleosemantics, developed by Ruth Millikan in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984), and later by David Papineau and others, grounded content in biological function: a state represents what it was selected to indicate. Just as a heart is for pumping blood, a perceptual state is for detecting certain conditions; misrepresentation occurs when the mechanism fails to perform its function. This gave a naturalistic account of error, but raised questions about how much of human thought is shaped by evolutionary selection.
Wide Content and the Externalist Turn
A parallel development challenged the assumption that mental content is fixed entirely by what is inside the head. In The Meaning of "Meaning" (1975) and later work, Hilary Putnam introduced the famous Twin Earth thought experiment: a person on Earth and a molecule-for-molecule duplicate on Twin Earth, where the watery stuff is not H₂O but a different compound, would both say "water," but arguably their words and thoughts mean different things. Tyler Burge extended this content externalism to many ordinary concepts, arguing that what we believe depends partly on the linguistic and social environment.
If externalism is right, the boundaries of the mind do not coincide with the boundaries of the skull. This set the stage for a more radical proposal.
The Extended Mind and Enactivism
In 1998, Andy Clark and David Chalmers published "The Extended Mind," arguing that cognitive processes can extend into the environment3. Their central example was Otto, a patient with Alzheimer's who relies on a notebook to store and retrieve information; Clark and Chalmers argued that, under the right conditions, the notebook plays the same functional role as biological memory and should count as part of his cognitive system3. The extended mind thesis was controversial—critics asked whether coupling to an external resource is enough for genuine mental representation—but it forced the field to reconsider where representation lives.
A different challenge came from enactivism, developed by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch in The Embodied Mind (1991), and later by Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin. Enactivists argue that cognition is fundamentally sensorimotor engagement with the world, not the manipulation of inner representations. Perceiving is something we do, not something that happens inside us. Some enactivists allow minimal representations; others (the "radical" wing) reject them outright. The debate is whether representation-talk is a useful explanatory tool or a legacy of the inner-picture tradition the ordinary-language critics attacked.
Connectionism and the Return of the Network
Meanwhile, the symbol-manipulation picture was being challenged from within cognitive science. Connectionism—the use of artificial neural networks with distributed representations—emerged in the 1940s and 1950s with McCulloch and Pitts's logical neurons and Rosenblatt's perceptron, and returned powerfully in the 1980s with work by Rumelhart, McClelland, and the Parallel Distributed Processing group4.
Connectionist networks represent information not as discrete symbols but as patterns of activation across many units. This had explanatory virtues: it handles pattern recognition and graceful degradation (networks degrade gradually rather than crashing) better than classical symbol systems. Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn's 1988 book Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis pressed the objection that connectionist networks cannot account for the systematicity and compositionality of thought without implicitly containing a symbol system. The debate reshaped both sides: later connectionist and hybrid models attempted to show how distributed representations could support structured thought.
Predictive Processing and the Representational Present
The most recent major framework is predictive processing, developed in the 2000s and 2010s by Karl Friston, Andy Clark, Jakob Hohwy, and others. On this view, the brain is constantly generating predictions about the causes of its sensory input and updating them as prediction errors arrive5. Perception is "controlled hallucination" corrected by the world; action is the fulfillment of predictions. The framework is representational in a distinctive sense—the brain encodes probabilistic models of the world—but it is also deeply embodied and action-oriented, drawing together threads from connectionism, enactivism, and the Bayesian turn in cognitive science.
The field today is pluralistic. Classical computationalism and the language of thought remain live research programs, defended by Fodor's successors and by philosophers of cognitive science such as Zenon Pylyshyn. Teleosemantics and informational semantics continue to be refined. Externalism about content is widely, though not universally, accepted, and the extended-mind debate has matured into careful work on the conditions under which environmental resources count as part of cognition. Enactivism and predictive processing represent the most active frontier, with a productive tension between those who see representation as the core explanatory posited and those who see it as a largely dispensable posit. The open questions are the old ones in new form: what exactly is a mental representation, what gives it content, and whether explaining the mind requires positing representations at all.
References
- Mental representation (introduction, Representational theories of mind), Wikipedia
- Language of thought hypothesis, Wikipedia
- Extended mind thesis ("The Extended Mind"), Wikipedia
- Connectionism, Wikipedia
- Predictive coding, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Mental Representation
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1250-Present
- 1600-1900
Representational Theory of Mind
What are the contents the mind directly grasps?
- 1949-1975
Ordinary language philosophy
How does public use fix the meaning of words?
- 1960-Present
Computational Theory of Mind
How does a physical system compute with symbols?
- 1975-Present
- 1975-Present
- 1981-Present
Informational Semantics
Does a state mean whatever it reliably indicates?
- 1984-Present
- 1986-Present
- 1991-Present
Enactivism
Is cognition sensorimotor action rather than inner representation?
- 1998-Present
- 2005-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Ordinary language philosophy reacted against Representational Theory of Mind
Ryle's The Concept of Mind and Wittgenstein's later work attacked the classical picture of private inner representations, arguing that meaning rests on public use and that inner objects do no explanatory work.
Carried by Gilbert Ryle; The Concept of Mind (1949); Ludwig Wittgenstein.
Language of thought hypothesis grew out of Computational Theory of Mind
Fodor's language of thought grew directly out of the computational theory of mind, specifying that the symbols computed over form an innate internal language with syntax and compositional structure.
Carried by Jerry Fodor; The Language of Thought (1975).
Extended Mind grew out of Anti-individualism
The extended mind thesis grew out of content externalism, pushing the claim that meaning depends on the environment toward the stronger claim that cognitive processes themselves can extend beyond the skull.
Carried by Andy Clark; David Chalmers; The Extended Mind (1998).
Teleosemantics grew out of Informational Semantics
Teleosemantics grew out of informational semantics as a response to the problem of misrepresentation, replacing mere covariation with biological function as the basis of content.
Carried by Ruth Millikan; Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories (1984).
Representational Theory of Mind grew out of Intentionality
The scholastic notion of intentionality, carried by the theory of species and the idea that thought is 'about' something, was taken up by Descartes and Locke and recast as a theory of ideas as mental contents directly present to the mind.
Carried by René Descartes; Meditations on First Philosophy (1641); John Locke.
Computational Theory of Mind replaced Representational Theory of Mind
The computational turn replaced the picture-theory of ideas with symbols manipulated by rules; Putnam's 'Minds and Machines' and early functionalism made mental representation a matter of computation rather than inner images.
Carried by Hilary Putnam; Minds and Machines (1960).
Anti-individualism reacted against Representational Theory of Mind
Anti-individualism rejected the classical assumption that mental content is fixed entirely inside the head, arguing via Twin Earth that what a state represents depends on the external environment.
Carried by Hilary Putnam; The Meaning of "Meaning" (1975); Tyler Burge.
Enactivism reacted against Representational Theory of Mind
Enactivism rejected the inner-picture conception of mind inherited from the classical representational theory, arguing that cognition is sensorimotor engagement with the world rather than manipulation of internal representations.
Carried by Francisco Varela; Evan Thompson; Eleanor Rosch.
Computational Theory of Mind reacted against Ordinary language philosophy
The cognitive revolution defined itself against the ordinary-language dismissal of inner states, reinstating internal representations as legitimate theoretical posits by modeling them as computational symbols.
Carried by Jerry Fodor; Hilary Putnam.
Connectionism reacted against Computational Theory of Mind
Connectionism challenged the symbol-manipulation picture of the computational theory, representing information as distributed patterns of activation rather than discrete symbols, and Fodor and Pylyshyn's 1988 critique framed the dispute.
Carried by David Rumelhart; James McClelland.
Enactivism reacted against Computational Theory of Mind
Enactivism defined itself against the computational view that cognition is the processing of internal representations, locating mind in embodied action instead.
Carried by Francisco Varela; The Embodied Mind (1991).
Informational Semantics influenced by Language of thought hypothesis
The language of thought posed the question of what makes a mental symbol mean something, and Dretske's informational semantics answered it by grounding content in reliable covariation with worldly conditions.
Carried by Fred Dretske; Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981).
Teleosemantics influenced by Language of thought hypothesis
Millikan's teleosemantics was framed as a naturalistic account of the intentional content that the language of thought had posited but left unexplained, taking the symbol-meaning question as its target.
Carried by Ruth Millikan.
Connectionism rival of Language of thought hypothesis
Fodor and Pylyshyn's critique pressed that connectionist networks cannot account for the systematicity and compositionality that the language of thought explains, defining the terms of the debate.
Carried by Jerry Fodor; Zenon Pylyshyn.
Predictive coding grew out of Connectionism
Predictive coding grew out of connectionist and neural-network modeling, recasting perception as the minimization of prediction error in hierarchical networks.
Beyond the field
Where Mental Representation's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 37 links.
Intentionality influenced Representationalism in Philosophy Of Consciousness
Representationalism about experience takes the intentionality of mental acts, revived by Brentano and developed in the analytic tradition, and applies it to phenomenal character. The thesis that experience is directed at intentional contents is the borrowed core.
Carried by Franz Brentano; Fred Dretske.
Intentionality influenced Chinese room in Philosophy Of Artificial Intelligence
Searle built the Chinese room on the distinction between syntax and semantics and on the notion of intrinsic intentionality drawn from his earlier work on intentionality. The argument's conclusion is that computation yields only derived, observer-relative intentionality.
Carried by John Searle; Intentionality (1983).
Representational Theory of Mind led to Representationalism in Philosophy Of Consciousness
Contemporary representationalism about consciousness generalises the representational theory of mind, holding that phenomenal character is a species of intentional content. The earlier doctrine that mental states are relations to representations supplies the core claim.
Carried by Franz Brentano; Jerry Fodor.
Representational Theory of Mind led to Representationalism in Philosophy Of Perception
Contemporary representationalism about perception is a branch of the representational theory of mind: it applies the older idea that mental states are relations to representations specifically to perceptual experience.
Computational Theory of Mind provoked Chinese room in Philosophy Of Artificial Intelligence
Searle's argument targeted the computational theory of mind as a thesis about mental representation, denying that formal symbol manipulation suffices for semantic content. The Chinese room became the standard counterexample in that debate.
Carried by John Searle.
Computational Theory of Mind led to Computational Theory of Vision in Philosophy Of Perception
Marr's theory of vision grew out of the computational-representational theory of mind, taking over the idea that perception consists in rule-governed operations on symbolic representations.
Carried by David Marr; Jerry Fodor.
Language of thought hypothesis grew out of Computational theory of mind in Philosophy Of Mind
Fodor's language of thought hypothesis was built directly on the computational theory of mind, adding that mental computations require a system of internal symbols. The representational system of thought is presented as the necessary medium for the computations posited by that theory.
Carried by Jerry A. Fodor; The Language of Thought (1975).
Connectionism influenced by Connectionism and Neural Networks in Machine Learning
The connectionist revival of the 1980s drew directly on neural-network models in machine learning, especially backpropagation and the perceptron tradition. Rumelhart, Hinton and Williams's learning procedure became the engine of the PDP programme in cognitive science.
Carried by David Rumelhart; Geoffrey Hinton; Parallel Distributed Processing (1986).
Enactivism led to 4E Cognition in Embodied Cognition
Enactivism is one of the four Es; the 4E framework was formulated as an umbrella uniting enactive with embodied, embedded and extended approaches.
Predictive coding grew out of Bayesian brain and predictive processing in Computational Neuroscience
Predictive coding in cognitive science grew directly out of the Bayesian brain and predictive-processing framework in computational neuroscience, especially the free-energy and hierarchical-inference models of the 1990s. Friston's work supplied the mathematical core that later predictive-coding theories of perception and mind adopted.
Carried by Karl Friston.
Intentionality influenced Self-Representationalism in Self Knowledge And Subjectivity
The medieval and scholastic analysis of intentionality, later revived by Brentano, provided the concept of mental directedness on which self-representationalism builds its account of states representing themselves. The notion of intentional content passed into the later theory.
Carried by Franz Brentano.
Intentionality influenced Anscombean Philosophy of Action in Philosophy Of Action
Anscombe took the scholastic and Brentanian concept of intentionality, transmitted through her teacher Wittgenstein and her reading of Aquinas, and made it central to the description of action under a description.
Carried by G. E. M. Anscombe.

Mental Representation is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 12 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Mental RepresentationRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Philosophy Of Mind 7 links
- Philosophy Of Consciousness 4 links
- Philosophy Of Artificial Intelligence 4 links
- Meaning And Understanding 3 links
- Philosophy Of Perception 3 links
- Embodied Cognition 2 links
- Social Ontology 2 links
- Self Knowledge And Subjectivity 2 links
- Cognitive Psychology 2 links
- Machine Learning 1 link
- Action And Motor Cognition 1 link
- Computational Cognitive Science 1 link
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