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Philosophy Of Mind
Philosophy of mind asks what minds are, what mental states are, and how minds fit into the rest of nature.
25 frameworks, from 450 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Mind · Philosophy
- Buddhist No-Self Theory 450 BCE-Present
- Platonic and Aristotelian psychology 400 BCE-300 BCE
- Buddhist and Indian analyses of mind 300 BCE-Present
- Nyaya Self Theory 200 BCE-Present
- Yogacara Consciousness-Only 400-Present
- Advaita Witness Consciousness 800-Present
- Scholastic and Islamic faculty psychology 900-1300
- Psychophysical parallelism 1100-1715
- Cartesian substance dualism 1640-1750
- Monism and Double-Aspect Theory 1670-1800
- Empiricism and associationism 1690-1850
- Intentionality and phenomenology 1874-Present
- Logical behaviorism 1949-1970
- Type physicalism 1956-1975
- Computational theory of mind 1960-Present
- Functionalism 1960-Present
- Anomalous monism 1970-2000
- Anti-individualism 1975-Present
- Connectionism 1980-Present
- Embodied and enactive cognition 1991-Present
- The hard problem of consciousness 1995-Present
- Illusionism 2005-Present
- Panpsychism 2005-Present
- Predictive coding 2005-Present
- Predictive Processing 2005-Present
Overview
Philosophy of mind asks what minds are, what mental states are, and how minds fit into the rest of nature1. Its central questions are deceptively simple: What is the difference between a thinking thing and a lump of matter? When you see red, what exactly is happening? Can a purely physical system have beliefs, feelings, or experiences? These questions matter because they bear on whether we are free, whether machines could be conscious, whether the mind survives the body, and what it means to know one's own thoughts. The history of the field is a long sequence of attempts to answer them, each new approach responding to problems the previous ones could not solve.
Ancient Foundations: Soul, Form, and the Tripartite Mind
Western philosophy of mind begins with Plato (c. 429–347 BCE), who argued that the soul is immaterial and distinct from the body. In dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic, he treated the soul as the principle of life and thought, temporarily imprisoned in a body. His tripartite psychology divided the soul into reason, spirit (thumos), and appetite, each with its own aims and potential for conflict—a model that explained inner struggle as a political tension among parts of the soul. Plato's student Aristotle (384–322 BCE) rejected the idea of a soul separable from the body2. In De Anima he developed hylomorphism: the soul is the form of a living body, as the shape of an axe is to its bronze. Soul and body are not two things but one thing described in two ways. Aristotle's account of perception, imagination, and intellect set the vocabulary—faculties, potentiality, actuality—that would dominate for centuries.
Indian and Buddhist Analyses of Mind
Parallel and equally rigorous traditions developed in South Asia. Buddhist thinkers analyzed the mind as a stream of momentary events (dharmas) with no permanent self behind them. The no-self (anātman) doctrine held that what we call a person is a bundle of physical and mental processes in constant flux; the question was how continuity, memory, and moral responsibility are possible without a self. The Abhidharma literature catalogued mental factors with great precision3. Later, the Yogācāra school (roughly 4th century CE onward), associated with thinkers such as Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, developed consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra): the claim that experienced objects are constructions of consciousness, analyzed through layers of awareness including a storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) that carries karmic traces. In the Hindu Nyāya school, by contrast, philosophers defended a substantial self (ātman) as the bearer of cognition, desire, and action, and developed sophisticated arguments about perception and inference. Advaita Vedānta, systematized by Śaṅkara (c. 8th century CE), held that the true self is pure witnessing consciousness, identical with ultimate reality, while the everyday ego is a superimposition. These traditions were not mere precursors; they offered detailed theories of attention, perception, self-awareness, and the construction of experience that remain in active philosophical use.
Medieval Synthesis: Faculties, Intentionality, and Harmony
Islamic philosophy absorbed and transformed Greek psychology. Thinkers such as al-Fārābī (c. 872–950) and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) developed elaborate faculty psychologies, distinguishing external senses, internal senses (including imagination, estimation, and memory), and a rational intellect. Avicenna's "floating man" thought experiment—imagining a person created fully formed but deprived of all sensory input—argued for immediate self-awareness independent of the body. In Latin Europe, scholastic thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) integrated Aristotelian hylomorphism with Christian doctrine, refining accounts of intellect, will, and sensory powers.
A recurring problem was how mind and body interact1. Occasionalism, developed by al-Ghazālī and later by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), held that created things have no causal power of their own; God is the sole true cause, and what looks like mind-body interaction is God's occasioning of one state upon another. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) offered pre-established harmony: mind and body are like two clocks synchronized by God at creation, each running its own mechanism without interacting. These were ingenious solutions to a problem created by Cartesian dualism.
Descartes and the Modern Divide
René Descartes (1596–1650) gave the field its modern shape. He argued that mind and body are distinct substances: mind is thinking, unextended stuff; body is extended, mechanical stuff1. This substance dualism seemed to secure the possibility of immortality and the certainty of self-knowledge (the cogito), but it created the interaction problem: how can an immaterial mind move a physical body? Descartes proposed the pineal gland as the point of contact, but the answer satisfied few. His contemporary Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and later materialists argued instead that thought is a motion of matter. The debate between dualism and materialism has never fully closed.
Empiricism, Associationism, and the Mind's Contents
John Locke (1632–1704) shifted attention from substance to content. His empiricist philosophy of mind held that all ideas derive from experience—sensation and reflection—rejecting innate ideas. David Hume (1711–1776) pushed further, analyzing the mind as a bundle of perceptions and arguing that the self is nothing over and above those perceptions. Associationism, developed by Hume and later by David Hartley (1705–1757) and James Mill (1773–1836), held that complex mental states arise from simple ideas combined by principles such as contiguity and resemblance. This tradition made psychology a naturalistic project, though it struggled to explain active thought and the unity of consciousness.
Intentionality and Phenomenology
A decisive turn came with Franz Brentano (1838–1917), who argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: mental states are about something45. A belief is a belief about something; a desire is a desire for something. This directedness seemed to distinguish mind from matter, since physical objects are not "about" anything. Brentano's student Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) founded phenomenology, a method for describing the structures of experience as they present themselves. Phenomenology of mind analyzed consciousness, embodiment, and the lived body in detail, influencing later work on perception and intersubjectivity. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) extended this tradition, emphasizing that minds are embedded in practical, bodily engagement with a world rather than detached spectators.
Behaviorism and Its Discontents
In the early twentieth century, philosophical behaviorism (associated with Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, 1949) argued that talk of inner mental states is talk about dispositions to behave. To say someone believes it will rain is to say they are disposed to carry an umbrella, not to report an inner occurrence1. This avoided dualist mysteries and fit a scientific temper, but critics objected that it cannot capture the felt quality of experience or the causal role of mental states. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) offered related arguments about the public criteria for mental language, while insisting that inner states are not private objects.
Identity Theory and Functionalism
The mid-twentieth century brought physicalism back to center. The mind–brain identity theory, defended by J. J. C. Smart (1920–2012) and Ullin Place (1924–2004) in the 1950s, held that mental states are identical with brain states—pain just is a certain pattern of neural firing. This was simple and scientifically attractive, but it faced the problem of multiple realizability: if octopuses or silicon-based systems can feel pain, pain cannot be identical with one specific human brain state6. Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) pressed this point, and functionalism emerged as the answer. Functionalism defines mental states by their causal roles—what causes them, what they cause, and how they relate to other states—rather than by their physical makeup17. A pain is whatever state is caused by tissue damage and causes avoidance and distress, whether realized in neurons or silicon1. Functionalism became the dominant framework in cognitive science and remains central.
Computation and Connectionism
Functionalism dovetailed with the computational theory of mind, developed by Putnam, Jerry Fodor (1935–2017), and others in the 1960s and 1970s. The mind is a symbol-manipulating system: thinking is computation over mental representations, and the brain is the hardware running the mind's software. Fodor's language-of-thought hypothesis held that thought has a compositional structure like a language8. This picture made psychology tractable and inspired artificial intelligence. But it struggled with the flexibility and context-sensitivity of real cognition. Connectionism, developed from the 1980s onward, modeled cognition as distributed networks of simple units whose weighted connections change with experience. Rather than explicit rules, connectionist networks learn patterns—a model that handled perception and learning more gracefully than classical symbol systems, though it raised questions about systematicity and compositionality.
Externalism and Embodiment
In 1975, Putnam argued that "meanings just ain't in the head." His Twin Earth thought experiment—where a person on a planet with a different substance than water has the same internal states but different beliefs—suggested that mental content depends on the environment. Tyler Burge extended this content externalism to social and linguistic context. Meanwhile, embodied and enactive approaches, developed by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (and later Andy Clark and others), argued that cognition is not confined to the brain but arises from the body's interaction with its environment. Enactivism holds that perception is an active skill, not passive reception9. Predictive processing, a more recent framework, treats the brain as a prediction machine that constantly generates and updates models of the world, minimizing prediction error—a unifying account that has gained wide influence.
Consciousness and the Hard Problem
The late twentieth century saw consciousness return as the central puzzle. David Chalmers (born 1966) distinguished the "easy problems" of explaining cognitive functions from the "hard problem" of explaining why any of it is accompanied by subjective experience—what it is like to be something. This framing reinvigorated dualist and mysterian options, while others pursued reductive accounts. Illusionism, defended by Keith Frankish, argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly conceived is an illusion; what exists are introspective states that misrepresent themselves as having intrinsic felt quality. Panpsychism, the view that experience is fundamental and ubiquitous, has seen a revival among philosophers such as Galen Strawson and Philip Goff as a response to the hard problem. Anomalous monism, Donald Davidson's (1917–2003) view that mental events are identical with physical events but cannot be captured by strict psychological laws, offered a non-reductive physicalism that preserved mental causation.
The Present Landscape
Philosophy of mind today is pluralistic. Functionalism and computational approaches remain influential in cognitive science, though connectionism, predictive processing, and enactivism have reshaped how researchers think about representation and learning. The hard problem continues to divide philosophers: some pursue reductive explanations, others defend panpsychism or mysterianism, and illusionists deny the problem is well posed. Buddhist and other non-Western analyses of mind are increasingly engaged as genuine theoretical resources rather than historical curiosities. Embodied and extended approaches challenge the boundary of the mind, while work on mental causation and physicalism continues to refine what it means to say the mental is real. The field's oldest questions—what is a mind, what is experience, how does thought relate to world—remain open, but the tools for addressing them are richer than ever.
References
- Philosophy of mind (introduction, Mind–body problem, Interactionist dualism, Behaviorism, Functionalism), Wikipedia
- Dualism (History), Wikipedia
- Abhidharma, Wikipedia
- Intentionality, Wikipedia
- Franz Brentano, Wikipedia
- Multiple realizability, Wikipedia
- Functionalism (philosophy of mind), Wikipedia
- Mental representation (Representational theories of mind), Wikipedia
- Enactivism, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Philosophy Of Mind
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 450 BCE-Present
- 400 BCE-300 BCE
Platonic and Aristotelian psychology
Is the soul separate from the body?
- 300 BCE-Present
Buddhist and Indian analyses of mind
What momentary events make up mental life?
- 200 BCE-Present
- 400-Present
Yogacara Consciousness-Only
Are experienced objects constructions of consciousness?
- 800-Present
Advaita Witness Consciousness
Is the true self pure witnessing consciousness?
- 900-1300
Scholastic and Islamic faculty psychology
Which faculties make up the human soul?
- 1100-1715
Psychophysical parallelism
How can mind and body correspond without interacting?
- 1640-1750
Cartesian substance dualism
Are mind and body two distinct substances?
About Cartesian substance dualism
Substance dualism is the view that the mind and the body are two fundamentally different kinds of substances. A substance, in this context, is something that can exist independently. The mind is a thinking, non-extended substance; the body is an extended, non-thinking substance. This framework directly addresses the mind-body problem—the question of how mental and physical events relate—by asserting that they belong to distinct realms. It is distinct from property dualism, which holds that mental and physical are different properties of a single substance, and from idealism, which reduces the physical to the mental. Substance dualism preserves the specialness of mind, making it irreducible to physical processes, but it famously struggles to explain how an immaterial mind can causally interact with a material body.Core CurriculumThe first course on substance dualism in philosophy of mind typically covers these concepts in logical order:- Substance: The fundamental category of being that can exist independently. In substance dualism, there are two kinds: mental and physical.
- Mind: The thinking, non-extended substance characterized by consciousness, thought, and volition.
- Body: The extended, non-thinking substance characterized by spatial location, size, shape, and motion.
- Interaction Problem: The central difficulty of explaining how an immaterial mind can cause changes in a material body and vice versa. This is the classic objection to substance dualism.
- Causal Interaction: The presumed relation between mind and body, typically understood as a two-way causal exchange (e.g., a decision to move an arm causes the arm to move; a pinprick causes pain).
- Mind-Body Problem: The broader philosophical problem of explaining the relationship between mental and physical phenomena, for which substance dualism offers one solution.
- Privacy of the Mental: The idea that mental states are directly accessible only to the subject who has them, unlike physical states which are publicly observable.
- Indubitability of the Mind: The claim, central to Descartes's method, that one can doubt the existence of one's body but not the existence of one's own mind (the cogito).
- Ghost in the Machine: A pejorative label, popularized by Gilbert Ryle, for the view that the mind is a non-physical entity inhabiting the body. It captures the perceived absurdity of substance dualism.
- Cartesian Dualism: The specific version of substance dualism articulated by René Descartes, which is the most historically influential form.
These concepts form the teaching spine. The interaction problem is the most discussed issue, leading to various proposed solutions (e.g., occasionalism, parallelism) and to the development of alternative frameworks like materialism and property dualism.Intellectual HistorySubstance dualism's local dominance in philosophy of mind begins with René Descartes (1596–1650) and his seminal work, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). Descartes, reacting to the mechanistic science of his day, sought to establish a foundation for knowledge that could not be doubted. He found that he could doubt the existence of his body and the entire physical world, but he could not doubt that he was thinking. This led to his famous conclusion, "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum), and the further claim that the mind is a substance distinct from the body. Descartes argued that the essence of mind is thought, and the essence of body is extension. He located the point of interaction in the pineal gland, a small structure in the brain, though this proposal was widely criticized.Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680) was an immediate and incisive critic. In their correspondence, she pressed Descartes on the interaction problem: how can an immaterial mind, with no physical properties, cause motion in a material body? This exchange set the agenda for subsequent debate. Later in the 17th century, Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) developed occasionalism, a radical solution to the interaction problem: God is the only true cause, and mental events are merely occasions for God to produce corresponding physical events. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) proposed pre-established harmony, in which God created mind and body to run in parallel like two synchronized clocks, with no direct causal interaction. These are parallel frameworks that accept the dualist premise but reject direct causal interaction.Substance dualism remained a dominant framework through the 17th and 18th centuries, coexisting with the rise of idealism (beginning around 1710 with George Berkeley). In the 20th century, it faced powerful challenges from logical behaviorism, the mind-brain identity theory, and functionalism, which sought to naturalize the mind. Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) famously dismissed substance dualism as the "ghost in the machine," arguing that it rested on a category mistake—treating the mind as if it were a thing of the same logical type as the body. Despite these critiques, substance dualism has persisted, often in revived forms. Contemporary philosophers such as Richard Swinburne (1934–) and John Foster (1940–) have defended updated versions, arguing that the unity of consciousness and the possibility of an afterlife require a non-physical mind. Today, substance dualism is a minority position in academic philosophy of mind, but it remains a live option in philosophical theology and in popular thought.Key Insights- Substance dualism set the terms for the modern mind-body problem, forcing subsequent frameworks to either solve the interaction problem or reject the dualist premise.
- Its sharp distinction between mind and body made the privacy and indubitability of mental states central to philosophy of mind, a legacy that persists in debates about introspection and self-knowledge.
- The framework's difficulties with causal interaction motivated the development of major alternatives, including materialism, property dualism, and idealism, shaping the entire trajectory of the subfield.
The 11 concepts its tower teaches
- Body
- Cartesian Dualism
- Causal Interaction
- Cogito
- Indubitability of the Mind
- Interaction Problem
- Mind
- Mind-Body Problem
- Privacy of the Mental
- Substance
- Substance Dualism
- 1670-1800
Monism and Double-Aspect Theory
Are mind and body two aspects of one thing?
- 1690-1850
- 1874-Present
Intentionality and phenomenology
What makes a mental state about something?
- 1949-1970
- 1956-1975
- 1960-Present
- 1960-Present
Functionalism
Are mental states defined by their causal roles?
About Functionalism
Functionalism emerged in the 1960s as a powerful alternative to two then-dominant views: behaviorism, which identified mental states with patterns of observable behavior, and the mind-brain identity theory, which identified them with specific physical states of the brain. Against both, functionalism argued that what makes a mental state the kind of state it is—a belief, a desire, a pain—is not its physical makeup or its behavioral expression alone, but its causal role: the way it is caused by sensory inputs, how it interacts with other mental states, and how it leads to behavioral outputs. This shift opened the door to thinking of minds as abstract functional organizations that could, in principle, be realized in many different physical substrates, including computers. Functionalism thus became the philosophical backbone of cognitive science, providing a framework for understanding the mind in terms of information processing and computation.Core CurriculumThe following concepts form the standard teaching spine for functionalism in philosophy of mind:- Multiple Realizability – The idea that the same mental state type (e.g., pain) can be realized by different physical states in different organisms (or even in machines). This is the central argument against the mind-brain identity theory.
- Functional Role – The distinctive causal profile of a mental state: what typically causes it, what it typically causes, and how it relates to other mental states.
- Causal Role – A synonym for functional role, emphasizing the causal connections that define a mental state.
- Input-Output Relations – The sensory inputs and behavioral outputs that, together with internal causal relations, define a mental state's functional role.
- Machine Functionalism – The version of functionalism that models the mind on a Turing machine: mental states are machine states defined by a transition table that maps inputs and current states to outputs and next states.
- Psychofunctionalism – The version, associated with Jerry Fodor, that holds that mental states are defined by the functional roles posited by empirical psychology, not by common-sense platitudes.
- Analytic Functionalism – The version, developed by David Lewis and David Armstrong, that defines mental state types by analyzing the causal roles implicit in our ordinary language about the mind.
- Homuncular Functionalism – The view that complex mental capacities can be analyzed into simpler sub-capacities, each performed by a specialized subsystem or "homunculus," which can themselves be further decomposed.
- Functional Analysis – The method of explaining a mental capacity by decomposing it into a set of simpler functions and their interactions.
- Realizer vs. Role – The distinction between the functional role itself (the abstract causal profile) and the particular physical state that fills that role in a given system (the realizer).
- Functional Organization – The overall pattern of causal relations among a system's states, inputs, and outputs that determines its mental life.
- Functional State – Any state of a system that is defined by its functional role, rather than by its physical composition.
- Mental State Type – A kind of mental state (e.g., belief, desire, pain) identified by its functional role, not by its physical realization.
- Functional Isomorphism – The relation between two systems that have the same functional organization, even if they are made of different materials.
- Turing Machine Functionalism – A specific version of machine functionalism that uses the formal apparatus of Turing machines to define mental states as computational states.
Intellectual HistoryFunctionalism arose in the mid-1960s as a direct response to the limitations of behaviorism and the mind-brain identity theory. Behaviorism, especially the version championed by B.F. Skinner, had tried to eliminate mental states from scientific psychology, treating them as unnecessary fictions. The identity theory, defended by U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart, had countered that mental states are simply brain states. But by the early 1960s, philosophers began to see problems with both views. Hilary Putnam, in a series of papers starting with "Minds and Machines" (1960) and culminating in "The Nature of Mental States" (1967), argued that mental states could not be identified with specific brain states because the same mental state could be realized in different physical systems—a point he illustrated with the example of pain in humans, octopuses, and hypothetical Martians. This argument from multiple realizability became the founding insight of functionalism.Putnam's early version was machine functionalism, which treated the mind as a kind of Turing machine. Around the same time, Jerry Fodor developed psychofunctionalism, arguing that mental states should be defined by the causal roles discovered by scientific psychology rather than by common-sense concepts. David Lewis and David Armstrong independently developed analytic functionalism, which used the method of Ramsification to define mental state types by the causal roles implicit in our ordinary mental concepts. William Lycan later developed homuncular functionalism, drawing on the idea of functional decomposition in cognitive science.Functionalism quickly became the dominant framework in philosophy of mind, especially after the rise of cognitive science in the 1970s. It provided a natural home for the computational theory of mind, which treated mental processes as computations over mental representations. It also made sense of the idea that artificial intelligence could, in principle, have genuine mental states if it had the right functional organization. The Turing test, originally proposed by Alan Turing in 1950, was reinterpreted as a test for functional equivalence.Functionalism faced significant criticisms. John Searle's Chinese Room argument (1980) challenged the idea that syntax alone could produce semantics, arguing that a purely functional system could not have genuine understanding. Ned Block's "Blockhead" thought experiment (1978) argued that a system could be functionally equivalent to a human without having conscious experiences. These criticisms led to refinements of functionalism, including the distinction between role and realizer functionalism, and to the development of successor frameworks such as anomalous monism and biological naturalism.Despite these challenges, functionalism remains a central framework in philosophy of mind. It shaped the agenda for debates about consciousness, mental causation, and the nature of psychological explanation. Its core insight—that mental states are defined by what they do, not what they are made of—continues to inform work in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of psychology.The 15 concepts its tower teaches
- Analytic Functionalism
- Causal Role
- Functional Analysis
- Functional Isomorphism
- Functional Organization
- Functional Role
- Functional State
- Homuncular Functionalism
- Input-Output Relations
- Machine Functionalism
- Mental State Type
- Multiple Realizability
- Psychofunctionalism
- Realizer vs. Role
- Turing Machine Functionalism
- 1970-2000
- 1975-Present
- 1980-Present
- 1991-Present
Embodied and enactive cognition
Is cognition shaped by the body and environment?
- 1995-Present
The hard problem of consciousness
Why is any physical process accompanied by experience?
- 2005-Present
- 2005-Present
Panpsychism
Is experience a fundamental feature of nature?
About Panpsychism
Panpsychism is the view that mind or consciousness is not an emergent property of complex physical systems, nor a rare anomaly in a dead universe, but a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. In the philosophy of mind, this ancient framework addresses the so-called "hard problem of consciousness"—the question of why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—by denying that there is any deep gap to bridge. If mind is already present at the most basic level of reality, then the appearance of human consciousness is not a miracle but a development of something already there. This makes panpsychism a distinctive alternative to both materialism, which struggles to explain how matter becomes conscious, and dualism, which struggles to explain how mind and matter interact.Panpsychism's core curriculum centers on a small set of organizing concepts. First is the distinction between panpsychism proper and panexperientialism: the former holds that all things have a mind or mental aspect, while the latter more cautiously claims that all things have some form of experience or subjective feel. A related concept is panprotopsychism, the view that the fundamental constituents of reality are not themselves conscious but possess protoconscious properties that, when combined in the right way, yield full consciousness. The combination problem is the central theoretical challenge for panpsychism: if basic particles each have their own micro-experiences, how do those micro-experiences combine to produce the unified macro-experience of a human mind? Proponents of the Russellian monist approach argue that physics only describes the relational, structural properties of matter, leaving the intrinsic nature of matter—which may be mental—open to philosophical speculation. This view draws on Bertrand Russell's distinction between the causal structure of the world (known by physics) and its intrinsic character (unknown but possibly mental). The subject-summing problem is a specific version of the combination problem: if each particle has its own subject of experience, how do many subjects become one subject? Some panpsychists adopt a constitutive version, holding that macro-consciousness is literally composed of micro-consciousnesses; others adopt a non-constitutive version, holding that macro-consciousness emerges from micro-consciousness without being composed of it. The spread mind thesis extends panpsychist intuitions to argue that consciousness can be distributed across space and time, not confined to individual brains. Finally, the hard problem of consciousness itself is the problem that panpsychism claims to solve most directly: it asks why there is subjective experience at all, and panpsychism answers that experience is built into the fabric of reality.Panpsychism is one of the oldest philosophical theories, with roots in ancient Greek thought. The earliest known Western proponent is Thales of Miletus (c. 624–546 BCE), who reportedly said that "all things are full of gods," implying that even apparently inanimate matter has a vital, mental aspect. This view was shared by other Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaximenes and Heraclitus, who saw the cosmos as a living, intelligent whole. Plato, in the Timaeus, described the world as a living being with a soul, a view that influenced later Neoplatonic and Renaissance thought. In the Indian tradition, the Upanishads (c. 800–200 BCE) teach that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is identical with Atman, the innermost self, implying that consciousness pervades all existence. This non-dualist framework, later systematized in Advaita Vedanta, shares with panpsychism the idea that mind is not a local phenomenon but a universal one.Panpsychism declined in the West during the rise of mechanistic materialism in the seventeenth century, but it never disappeared. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) argued that thought and extension are two attributes of a single substance, God or Nature, implying that everything that exists has a mental aspect. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) developed a panpsychist metaphysics of monads—simple, immaterial substances that each perceive the universe from their own perspective. In the nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) argued that the inner nature of all things is Will, a blind striving that is mental in character. William James (1842–1910) defended a form of panpsychism in his later writings, arguing that consciousness is not a thing but a function that may be present in rudimentary forms throughout nature. Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) developed the most systematic panpsychist metaphysics of the twentieth century, replacing the concept of inert matter with "actual occasions" that have both physical and mental poles. His process philosophy has been a major influence on contemporary panpsychism.In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, panpsychism has experienced a revival, driven by frustration with materialist explanations of consciousness. Thomas Nagel (b. 1937) argued in his 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" that subjective experience cannot be captured by objective science, a conclusion that opens the door to panpsychism. Galen Strawson (b. 1952) has forcefully argued that materialism must include experiential reality as fundamental, making panpsychism the only coherent form of materialism. David Chalmers (b. 1966) has defended panpsychism as a serious option for solving the hard problem, and Philip Goff (b. 1978) has developed a detailed version of Russellian monism. Contemporary panpsychism remains a minority view, but it is now a live option in philosophy of mind, debated alongside materialism, dualism, and idealism.The 10 concepts its tower teaches
- Combination problem
- Constitutive panpsychism
- Hard problem of consciousness
- Non-constitutive panpsychism
- Panexperientialism
- Panprotopsychism
- Panpsychism
- Russellian monism
- Spread mind thesis
- Subject-summing problem
- 2005-Present
- 2005-Present
Predictive Processing
Is the brain a prediction-error minimizing machine?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Buddhist and Indian analyses of mind grew out of Buddhist No-Self Theory
Abhidharma analyses of mental factors systematized the no-self doctrine into a catalogue of momentary dharmas, and Yogācāra later built its consciousness-only account on that Abhidharma analysis.
Carried by Vasubandhu; Abhidharmakośa.
Nyaya Self Theory reacted against Buddhist No-Self Theory
Nyāya arguments for a substantial ātman as bearer of cognition, desire and action were developed largely in opposition to Buddhist no-self and momentariness.
Carried by Gautama; Nyāya Sūtras.
Scholastic and Islamic faculty psychology grew out of Platonic and Aristotelian psychology
Islamic falāsifa absorbed Aristotle's De Anima and its faculty psychology, and al-Fārābī and Avicenna built their accounts of internal senses and intellect on that Greek foundation.
Carried by al-Fārābī; Avicenna.
Yogacara Consciousness-Only grew out of Buddhist and Indian analyses of mind
Yogācāra consciousness-only developed out of earlier Buddhist Abhidharma analysis, adding the storehouse consciousness to explain continuity and karmic traces without a self.
Carried by Asaṅga; Vasubandhu.
Monism and Double-Aspect Theory reacted against Cartesian substance dualism
Spinoza's double-aspect monism and later parallelist monisms arose as direct responses to the interaction problem and the two-substance scheme of Descartes.
Carried by Baruch Spinoza; Ethics (1677).
Intentionality and phenomenology reacted against Empiricism and associationism
Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint defined the mental by intentional directedness, rejecting the associationist picture of mental life as combinations of simple ideas and images.
Carried by Franz Brentano; Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874).
Type physicalism replaced Logical behaviorism
Place and Smart's identity theory replaced behaviourist dispositions with the claim that mental states are neural states, explaining behaviour by inner causes rather than by dispositions to behave.
Carried by Ullin Place; J. J. C. Smart.
Functionalism replaced Type physicalism
Putnam's multiple-realizability objection to type identity led him and others to define mental states by causal role rather than by physical constitution.
Carried by Hilary Putnam.
Anomalous monism reacted against Type physicalism
Davidson's anomalous monism accepted the identity of mental and physical events but denied strict psychophysical laws, defining itself against the law-like reductionism of type physicalism.
Carried by Donald Davidson.
Predictive coding grew out of Computational theory of mind
Predictive coding grew out of the computational framework of hierarchical generative models in vision research, treating perception as inference over the causes of sensory input.
Carried by Rao and Ballard.
The hard problem of consciousness reacted against Functionalism
The hard problem was framed explicitly as the residue functionalism and computationalism leave unexplained, namely why any functional organization should be accompanied by experience.
Carried by David Chalmers; The Conscious Mind (1996).
Illusionism reacted against The hard problem of consciousness
Illusionism arose as a response to the hard problem, arguing that the apparent phenomenal qualities which make the problem seem insoluble are themselves a misrepresentation of inner states.
Carried by Keith Frankish.
Cartesian substance dualism influenced by Platonic and Aristotelian psychology
Descartes inherited the Platonic and Augustinian contrast between the immaterial soul and the extended body, and in the Meditations recast it as a distinction between two created substances.
Carried by René Descartes; Meditations on First Philosophy (1641).
Advaita Witness Consciousness reacted against Buddhist and Indian analyses of mind
Advaita's account of pure witnessing consciousness was formulated in sustained debate with Buddhist Yogācāra and no-self views, which Śaṅkara criticized for denying a persisting witness.
Carried by Śaṅkara.
Cartesian substance dualism reacted against Scholastic and Islamic faculty psychology
Descartes rejected the scholastic framework of faculties and substantial forms, replacing explanatory forms with mechanical corpuscles and a single immaterial thinking substance.
Carried by René Descartes.
Empiricism and associationism reacted against Cartesian substance dualism
Locke and Hume shifted philosophy of mind from substance to the contents of experience, treating ideas as derived from sensation and reflection rather than from a Cartesian thinking substance.
Carried by John Locke; An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690); David Hume.
Logical behaviorism reacted against Intentionality and phenomenology
Ryle's The Concept of Mind attacked the Cartesian and phenomenological picture of inner mental states as a 'ghost in the machine', redescribing them as behavioural dispositions.
Carried by Gilbert Ryle; The Concept of Mind (1949).
Panpsychism influenced by The hard problem of consciousness
Contemporary panpsychism was revived largely as an answer to the hard problem, taking experience as fundamental rather than emergent from physical structure.
Carried by David Chalmers; Galen Strawson.
Beyond the field
Where Philosophy Of Mind's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 157 links.
Buddhist No-Self Theory reacted against Upaniṣadic Philosophy in Hinduism
The Buddhist not-self teaching was framed against Upaniṣadic claims of an enduring ātman, denying the permanent self the Upaniṣads identified with ultimate reality. The early discourses set anattā directly against the ātman doctrine.
Carried by Early Buddhist discourses.
Buddhist No-Self Theory led to Buddhist Abhidharma Analysis of Mind in Philosophy Of Consciousness
Abhidharma analysis of mind grew directly out of the early Buddhist no-self doctrine, working out in detail which mental factors and aggregates could constitute experience without a self. The Abhidharma matrices are the systematic elaboration of the not-self teaching.
Carried by Abhidharma texts.
Platonic and Aristotelian psychology influenced Scholastic passions theory in Philosophy Of Emotion
Scholastic passions theory inherits its account of the soul's parts and affections from Platonic and Aristotelian psychology as transmitted through Arabic and Latin commentaries.
Carried by Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas.
Buddhist and Indian analyses of mind grew out of Early Buddhist Philosophy in Buddhist Philosophy
The Abhidharma analyses of mind grew directly out of early Buddhist teachings, systematising the aggregates, sense bases and dependent origination into lists of mental factors. The scholastic project is a refinement of the early discourses' psychology.
Nyaya Self Theory rival of Anattā in Self Knowledge And Subjectivity
Nyaya's substantial self theory was elaborated in direct opposition to the Buddhist anattā doctrine, arguing for a permanent self as the substratum of cognition and memory. Nyaya texts devote sustained arguments to refuting the Buddhist no-self view.
Yogacara Consciousness-Only grew out of Buddhist Abhidharma Analysis of Mind in Philosophy Of Consciousness
Yogacara consciousness-only grew out of Abhidharma analysis of mind, reworking its lists of dharmas and mental factors into a doctrine that mind and its contents are all that exist. The school's founders systematised earlier Abhidharma categories.
Carried by Vasubandhu; Asanga.
Advaita Witness Consciousness grew out of Vedantic Witness Consciousness in Philosophy Of Consciousness
Advaita's witness consciousness is a systematic development of the Upaniṣadic teaching of the self as pure consciousness, which Advaita identified with Brahman. Śaṅkara's commentaries built the doctrine directly on Upaniṣadic texts.
Carried by Adi Shankara.
Scholastic and Islamic faculty psychology influenced Scholastic passions theory in Philosophy Of Emotion
Scholastic passions theory took its faculty psychology of appetites and powers from the Islamic and earlier scholastic faculty psychology, above all Avicenna's.
Carried by Avicenna; Thomas Aquinas.
Cartesian substance dualism led to Passions of the Soul in Philosophy Of Emotion
The Passions of the Soul is a direct outgrowth of Cartesian substance dualism, defining passions as perceptions of the soul occasioned by bodily motions under the mind-body union. The emotion theory is the psychological branch of the dualist metaphysics.
Carried by René Descartes; Passions of the Soul (1649).
Cartesian substance dualism provoked Materialism in Consciousness Studies
Materialism took shape as an attack on Cartesian substance dualism, replacing two substances with matter alone; the doctrine's identity rests on rejecting the dualist picture.
Carried by Thomas Hobbes.
Empiricism and associationism led to Associationism in Psychology
Associationist psychology was a direct outgrowth of empiricist-associationist philosophy of mind; Hartley and the Scottish and English associationists systematised the associative laws Locke and Hume had sketched.
Carried by David Hartley; David Hume.
Empiricism and associationism led to Associationism in Psychology
Associationist psychology grew directly out of the empiricist-associationist philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and Hume; Hartley's 1749 Observations applied their laws of association to physiology and made them the basis of a psychological system.
Carried by David Hartley; Observations on Man (1749).

Philosophy Of Mind is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 25 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Philosophy Of MindRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Philosophy Of Consciousness 34 links
- Mental Causation And Physicalism 19 links
- Consciousness Studies 12 links
- Philosophy Of Perception 11 links
- Mental Representation 7 links
- Self Knowledge And Subjectivity 7 links
- Psychology 6 links
- Cognitive Science 5 links
- Philosophy Of Emotion 5 links
- Metaphysics 4 links
- Personal Identity 4 links
- Embodied Cognition 3 links
More in Philosophy Of Mind
- Mental Causation And Physicalism
- Mental Representation
- Philosophy Of Action
- Philosophy Of Consciousness
- Philosophy Of Emotion
- Philosophy Of Perception
- Self Knowledge And Subjectivity
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