Philosophy Of Mind

Philosophy of mind asks what minds are, what mental states are, and how minds fit into the rest of nature.

25 frameworks, from 450 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Mind · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Philosophy of mind asks what minds are, what mental states are, and how minds fit into the rest of nature1. Its central questions are deceptively simple: What is the difference between a thinking thing and a lump of matter? When you see red, what exactly is happening? Can a purely physical system have beliefs, feelings, or experiences? These questions matter because they bear on whether we are free, whether machines could be conscious, whether the mind survives the body, and what it means to know one's own thoughts. The history of the field is a long sequence of attempts to answer them, each new approach responding to problems the previous ones could not solve.

Ancient Foundations: Soul, Form, and the Tripartite Mind

Western philosophy of mind begins with Plato (c. 429–347 BCE), who argued that the soul is immaterial and distinct from the body. In dialogues such as the Phaedo and the Republic, he treated the soul as the principle of life and thought, temporarily imprisoned in a body. His tripartite psychology divided the soul into reason, spirit (thumos), and appetite, each with its own aims and potential for conflict—a model that explained inner struggle as a political tension among parts of the soul. Plato's student Aristotle (384–322 BCE) rejected the idea of a soul separable from the body2. In De Anima he developed hylomorphism: the soul is the form of a living body, as the shape of an axe is to its bronze. Soul and body are not two things but one thing described in two ways. Aristotle's account of perception, imagination, and intellect set the vocabulary—faculties, potentiality, actuality—that would dominate for centuries.

Indian and Buddhist Analyses of Mind

Parallel and equally rigorous traditions developed in South Asia. Buddhist thinkers analyzed the mind as a stream of momentary events (dharmas) with no permanent self behind them. The no-self (anātman) doctrine held that what we call a person is a bundle of physical and mental processes in constant flux; the question was how continuity, memory, and moral responsibility are possible without a self. The Abhidharma literature catalogued mental factors with great precision3. Later, the Yogācāra school (roughly 4th century CE onward), associated with thinkers such as Vasubandhu and Asaṅga, developed consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra): the claim that experienced objects are constructions of consciousness, analyzed through layers of awareness including a storehouse consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) that carries karmic traces. In the Hindu Nyāya school, by contrast, philosophers defended a substantial self (ātman) as the bearer of cognition, desire, and action, and developed sophisticated arguments about perception and inference. Advaita Vedānta, systematized by Śaṅkara (c. 8th century CE), held that the true self is pure witnessing consciousness, identical with ultimate reality, while the everyday ego is a superimposition. These traditions were not mere precursors; they offered detailed theories of attention, perception, self-awareness, and the construction of experience that remain in active philosophical use.

Medieval Synthesis: Faculties, Intentionality, and Harmony

Islamic philosophy absorbed and transformed Greek psychology. Thinkers such as al-Fārābī (c. 872–950) and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) developed elaborate faculty psychologies, distinguishing external senses, internal senses (including imagination, estimation, and memory), and a rational intellect. Avicenna's "floating man" thought experiment—imagining a person created fully formed but deprived of all sensory input—argued for immediate self-awareness independent of the body. In Latin Europe, scholastic thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) integrated Aristotelian hylomorphism with Christian doctrine, refining accounts of intellect, will, and sensory powers.

A recurring problem was how mind and body interact1. Occasionalism, developed by al-Ghazālī and later by Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715), held that created things have no causal power of their own; God is the sole true cause, and what looks like mind-body interaction is God's occasioning of one state upon another. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) offered pre-established harmony: mind and body are like two clocks synchronized by God at creation, each running its own mechanism without interacting. These were ingenious solutions to a problem created by Cartesian dualism.

Descartes and the Modern Divide

René Descartes (1596–1650) gave the field its modern shape. He argued that mind and body are distinct substances: mind is thinking, unextended stuff; body is extended, mechanical stuff1. This substance dualism seemed to secure the possibility of immortality and the certainty of self-knowledge (the cogito), but it created the interaction problem: how can an immaterial mind move a physical body? Descartes proposed the pineal gland as the point of contact, but the answer satisfied few. His contemporary Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and later materialists argued instead that thought is a motion of matter. The debate between dualism and materialism has never fully closed.

Empiricism, Associationism, and the Mind's Contents

John Locke (1632–1704) shifted attention from substance to content. His empiricist philosophy of mind held that all ideas derive from experience—sensation and reflection—rejecting innate ideas. David Hume (1711–1776) pushed further, analyzing the mind as a bundle of perceptions and arguing that the self is nothing over and above those perceptions. Associationism, developed by Hume and later by David Hartley (1705–1757) and James Mill (1773–1836), held that complex mental states arise from simple ideas combined by principles such as contiguity and resemblance. This tradition made psychology a naturalistic project, though it struggled to explain active thought and the unity of consciousness.

Intentionality and Phenomenology

A decisive turn came with Franz Brentano (1838–1917), who argued that the mark of the mental is intentionality: mental states are about something45. A belief is a belief about something; a desire is a desire for something. This directedness seemed to distinguish mind from matter, since physical objects are not "about" anything. Brentano's student Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) founded phenomenology, a method for describing the structures of experience as they present themselves. Phenomenology of mind analyzed consciousness, embodiment, and the lived body in detail, influencing later work on perception and intersubjectivity. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961) extended this tradition, emphasizing that minds are embedded in practical, bodily engagement with a world rather than detached spectators.

Behaviorism and Its Discontents

In the early twentieth century, philosophical behaviorism (associated with Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind, 1949) argued that talk of inner mental states is talk about dispositions to behave. To say someone believes it will rain is to say they are disposed to carry an umbrella, not to report an inner occurrence1. This avoided dualist mysteries and fit a scientific temper, but critics objected that it cannot capture the felt quality of experience or the causal role of mental states. Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) offered related arguments about the public criteria for mental language, while insisting that inner states are not private objects.

Identity Theory and Functionalism

The mid-twentieth century brought physicalism back to center. The mind–brain identity theory, defended by J. J. C. Smart (1920–2012) and Ullin Place (1924–2004) in the 1950s, held that mental states are identical with brain states—pain just is a certain pattern of neural firing. This was simple and scientifically attractive, but it faced the problem of multiple realizability: if octopuses or silicon-based systems can feel pain, pain cannot be identical with one specific human brain state6. Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) pressed this point, and functionalism emerged as the answer. Functionalism defines mental states by their causal roles—what causes them, what they cause, and how they relate to other states—rather than by their physical makeup17. A pain is whatever state is caused by tissue damage and causes avoidance and distress, whether realized in neurons or silicon1. Functionalism became the dominant framework in cognitive science and remains central.

Computation and Connectionism

Functionalism dovetailed with the computational theory of mind, developed by Putnam, Jerry Fodor (1935–2017), and others in the 1960s and 1970s. The mind is a symbol-manipulating system: thinking is computation over mental representations, and the brain is the hardware running the mind's software. Fodor's language-of-thought hypothesis held that thought has a compositional structure like a language8. This picture made psychology tractable and inspired artificial intelligence. But it struggled with the flexibility and context-sensitivity of real cognition. Connectionism, developed from the 1980s onward, modeled cognition as distributed networks of simple units whose weighted connections change with experience. Rather than explicit rules, connectionist networks learn patterns—a model that handled perception and learning more gracefully than classical symbol systems, though it raised questions about systematicity and compositionality.

Externalism and Embodiment

In 1975, Putnam argued that "meanings just ain't in the head." His Twin Earth thought experiment—where a person on a planet with a different substance than water has the same internal states but different beliefs—suggested that mental content depends on the environment. Tyler Burge extended this content externalism to social and linguistic context. Meanwhile, embodied and enactive approaches, developed by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch (and later Andy Clark and others), argued that cognition is not confined to the brain but arises from the body's interaction with its environment. Enactivism holds that perception is an active skill, not passive reception9. Predictive processing, a more recent framework, treats the brain as a prediction machine that constantly generates and updates models of the world, minimizing prediction error—a unifying account that has gained wide influence.

Consciousness and the Hard Problem

The late twentieth century saw consciousness return as the central puzzle. David Chalmers (born 1966) distinguished the "easy problems" of explaining cognitive functions from the "hard problem" of explaining why any of it is accompanied by subjective experience—what it is like to be something. This framing reinvigorated dualist and mysterian options, while others pursued reductive accounts. Illusionism, defended by Keith Frankish, argues that phenomenal consciousness as commonly conceived is an illusion; what exists are introspective states that misrepresent themselves as having intrinsic felt quality. Panpsychism, the view that experience is fundamental and ubiquitous, has seen a revival among philosophers such as Galen Strawson and Philip Goff as a response to the hard problem. Anomalous monism, Donald Davidson's (1917–2003) view that mental events are identical with physical events but cannot be captured by strict psychological laws, offered a non-reductive physicalism that preserved mental causation.

The Present Landscape

Philosophy of mind today is pluralistic. Functionalism and computational approaches remain influential in cognitive science, though connectionism, predictive processing, and enactivism have reshaped how researchers think about representation and learning. The hard problem continues to divide philosophers: some pursue reductive explanations, others defend panpsychism or mysterianism, and illusionists deny the problem is well posed. Buddhist and other non-Western analyses of mind are increasingly engaged as genuine theoretical resources rather than historical curiosities. Embodied and extended approaches challenge the boundary of the mind, while work on mental causation and physicalism continues to refine what it means to say the mental is real. The field's oldest questions—what is a mind, what is experience, how does thought relate to world—remain open, but the tools for addressing them are richer than ever.

References

  1. Philosophy of mind (introduction, Mind–body problem, Interactionist dualism, Behaviorism, Functionalism), Wikipedia
  2. Dualism (History), Wikipedia
  3. Abhidharma, Wikipedia
  4. Intentionality, Wikipedia
  5. Franz Brentano, Wikipedia
  6. Multiple realizability, Wikipedia
  7. Functionalism (philosophy of mind), Wikipedia
  8. Mental representation (Representational theories of mind), Wikipedia
  9. Enactivism, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Philosophy Of Mind

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 450 BCE-Present

    Buddhist No-Self Theory

    Is there a permanent self behind experience?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  2. 400 BCE-300 BCE
  3. 300 BCE-Present
  4. 200 BCE-Present

    Nyaya Self Theory

    Is a substantial self needed to explain experience?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 400-Present

    Yogacara Consciousness-Only

    Are experienced objects constructions of consciousness?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  6. 800-Present

    Advaita Witness Consciousness

    Is the true self pure witnessing consciousness?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  7. 900-1300
  8. 1100-1715

    Psychophysical parallelism

    How can mind and body correspond without interacting?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1640-1750

    Cartesian substance dualism

    Are mind and body two distinct substances?

    About Cartesian substance dualism
    Substance dualism is the view that the mind and the body are two fundamentally different kinds of substances. A substance, in this context, is something that can exist independently. The mind is a thinking, non-extended substance; the body is an extended, non-thinking substance. This framework directly addresses the mind-body problem—the question of how mental and physical events relate—by asserting that they belong to distinct realms. It is distinct from property dualism, which holds that mental and physical are different properties of a single substance, and from idealism, which reduces the physical to the mental. Substance dualism preserves the specialness of mind, making it irreducible to physical processes, but it famously struggles to explain how an immaterial mind can causally interact with a material body.
    Core Curriculum
    The first course on substance dualism in philosophy of mind typically covers these concepts in logical order:
    1. Substance: The fundamental category of being that can exist independently. In substance dualism, there are two kinds: mental and physical.
    2. Mind: The thinking, non-extended substance characterized by consciousness, thought, and volition.
    3. Body: The extended, non-thinking substance characterized by spatial location, size, shape, and motion.
    4. Interaction Problem: The central difficulty of explaining how an immaterial mind can cause changes in a material body and vice versa. This is the classic objection to substance dualism.
    5. Causal Interaction: The presumed relation between mind and body, typically understood as a two-way causal exchange (e.g., a decision to move an arm causes the arm to move; a pinprick causes pain).
    6. Mind-Body Problem: The broader philosophical problem of explaining the relationship between mental and physical phenomena, for which substance dualism offers one solution.
    7. Privacy of the Mental: The idea that mental states are directly accessible only to the subject who has them, unlike physical states which are publicly observable.
    8. Indubitability of the Mind: The claim, central to Descartes's method, that one can doubt the existence of one's body but not the existence of one's own mind (the cogito).
    9. Ghost in the Machine: A pejorative label, popularized by Gilbert Ryle, for the view that the mind is a non-physical entity inhabiting the body. It captures the perceived absurdity of substance dualism.
    10. Cartesian Dualism: The specific version of substance dualism articulated by René Descartes, which is the most historically influential form.
    These concepts form the teaching spine. The interaction problem is the most discussed issue, leading to various proposed solutions (e.g., occasionalism, parallelism) and to the development of alternative frameworks like materialism and property dualism.
    Intellectual History
    Substance dualism's local dominance in philosophy of mind begins with René Descartes (1596–1650) and his seminal work, Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). Descartes, reacting to the mechanistic science of his day, sought to establish a foundation for knowledge that could not be doubted. He found that he could doubt the existence of his body and the entire physical world, but he could not doubt that he was thinking. This led to his famous conclusion, "I think, therefore I am" (cogito ergo sum), and the further claim that the mind is a substance distinct from the body. Descartes argued that the essence of mind is thought, and the essence of body is extension. He located the point of interaction in the pineal gland, a small structure in the brain, though this proposal was widely criticized.
    Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680) was an immediate and incisive critic. In their correspondence, she pressed Descartes on the interaction problem: how can an immaterial mind, with no physical properties, cause motion in a material body? This exchange set the agenda for subsequent debate. Later in the 17th century, Nicolas Malebranche (1638–1715) developed occasionalism, a radical solution to the interaction problem: God is the only true cause, and mental events are merely occasions for God to produce corresponding physical events. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) proposed pre-established harmony, in which God created mind and body to run in parallel like two synchronized clocks, with no direct causal interaction. These are parallel frameworks that accept the dualist premise but reject direct causal interaction.
    Substance dualism remained a dominant framework through the 17th and 18th centuries, coexisting with the rise of idealism (beginning around 1710 with George Berkeley). In the 20th century, it faced powerful challenges from logical behaviorism, the mind-brain identity theory, and functionalism, which sought to naturalize the mind. Gilbert Ryle (1900–1976) famously dismissed substance dualism as the "ghost in the machine," arguing that it rested on a category mistake—treating the mind as if it were a thing of the same logical type as the body. Despite these critiques, substance dualism has persisted, often in revived forms. Contemporary philosophers such as Richard Swinburne (1934–) and John Foster (1940–) have defended updated versions, arguing that the unity of consciousness and the possibility of an afterlife require a non-physical mind. Today, substance dualism is a minority position in academic philosophy of mind, but it remains a live option in philosophical theology and in popular thought.
    Key Insights
    • Substance dualism set the terms for the modern mind-body problem, forcing subsequent frameworks to either solve the interaction problem or reject the dualist premise.
    • Its sharp distinction between mind and body made the privacy and indubitability of mental states central to philosophy of mind, a legacy that persists in debates about introspection and self-knowledge.
    • The framework's difficulties with causal interaction motivated the development of major alternatives, including materialism, property dualism, and idealism, shaping the entire trajectory of the subfield.
    The 11 concepts its tower teaches
    • Body
    • Cartesian Dualism
    • Causal Interaction
    • Cogito
    • Indubitability of the Mind
    • Interaction Problem
    • Mind
    • Mind-Body Problem
    • Privacy of the Mental
    • Substance
    • Substance Dualism

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1670-1800

    Monism and Double-Aspect Theory

    Are mind and body two aspects of one thing?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  11. 1690-1850
  12. 1874-Present

    Intentionality and phenomenology

    What makes a mental state about something?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  13. 1949-1970

    Logical behaviorism

    Is talk of inner states just talk of behaviour?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  14. 1956-1975

    Type physicalism

    Are mental states identical to brain states?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  15. 1960-Present
  16. 1960-Present

    Functionalism

    Are mental states defined by their causal roles?

    About Functionalism
    Functionalism emerged in the 1960s as a powerful alternative to two then-dominant views: behaviorism, which identified mental states with patterns of observable behavior, and the mind-brain identity theory, which identified them with specific physical states of the brain. Against both, functionalism argued that what makes a mental state the kind of state it is—a belief, a desire, a pain—is not its physical makeup or its behavioral expression alone, but its causal role: the way it is caused by sensory inputs, how it interacts with other mental states, and how it leads to behavioral outputs. This shift opened the door to thinking of minds as abstract functional organizations that could, in principle, be realized in many different physical substrates, including computers. Functionalism thus became the philosophical backbone of cognitive science, providing a framework for understanding the mind in terms of information processing and computation.
    Core Curriculum
    The following concepts form the standard teaching spine for functionalism in philosophy of mind:
    1. Multiple Realizability – The idea that the same mental state type (e.g., pain) can be realized by different physical states in different organisms (or even in machines). This is the central argument against the mind-brain identity theory.
    1. Functional Role – The distinctive causal profile of a mental state: what typically causes it, what it typically causes, and how it relates to other mental states.
    1. Causal Role – A synonym for functional role, emphasizing the causal connections that define a mental state.
    1. Input-Output Relations – The sensory inputs and behavioral outputs that, together with internal causal relations, define a mental state's functional role.
    1. Machine Functionalism – The version of functionalism that models the mind on a Turing machine: mental states are machine states defined by a transition table that maps inputs and current states to outputs and next states.
    1. Psychofunctionalism – The version, associated with Jerry Fodor, that holds that mental states are defined by the functional roles posited by empirical psychology, not by common-sense platitudes.
    1. Analytic Functionalism – The version, developed by David Lewis and David Armstrong, that defines mental state types by analyzing the causal roles implicit in our ordinary language about the mind.
    1. Homuncular Functionalism – The view that complex mental capacities can be analyzed into simpler sub-capacities, each performed by a specialized subsystem or "homunculus," which can themselves be further decomposed.
    1. Functional Analysis – The method of explaining a mental capacity by decomposing it into a set of simpler functions and their interactions.
    1. Realizer vs. Role – The distinction between the functional role itself (the abstract causal profile) and the particular physical state that fills that role in a given system (the realizer).
    1. Functional Organization – The overall pattern of causal relations among a system's states, inputs, and outputs that determines its mental life.
    1. Functional State – Any state of a system that is defined by its functional role, rather than by its physical composition.
    1. Mental State Type – A kind of mental state (e.g., belief, desire, pain) identified by its functional role, not by its physical realization.
    1. Functional Isomorphism – The relation between two systems that have the same functional organization, even if they are made of different materials.
    1. Turing Machine Functionalism – A specific version of machine functionalism that uses the formal apparatus of Turing machines to define mental states as computational states.
    Intellectual History
    Functionalism arose in the mid-1960s as a direct response to the limitations of behaviorism and the mind-brain identity theory. Behaviorism, especially the version championed by B.F. Skinner, had tried to eliminate mental states from scientific psychology, treating them as unnecessary fictions. The identity theory, defended by U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart, had countered that mental states are simply brain states. But by the early 1960s, philosophers began to see problems with both views. Hilary Putnam, in a series of papers starting with "Minds and Machines" (1960) and culminating in "The Nature of Mental States" (1967), argued that mental states could not be identified with specific brain states because the same mental state could be realized in different physical systems—a point he illustrated with the example of pain in humans, octopuses, and hypothetical Martians. This argument from multiple realizability became the founding insight of functionalism.
    Putnam's early version was machine functionalism, which treated the mind as a kind of Turing machine. Around the same time, Jerry Fodor developed psychofunctionalism, arguing that mental states should be defined by the causal roles discovered by scientific psychology rather than by common-sense concepts. David Lewis and David Armstrong independently developed analytic functionalism, which used the method of Ramsification to define mental state types by the causal roles implicit in our ordinary mental concepts. William Lycan later developed homuncular functionalism, drawing on the idea of functional decomposition in cognitive science.
    Functionalism quickly became the dominant framework in philosophy of mind, especially after the rise of cognitive science in the 1970s. It provided a natural home for the computational theory of mind, which treated mental processes as computations over mental representations. It also made sense of the idea that artificial intelligence could, in principle, have genuine mental states if it had the right functional organization. The Turing test, originally proposed by Alan Turing in 1950, was reinterpreted as a test for functional equivalence.
    Functionalism faced significant criticisms. John Searle's Chinese Room argument (1980) challenged the idea that syntax alone could produce semantics, arguing that a purely functional system could not have genuine understanding. Ned Block's "Blockhead" thought experiment (1978) argued that a system could be functionally equivalent to a human without having conscious experiences. These criticisms led to refinements of functionalism, including the distinction between role and realizer functionalism, and to the development of successor frameworks such as anomalous monism and biological naturalism.
    Despite these challenges, functionalism remains a central framework in philosophy of mind. It shaped the agenda for debates about consciousness, mental causation, and the nature of psychological explanation. Its core insight—that mental states are defined by what they do, not what they are made of—continues to inform work in cognitive science, artificial intelligence, and the philosophy of psychology.
    The 15 concepts its tower teaches
    • Analytic Functionalism
    • Causal Role
    • Functional Analysis
    • Functional Isomorphism
    • Functional Organization
    • Functional Role
    • Functional State
    • Homuncular Functionalism
    • Input-Output Relations
    • Machine Functionalism
    • Mental State Type
    • Multiple Realizability
    • Psychofunctionalism
    • Realizer vs. Role
    • Turing Machine Functionalism

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  17. 1970-2000

    Anomalous monism

    Can mental events be physical without strict laws?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  18. 1975-Present

    Anti-individualism

    Do mental contents depend on the outer world?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  19. 1980-Present

    Connectionism

    Can networks of simple units model thought?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  20. 1991-Present

    Embodied and enactive cognition

    Is cognition shaped by the body and environment?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  21. 1995-Present

    The hard problem of consciousness

    Why is any physical process accompanied by experience?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  22. 2005-Present

    Illusionism

    Is phenomenal experience an illusion?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  23. 2005-Present

    Panpsychism

    Is experience a fundamental feature of nature?

    About Panpsychism
    Panpsychism is the view that mind or consciousness is not an emergent property of complex physical systems, nor a rare anomaly in a dead universe, but a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of reality. In the philosophy of mind, this ancient framework addresses the so-called "hard problem of consciousness"—the question of why and how physical processes give rise to subjective experience—by denying that there is any deep gap to bridge. If mind is already present at the most basic level of reality, then the appearance of human consciousness is not a miracle but a development of something already there. This makes panpsychism a distinctive alternative to both materialism, which struggles to explain how matter becomes conscious, and dualism, which struggles to explain how mind and matter interact.
    Panpsychism's core curriculum centers on a small set of organizing concepts. First is the distinction between panpsychism proper and panexperientialism: the former holds that all things have a mind or mental aspect, while the latter more cautiously claims that all things have some form of experience or subjective feel. A related concept is panprotopsychism, the view that the fundamental constituents of reality are not themselves conscious but possess protoconscious properties that, when combined in the right way, yield full consciousness. The combination problem is the central theoretical challenge for panpsychism: if basic particles each have their own micro-experiences, how do those micro-experiences combine to produce the unified macro-experience of a human mind? Proponents of the Russellian monist approach argue that physics only describes the relational, structural properties of matter, leaving the intrinsic nature of matter—which may be mental—open to philosophical speculation. This view draws on Bertrand Russell's distinction between the causal structure of the world (known by physics) and its intrinsic character (unknown but possibly mental). The subject-summing problem is a specific version of the combination problem: if each particle has its own subject of experience, how do many subjects become one subject? Some panpsychists adopt a constitutive version, holding that macro-consciousness is literally composed of micro-consciousnesses; others adopt a non-constitutive version, holding that macro-consciousness emerges from micro-consciousness without being composed of it. The spread mind thesis extends panpsychist intuitions to argue that consciousness can be distributed across space and time, not confined to individual brains. Finally, the hard problem of consciousness itself is the problem that panpsychism claims to solve most directly: it asks why there is subjective experience at all, and panpsychism answers that experience is built into the fabric of reality.
    Panpsychism is one of the oldest philosophical theories, with roots in ancient Greek thought. The earliest known Western proponent is Thales of Miletus (c. 624–546 BCE), who reportedly said that "all things are full of gods," implying that even apparently inanimate matter has a vital, mental aspect. This view was shared by other Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Anaximenes and Heraclitus, who saw the cosmos as a living, intelligent whole. Plato, in the Timaeus, described the world as a living being with a soul, a view that influenced later Neoplatonic and Renaissance thought. In the Indian tradition, the Upanishads (c. 800–200 BCE) teach that Brahman, the ultimate reality, is identical with Atman, the innermost self, implying that consciousness pervades all existence. This non-dualist framework, later systematized in Advaita Vedanta, shares with panpsychism the idea that mind is not a local phenomenon but a universal one.
    Panpsychism declined in the West during the rise of mechanistic materialism in the seventeenth century, but it never disappeared. Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) argued that thought and extension are two attributes of a single substance, God or Nature, implying that everything that exists has a mental aspect. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) developed a panpsychist metaphysics of monads—simple, immaterial substances that each perceive the universe from their own perspective. In the nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) argued that the inner nature of all things is Will, a blind striving that is mental in character. William James (1842–1910) defended a form of panpsychism in his later writings, arguing that consciousness is not a thing but a function that may be present in rudimentary forms throughout nature. Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) developed the most systematic panpsychist metaphysics of the twentieth century, replacing the concept of inert matter with "actual occasions" that have both physical and mental poles. His process philosophy has been a major influence on contemporary panpsychism.
    In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, panpsychism has experienced a revival, driven by frustration with materialist explanations of consciousness. Thomas Nagel (b. 1937) argued in his 1974 paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" that subjective experience cannot be captured by objective science, a conclusion that opens the door to panpsychism. Galen Strawson (b. 1952) has forcefully argued that materialism must include experiential reality as fundamental, making panpsychism the only coherent form of materialism. David Chalmers (b. 1966) has defended panpsychism as a serious option for solving the hard problem, and Philip Goff (b. 1978) has developed a detailed version of Russellian monism. Contemporary panpsychism remains a minority view, but it is now a live option in philosophy of mind, debated alongside materialism, dualism, and idealism.
    The 10 concepts its tower teaches
    • Combination problem
    • Constitutive panpsychism
    • Hard problem of consciousness
    • Non-constitutive panpsychism
    • Panexperientialism
    • Panprotopsychism
    • Panpsychism
    • Russellian monism
    • Spread mind thesis
    • Subject-summing problem

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  24. 2005-Present

    Predictive coding

    Does the brain predict the causes of its input?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  25. 2005-Present

    Predictive Processing

    Is the brain a prediction-error minimizing machine?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Buddhist No-Self TheoryPlatonic and Aristotelian psychologyBuddhist and Indian analyses of mindNyaya Self TheoryYogacara Consciousness-OnlyAdvaita Witness ConsciousnessScholastic and Islamic faculty psycho…Psychophysical parallelismCartesian substance dualismMonism and Double-Aspect TheoryEmpiricism and associationismIntentionality and phenomenologyLogical behaviorismType physicalismComputational theory of mindFunctionalismAnomalous monismAnti-individualismConnectionismEmbodied and enactive cognitionThe hard problem of consciousnessIllusionismPanpsychismPredictive codingPredictive Processing

Beyond the field

Where Philosophy Of Mind's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 157 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Philosophy Of Mind is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 25 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

Land on Philosophy Of Mind

Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

More in Philosophy Of Mind

See where Philosophy Of Mind sits on the Map of Human Knowledge