Philosophy Of Action

Philosophy of action asks what it is to do something, as opposed to merely having something happen to you.

12 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Mind · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Philosophy of action asks what it is to do something, as opposed to merely having something happen to you1. When your arm rises because a doctor lifted it, nothing has been done by you; when it rises because you decided to raise it, you have acted1. The field tries to say what makes that difference, what an intention is, whether reasons cause actions or merely make them intelligible, and how acting for a reason connects to freedom, responsibility, and value. These questions matter far beyond the seminar room: they sit underneath debates about moral responsibility, criminal culpability, addiction, and whether machines or animals can be agents at all. The history of the field is largely a history of successive attempts to explain how a bit of behavior can be yours in the distinctive way that action is.

Aristotle and the Practical Syllogism

The founding text is Aristotle's discussion of voluntary action, choice, and weakness of will in the Nicomachean Ethics, together with his account of motion in the De Anima. Aristotle distinguished the voluntary (what springs from the agent without external compulsion) from the chosen (what is deliberately selected after deliberation), and he described practical reasoning as a kind of syllogism whose conclusion is an action rather than a proposition. A general premise ("dry food is good for every human being") combined with a particular one ("this is dry food") yields, in the practically wise person, the deed of eating. This was a genuinely explanatory structure: it showed how a reason could terminate in movement without being a mere push.

The tradition that grew from this—Aristotelian practical reason—treats action as the conclusion of deliberation aimed at the good, and treats the virtues as stable dispositions that make deliberation reliable. Its central claim is that the rationality of an action is not something added after the fact but is internal to the practical reasoning that produced it. Thomas Aquinas systematized this in the thirteenth century, folding Aristotelian choice into a theology of will and intellect, and the framework remained the default in European universities for centuries.

Hume and the Division of Reason and Passion

David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) reset the terms2. Hume argued that reason alone "is perfectly inert" and can never move us to act; it discovers relations of ideas and matters of fact, but it is passion that supplies the motive. His famous line that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" expressed a view now called the Humean theory of motivation: beliefs and desires are distinct kinds of state, and only a desire (or some conative state) can originate action, with belief contributing information about means32. On this picture, to explain an action is to cite the desire that drove it and the belief about how to satisfy it4.

Hume's framework made a sharp question unavoidable: if reasons are belief–desire pairs, in what sense is acting for a reason a rational achievement rather than a causal one? The Humean answer is instrumental: an action is rational relative to the agent's ends, whatever those ends are3. This remains one of the live positions in the field, defended in the twentieth century by philosophers who held that all intentional action requires a "pro-attitude" plus a means–end belief.

Kant and the Autonomy of Practical Reason

Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788) mounted the great counterattack. Kant held that pure reason can be practical: a rational agent can act from a principle that is valid independently of any desire, and indeed the moral law commands precisely because it does not depend on inclination. The will, for Kant, is a faculty of self-legislation; to act autonomously is to determine oneself by a law one gives oneself. This introduced a concept that would echo through the whole later history: the difference between acting according to a rule and acting from the representation of a rule.

Kantian practical reason thus supplied a rival to Humean motivation—one on which the normative structure of a reason is what moves a rational agent, not a contingent desire. The dispute between these two pictures, sometimes framed as whether motivation is "cognitive" or "conative," is still the field's central axis.

Anscombe and the Return of Intention

For much of the early twentieth century, action theory was absorbed into behaviorism and logical positivism, which had little room for intention as an inner cause. The turning point was G. E. M. Anscombe's short, dense book Intention (1957)5. Anscombe asked what distinguishes the question "Why did you do that?" when it seeks a reason from the same question when it seeks a cause. Her answer was that intentional action is action to which a certain kind of "Why?" question applies, and that the agent's own knowledge of what they are doing—"practical knowledge"—is not a prediction but a description of the action under an aspect.

Anscombe's work, later called Anscombean philosophy of action, insisted that reasons and actions are internally related: the description of the action and the reason for it belong to a single practical order, not to two separate realms (mental cause, bodily effect) that then need bridging. She also revived interest in Aristotle's practical syllogism and in the idea that intention is not a separate mental event but a form of description. Her influence was slow and then enormous; much late-twentieth-century work on intention, practical knowledge, and the "guise of the good" descends from her.

The Causal Theory and Its Critics

The dominant mid-century synthesis was the causal theory of action, most associated with Donald Davidson's essays collected in Essays on Actions and Events (1980), especially "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963). Davidson argued that a reason explains an action only if it is also the cause of the action, and that the reason is a belief–desire pair. This reconciled Humean motivation with a naturalistic, event-causal picture: reasons are mental states, mental states are (on Davidson's anomalous monism) physical events, and so reasons can cause behavior. The theory made action explanation continuous with causal explanation generally, which many found its great virtue.

Critics pressed hard. If a reason causes an action, what makes the causation rational rather than merely mechanical—the problem of "deviant causal chains," where an action is caused by the right belief and desire but in the wrong way (a climber's desire to be rid of a weight and belief that letting go will do it cause him to loosen his grip through a nervous spasm). Non-causalist accounts, drawing on Anscombe and on Wittgenstein, argued instead that reasons make actions intelligible by placing them in a normative pattern, and that causal talk misdescribes this. The debate between causalists and non-causalists, and the search for a condition that rules out deviance, occupied the 1970s and 1980s.

Frankfurt, Volition, and the Structure of the Will

A parallel line concerned the will itself. Harry Frankfurt's "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" (1971) introduced the distinction between first-order desires (to do or have something) and second-order volitions (desires to be moved by a given first-order desire). An addict who wants the drug but does not want to want it lacks freedom of the will; a person whose second-order volition endorses the effective first-order desire acts freely. This Frankfurtian volitional theory reframed free action as a matter of the hierarchical structure of the agent's attitudes rather than of causal indeterminism, and it spawned a large literature on identification, alienation, and the "true self."67

Intention as Plan

The next major constructive proposal was Michael Bratman's planning theory of intention, developed in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987). Bratman observed that intentions are not just strong desires: they are conduct-controlling commitments that persist, resist reconsideration, and coordinate action over time and with others. Intentions function as elements of plans—partial, hierarchically organized structures that let an agent settle matters in advance and then act without re-deliberating at every step. This explained phenomena the belief–desire model handled poorly, such as the stability of intention and the way future-directed intentions constrain present deliberation. Bratman's account became the standard framework for thinking about intention and is a bridge to work on shared intention and collective agency.

Action Ontology and the Individuation of Deeds

Running alongside these debates was a more metaphysical strand, action ontology, which asked what actions are and how they are individuated. Is my action one thing (moving my finger) or many (moving my finger, firing the gun, killing the king)? Davidson's answer—that actions are particular events, and that a single event can be described in many ways—competed with finer-grained accounts on which different descriptions pick out different actions. This literature, prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, connected action theory to the metaphysics of events and to the logic of "by"-relations (I did A by doing B).

The Normativity of Action and the Guise of the Good

A further tradition asks whether action is essentially evaluative. The "guise of the good" thesis, with roots in Aristotle and Aquinas and revived in the late twentieth century, holds that to act intentionally is always to act under the appearance of some good—one does what one takes to be worth doing, in some respect. This connects action theory to metaethics and to the normativity of action: the idea that actions are assessable as correct or incorrect, and that this assessment is internal to agency rather than imposed from outside. Related work asks how akrasia (acting against one's better judgment) is possible at all if intention always presents its object as good.

Empirical Philosophy of Action

From the 1990s onward, philosophers increasingly drew on psychology and neuroscience. Work on the "two systems" of reasoning, on implementation intentions, on the neuroscience of voluntary movement (including the much-discussed Libet experiments on the timing of conscious will), and on disorders of agency such as anarchic hand syndrome and schizophrenia's "passivity" symptoms gave action theory new test cases. Empirical philosophy of action uses these findings to constrain theories of intention, control, and the sense of agency—asking, for instance, whether the phenomenology of "I did it" tracks a real causal process or is a post-hoc construction. This strand remains contested but has made action theory answerable to evidence in a way the earlier conceptual debates were not.

The Field Today

Contemporary philosophy of action is plural. The causal theory, in refined forms that add conditions to exclude deviance, remains widely held; Bratman's planning framework anchors work on intention and shared agency; Anscombean and non-causalist approaches flourish in work on practical knowledge and the first-person perspective; and the Humean–Kantian dispute over motivation continues under new labels. Empirical work on agency and the sense of control is increasingly integrated with the conceptual literature. Open questions persist: what exactly distinguishes an intention from a prediction or a desire; whether reasons can be causes without the causal story collapsing into mechanism; how collective and institutional action relate to individual action; and whether the normative dimension of action can be naturalized. The field's history is, in effect, a long argument about whether doing something is best understood as a special kind of event in the world or as a special kind of answer to the question "Why?"—and that argument is not over.

References

  1. Action (philosophy), Wikipedia
  2. David Hume, Wikipedia
  3. Humeanism, Wikipedia
  4. Action theory (philosophy) (Overview), Wikipedia
  5. G. E. M. Anscombe, Wikipedia
  6. Harry Frankfurt, Wikipedia
  7. Compatibilism (History), Wikipedia

The frameworks of Philosophy Of Action

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 350 BCE-1600

    Aristotelian Practical Reason

    How does practical reasoning end in action?

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  2. 1739-Present
  3. 1785-Present
  4. 1957-Present

    Anscombean Philosophy of Action

    What makes a why-question ask for a reason?

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  5. 1960-Present

    Non-Causalist Accounts of Action

    Do reasons cause actions or make them intelligible?

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  6. 1963-1990

    Action Ontology

    What are actions and how are they individuated?

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  7. 1963-Present

    Causalism

    Must a reason for acting also cause the act?

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  8. 1971-Present
  9. 1980-Present
  10. 1987-Present
  11. 1990-Present

    Empirical Philosophy of Action

    What do experiments show about intention and action?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  12. 1990-Present

    Normativity of Action

    Are there norms internal to acting at all?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Aristotelian Practical ReasonHumean Theory of MotivationKantian Practical ReasonAnscombean Philosophy of ActionNon-Causalist Accounts of ActionAction OntologyCausalismFrankfurtian Volitional TheoryGuise of the GoodPlanning Theory of IntentionEmpirical Philosophy of ActionNormativity of Action

Beyond the field

Where Philosophy Of Action's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 38 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
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Philosophy Of Action is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 12 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

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