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Philosophy Of Action
Philosophy of action asks what it is to do something, as opposed to merely having something happen to you.
12 frameworks, from 350 BCE to today · Philosophy Of Mind · Philosophy
- Aristotelian Practical Reason 350 BCE-1600
- Humean Theory of Motivation 1739-Present
- Kantian Practical Reason 1785-Present
- Anscombean Philosophy of Action 1957-Present
- Non-Causalist Accounts of Action 1960-Present
- Action Ontology 1963-1990
- Causalism 1963-Present
- Frankfurtian Volitional Theory 1971-Present
- Guise of the Good 1980-Present
- Planning Theory of Intention 1987-Present
- Empirical Philosophy of Action 1990-Present
- Normativity of Action 1990-Present
Overview
Philosophy of action asks what it is to do something, as opposed to merely having something happen to you1. When your arm rises because a doctor lifted it, nothing has been done by you; when it rises because you decided to raise it, you have acted1. The field tries to say what makes that difference, what an intention is, whether reasons cause actions or merely make them intelligible, and how acting for a reason connects to freedom, responsibility, and value. These questions matter far beyond the seminar room: they sit underneath debates about moral responsibility, criminal culpability, addiction, and whether machines or animals can be agents at all. The history of the field is largely a history of successive attempts to explain how a bit of behavior can be yours in the distinctive way that action is.
Aristotle and the Practical Syllogism
The founding text is Aristotle's discussion of voluntary action, choice, and weakness of will in the Nicomachean Ethics, together with his account of motion in the De Anima. Aristotle distinguished the voluntary (what springs from the agent without external compulsion) from the chosen (what is deliberately selected after deliberation), and he described practical reasoning as a kind of syllogism whose conclusion is an action rather than a proposition. A general premise ("dry food is good for every human being") combined with a particular one ("this is dry food") yields, in the practically wise person, the deed of eating. This was a genuinely explanatory structure: it showed how a reason could terminate in movement without being a mere push.
The tradition that grew from this—Aristotelian practical reason—treats action as the conclusion of deliberation aimed at the good, and treats the virtues as stable dispositions that make deliberation reliable. Its central claim is that the rationality of an action is not something added after the fact but is internal to the practical reasoning that produced it. Thomas Aquinas systematized this in the thirteenth century, folding Aristotelian choice into a theology of will and intellect, and the framework remained the default in European universities for centuries.
Hume and the Division of Reason and Passion
David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) reset the terms2. Hume argued that reason alone "is perfectly inert" and can never move us to act; it discovers relations of ideas and matters of fact, but it is passion that supplies the motive. His famous line that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" expressed a view now called the Humean theory of motivation: beliefs and desires are distinct kinds of state, and only a desire (or some conative state) can originate action, with belief contributing information about means32. On this picture, to explain an action is to cite the desire that drove it and the belief about how to satisfy it4.
Hume's framework made a sharp question unavoidable: if reasons are belief–desire pairs, in what sense is acting for a reason a rational achievement rather than a causal one? The Humean answer is instrumental: an action is rational relative to the agent's ends, whatever those ends are3. This remains one of the live positions in the field, defended in the twentieth century by philosophers who held that all intentional action requires a "pro-attitude" plus a means–end belief.
Kant and the Autonomy of Practical Reason
Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of Practical Reason (1788) mounted the great counterattack. Kant held that pure reason can be practical: a rational agent can act from a principle that is valid independently of any desire, and indeed the moral law commands precisely because it does not depend on inclination. The will, for Kant, is a faculty of self-legislation; to act autonomously is to determine oneself by a law one gives oneself. This introduced a concept that would echo through the whole later history: the difference between acting according to a rule and acting from the representation of a rule.
Kantian practical reason thus supplied a rival to Humean motivation—one on which the normative structure of a reason is what moves a rational agent, not a contingent desire. The dispute between these two pictures, sometimes framed as whether motivation is "cognitive" or "conative," is still the field's central axis.
Anscombe and the Return of Intention
For much of the early twentieth century, action theory was absorbed into behaviorism and logical positivism, which had little room for intention as an inner cause. The turning point was G. E. M. Anscombe's short, dense book Intention (1957)5. Anscombe asked what distinguishes the question "Why did you do that?" when it seeks a reason from the same question when it seeks a cause. Her answer was that intentional action is action to which a certain kind of "Why?" question applies, and that the agent's own knowledge of what they are doing—"practical knowledge"—is not a prediction but a description of the action under an aspect.
Anscombe's work, later called Anscombean philosophy of action, insisted that reasons and actions are internally related: the description of the action and the reason for it belong to a single practical order, not to two separate realms (mental cause, bodily effect) that then need bridging. She also revived interest in Aristotle's practical syllogism and in the idea that intention is not a separate mental event but a form of description. Her influence was slow and then enormous; much late-twentieth-century work on intention, practical knowledge, and the "guise of the good" descends from her.
The Causal Theory and Its Critics
The dominant mid-century synthesis was the causal theory of action, most associated with Donald Davidson's essays collected in Essays on Actions and Events (1980), especially "Actions, Reasons, and Causes" (1963). Davidson argued that a reason explains an action only if it is also the cause of the action, and that the reason is a belief–desire pair. This reconciled Humean motivation with a naturalistic, event-causal picture: reasons are mental states, mental states are (on Davidson's anomalous monism) physical events, and so reasons can cause behavior. The theory made action explanation continuous with causal explanation generally, which many found its great virtue.
Critics pressed hard. If a reason causes an action, what makes the causation rational rather than merely mechanical—the problem of "deviant causal chains," where an action is caused by the right belief and desire but in the wrong way (a climber's desire to be rid of a weight and belief that letting go will do it cause him to loosen his grip through a nervous spasm). Non-causalist accounts, drawing on Anscombe and on Wittgenstein, argued instead that reasons make actions intelligible by placing them in a normative pattern, and that causal talk misdescribes this. The debate between causalists and non-causalists, and the search for a condition that rules out deviance, occupied the 1970s and 1980s.
Frankfurt, Volition, and the Structure of the Will
A parallel line concerned the will itself. Harry Frankfurt's "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" (1971) introduced the distinction between first-order desires (to do or have something) and second-order volitions (desires to be moved by a given first-order desire). An addict who wants the drug but does not want to want it lacks freedom of the will; a person whose second-order volition endorses the effective first-order desire acts freely. This Frankfurtian volitional theory reframed free action as a matter of the hierarchical structure of the agent's attitudes rather than of causal indeterminism, and it spawned a large literature on identification, alienation, and the "true self."67
Intention as Plan
The next major constructive proposal was Michael Bratman's planning theory of intention, developed in Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987). Bratman observed that intentions are not just strong desires: they are conduct-controlling commitments that persist, resist reconsideration, and coordinate action over time and with others. Intentions function as elements of plans—partial, hierarchically organized structures that let an agent settle matters in advance and then act without re-deliberating at every step. This explained phenomena the belief–desire model handled poorly, such as the stability of intention and the way future-directed intentions constrain present deliberation. Bratman's account became the standard framework for thinking about intention and is a bridge to work on shared intention and collective agency.
Action Ontology and the Individuation of Deeds
Running alongside these debates was a more metaphysical strand, action ontology, which asked what actions are and how they are individuated. Is my action one thing (moving my finger) or many (moving my finger, firing the gun, killing the king)? Davidson's answer—that actions are particular events, and that a single event can be described in many ways—competed with finer-grained accounts on which different descriptions pick out different actions. This literature, prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, connected action theory to the metaphysics of events and to the logic of "by"-relations (I did A by doing B).
The Normativity of Action and the Guise of the Good
A further tradition asks whether action is essentially evaluative. The "guise of the good" thesis, with roots in Aristotle and Aquinas and revived in the late twentieth century, holds that to act intentionally is always to act under the appearance of some good—one does what one takes to be worth doing, in some respect. This connects action theory to metaethics and to the normativity of action: the idea that actions are assessable as correct or incorrect, and that this assessment is internal to agency rather than imposed from outside. Related work asks how akrasia (acting against one's better judgment) is possible at all if intention always presents its object as good.
Empirical Philosophy of Action
From the 1990s onward, philosophers increasingly drew on psychology and neuroscience. Work on the "two systems" of reasoning, on implementation intentions, on the neuroscience of voluntary movement (including the much-discussed Libet experiments on the timing of conscious will), and on disorders of agency such as anarchic hand syndrome and schizophrenia's "passivity" symptoms gave action theory new test cases. Empirical philosophy of action uses these findings to constrain theories of intention, control, and the sense of agency—asking, for instance, whether the phenomenology of "I did it" tracks a real causal process or is a post-hoc construction. This strand remains contested but has made action theory answerable to evidence in a way the earlier conceptual debates were not.
The Field Today
Contemporary philosophy of action is plural. The causal theory, in refined forms that add conditions to exclude deviance, remains widely held; Bratman's planning framework anchors work on intention and shared agency; Anscombean and non-causalist approaches flourish in work on practical knowledge and the first-person perspective; and the Humean–Kantian dispute over motivation continues under new labels. Empirical work on agency and the sense of control is increasingly integrated with the conceptual literature. Open questions persist: what exactly distinguishes an intention from a prediction or a desire; whether reasons can be causes without the causal story collapsing into mechanism; how collective and institutional action relate to individual action; and whether the normative dimension of action can be naturalized. The field's history is, in effect, a long argument about whether doing something is best understood as a special kind of event in the world or as a special kind of answer to the question "Why?"—and that argument is not over.
References
- Action (philosophy), Wikipedia
- David Hume, Wikipedia
- Humeanism, Wikipedia
- Action theory (philosophy) (Overview), Wikipedia
- G. E. M. Anscombe, Wikipedia
- Harry Frankfurt, Wikipedia
- Compatibilism (History), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Philosophy Of Action
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 350 BCE-1600
Aristotelian Practical Reason
How does practical reasoning end in action?
- 1739-Present
- 1785-Present
- 1957-Present
Anscombean Philosophy of Action
What makes a why-question ask for a reason?
- 1960-Present
Non-Causalist Accounts of Action
Do reasons cause actions or make them intelligible?
- 1963-1990
- 1963-Present
- 1971-Present
- 1980-Present
- 1987-Present
- 1990-Present
Empirical Philosophy of Action
What do experiments show about intention and action?
- 1990-Present
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Humean Theory of Motivation reacted against Aristotelian Practical Reason
Hume's Treatise defined the passivity of reason against the Aristotelian-Scholastic view that practical reason can conclude in action, replacing the practical syllogism with belief-desire motivation.
Carried by David Hume; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).
Anscombean Philosophy of Action revived Aristotelian Practical Reason
Anscombe's Intention deliberately recovered Aristotle's practical syllogism and the idea of practical knowledge, making them central again after behaviorist neglect.
Carried by G. E. M. Anscombe; Intention (1957).
Kantian Practical Reason reacted against Humean Theory of Motivation
Kant's Groundwork attacked the Humean enslavement of reason to passion, arguing pure reason can be practical and the moral law motivates independently of inclination.
Carried by Immanuel Kant; Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).
Causalism grew out of Humean Theory of Motivation
Davidson's 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' built the causal theory on the Humean belief-desire pair, adding that the pair must cause the action.
Carried by Donald Davidson; Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963).
Planning Theory of Intention reacted against Humean Theory of Motivation
Bratman's planning theory was built as a corrective to the belief-desire model, arguing intentions are conduct-controlling commitments that cannot be reduced to strong desires.
Carried by Michael Bratman; Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987).
Non-Causalist Accounts of Action grew out of Anscombean Philosophy of Action
Non-causalists took Anscombe's internal relation between reason and action and her Wittgensteinian milieu to argue that reasons make actions intelligible rather than cause them.
Carried by G. E. M. Anscombe; Intention (1957).
Non-Causalist Accounts of Action rival of Causalism
Non-causalist accounts defined themselves against Davidson's claim that reasons explain by causing, pressing the deviant-causal-chain problem and the normative character of reason explanation.
Carried by Donald Davidson; Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963).
Frankfurtian Volitional Theory grew out of Humean Theory of Motivation
Frankfurt's hierarchical account of the will worked within the Humean picture of desires as the springs of action, adding higher-order volitions to explain freedom.
Carried by Harry Frankfurt; Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person (1971).
Normativity of Action influenced by Kantian Practical Reason
Work on the normativity of action drew on Kant's distinction between acting according to a rule and acting from the representation of a rule, applying it to the standards internal to intentional action.
Carried by Immanuel Kant.
Causalism reacted against Anscombean Philosophy of Action
Davidson's causal theory was framed against the Anscombean idea that reasons and actions are internally related, insisting instead on a causal bridge between distinct mental and bodily events.
Carried by Donald Davidson; Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963).
Guise of the Good grew out of Anscombean Philosophy of Action
The guise-of-the-good literature drew on Anscombe's revival of the practical syllogism and her claim that intentional action is action under a description of the good.
Carried by G. E. M. Anscombe; Intention (1957).
Planning Theory of Intention influenced by Anscombean Philosophy of Action
Bratman took from Anscombe the point that intention is not a separate mental event but a form of practical commitment, and built his planning account around it.
Carried by Michael Bratman; G. E. M. Anscombe.
Action Ontology rival of Causalism
Action ontology pursued the individuation and metaphysical nature of actions in the same years Davidson's causal theory dominated, competing over what an action fundamentally is.
Carried by Donald Davidson; G. E. M. Anscombe.
Planning Theory of Intention reacted against Causalism
Bratman's account of intention as plan challenged the causal theory's treatment of intentions as just further belief-desire states, emphasizing their coordinating and stability-conferring role.
Carried by Michael Bratman; Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987).
Empirical Philosophy of Action grew out of Causalism
Empirical philosophy of action grew out of the causalist framework, testing its claims about intention and reason causation against experimental psychology and neuroscience.
Carried by Donald Davidson.
Normativity of Action grew out of Guise of the Good
The normativity-of-action literature developed the guise-of-the-good idea that intentional action is governed by standards of correctness, generalizing it beyond the good to norms of action as such.
Beyond the field
Where Philosophy Of Action's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 38 links.
Humean Theory of Motivation grew out of Moral Sense Theory in Moral Psychology
Hume's theory of motivation developed directly out of the moral sense tradition, especially Hutcheson's account of moral approbation as grounded in sentiment rather than reason.
Carried by Francis Hutcheson; David Hume.
Kantian Practical Reason led to Kantian Rational Justification in Authority And Legitimacy
Kant's rational justification of political authority is a branch of his theory of practical reason: the categorical imperative and the idea of autonomy supply the principle from which right is derived.
Carried by Immanuel Kant; Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); The Metaphysics of Morals (1797).
Kantian Practical Reason led to Kantian constructivism in Metaethics
Kantian constructivism in ethics is built directly on Kant's account of practical reason, taking the categorical imperative and the idea of rational willing as the procedure by which moral norms are constructed. Rawls and Korsgaard developed the metaethical position as an interpretation of that Kantian practical philosophy.
Carried by John Rawls; Christine Korsgaard; Immanuel Kant.
Causalism influenced Event-Causal Libertarianism in Free Will
Event-causal libertarianism adopts the causal theory of action, holding that reasons explanations are causal, and adds indeterminism at the point of choice. It thereby carries the causalist framework into libertarian territory.
Carried by Robert Kane.
Frankfurtian Volitional Theory influenced by Frankfurt Cases in Moral Responsibility
Frankfurt's 1969 paper on alternative possibilities and moral responsibility supplied the cases and the argument that the volitional theory then built on. The hierarchical account of the will was developed as the positive theory accompanying those Frankfurt cases.
Carried by Harry Frankfurt.
Planning Theory of Intention influenced Reductive Shared-Intention Theory in Social Ontology
Reductive shared-intention theory is a direct development of Bratman's planning theory, extending his individual planning account of intention to shared intention through interlocking plans.
Carried by Michael Bratman.
Planning Theory of Intention influenced Belief–desire–intention software model in Planning And Search
Bratman's planning theory of intention supplied the core commitment that intentions are conduct-controlling, partial plans that constrain and guide later reasoning. The BDI software model's makers took this directly as the specification for agent deliberation and means-end reasoning.
Carried by Michael Bratman; Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (1987).
Aristotelian Practical Reason grew out of Four causes in Philosophy Of Causation
Aristotle's practical syllogism and his account of deliberation and choice apply the same four-cause apparatus (especially the final cause) to action in the Nicomachean Ethics III and VI. The practical-reason doctrine is a branch grown from the causal scheme.
Carried by Aristotle; Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotelian Practical Reason influenced Voluntary action in Moral Responsibility
Aristotle's account of practical reasoning, the practical syllogism and the relation of deliberation to action, was taken up by later philosophers of action as the paradigm of intentional explanation. Discussions of voluntary action in the twentieth century drew on this account of how reasons figure in the production of action.
Carried by Aristotle; Nicomachean Ethics.
Aristotelian Practical Reason influenced Casuistry in Legal Reasoning
Casuistry applied Aristotelian practical reason and the doctrine of the practical syllogism to particular moral cases. Scholastic moral theologians took the analysis of deliberation and choice from Aristotle's ethics and used it to structure case resolution.
Carried by Aristotle; Thomas Aquinas.
Humean Theory of Motivation influenced Hierarchical Desire Theory in Moral Responsibility
Hume's account of motivation, in which desires supply the ends and reason merely serves them, underlies the hierarchical theory's treatment of first-order desires as the springs of action. Frankfurt's hierarchy of desires presupposes this Humean picture of what motivates conduct.
Carried by David Hume; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).
Humean Theory of Motivation influenced Theory-Theory of Action Understanding in Action And Motor Cognition
Theory-theory's proposed folk psychology is broadly Humean, explaining action by desire together with belief about means. The belief-desire model of motivation that theory-theorists attribute to the naive observer descends from Hume's account of the passions as the springs of action.
Carried by David Hume; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).

Philosophy Of Action is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 12 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Philosophy Of ActionRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Moral Responsibility 6 links
- Action And Motor Cognition 4 links
- Moral Psychology 4 links
- Free Will 4 links
- Ethics 3 links
- Metaethics 3 links
- Social Ontology 3 links
- Planning And Search 2 links
- Philosophy Of Causation 2 links
- Business Ethics 1 link
- Austrian Economics 1 link
- Legal Reasoning 1 link
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See where Philosophy Of Action sits on the Map of Human Knowledge