Mental Causation And Physicalism

Mental causation is the idea that what goes on in your mind makes a difference to what happens in your body and, through it, in the world.

14 frameworks, from 1641 to today · Philosophy Of Mind · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Mental causation is the idea that what goes on in your mind makes a difference to what happens in your body and, through it, in the world1. You decide to raise your arm and the arm goes up; you feel a sting and pull your hand back; you believe the train leaves at six, so you leave the house at five-thirty1. Each of these is a case of a mental state apparently producing a physical effect. The trouble is that physics seems to say the physical world is already complete: every bodily movement has a sufficient physical cause in the brain and body, leaving nothing for a thought or a feeling to do1. Mental causation and physicalism is the branch of philosophy of mind that wrestles with this collision. Its history is a long argument about whether minds can be real causes in a world that physics describes exhaustively—and, if they can, what kind of thing a mind must be.

Dualism and the Interaction Problem

The modern debate begins with René Descartes, whose Meditations (1641) divided the world into two kinds of substance: res cogitans, thinking stuff, and res extensa, extended stuff234. The mind, on this Cartesian substance dualism, is an immaterial thing whose essence is thought; the body is a machine whose essence is extension54. Descartes needed the two to interact, since he held that the soul moves the "animal spirits" in the pineal gland. But this raised what came to be called the interaction problem: how can something with no size, location, or mass push on matter1? Descartes never gave a satisfying answer, and his critics—most famously Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, in their correspondence of 1643—pressed the point sharply. If the mind is unextended, how can it move a body that is extended1?

Two seventeenth-century responses tried to keep dualism while removing the mystery. Occasionalism, developed by Nicolas Malebranche in The Search after Truth (1674–75), held that created things never truly cause anything; on each occasion that I will my arm to rise, God is the real cause of the motion, and the mental event is merely the occasion for divine action. Pre-established harmony, associated with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, took a different route: mind and body are like two clocks synchronized in advance by God, each running its own mechanism with no causal traffic between them3. Both views preserved the felt connection between mind and body at the cost of making the mind itself causally idle—an early hint of the epiphenomenalist worry1.

The Rise of Physicalism and the Identity Theory

By the twentieth century, the success of physiology and neuroscience made substance dualism hard to sustain for most philosophers. If mental states are to be causes, the natural thought was that they must simply be physical states. Mind–brain identity theory, defended in the late 1950s and 1960s by U. T. Place, J. J. C. Smart, and others, proposed exactly that: pain is identical with a certain pattern of brain activity, in the way that lightning is identical with an electrical discharge. This is a claim about types—that every kind of mental state is a kind of physical state6. It made mental causation unproblematic, since a brain state is a physical state and physical states plainly cause things. But it faced a stubborn objection: the "multiple realizability" of mental states7. Octopuses, mammals, and (perhaps) silicon-based machines might all feel pain without sharing a brain structure, so pain cannot be one single physical type7.

Functionalism and Non-Reductive Physicalism

Functionalism, developed by Hilary Putnam and others from the 1960s, answered this by defining mental states in terms of their causal roles rather than their physical makeup. Pain is whatever state is caused by tissue damage and causes avoidance and complaint; it does not matter what material realizes that role8. Functionalism opened the door to non-reductive physicalism, the dominant position in the field for much of the late twentieth century. On this view, everything is physical—there are no immaterial substances—but mental properties are not identical with, and cannot be reduced to, physical properties2. They are higher-level properties that depend on the physical without being exhausted by it2.

The most influential statement of this position is Donald Davidson's anomalous monism, set out in "Mental Events" (1970). Davidson held that mental events are identical with physical events (monism), but that mental descriptions cannot be captured by strict laws (anomalism)9. There are no psychophysical laws connecting belief and brain state the way physics connects mass and acceleration9. Mental states are causes, Davidson argued, but they cause as physical events; the mental description picks out the same event under a different aspect9. This preserved both physicalism and the causal efficacy of the mental—at least on paper.

The Exclusion Problem

The trouble with non-reductive physicalism is that it seems to leave the mental without distinctive causal work. This is the exclusion problem, given its classic formulation by Jaegwon Kim from the late 1980s onward. Suppose a mental event M causes a physical event P (say, a decision causes a bodily movement). But P also has a sufficient physical cause, the brain event B that realizes M. If B is sufficient for P, what work is left for M to do? Either M is identical with B (reduction, which the non-reductive physicalist denies) or M is a distinct cause competing with B (overdetermination, which seems implausible in every case). Kim concluded that non-reductive physicalism cannot secure mental causation, and that the mental is in danger of becoming epiphenomenal—a mere byproduct, like the steam whistle on a train, with no causal power of its own.

Epiphenomenalism had already been defended in the nineteenth century by Thomas Huxley, who likened consciousness to the whistle of a steam engine, and it returned as a serious option110. Its cost is steep: it says our thoughts and feelings never actually move us, which clashes with how we explain our own actions.

Emergence and Downward Causation

One response to exclusion was to argue that higher-level properties can exert downward causation on the physical level11. Emergentism, with roots in the nineteenth-century work of John Stuart Mill and later C. D. Broad's The Mind and Its Place in Nature (1925), holds that when matter is organized in sufficiently complex ways, genuinely novel properties emerge that cannot be predicted from the lower level. Some contemporary emergentists, such as Roger Sperry, argued that emergent mental properties can constrain and direct the physical processes that realize them—the whole system's organization "causes" its parts to behave in certain ways. Critics ask whether this is anything more than a redescription of the physical goings-on, and whether it reintroduces the very causal competition the exclusion problem described.

Eliminativism and Illusionism

A more radical response denies that there is a mental level to be causally efficacious in the first place. Eliminativism, associated with Paul and Patricia Churchland from the 1980s, argues that "folk psychology"—our everyday vocabulary of beliefs, desires, and pains—is a false theory that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. If beliefs and desires do not really exist, there is no special problem of their causal efficacy; the question dissolves. Illusionism, defended more recently by Keith Frankish, takes a related line about consciousness specifically: phenomenal consciousness as we naively conceive it is an illusion, and the real work is done by physical processes we misrepresent to ourselves12. Both views are minority positions, but they sharpen the debate by asking whether the mental causes we thought we had to explain are real at all.

Interventionism and Difference-Making

In the 2000s, a new toolkit arrived from the philosophy of causation. Interventionist accounts, developed by James Woodward and applied to mental causation by Woodward and by Christopher Hitchcock, define causation in terms of what would happen under interventions: X causes Y if intervening to change X would change Y, holding other things fixed. On this account, a mental state can be a genuine cause even if a physical state realizes it, because intervening on the mental state (say, changing a belief) would change the behaviour, and the physical realizer is not a competing cause but part of the same causal pathway. This difference-making approach promised to defuse the exclusion problem by showing that higher-level and lower-level causes need not exclude one another—they answer different questions about the same system. Whether it fully succeeds remains contested.

Embodied and Enactive Approaches

Running alongside these analytic debates, embodied and enactive approaches, drawing on phenomenology (Merleau-Ponty) and developed in the late twentieth century by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, among others, reject the picture of a mind inside a body pushing it around1314. On enactivism, cognition is constituted by the ongoing interaction of organism and environment; the mind is not a separate causal agent but a pattern of embodied activity13. This reframes mental causation: the question is not how an inner state moves an outer body, but how the whole organism-environment system organizes its behaviour. These views have gained influence in the twenty-first century, especially in work on perception and action.

The Present

Today the field is divided among several live approaches. Non-reductive physicalism remains widely held, though its defenders must answer Kim's exclusion problem, and many now do so using interventionist or difference-making resources. Others accept reduction of the mental to the physical, or pursue eliminativist and illusionist routes. Emergentist and enactive views attract growing interest, particularly among philosophers impressed by the embedded, bodily character of cognition. The open questions are the ones that have driven the field since Descartes: whether the physical world is causally closed, whether higher-level properties can be genuinely efficacious, and whether the mental is something over and above the physical or simply the physical described in another vocabulary. What has changed is the sophistication of the tools—from the pineal gland to interventionist counterfactuals—brought to bear on them.

References

  1. Problem of mental causation (introduction, Description, Exclusion problem, Dualist solutions), Wikipedia
  2. Philosophy of mind (introduction, Non-reductive physicalism), Wikipedia
  3. Mind–body problem (Historical background, Pre-established harmony), Wikipedia
  4. Mind–body dualism (introduction, Substance or Cartesian dualism), Wikipedia
  5. Res extensa, Wikipedia
  6. Type physicalism, Wikipedia
  7. Multiple realizability, Wikipedia
  8. Functionalism (philosophy of mind), Wikipedia
  9. Anomalous monism, Wikipedia
  10. Epiphenomenalism (Development), Wikipedia
  11. Downward causation, Wikipedia
  12. Illusionism (philosophy of mind), Wikipedia
  13. Enactivism, Wikipedia
  14. Embodied cognition (History), Wikipedia

The frameworks of Mental Causation And Physicalism

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1641-1700
  2. 1674-1720

    Occasionalism

    Do created things really cause anything?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 1695-1750

    Pre-established Harmony

    How are mind and body synchronized?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 1874-Present

    Epiphenomenalism

    Does consciousness cause behavior?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 1925-Present

    Emergentism

    Can higher-level properties cause lower-level events?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  6. 1956-1975

    Type physicalism

    Are mental states identical with brain states?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  7. 1960-Present

    Functionalism

    What defines a mental state?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  8. 1970-2000

    Anomalous Monism

    Can mental events be causes without laws?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  9. 1970-Present

    Non-Reductive Physicalism

    Can mental properties be causally efficacious?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1981-Present

    Eliminative materialism

    Do beliefs and desires really exist?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  11. 1989-Present

    Exclusion Argument

    Does the physical exclude the mental as cause?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  12. 1991-Present

    Enactivism

    Is cognition embodied and enactive?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  13. 2003-Present
  14. 2016-Present

    Illusionism

    Is phenomenal consciousness an illusion?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Cartesian Substance DualismOccasionalismPre-established HarmonyEpiphenomenalismEmergentismType physicalismFunctionalismAnomalous MonismNon-Reductive PhysicalismEliminative materialismExclusion ArgumentEnactivismInterventionism and Difference-MakingIllusionism

Beyond the field

Where Mental Causation And Physicalism's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 66 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
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Mental Causation And Physicalism is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 14 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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Related fields

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