Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethics is the branch of moral philosophy that asks what we owe to the natural world and to the beings in it.

11 frameworks, from 1890 to today · Ethics · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Environmental ethics is the branch of moral philosophy that asks what we owe to the natural world and to the beings in it1. Its central questions are deceptively simple: does a forest, a river, or a species have value in its own right, or only because it serves human purposes1? What is the moral standing of an animal that can suffer? How should we weigh the interests of future generations against present convenience1? And who has the authority to decide? These questions matter because the answers shape real decisions—about conservation, pollution, land use, and climate policy—that affect both human communities and the nonhuman world. The field emerged as a distinct area of philosophy in the 1970s, but its roots run back through conservation movements, animal welfare campaigns, and older debates about humanity's place in nature1.

Precursors: Conservation, Preservation, and the Roots of Concern

Long before environmental ethics became a philosophical specialty, practical movements raised the questions it would later theorize. In the nineteenth century, the conservation movement took shape in Europe and North America as industrialization and westward expansion threatened forests, wildlife, and landscapes. In the United States, figures like George Perkins Marsh, whose Man and Nature (1864) documented human-caused environmental degradation, argued that careful stewardship was necessary. Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the U.S. Forest Service, championed "conservation" in the utilitarian sense: natural resources should be managed for the greatest good of the greatest number over the long run. This was a resource-management ethic, not a nature-for-its-own-sake ethic, but it introduced the idea that human use of nature should be governed by principle rather than mere extraction.

A rival strand, preservationism, held that some places should be protected from development altogether. John Muir's campaigns for Yosemite and the Sierra Nevada in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries embodied this view, and the creation of national parks in the United States and elsewhere gave it institutional form. The tension between Pinchot's "wise use" and Muir's "preservation" prefigured the later philosophical split between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches.

Parallel developments occurred elsewhere. In Britain, the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (founded 1889) and the National Trust (1895) reflected similar concerns. In colonial contexts, forest conservation policies were often imposed by imperial authorities with little regard for local communities—a tension that would later feed into environmental justice critiques.

Animal Welfare and the Widening Circle of Moral Concern

A second precursor came from animal welfare. In Britain, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals was founded in 1824, and the first anti-cruelty legislation followed in 1822. These were moral reforms grounded in the idea that unnecessary suffering was wrong, regardless of the species of the sufferer. Jeremy Bentham had already asked, in the eighteenth century, whether animals could suffer rather than whether they could reason—a question that would become central to animal ethics.

In 1975, Peter Singer's Animal Liberation brought this tradition into philosophy with a utilitarian argument: if we take suffering seriously, we must give equal consideration to the interests of all beings capable of suffering, regardless of species. Singer's book became a founding text of the animal liberation movement and a direct challenge to the assumption that only humans matter morally. Tom Regan's The Case for Animal Rights (1983) offered a deontological alternative: animals that are "subjects of a life"—capable of experiencing pleasure and pain, having preferences and a sense of their own future—have inherent value and therefore rights that must not be violated. These arguments extended the moral circle beyond humanity and set the stage for broader questions about the moral status of nature itself.

The Emergence of Environmental Ethics as a Field

The 1960s and early 1970s saw a surge of public environmental concern—Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1962) on pesticides, the first Earth Day in 1970, and the founding of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1970. Philosophers began to ask whether traditional ethical frameworks were adequate to these problems. In 1973, the Australian philosopher Richard Routley (later Richard Sylvan) presented a thought experiment at a conference: imagine the last person on Earth destroying the last tree or the last species. If this seems wrong even when no human is harmed, then nature must have value beyond its use to humans. This "last man" argument became a standard way of challenging anthropocentrism—the view that only human beings have moral standing.

The field crystallized with the founding of the journal Environmental Ethics in 1979 by Eugene Hargrove, and the first major anthology, Ethics and the Environment, edited by Donald Scherer and Thomas Attig in 1983. The central debate was between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism. Anthropocentrists held that environmental protection could be justified entirely in terms of human interests—clean air, clean water, aesthetic value, future generations1. Non-anthropocentrists argued that this was insufficient and that nature itself had intrinsic value1.

Biocentrism and Ecocentrism

Two non-anthropocentric positions emerged as major alternatives. Biocentrism holds that all living things have moral standing—not just animals, but plants, microorganisms, and entire species2. Paul Taylor's Respect for Nature (1986) offered a systematic biocentric ethic: every living thing is a "teleological center of life" pursuing its own good, and all such centers deserve equal moral consideration. This does not mean all lives are equally valuable in practice, but it means no living thing is automatically excluded from moral concern.

Ecocentrism goes further, locating value in ecological wholes—ecosystems, species, and the biosphere—rather than in individual organisms. Aldo Leopold's A Sand County Almanac (1949) had already articulated a "land ethic": "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community13. It is wrong when it tends otherwise."1 Leopold's ethic was holistic, valuing the community of life over individual members43. This raised a difficult question: if the good of the ecosystem conflicts with the good of individual animals or plants, which takes priority? Ecocentrists like J. Baird Callicott argued that ecological wholes are the proper locus of moral concern, while critics worried that holism could justify sacrificing individuals for the sake of the system.

Deep Ecology

In 1973, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss introduced the term "deep ecology" to distinguish a fundamental questioning of human-centered assumptions from "shallow" environmentalism that sought only to fix pollution and resource depletion within existing economic and social structures. Deep ecology proposed a shift in worldview: humans are not separate from nature but part of it, and the flourishing of nonhuman life has value independent of human use5. Næss's "ecosophy" was a personal philosophy, but the deep ecology movement that grew around it—especially through the work of Bill Devall and George Sessions—advocated "biocentric equality" and radical changes in how humans live. Deep ecology was influential but also criticized for lacking a clear political program and for sometimes romanticizing nature.

Environmental Justice

A major challenge to mainstream environmental ethics came from the environmental justice movement, which emerged in the United States in the 1980s6. Studies showed that hazardous waste facilities and polluting industries were disproportionately located in poor and minority communities6. The movement, led by figures like Robert Bullard, argued that environmental problems are also social justice problems: the people who suffer most from pollution are often those with the least power to resist it7. This critique exposed a blind spot in environmental ethics, which had focused on wilderness and wildlife while neglecting the urban and workplace environments where many people actually live. Environmental justice expanded the field's scope to include issues of race, class, and equity, and it insisted that environmental protection cannot be separated from social justice6.

Environmental Pragmatism

In the 1990s, a group of philosophers—including Andrew Light, Eric Katz, and Bryan Norton—began to argue that the field's preoccupation with theoretical debates about intrinsic value was getting in the way of practical action. Environmental pragmatism holds that philosophers should focus on solving real environmental problems rather than on settling metaphysical questions about whether nature has intrinsic value1. Norton's "convergence hypothesis" suggested that anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric arguments often lead to the same practical conclusions, so the theoretical dispute matters less than it seems. Pragmatists urged environmental ethicists to engage with policy, economics, and law, and to work with communities rather than lecturing them. This approach was controversial—critics saw it as a retreat from the field's radical edge—but it helped connect environmental ethics to real-world decision-making.

Climate Ethics

As climate change became a central global issue in the 1990s and 2000s, a new subfield emerged: climate ethics. This area addresses questions of distributive justice (who should bear the costs of mitigation and adaptation?), historical responsibility (do wealthy nations that emitted most greenhouse gases owe a debt to those that emitted less?), and intergenerational justice (what do we owe to future people who will inherit a warmer world?)8. Philosophers like Henry Shue, Dale Jamieson, and Stephen Gardiner have explored these questions. Gardiner's notion of a "perfect moral storm"—the convergence of global, intergenerational, and theoretical challenges—captures why climate change is so difficult to address ethically. Climate ethics has become one of the most active areas of the field, connecting environmental philosophy to international policy debates.

Comparative and Cross-Cultural Environmental Ethics

Western environmental ethics has often been criticized for ignoring non-Western traditions. In response, scholars have explored how other cultures have thought about nature and human responsibility. Indigenous traditions in the Americas, Africa, and Australasia often embed environmental ethics in cosmology and community practice rather than in abstract philosophy. East Asian traditions—Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism—offer resources for thinking about harmony with nature. Daoist ideas of wu wei (non-action or effortless action) and the unity of all things have been read as ecological. Buddhist concepts of interdependence and compassion for all sentient beings have been brought into dialogue with environmental ethics. Confucian thought, with its emphasis on relationality and the cultivation of virtue, has been explored as a basis for environmental responsibility. This comparative work has enriched the field by showing that environmental ethics is not a purely Western invention and by challenging the assumption that only Western philosophy has the tools to address environmental problems.

The Present: Plural Approaches and Open Questions

Today, environmental ethics is a plural field. Anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric approaches coexist, often in productive tension1. Biocentrism and ecocentrism remain influential, though few philosophers defend them in their purest forms. Animal ethics has become a major subfield in its own right, with debates about factory farming, animal experimentation, and the moral status of wild animals. Environmental justice has moved from the margins to the center, and climate ethics is now one of the most urgent areas of inquiry68. Environmental pragmatism has influenced how philosophers engage with policy, while deep ecology's radical questioning continues to inspire activists.

The field's open questions are substantial. How should we weigh the interests of present people against future generations1? What is the moral status of ecosystems that are constantly changing? How can environmental ethics be genuinely global when cultural traditions differ so widely? And what does it mean to take nature seriously as a moral subject when our knowledge of ecological systems is always incomplete? These questions remain unresolved, and they ensure that environmental ethics will continue to be a living field—one that matters not only for philosophers but for anyone who cares about the world we inhabit and the world we leave behind.

References

  1. Environmental ethics (introduction, History, Conservation ethics, Libertarian extension, Consequentialism, Anthropocentrism), Wikipedia
  2. Biocentrism (ethics), Wikipedia
  3. Land ethic, Wikipedia
  4. Ecocentrism (Origin of term), Wikipedia
  5. Deep ecology, Wikipedia
  6. Environmental justice, Wikipedia
  7. Environmental racism, Wikipedia
  8. Ethics of climate change, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Environmental Ethics

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 1890-1975

    Conservation movement

    How should natural resources be managed for long-term human benefit?

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  2. 1890-1975

    Preservationism

    Should some places be protected from human development altogether?

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  3. 1949-Present
  4. 1973-Present

    Anthropocentrism

    Do only human beings have moral standing?

    About Anthropocentrism
    The central question of environmental ethics—does nature matter for its own sake or only for human purposes?—is answered decisively by anthropocentrism. This framework holds that only human beings possess intrinsic value; the nonhuman world matters only instrumentally, as a means to satisfy human interests. For anthropocentrism, the environment deserves ethical consideration because it sustains human welfare, not because it has a good of its own. This view was the dominant Western default when environmental ethics emerged as a field in the 1970s, and it remains influential in policy and resource management, even as biocentric and ecocentric alternatives have challenged its moral exclusivity.
    Core curriculum. Anthropology brings together a handful of organizing commitments. (1) Anthropocentrism is the overarching stance: human beings are the sole locus of intrinsic value; nonhuman entities have only instrumental value as resources for meeting human needs. This status determines moral standing: only humans count morally in themselves. (2) From this base, the framework develops an active ethical duty of stewardship—humans are responsible caretakers of nature, not mere exploiters. This duty shapes conservation (wise use) and resource management as practices that serve human welfare over time. (3) The long-term human interest extends to future generations, whose welfare depends on present prudence. Sustainable development (anthropocentric) is therefore defined as development that meets current human needs without compromising the ability of future humans to meet theirs. (4) The framework's evaluative tools are cost-benefit analysis and environmental impact assessment, which quantify trade-offs among human preferences and risks. Two important refinements structure the position: weak anthropocentrism acknowledges that human interests can be informed by nonhuman values, while strong anthropocentrism holds that only felt human preferences count. Finally, property rights (conservation) serve as a key institutional mechanism: granting ownership or use rights can incentivize long-term stewardship and prevent the tragedy of the commons.
    Intellectual history. Anthropocentrism did not originate with environmental ethics; it was the inherited background of Western moral philosophy. Its deepest roots lie in the Judeo-Christian tradition and its doctrine of Dominion, the idea that humans are created in God's image and given rule over the natural world. Cartesian dualism sharpened this division by separating mind (human) from unthinking matter (nature). Francis Bacon and the scientific revolution framed nature as a resource to be mastered for human benefit. Kantian ethics located intrinsic value only in rational agents, explicitly denying it to animals and ecosystems. Utilitarianism also functioned anthropocentrically when its calculus of pleasure and pain was limited to humans, as was typical in early modern thought. Enlightenment rationalism and social contract theory further assumed that only beings capable of reasoning and contracting have moral standing.
    When environmental ethics coalesced as a field around 1970, anthropocentrism was the position that critics opposed—but also the position that needed careful articulation. The key figures who gave it a rigorous defense within the new subfield came primarily from applied philosophy and policy. John Passmore (1914–2004) argued in Man's Responsibility for Nature (1974) that the Western tradition, properly understood, already contains a stewardship ethic sufficient for environmental protection, without requiring radical new values. William Baxter (1929–1998) in People or Penguins (1974) offered a starkly instrumental case: we should protect penguins only if doing so serves humans. Bryan Norton (b. 1944) later refined the position with his distinction between weak and strong anthropocentrism (1984), showing that a properly informed set of human preferences can justify strong environmental protection without granting intrinsic value to nature. Mark Sagoff (b. 1941) argued that citizens' environmental values are different from consumers' preferences, muddying the cost-benefit model.
    In the context of the field's timeline, anthropocentrism was the immediate predecessor of, and has since coexisted with, biocentrism (moral standing to all living individuals) and ecocentrism (moral standing to ecosystems). Later alternatives like deep ecology (demanding biospheric egalitarianism), ecofeminism (linking domination of nature to domination of women), and social ecology (tracing environmental destruction to social hierarchy) each emerged partly in reaction against anthropocentrism's perceived narrowness. Yet anthropocentrism never disappeared. It has been supplemented rather than replaced: it remains the de facto operating framework for most environmental law, policy, and cost-benefit regulation, even as philosophical discourse has moved toward biocentrism and ecocentrism. The framework's continuing strength lies in its compatibility with liberal democratic institutions, economic valuation methods, and human rights frameworks—all of which struggle to accommodate intrinsic value in nature.
    Two seminal works securely within the local period anchor the curriculum: Passmore's Man's Responsibility for Nature (1974) gave the stewardship-based defense, and Baxter's People or Penguins (1974) gave the preference-satisfaction argument. Norton's (1984) article "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism" in Environmental Ethics journal codified the weak/strong distinction that became a textbook staple. These works, and the decades of commentary they generated, established anthropocentrism as a live normative option in environmental ethics, not merely a straw man.
    The 15 concepts its tower teaches
    • Anthropocentrism
    • Conservation (wise use)
    • Cost-benefit analysis
    • Environmental impact assessment
    • Future generations
    • Human welfare
    • Instrumental value
    • Intrinsic value (human only)
    • Moral standing (human only)
    • Property rights (conservation)
    • Resource management
    • Stewardship
    • Strong anthropocentrism
    • Sustainable development (anthropocentric)
    • Weak anthropocentrism

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  5. 1973-Present

    Deep ecology

    What would a fundamental shift in our worldview about nature require?

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  6. 1975-Present

    Animal rights

    Do animals have rights that must not be violated?

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  7. 1975-Present

    Biocentrism

    Do all living things deserve equal moral consideration?

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  8. 1980-Present

    Comparative and cross-cultural environmental ethics

    How do different cultures conceive of humanity's relation to nature?

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  9. 1982-Present

    Environmental justice

    Who bears the burden of environmental harm and why?

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  10. 1990-Present

    Environmental pragmatism

    How can philosophy help solve real environmental problems?

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  11. 1990-Present

    Ethics of climate change

    How should we weigh present costs against future climate harms?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Conservation movementPreservationismEcocentrism and the land ethicAnthropocentrismDeep ecologyAnimal rightsBiocentrismComparative and cross-cultural enviro…Environmental justiceEnvironmental pragmatismEthics of climate change

Beyond the field

Where Environmental Ethics's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 45 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Environmental Ethics is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 11 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

Land on Environmental Ethics

Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

More in Ethics

See where Environmental Ethics sits on the Map of Human Knowledge