- Atlas
- Philosophy
- Moral Psychology
Moral Psychology
Moral psychology is the study of the psychological processes that underlie moral judgment, motivation, and behavior.
10 frameworks, from 1700 to today · Ethics · Philosophy
- Moral Rationalism 1700-1800
- Moral Sense Theory 1700-1800
- Cognitive-Developmental Theory 1932-1990
- Virtue Ethics 1950-Present
- Situationism 1968-Present
- Ethics of care 1982-Present
- Dual-Process Theory 2001-Present
- Experimental Philosophy 2001-Present
- Social intuitionism 2001-Present
- Moral Foundations Theory 2004-Present
Overview
Moral psychology is the study of the psychological processes that underlie moral judgment, motivation, and behavior1. It asks how people come to call something right or wrong, whether those judgments are driven by feeling or reason, how children acquire moral concepts, and why people so often fail to act as they think they should. The field sits between ethics and psychology, and its history is a long argument about what kind of thing morality is: a matter of sentiment, of reason, of development, or of evolved intuition. That argument matters because the answer shapes how we hold one another responsible, how we educate children, and how we explain moral disagreement.
Sentiment and Reason in the Eighteenth Century
The modern field begins with a dispute about the source of moral judgment. In early eighteenth-century Britain, Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, argued that human beings possess a "moral sense"—a natural capacity to feel approval toward virtue and disapproval toward vice, prior to any reasoning. Francis Hutcheson developed this into a systematic account in which benevolence and a calm, disinterested moral feeling ground our judgments2. The claim was that reason alone cannot move us; it can inform us about facts, but approval and disapproval are felt.
David Hume gave this sentimentalism its most famous formulation in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40). Hume argued that moral distinctions are not derived from reason but from a moral sense, and that reason is "the slave of the passions"—it serves our sentiments rather than commanding them. His example of the parricide and the oak tree made the point concrete: we feel the same kind of disapproval toward a wilful murderer as toward a tree that kills its parent, but only in the human case do we call it moral, because we are responding to character and motive, not to the bare event.
Against this, Samuel Clarke and later Richard Price defended rationalism: the view that moral truths are grasped by reason, that certain actions are fitting or unfitting in themselves, and that a rational agent can recognize this independently of feeling. The debate set the terms that moral psychology would revisit for three centuries—whether moral judgment is fundamentally affective or cognitive.
Virtue, Character, and the Nineteenth-Century Background
Immanuel Kant's ethics, developed in the 1780s, placed moral worth in the rational will acting from duty, and his account of the moral law gave rationalism a powerful systematic form. But the nineteenth century also carried forward the older tradition of virtue ethics, which had been central to Aristotle and to medieval and early modern moral thought. Virtue ethics locates the moral question not in "what should I do?" but in "what kind of person should I be?"—in character traits, practical wisdom, and flourishing. This tradition kept attention on moral development and habituation, and it would later provide a vocabulary for psychologists studying character.
Piaget and the Cognitive-Developmental Turn
The first sustained empirical program in moral psychology came from Jean Piaget. In The Moral Judgment of the Child (1932), Piaget studied children's games and their responses to moral dilemmas, and he proposed that moral understanding develops in stages. Young children, he argued, show "heteronomous" morality—rules are fixed, absolute, and handed down by adults, and wrongness is judged by consequences rather than intentions. Older children move toward "autonomous" morality, in which rules are understood as agreements that can be changed, and intentions matter. Piaget tied this shift to the decline of adult constraint and the growth of peer interaction, where children negotiate as equals.
Lawrence Kohlberg built on Piaget in the 1950s and 1960s with a more elaborate stage theory13. Using hypothetical dilemmas—most famously the Heinz dilemma, in which a man must decide whether to steal a drug to save his dying wife—Kohlberg interviewed subjects and classified their reasoning into three levels and six stages, from pre-conventional obedience and self-interest, through conventional conformity to social norms, to post-conventional reasoning grounded in universal principles of justice. Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory claimed that moral reasoning develops through invariant stages and that the highest stage involves principled judgment13. His work made moral psychology a serious empirical enterprise and dominated the field for two decades.
The Challenge from Care
In the 1980s, Carol Gilligan challenged Kohlberg's framework1. In In a Different Voice (1982), she argued that Kohlberg's stages privileged a "justice" orientation—abstract, rule-based, impartial—and marginalized a "care" orientation centered on relationships, responsiveness, and responsibility to particular others14. Gilligan's work, developed with collaborators and later elaborated by philosophers such as Nel Noddings, gave rise to care ethics as a moral-psychological and normative approach. The empirical claim was that many people, and disproportionately women in the samples studied, reason about moral problems in terms of maintaining relationships and avoiding harm rather than applying universal rules4. The debate over whether the gender difference was real, and over what it meant, became one of the most contested episodes in the field.
Situationism and the Attack on Character
A different challenge came from social psychology. In the late 1960s and 1970s, experiments such as Stanley Milgram's obedience studies and Philip Zimbardo's Stanford prison experiment suggested that situational pressures could overwhelm individual character. In philosophy, this fed into situationism—the view, pressed by philosophers such as John Doris and Gilbert Harman in the early 2000s, that the empirical evidence does not support the existence of robust, cross-situationally consistent character traits of the kind virtue ethics presupposes. The situationist critique forced moral psychologists and virtue ethicists to take seriously how much behavior is shaped by context, and it prompted a rethinking of what "character" could mean.
Dual-Process Theory and the New Intuitionism
The most influential recent turn came from the cognitive science of the 1990s and 2000s. Joshua Greene and colleagues used functional magnetic resonance imaging to study brain activity during moral judgment1. In a 2001 study, they found that "personal" moral dilemmas—those involving direct, up-close harm, such as pushing a man off a footbridge to stop a trolley—activated brain regions associated with emotion, while "impersonal" dilemmas activated regions associated with working memory and reasoning. Greene and others developed dual-process theory: the idea that moral judgment arises from two interacting systems, one fast, automatic, and affective, the other slow, controlled, and deliberative15.
Jonathan Haidt pushed this further with the Social Intuitionist Model, proposed in 20011. Haidt argued that moral judgments are typically the product of rapid, automatic intuitions, and that conscious reasoning usually comes afterward, serving to justify the intuition rather than to produce it1. His famous example was the "harmless taboo" scenarios—such as a brother and sister who have consensual sex once and no one is harmed—where people report strong disapproval but struggle to give reasons, a phenomenon he called "moral dumbfounding." The model claimed that moral reasoning is mostly post hoc rationalization, and that social interaction, not private reflection, is what changes moral views.
Haidt and colleagues later developed Moral Foundations Theory, which proposes that moral judgment draws on several innate, modular "foundations"—initially five: care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation16. The theory was used to explain political differences, with liberals weighting care and fairness more heavily and conservatives weighting loyalty, authority, and sanctity more. It became one of the most widely discussed frameworks in the field, though it also drew criticism for its methods and its political uses.
Experimental Philosophy and the Present
Alongside these developments, a movement called experimental philosophy emerged in the early 2000s, with philosophers such as Joshua Knobe and Shaun Nichols using controlled surveys to test ordinary people's intuitions about moral cases. Knobe's 2003 "side-effect effect" showed that people are more willing to say an agent brought about a bad side effect intentionally than a good one—a finding that challenged standard assumptions about intentional action and opened a productive exchange between philosophy and psychology.
Today moral psychology is a plural field. Dual-process models remain central but are debated, with some researchers emphasizing the role of reasoning and reflection more than the early intuitionists allowed. Moral foundations research continues, alongside competing frameworks such as moral typecasting and the "morality as cooperation" approach. Developmental psychology has moved beyond stage theories toward domain-specific accounts of how children acquire moral norms. The situationist challenge has been absorbed into a broader recognition that behavior is context-sensitive. And the care tradition persists in work on empathy, relational ethics, and the moral lives of particular communities. The old question—whether morality is rooted in feeling or reason—has not been settled so much as reframed: the live question is how the two systems interact, and what that interaction implies for how we judge, blame, and teach.
References
- Moral psychology (introduction, History, Interview techniques, Kohlberg's stage theory, Moral intuitions, Survey instruments, Moral foundations theory), Wikipedia
- Moral sense theory (introduction, History), Wikipedia
- Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development, Wikipedia
- Ethics of care (Historical background), Wikipedia
- Dual process theory (moral psychology), Wikipedia
- Moral foundations theory, Wikipedia
The frameworks of Moral Psychology
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1700-1800
- 1700-1800
- 1932-1990
Cognitive-Developmental Theory
How does moral reasoning develop in children?
- 1950-Present
- 1968-Present
- 1982-Present
- 2001-Present
- 2001-Present
Experimental Philosophy
What do ordinary people's moral intuitions show?
- 2004-Present
Moral Foundations Theory
What innate foundations underlie moral judgment?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Moral Rationalism rival of Moral Sense Theory
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson's moral sense theory was answered directly by Samuel Clarke and Richard Price, who argued that moral distinctions are grasped by reason and that fitness or unfitness is perceived intellectually rather than felt. The two positions were framed against each other in the same British debate.
Carried by Francis Hutcheson; Samuel Clarke; Richard Price.
Ethics of care reacted against Cognitive-Developmental Theory
Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice attacked Kohlberg's stage hierarchy for privileging an abstract justice orientation and marginalizing a care orientation. Care ethics defined itself by rejecting the cognitive-developmental framework's claim to represent moral maturity universally.
Carried by Carol Gilligan; In a Different Voice (1982).
Situationism reacted against Virtue Ethics
Doris and Harman's situationist critique used Milgram's and Zimbardo's experiments to argue that robust cross-situationally consistent character traits do not exist, undercutting the virtue-ethical presupposition of stable character. Situationism arose as a direct empirical attack on virtue ethics.
Carried by John Doris; Gilbert Harman.
Moral Foundations Theory grew out of Social intuitionism
Moral Foundations Theory grew directly out of Haidt's social intuitionism, extending the claim that moral judgment rests on automatic intuitions into a modular account of several innate foundations. Haidt and colleagues developed it as a refinement of the earlier model.
Carried by Jonathan Haidt; Jesse Graham.
Social intuitionism revived Moral Sense Theory
Haidt's social intuitionist model deliberately brought back the Humean claim that moral judgment is grounded in rapid sentiment and that reason serves the passions. Haidt cited Hume's sentimentalism as the ancestor of his intuitionist account.
Carried by Jonathan Haidt; David Hume.
Social intuitionism rival of Dual-Process Theory
Greene's dual-process findings on emotional versus deliberative moral judgment supplied the cognitive-science backdrop for Haidt's claim that fast automatic intuitions drive judgment. Haidt built his model on the same fast/slow architecture, though he pushed it toward intuitionism.
Carried by Joshua Greene; Jonathan Haidt.
Beyond the field
Where Moral Psychology's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 59 links.
Moral Rationalism influenced by Rationalism in Epistemology
Epistemological rationalism's claim that reason, not sense, is the source of certain knowledge was transferred to morals by the moral rationalists, who held that moral distinctions are perceived by reason and are as self-evident as mathematical axioms. This is the core move of the school.
Carried by Samuel Clarke; John Balguy.
Moral Rationalism influenced by Rationalism in Metaphysics
The moral rationalists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries took the metaphysical doctrine that reality is rationally ordered and that reason grasps necessary truths, and applied it to morality: moral truths are knowable by reason alone. Clarke and Wollaston argued that moral relations are as demonstrable as mathematical ones, carrying the rationalist method into ethics.
Carried by Samuel Clarke; William Wollaston.
Moral Rationalism provoked Moral sense theory in Normative Ethics
Moral sense theory arose in the early eighteenth century as a reaction against moral rationalism, the view that morality is grasped by reason alone. Shaftesbury and Hutcheson defined the moral sense by contrast with the rationalist claim that virtue consists in conformity to reason.
Carried by Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury; Francis Hutcheson.
Moral Sense Theory led to Humean Theory of Motivation in Philosophy Of Action
Hume's theory of motivation developed directly out of the moral sense tradition, especially Hutcheson's account of moral approbation as grounded in sentiment rather than reason.
Carried by Francis Hutcheson; David Hume.
Cognitive-Developmental Theory grew out of Piaget's theory of cognitive development in Developmental Psychology
Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral judgement grew directly out of Piaget's theory of cognitive development, extending Piaget's stages and his structural, constructivist method from intellectual to moral development. Kohlberg explicitly built on Piaget's work.
Carried by Jean Piaget; Lawrence Kohlberg.
Situationism reacted against Virtue ethics in Normative Ethics
Situationism in moral psychology arose as an attack on virtue ethics, arguing from experiments on situational determinants of behaviour that global character traits do not exist and that virtue ethics therefore rests on a false psychology. The position defined itself by rejecting the virtue-ethical picture of character.
Carried by Gilbert Harman; John Doris.
Situationism reacted against Virtue ethics in Ethics
The situationist challenge was framed as a rejection of the virtue-ethical claim that character traits reliably explain behaviour, using social-psychological evidence to argue that virtues so conceived are empirically unsupported. This is the same reaction as against the other virtue-ethics filing.
Carried by Gilbert Harman; John Doris.
Moral Rationalism provoked Moral sense theory in Ethics
Moral rationalism, the view that moral truths are grasped by reason, was the doctrine against which the moral-sense theorists defined themselves, arguing that reason alone cannot move us to action. Hutcheson and later Hume framed sentimentalism as a rejection of rationalist moral psychology.
Carried by Francis Hutcheson; David Hume; A Treatise of Human Nature (1739).
Moral Rationalism influenced Kantian Philosophy of Religion in Philosophy Of Religion
Kant's moral argument for God rests on the moral rationalism of the period, above all the claim that moral law is known by reason; he built his postulate of God on that rational moral law.
Carried by Immanuel Kant.
Moral Rationalism influenced Universal prescriptivism in Metaethics
Hare built his prescriptivism on the Kantian thesis that moral judgement is a matter of rational willing, universalising one's maxims. He explicitly presented his universalisability test as a formalised descendant of Kant's categorical imperative.
Carried by R. M. Hare; Immanuel Kant.
Moral Rationalism provoked Moral Sentimentalism in Metaethics
Moral sentimentalism defined itself against moral rationalism, the view that moral judgments are deliverances of reason. Hume's argument that morals are felt rather than judged by reason was framed as a rejection of rationalist ethics.
Carried by David Hume; Samuel Clarke.
Moral Rationalism influenced Ethical non-naturalism in Metaethics
Moore's non-naturalism revives the rationalist intuition of self-evident moral truths grasped by reason, against the naturalistic and sentimentalist alternatives. The earlier rationalists' claim that moral truths are not reducible to empirical facts passed into the intuitionist programme.
Carried by G. E. Moore; Richard Price.

Moral Psychology is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 10 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Moral PsychologyRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Metaethics 13 links
- Normative Ethics 8 links
- Ethics 7 links
- Philosophy Of Action 4 links
- Behavioral Business Ethics 2 links
- Christian Ethics 2 links
- Medical Ethics 2 links
- Epistemology 2 links
- Feminist Ethics 2 links
- Philosophy Of Emotion 2 links
- Self Knowledge And Subjectivity 2 links
- Buddhist Ethics 1 link
More in Ethics
- Animal Ethics
- Environmental Ethics
- Ethics
- Ethics Of War
- Feminist Ethics
- Metaethics
- Moral Responsibility
- Normative Ethics
See where Moral Psychology sits on the Map of Human Knowledge