Properties And Universals

Two red roses sit in a vase.

14 frameworks, from 390 BCE to today · Metaphysics · Philosophy

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Overview

Two red roses sit in a vase. They are distinct objects, in different positions, each with its own history. Yet they have something in common: each is red. What is that "something"? Is redness a single entity that both roses somehow share, present in each at once1? Or is each rose's redness a particular, wholly located in that one flower, and the word "red" merely a label for a resemblance between them? Or is there no redness in the world at all, only our minds grouping things under a concept?

These questions define the problem of properties and universals, one of the oldest and most persistent in metaphysics. A property is whatever can be truly said of a thing—being red, being square, being alive2. A universal is a property understood as one thing that can be wholly present in many distinct particulars at once. The stakes reach far beyond roses. If universals exist, they can ground the laws of nature, the sameness of kinds, the possibility of objective classification, and the meaningfulness of scientific predicates. If they do not, we owe an account of how the world nonetheless comes structured. The history of this subfield is a history of competing answers, each devised to escape a problem the previous one could not solve.

Plato's Separate Forms and Aristotle's Immanent Kinds

The quarrel begins in earnest with Plato (c. 429–347 BCE), who held that properties exist as Forms—perfect, eternal, non-physical entities in a realm separate from the sensible world. A particular rose is red because it "participates in" the Form of Red3. This Platonic realism explains how many things can share one property and gives properties a stability that sensible things lack1. But it raises the sharpest objection in the tradition, pressed by Aristotle: if Forms are separate from the things that have them, what does "participation" actually amount to? The relation seems mysterious, and positing a separate Form for every property—including properties of negations and relations—multiplies entities extravagantly (the "third man" argument: if a Form explains why a man and the Form of Man are both men, a further Form is needed, and so on)4.

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) answered by bringing properties down to earth15. In his immanent realism, the universal is not separate but exists in the particulars that instantiate it1. Redness exists only in red things; the species "human" exists only in individual humans1. Universals are real, but they are not elsewhere1. This view, developed through Aristotle's categories and his distinction between essence and accident, became the dominant framework of medieval philosophy and remains a live option today. Its difficulty is explaining how a universal can be one thing while being present in many places—the problem of "one over many" in its immanent form1.

The Medieval Debate: Realism, Conceptualism, Nominalism

Medieval Latin philosophy turned this into a technical controversy of extraordinary intensity16. The realists, following a broadly Augustinian and then Aristotelian line, held that universals are genuinely real. But a sharper question emerged: do universals exist before the things (ante rem, as in Plato), in the things (in re, as in Aristotle), or after the things, as products of the mind (post rem)16?

Peter Abelard (1079–1142) gave the debate its most influential formulation. Against the extreme realism of his teacher William of Champeaux, who held that the same substance is wholly present in each member of a species, Abelard argued that no single thing can be wholly in many particulars at once. Against the radical nominalism that would later be associated with William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347)—the view that only particulars exist and universals are mere words or mental signs—Abelard developed a position often called conceptualism: universals are neither separate things nor empty words but concepts, general mental representations grounded in the real similarities among particulars176. Ockham pushed further, insisting that universals are nothing but signs (ficta) and that the world contains only individuals; his principle of parsimony—"do not multiply entities beyond necessity"—became a permanent weapon in the debate.

The medieval settlement mattered because it fixed the vocabulary: realism, conceptualism, and nominalism became the three standard positions, and the question of what grounds similarity became unavoidable16.

The Empiricist Critique and the Linguistic Turn

Early modern empiricism sharpened the nominalist case. John Locke (1632–1704) held that universals are "creatures of the understanding"—general ideas formed by abstraction from particular experiences. George Berkeley (1685–1753) attacked abstract general ideas outright, arguing that we never encounter a redness apart from some particular red thing; the mind can only frame particular ideas that stand for others by resemblance. David Hume (1711–1776) completed the move: what we call a property is a resemblance among particular impressions, and the "universal" is a habit of the mind.

This empiricist critique of universals set the stage for the twentieth century's logical and linguistic approach. With the rise of modern logic, Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege reframed the problem. Russell (in work from the 1900s and 1910s) argued that predicates in a logically perspicuous language require universals as their referents: "red" must stand for something if sentences containing it are to be true. The question "what is a property?" became "what is the semantic value of a predicate?" This linguistic turn made the debate precise but also raised the worry that it had become a dispute about language rather than reality.

Wittgenstein, Family Resemblance, and the Attack on Essences

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) delivered the most influential blow to the assumption that every general term names a shared property. In the Philosophical Investigations (published 1953), he asked what all games have in common8. There is no single feature—some are competitive, some solitary, some played with balls, some with boards8. Instead there is a network of overlapping similarities, "as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre."8 This is family resemblance: a general term can apply to a class whose members are linked by criss-crossing similarities rather than a common essence8.

The idea was powerful and liberating, and it shaped later work in philosophy of language and mind. But it also provoked a realist response: resemblance itself seems to require properties (things resemble each other in some respect), and so family resemblance may presuppose rather than eliminate universals.

Tropes: Properties as Particulars

A major twentieth-century alternative was trope theory9. A trope is a particular property—this rose's redness, that rose's redness—wholly located in one place and not shareable. Resemblance between tropes is then explained without positing a universal: two tropes resemble each other because they belong to the same class of exactly resembling tropes, or because of a primitive similarity relation. The view was developed in different forms by G. F. Stout (in the early twentieth century) and later by D. C. Williams and Keith Campbell (1970s–1980s). Its attraction is ontological economy: it admits properties into the world without the "one in many" mystery. Its cost is that exact resemblance among tropes becomes a primitive that realists think is itself unexplained.

Descriptive Metaphysics and the Rehabilitation of Properties

Mid-century, P. F. Strawson's Individuals (1959) helped revive descriptive metaphysics—the project of describing the structure of our ordinary conceptual scheme rather than revising it. This created space for properties as part of the furniture of the world as we experience it, without requiring a Platonic realm. At the same time, analytic metaphysics grew more systematic, and the question of properties returned as a central topic in its own right.

Dispositional versus Categorical Properties

A major fault line opened in the late twentieth century: are properties categorical (occurrent, qualitative, like being square) or dispositional (powers or capacities, like being soluble)? The dispositionalist holds that every property is a power to produce effects; the categoricalist holds that powers are grounded in non-dispositional natures. This debate, pressed by philosophers such as C. B. Martin and John Heil, connects directly to the metaphysics of laws: if properties are powers, laws may be necessary rather than contingent.

Natural Properties, Laws, and Naturalistic Universals

David Lewis (1946–2001) introduced the notion of natural properties—the sparse set of properties that "carve nature at its joints" and ground objective similarity, laws, and reference. On his view, not every predicate corresponds to a property; only the elite, natural ones do. This naturalistic approach tied universals to science: the properties physics discovers are the real ones. It also generated the naturalistic universals and laws program, in which laws of nature are necessary connections among universals (as in D. M. Armstrong's What Is a Law of Nature?, 1983). Armstrong held that universals are real, immanent, and that laws are relations of necessitation between them—a view that made universals do serious explanatory work.

Structural Realism and the Retreat from Intrinsic Natures

Structural realism, developed by John Worrall (1989) and others, argued that scientific theories preserve structure rather than intrinsic natures across theory change. Applied to properties, this suggests that what we know of properties is their relational-structural role, not their intrinsic essence—a challenge to the idea that universals have determinate intrinsic natures at all.

Truthmaking and Grounding: Properties as Explananda

Two late-twentieth- and early-twenty-first-century frameworks reshaped the debate. Truthmaker theory asks what in the world makes a true proposition true; a sentence attributing a property to a thing must have a truthmaker, which may be a universal, a trope, or a state of affairs10. Grounding theory asks what non-causally depends on what; properties are often invoked as grounds for similarity, laws, and dispositional facts. These frameworks shifted attention from "do universals exist?" to "what explanatory work do properties do, and what is the best ontology to do it?"

The Present: A Crowded and Productive Field

Today the debate is plural and technically demanding. Realists (Platonic and immanent), trope theorists, nominalists of various stripes (including resemblance nominalism and class nominalism), and structuralists all defend sophisticated positions. The central open questions are whether properties are sparse or abundant, whether they are categorical or dispositional, whether laws are necessary or contingent, and whether grounding or truthmaking can settle ontological disputes. The quarrel Plato and Aristotle began is not resolved—but it has become one of the most rigorously developed areas of contemporary metaphysics, and its vocabulary of universals, tropes, natural properties, and grounding is now indispensable across philosophy of science, language, and mind.

References

  1. Problem of universals (introduction, Plato, Positions, Aristotle, Realism, Boethius, Nominalism, Medieval nominalism, Conceptualism), Wikipedia
  2. Property (philosophy), Wikipedia
  3. Theory of forms, Wikipedia
  4. Platonism, Wikipedia
  5. Metaphysics (History), Wikipedia
  6. Philosophical realism (Medieval philosophy), Wikipedia
  7. Scotistic realism, Wikipedia
  8. Family resemblance, Wikipedia
  9. Trope (philosophy) (In metaphysics), Wikipedia
  10. Truthmaker theory, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Properties And Universals

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 390 BCE-Present
  2. 340 BCE-Present
  3. 1120-Present
  4. 1300-Present
  5. 1690-1800
  6. 1900-Present
  7. 1910-Present
  8. 1953-Present
  9. 1959-1980
  10. 1970-Present
  11. 1983-Present
  12. 1989-Present
  13. 1990-Present
  14. 2000-Present
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