Ontology

Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that asks what exists, what it means for something to exist, and what the most general kinds or categories of things are.

25 frameworks, from 490 BCE to today · Metaphysics · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that asks what exists, what it means for something to exist, and what the most general kinds or categories of things are1. Its name is early modern—coined in the seventeenth century from the Greek on (being) and logos (account)—but the questions are as old as philosophy1. What is at stake is not a list of everything in the universe. It is the framework in which any list would make sense: whether the basic furniture of reality is matter, minds, forms, numbers, or processes; whether the everyday objects we name—tables, persons, species—are fundamental or constructed; and what it is about a thing that makes it the thing it is. Every other branch of philosophy, and every science, presupposes some answer to these questions, even when it does not state one.

The Greek invention of being as a question

The inquiry begins with Parmenides of Elea (early fifth century BCE), who argued that what is cannot come to be or pass away, cannot move, and cannot be divided: change and plurality, he held, are illusions of the senses, and only unchanging being is real12. His poem On Nature set the terms for everything after2. The problem it created was acute: if being is one and unchanging, how can the evident world of many changing things be explained at all?

Plato (c. 428–348 BCE) answered by dividing reality into two levels1. The theory of forms holds that the stable, intelligible objects are abstract Forms—Beauty itself, Equality itself, the Form of the Good—which exist independently of the sensible world, while particular beautiful or equal things are what they are by participating in those Forms3. In the Parmenides Plato himself pressed the hardest objection: if particulars "participate" in Forms, what is the relation, and does it not generate an infinite regress of further Forms? The theory's strength was that it made knowledge and definition possible—there must be something fixed for a definition to latch onto—and its weakness was that it left the link between the two realms unexplained.

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) rejected separate Forms and relocated the answer inside things14. His hylomorphism (from hyle, matter, and morphe, form) holds that every concrete thing is a compound of matter and form: the form is what makes the matter a thing of that kind, and the composite is a substance—the primary bearer of properties, what exists in its own right rather than as a feature of something else5. A bronze sphere is bronze (matter) organized as a sphere (form). Aristotle's Categories offered a scheme of ten kinds of predication, with substance at the base, and his distinction between potentiality and actuality gave an account of change that Parmenides had ruled out. This framework, transmitted through late antiquity and the Islamic world, dominated ontology for nearly two millennia.

Late antique and non-Western systematizations

Plotinus (c. 204–270 CE) and the Neoplatonists built a hierarchical ontology in which all reality emanates from a single ultimate principle, "the One," descending through Intellect and Soul to the material world. Being is thus graded: things exist more or less fully according to their proximity to the source. This scheme, with its emphasis on degrees of reality and on the dependence of everything on a first principle, passed into Christian, Jewish, and Islamic thought6.

Indian philosophy developed its own rigorous ontology. The Nyaya–Vaisheshika school, systematized in texts from roughly the early centuries CE onward (the Nyaya Sutras and Vaisheshika Sutras), analyzed reality into categories—substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, inherence, and later absence—and held that universals (samanya) are real, objectively present in their instances. Against this realist grain, Buddhist philosophers advanced a radical alternative. Abhidharma analysis reduced the world to momentary dharmas—irreducible events or factors—denying the reality of enduring persons and composite objects. Nagarjuna (c. 150–250 CE), founder of the Madhyamaka school, pushed further with the doctrine of sunyata, emptiness: all things are empty of intrinsic, independent existence because they arise only in dependence on other things7. Emptiness is not nothingness; it is the claim that nothing has a self-standing nature. The debate between these schools over whether universals, wholes, and enduring selves are real is recognizably the same dispute that later occupied Latin Europe.

Islamic and Chinese ontologies

Al-Farabi and then Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980–1037) transformed the inherited Aristotelian scheme with a distinction that proved enormously influential: the essence–existence distinction. For Avicenna, a thing's essence (what it is) does not of itself entail its existence (that it is); existence must be added, and in all things except God—the Necessary Existent—existence is received from another. This made existence itself a topic of analysis and set up the later scholastic question of whether existence is a real feature added to essence or not.

In China, Neo-Confucian thinkers of the Song and Ming periods built an ontology around li (pattern or principle) and qi (vital stuff or material force). Zhu Xi (1130–1200) held that li is the intelligible structure of things and qi the stuff they are made of; everything arises from their interplay8. A related current, often called Chinese process and relational ontology, treats reality as constituted by relations and becoming rather than by isolated substances—a tendency visible in Daoist texts such as the Daodejing, where the Dao is described as the source that is not itself a thing, and in later correlative cosmology.

The medieval debate over universals

The Latin Middle Ages inherited both Aristotle and the problem of universals: are general kinds—humanity, redness—real things, or only names, or something in between? Realists held that universals exist in things (or, in stronger versions, apart from them); nominalists held that they are mere words or concepts19. The dispute was not academic: it bore on theology (how can three persons share one divine nature?) and on the status of species. William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) gave nominalism its sharpest formulation, arguing that only individuals exist and that universals are signs in the mind. The debate established the pattern—realism versus nominalism versus conceptualism—that analytic ontology still uses.

Early modern substance and its critics

René Descartes (1596–1650) reorganized ontology around substances defined by their principal attributes: mind by thought, body by extension. This substance–mode ontology, in which modes are ways a substance is, was sharpened by Spinoza, who argued that there is only one substance, and by Leibniz, whose monads are simple substances. The framework's problem was the relation between mind and body, and more generally whether "substance" was doing any explanatory work.

The empiricist critique attacked it from within. Locke distinguished real essences (unknown) from nominal essences (our classifications) and confessed that "substance" is a "something I know not what" underlying qualities. Berkeley denied material substance altogether; Hume dissolved the self into a bundle of perceptions and argued that we never observe any necessary connection or underlying substratum, only constant conjunctions. The question became whether substance is a discovery or a fiction of grammar.

Kant and the idealist turn

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) reframed the whole enterprise1. His transcendental approach asked not what exists but what the structure of our cognition must be for experience of an objective world to be possible110. Categories such as substance and causation are conditions of experience, not features read off a mind-independent world; the thing in itself is unknowable. This did not end ontology but relocated it—into the analysis of the conditions of possible experience.

Hegel (1770–1831) went further, treating logic itself as ontology: the dialectical development of the categories of thought is the development of reality, so that the Science of Logic is at once an account of thinking and of being111. The idealist tradition thus made ontology a matter of conceptual necessity rather than of inventory.

The analytic revival: commitment, universals, and modality

The twentieth century brought ontology back as a technical discipline. W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000) supplied its central method: ontological commitment112. To say what a theory is committed to, regiment it in first-order logic and ask what its quantifiers must range over for its sentences to be true. "There are numbers" commits you to numbers; the question is which theories we should accept, and Quine's answer was that we should accept the ontology of our best total science, judged by simplicity and explanatory power. This made ontology continuous with science and gave it a test.

The problem of universals returned in analytic dress. Realists (following Armstrong) hold that properties are universals genuinely shared by their instances; trope theorists hold that each property-instance is a particular—this redness here—and that resemblance among tropes does the work universals were meant to do. The debate turns on whether sameness of kind is primitive or explained.

Modal realism, advanced by David Lewis (1946–2001), held that possible worlds are concrete universes as real as our own, which lets claims about possibility be analyzed as claims about what exists elsewhere. Most philosophers found the price too high and developed ersatz alternatives—possible worlds as abstract representations—but Lewis's proposal forced clarity about what modal talk commits us to.

Two further debates concern persistence and composition. Endurantism holds that a thing exists wholly at each moment of its life; perdurantism holds that it exists as a four-dimensional whole with temporal parts113. The special composition question asks under what conditions some things compose a further thing—whether there is any principled answer, or whether composition is restricted (only organisms count) or unrestricted (any things whatsoever compose something).

Meta-ontology and grounding

Late twentieth-century work turned reflexive. Meta-ontology asks what the ontological question itself means: is "what exists?" to be answered by Quinean quantifier-commitment, by a neo-Aristotelian inquiry into what is fundamental, or by deflationary agreement that existence is cheap and the real work is done by other notions? Eli Hirsch and others argued that many ontological disputes are merely verbal, turning on different uses of words; others insisted the disputes are substantive.

The most prominent recent development is grounding theory. Rather than asking only what exists, philosophers ask what grounds what—what is metaphysically prior, what depends on what14. That a set exists may be grounded in its members; that a statue exists may be grounded in its atoms arranged sculpturally14. Grounding is offered as the notion that captures the hierarchical structure of reality that mere existence claims flatten14. Whether grounding is a genuine relation, and whether it is unified enough to do the work asked of it, remains contested.

The present

Ontology today is a crowded, technical field. The Quinean method of regimentation and commitment remains standard, but it is supplemented by grounding-based approaches, by neo-Aristotelian accounts of substance and essence, and by deflationary and pluralist positions that question whether there is a single correct inventory. The old debates persist in new form: realism versus nominalism about universals, endurantism versus perdurantism, restricted versus unrestricted composition. Non-Western traditions—Nyaya–Vaisheshika category theory, Madhyamaka emptiness, Avicennan essence–existence—are increasingly studied as live contributions rather than historical curiosities, and the question of whether ontology is continuous with natural science or autonomous from it remains open. What has not changed since Parmenides is the difficulty: saying clearly what there is turns out to require saying what it is to be at all.

References

  1. Ontology (introduction, Definition, History, Realism and anti-realism, Others), Wikipedia
  2. Parmenides, Wikipedia
  3. Theory of forms, Wikipedia
  4. Metaphysics (History), Wikipedia
  5. Hylomorphism, Wikipedia
  6. Neoplatonism, Wikipedia
  7. Madhyamaka, Wikipedia
  8. Li (neo-Confucianism), Wikipedia
  9. Nominalism, Wikipedia
  10. Transcendental idealism, Wikipedia
  11. Science of Logic, Wikipedia
  12. Willard Van Orman Quine, Wikipedia
  13. Endurantism, Wikipedia
  14. Metaphysical grounding, Wikipedia

The frameworks of Ontology

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 490 BCE-450 BCE

    Eleatic monism

    Is change an illusion of the senses?

    About Eleatic monism
    The question Parmenidean ontology exists to answer is blunt: when we say that something is, what are we actually saying? Most of us assume that reality contains a mixture—things that exist fully, things that exist partly, things that come to be and pass away, things that could have been otherwise. Parmenides of Elea argued that this assumption is incoherent. On his account there is exactly one thing to say about what is: it is. Everything else—change, plurality, coming-to-be, perishing, even the distinction between past and future—is not a feature of reality but an artifact of confused speech. The framework is the first sustained attempt in the Western tradition to derive an inventory of reality from a single logical principle, and its arguments set the terms for nearly everything that followed in ontology.

    What you need to know first

    No specialist background is required. The arguments turn on ordinary notions—existence, negation, change, and the difference between how things seem and how they must be—and they are conducted in verse and prose that a first-time reader can follow. A willingness to hold two ideas at once (that the senses report change, and that reason may forbid it) is the only real prerequisite.

    The organizing idea: what-is and what-is-not

    Parmenides' poem, conventionally titled On Nature and composed in the early fifth century BCE, presents a goddess who lays out two "ways of inquiry." The first: that it is, and that it is not possible for it not to be—the way of conviction, which leads to truth. The second: that it is not, and that it must not be—a way that cannot be traveled at all, because what-is-not cannot be thought or spoken of. A third way, followed by ordinary mortals, tries to combine both: to say that things both are and are not, that they come into being and perish. This, Parmenides argues, is the source of all error.
    The principle doing the work is often compressed into the slogan "thinking and being are the same." Whatever can be thought and said must be something; what is nothing cannot be thought. From this it follows that what-is is ungenerated (it cannot have come from what-is-not), imperishable, whole, continuous, indivisible, and unchanging. There is no room in it for becoming, because becoming would require something to arrive from nothing.

    What it is contrasted with

    Three contrasts make the position legible.
    Against Milesian cosmogony. The earlier Greek natural philosophers—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes—explained the world by deriving it from a primordial stuff or process: water, the boundless, air. These are genetic accounts: they tell you what the world came from. Parmenides denies that any such account can be true, because coming-from-something-else presupposes a transition out of non-being. His framework is not a rival cosmology but a challenge to the intelligibility of cosmology as such.
    Against Heraclitean flux. The popular contrast, reported by Plato and later writers, sets Parmenides' stable One against Heraclitus' doctrine that everything flows. Whether Heraclitus held precisely the view attributed to him is disputed, but the contrast is instructive: where a flux ontology takes change as basic and asks how stability is possible, Parmenides takes stability as basic and asks how change could be anything but illusion.
    Against pluralist and atomist responses. Later fifth-century thinkers—Empedocles with his four roots, Anaxagoras with his seeds, the atomists Leucippus and Democritus with indivisible atoms and void—accepted Parmenides' constraint that nothing comes from nothing, then reintroduced plurality and motion by positing permanent, unchanging constituents whose arrangements change. This is the great constructive response to Parmenides: keep his permanent beings, deny his monism.

    The core concepts, in learning order

    The two ways. The fundamental distinction is between the path of "it is" and the path of "it is not." The second is not a falsehood to be refuted but a route that cannot be taken, since to think or say "not" is already to have something in mind. Grasp this and the rest follows.
    What-is (to eon). The subject of the true way. It is not a thing among things but the totality of what can be thought and spoken. Parmenides' deductions from it are the first surviving example of a priori reasoning in ontology: from the meaning of "is," derive the properties of what is.
    The signs (sēmata). Along the true way the goddess lists the marks of what-is: ungenerated, imperishable, whole, of one kind, steadfast, complete. These function as a checklist. If a candidate entity is subject to generation or decay, it fails the test and cannot be fundamental.
    The critique of becoming. The argument that what comes to be must come either from what-is (in which case it already is, so nothing comes to be) or from what-is-not (which cannot be). This is the engine of the whole framework and the target of nearly every later rebuttal.
    The critique of plurality and motion. If what-is is continuous and indivisible, then the appearance of many distinct things, and of things moving through space, must be explained as perceptual or linguistic error. The poem's "Way of Seeming" offers a cosmology of light and night, apparently as a concession to how the world appears—its status is one of the most contested questions in the scholarship.
    The mortal error. Ordinary language treats "is" and "is not" as applying to the same subject ("this is hot, then cold"; "this exists, then does not"). Parmenides identifies this habit as the root of the illusion of change.
    A concrete case makes the method vivid. Consider a seed becoming a tree. The ordinary description says: what was not a tree becomes a tree. Parmenides' analysis asks where the tree came from. If from nothing, the transition is unintelligible; if from something already present, then the tree was in some sense already there, and "becoming" names only a rearrangement of what always was. Either way, strict becoming is impossible. The same reasoning applies to a person aging, a fire going out, or a day turning into night.

    Who shaped it, and where

    Parmenides was a citizen of Elea, a Greek colony in southern Italy, and ancient testimony places his philosophical activity in the early-to-mid fifth century BCE. He is the founder of what later writers called the Eleatic school; his younger associate Zeno of Elea and the later Eleatic Melissus of Samos defended and extended his position. Zeno's paradoxes—Achilles and the tortoise, the arrow that cannot move—are arguments designed to show that motion and plurality lead to contradiction, and they are the most durable legacy of the school. Melissus pushed the argument toward a strictly infinite, unchanging One. The poem itself survives in substantial fragments quoted by later authors, including Simplicius, whose commentary preserves the largest portions.

    How it developed: responses, critiques, and what changed

    The immediate history of the framework is a history of reactions. The pluralists and atomists accepted the ban on creation from nothing and built worlds out of permanent particles in motion. Plato's Parmenides stages a confrontation with the Eleatic position and presses the "third man" regress against the theory of Forms, while Plato's Sophist directly attacks the Parmenidean prohibition by arguing that not-being must be intelligible if falsehood is to be possible—a decisive turning point, since it reopens the space for difference and plurality. Aristotle, in the Physics and Metaphysics, treats Parmenides as a serious interlocutor and refutes his monism by distinguishing senses of "is" and by analyzing change as the actualization of potential.
    The framework's deepest influence is methodological rather than doctrinal. It established that ontology could proceed by deriving conclusions from the meaning of existence, that logical consistency could override sensory report, and that a theory of being must reckon with negation. These commitments survive in traditions that reject Parmenides' conclusions—in the Eleatic arguments embedded in later paradoxes, in the perennial appeal to "nothing comes from nothing," and in the recurring monist temptation that reappears in Neoplatonism and in rationalist metaphysics.

    Where it stands today

    Parmenides is taught wherever the history of ontology is taught, chiefly as the origin of the discipline's central problem: how to reconcile the apparent reality of change and plurality with the demands of logical consistency. Zeno's paradoxes remain live in philosophy of mathematics and in discussions of the continuum. The poem is a standard text in surveys of ancient philosophy, and the "two ways" argument is a standard illustration of a priori ontological reasoning. What remains open is what the framework itself leaves unresolved: whether the Way of Seeming is a serious physical theory or a diagnostic of error; whether "what-is" is a single entity, a totality, or a predicate; and whether the prohibition on thinking what-is-not can be maintained once negation, falsehood, and difference are given a logic. Those questions, first posed in Elea, are still being answered.
    The 7 concepts its tower teaches
    • The Two Ways
    • What-Is (to eon)
    • The Signs (sēmata)
    • Critique of Becoming
    • Critique of Plurality and Motion
    • The Mortal Error
    • Eleatic Monism

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  2. 400 BCE-Present
  3. 390 BCE-340 BCE

    Platonic Theory of Forms

    Do abstract Forms exist apart from things?

    About Platonic Theory of Forms
    The world of ordinary experience is full of things that are imperfect, changing, and many. There are many beautiful faces, many equal sticks, many just acts. Yet we seem to know what beauty, equality, and justice are—we can recognize instances, compare them, and say when one falls short. How is that possible if everything we encounter is imperfect and shifting? And what makes a thing the kind of thing it is at all: what is it for a particular horse to be a horse, or a particular triangle to be a triangle?
    The Platonic Theory of Forms is a systematic answer to these questions. It holds that the sensible world—the world of sight, touch, and change—is not the most real level of reality. Over and above it stands a realm of Forms (Plato's Greek eidē or ideai, often translated "Ideas"): immaterial, unchanging, intelligible objects that are the perfect models of which sensible things are imperfect copies. To understand anything properly, on this view, is to grasp the Form it participates in.
    No specialist background is required to follow the core of the theory. Some patience with abstract distinctions helps, and a willingness to treat questions like "what is justice?" as having real answers rather than being matters of taste. The theory is best learned through the dialogues in which Plato develops it, so a reader benefits from being comfortable reading philosophical argument in dialogue form.

    The organizing idea: two levels of reality

    The theory's central move is to divide reality into two grades. Becoming is the realm of sensible particulars: things that come to be, change, and perish, known through perception. Being is the realm of Forms: things that neither come to be nor perish, known through reason. A Form is a universal—one single entity that many particulars share—but Plato treats it as separate from those particulars, existing "itself by itself" rather than as a feature located in them.
    This separates Plato sharply from two alternatives. Against a broadly materialist or empiricist approach, which holds that whatever exists is either a physical thing or a feature of physical things and that knowledge comes from experience, Plato insists that the most real objects are non-physical and grasped by thought. Against nominalism, the view that only particular things exist and that general terms like "beauty" or "justice" are just names or mental conveniences, Plato holds that the universal is a genuine, mind-independent entity. And against the immanent approach later associated with Aristotle, which keeps universals but places them inside sensible things as their essences, Plato keeps the Forms apart from and prior to the things that share them.

    Who shaped it, and where

    The theory is the work of Plato (c. 428–348 BCE), writing in Athens. It is developed most fully in his middle-period dialogues: the Phaedo, the Symposium, the Republic, and the Phaedrus. The Republic contains the theory's most famous images—the allegory of the cave, in which prisoners mistake shadows on a wall for reality, and the divided line, which ranks kinds of cognition from imaging to pure understanding—and its most ambitious claim, that all Forms are ordered under the Form of the Good, which is to the intelligible world what the sun is to the visible world. The Parmenides, a later and more self-critical dialogue, turns the theory's own logic against it and is the source of its most enduring internal objections.

    Core concepts, in learning order

    The one over many. Start with the basic pattern. Many things are beautiful; there is one Beauty. Many things are equal; there is one Equality. The Form is that single item in virtue of which the many are what they are. This is the theory's minimal claim and the root of the later problem of universals.
    Participation. Particulars are said to participate in or share Forms. A beautiful face is beautiful because it partakes of Beauty. Plato uses several metaphors—participation, imitation (mimēsis), presence—without settling on one, and this looseness becomes a target for criticism. A concrete case: a drawn circle is never perfectly round, yet we judge it against roundness itself; the drawn figure imitates the Form of the Circle and falls short of it.
    The imperfection argument. Sensible things are deficient relative to their Forms. A particular equal pair of sticks is also, in some respect, unequal (one stick is longer than the other); Equality itself is never unequal. Since we can recognize the deficiency, we must in some sense already possess the standard—an argument the Phaedo uses to motivate the Forms and the soul's acquaintance with them.
    Knowledge versus opinion. Forms are the objects of knowledge (epistēmē), which is infallible and concerns what is; sensible particulars are the objects of opinion (doxa), which concerns what changes and may be true or false. Ignorance concerns what is not. This threefold ranking is the epistemological face of the two-worlds ontology.
    *Recollection (anamnēsis). In the Meno and Phaedo, Plato argues that learning is remembering: the soul, before embodiment, was acquainted with the Forms, and inquiry draws that knowledge out. The Meno*'s demonstration—Socrates leading an uneducated slave boy to work out a geometrical result by questioning—is the dialogue's illustration that such knowledge is elicited rather than poured in.
    The Form of the Good. The highest Form, in the Republic, is that which makes the other Forms intelligible and gives them their being, as the sun makes visible things visible and sustains them. Plato notoriously declines to define it directly, comparing it to the sun in the visible realm and calling it "beyond being" in dignity.
    The method of dialectic and the divided line. The Republic's divided line ranks four cognitive states—imaging (eikasia), belief (pistis), mathematical reasoning (dianoia), and dialectic (noēsis)—and the corresponding objects, from shadows and reflections up to the Forms. Dialectic is the disciplined ascent by question and answer that proceeds from hypotheses to an unhypothetical first principle, the Good. This is the theory's method, not just its doctrine.

    The theory under pressure

    Plato himself staged the most famous objections in the Parmenides. If particulars participate in Forms, what is the nature of participation? And the "third man" regress: if a particular man and the Form of Man are both man-like, they must share a further Form of Man, and so on without end. The dialogue also presses a dilemma about whether a Form is whole in each participant or divided among them. Plato does not resolve these in the text; whether he abandons, revises, or merely refines the theory is a long-running scholarly dispute.
    Aristotle, Plato's student, rejected separate Forms and relocated universals into sensible substances as essences, a turning point that reshaped ontology for centuries. Later ancient thinkers, especially the Neoplatonists, reworked the hierarchy of Forms into a systematic emanation from a single first principle. In the medieval period the question of universals—do they exist independently, only in particulars, or only in minds?—became a central fault line, with the theory's descendants on the "realist" side. Modern philosophy largely set the separate Forms aside, but the underlying problem of universals never disappeared, and it reappears in contemporary debates over whether properties exist over and above the things that have them.

    Where it stands

    The theory is taught wherever metaphysics and the history of philosophy are taught, above all through the Republic, Phaedo, Symposium, and Parmenides. It remains a live reference point in the problem of universals, in philosophy of mathematics (where the existence of abstract objects is still called "Platonism"), and in aesthetics and ethics, where the idea of a standard against which particulars are measured retains force. What it leaves open is substantial: the exact status of participation, whether the regress can be stopped, how Forms relate to the Good, and whether any two-worlds ontology can be reconciled with the naturalistic picture of the world that later science assumes. Those questions are why the theory is still argued about rather than merely studied.
    The 10 concepts its tower teaches
    • Two Levels of Reality
    • The One over Many
    • Participation
    • The Imperfection Argument
    • Knowledge versus Opinion
    • Recollection
    • The Form of the Good
    • Dialectic
    • The Third Man Regress
    • The Problem of Universals

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  4. 390 BCE-340 BCE

    Theory of forms

    What makes a thing the kind it is?

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  5. 340 BCE-1600

    Hylomorphism

    Is a thing matter organized by form?

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  6. 200 BCE-500

    Abhidharma reductionism

    Are persons and wholes ultimately real?

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  7. 150-900

    Madhyamaka

    Does anything have its own nature?

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  8. 200-1200
  9. 250-1200

    Neoplatonism

    How does everything depend on one source?

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  10. 1020-1400
  11. 1100-1700
  12. 1100-1350
  13. 1640-1750
  14. 1690-1750
  15. 1781-1830

    Transcendental idealism

    What must our minds contribute to experience?

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  16. 1812-1850

    Hegelian dialectical ontology

    Is thought itself the structure of reality?

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  17. 1948-Present
  18. 1950-Present

    Trope

    Are properties particular or repeatable?

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  19. 1953-Present

    Universals versus Tropes

    Are properties universals or particulars?

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  20. 1970-Present

    Endurantism and Perdurantism

    Do objects persist wholly at each moment?

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  21. 1970-Present
  22. 1980-Present
  23. 1990-Present

    Meta-ontology

    What are we asking when we ask what exists?

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  24. 2001-Present

    Metaphysical grounding

    What makes one fact more basic than another?

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How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Eleatic monismChinese Process and Relational Ontolo…Platonic Theory of FormsTheory of formsHylomorphismAbhidharma reductionismMadhyamakaNyaya-Vaisheshika category realismNeoplatonismAvicennan essence-existence distincti…Neo-Confucian li-qi ontologyScholastic realism-nominalism debateSubstance-mode ontologyEmpiricist critique of substanceTranscendental idealismHegelian dialectical ontologyOntological commitmentTropeUniversals versus TropesModal realismEndurantism and PerdurantismFour-dimensionalismSpecial composition theoryMeta-ontologyMetaphysical grounding

Beyond the field

Where Ontology's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 94 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Ontology is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 25 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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Related fields

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