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Social Ontology
Social ontology asks what it is for something to be social: what makes a piece of paper a five-euro note, a gathering of people a parliament, a word an insult, a crowd a team.
12 frameworks, from 1651 to today · Metaphysics · Philosophy
- Social contract 1651-1800
- Sociological Holism 1895-1980
- Methodological individualism 1922-1980
- Social Constructionism 1966-Present
- Critical Realism 1979-Present
- Collective Agency and Responsibility 1980-Present
- Collective Intentionality 1988-Present
- Plural Subject Theory 1989-Present
- Constitutive Rules and Institutional Facts 1995-Present
- Social Kinds and Looping Effects 1995-Present
- Reductive Shared-Intention Theory 1999-Present
- Analytic Social Ontology 2011-Present
Overview
Social ontology asks what it is for something to be social: what makes a piece of paper a five-euro note, a gathering of people a parliament, a word an insult, a crowd a team1. Its objects are everywhere and nowhere in the physical world. There is no atom of "money" or "marriage," yet these things constrain what we can do as firmly as walls do. The field's central question is how such things exist—what they are made of, what makes them real, and what they depend on1. The stakes are practical as well as theoretical: if institutions are mere conventions, they can be redesigned; if they are brute facts, they cannot. If collective action is real, groups can bear responsibility; if only individuals act, responsibility stops at each person.
The history of social ontology is a history of attempts to answer that question, and the answers have clustered around a few recurring strategies: grounding the social in agreement (contract), in emergent wholes (holism), in individual meaning (interpretation), in rules (constitution), in shared mental states (collective intentionality), and in construction (constructionism). The field as a named philosophical subdiscipline is recent, but its problems are ancient.
The Social Contract: Society as Agreement
The oldest sustained tradition treats social reality as the product of agreement. Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) is the founding text: before society, humans live in a "state of nature" where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," and they escape by authorizing a sovereign to rule over them. The social contract is not a historical event but a device for explaining why political obligation binds: we are obligated because we (or our predecessors) agreed.
John Locke's Two Treatises of Government (1689) recast the contract as a trust revocable when government violates natural rights, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's The Social Contract (1762) made the general will—the collective will of citizens aimed at the common good—the source of legitimate authority. The tradition's lasting contribution to social ontology is the idea that social facts are artificial: they exist because we make them, and their authority derives from the act of making. Its weakness is equally lasting: no one has ever located the original agreement, and the theory struggles to explain institutions that no one alive consented to. The contract tradition survives less as a literal account of social reality than as a normative framework for political obligation—and as the ancestor of every later attempt to explain the social in terms of what individuals do or agree.
Holism and the Emergence of the Social
A rival tradition holds that social wholes are prior to and irreducible to individuals. Émile Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method (1895) gave this view its classic statement: social facts are "external to" and "constraining on" individuals, and must be explained by other social facts, not by psychology. A society's norms, its division of labour, its rates of suicide are sui generis—their own kind of thing. Durkheim's argument was methodological as much as metaphysical: if you try to explain social regularities by individual motives, you will fail, because the regularities persist across changes in the individuals who populate them.
Sociological holism set the agenda for much of twentieth-century social theory, including structuralism and functionalism, and it remains the default assumption of much sociology. Its philosophical critics pressed a simple question: if social wholes are real, what are they made of? Holism describes the dependence of individuals on society but is thin on the mechanism by which society exists at all. That gap is what the next tradition tried to fill from the other direction.
Interpretive Individualism: Meaning from the Inside
Max Weber's Economy and Society (posthumous, 1922) argued that social phenomena are ultimately understandable through the subjective meanings individuals attach to their actions. A social fact is not a thing hovering above people but a pattern of meaningful behaviour: a banknote is money because people treat it as money, and understanding why they do so requires interpreting their beliefs and intentions. This "interpretive" or "verstehende" approach made individual meaning the basic unit of social reality.
The tradition's strength is its attention to how social reality looks from the inside—why a ritual matters to its participants, how legitimacy is experienced. Its weakness is the converse of holism's: if everything reduces to individual meanings, it becomes hard to explain why meanings are so often not chosen—why people find themselves bound by norms they did not invent and cannot individually revise. Weber's own work on bureaucracy and authority shows the tension: rational-legal authority is a pattern of individual beliefs, yet it operates as an impersonal machine.
Rules and Constitutive Constitution
The twentieth century's most influential move was to explain social facts through rules, and specifically through rules that constitute rather than regulate. John Searle's The Construction of Social Reality (1995) is the landmark1. Searle distinguished regulative rules (which govern pre-existing activity, like "drive on the right") from constitutive rules, which create the very possibility of the activity they govern. His formula: "X counts as Y in context C." A piece of paper counts as money; a person counts as married; a move of wood counts as a legal chess move1. The Y term carries deontic powers—rights, obligations, permissions—that the X term lacks.
Searle added collective intentionality: the "we intend" that underlies institutional facts1. Money works only because we collectively accept it as money, and that acceptance is not a sum of individual beliefs but a shared attitude. His account made institutions tractable: they are not mysterious substances but statuses assigned by collective acceptance, layered on physical reality. Critics noted that "collective acceptance" is doing enormous work and is itself unexplained—why do we accept?—and that Searle's formula fits some institutions (money, marriage) better than others (language, which seems to constitute its speakers rather than the reverse).
Collective Intentionality: The Plural Subject
Where Searle treated collective intentionality as a primitive, a parallel tradition tried to analyze it. Raimo Tuomela and Kaarlo Miller's 1988 paper "We-Intentions" distinguished I-mode intentions (I intend that we do X) from genuine we-mode intentions, arguing that the latter involve a joint commitment to a shared goal. Margaret Gilbert's On Social Facts (1989) developed the most systematic alternative: a plural subject exists when two or more people are jointly committed to doing something as a body1. Joint commitment is not reducible to individual commitments plus mutual belief; it creates a new normative entity—"we"—that can be right or wrong, and that persists until jointly dissolved.
Michael Bratman's Shared Agency (2014) offered a reductive alternative: shared intention is a structured web of individual intentions, beliefs, and commitments—each of us intends that we do X, believes the other intends it, and is committed to meshing our sub-plans. On Bratman's account there is no irreducible "we"; there are only individuals with interlocking attitudes. The debate between Gilbert and Bratman—whether collective intentionality is a genuine plural subject or an elegant reduction—remains one of the field's live fault lines, and it matters for questions of group responsibility: if there is no "we," can a corporation be guilty?
Social Construction and Looping Kinds
A different strand asks not how social facts are constituted but how they are made up—and what that making does to the people classified. Ian Hacking's The Social Construction of What? (1999) distinguished kinds of construction claims and pressed the question of what "construction" means. His earlier work on making up people (1986) described looping effects: classifications of people (the "multiple personality," the "homosexual," the "child prodigy") change the people classified, who then change the classification. A social kind is not a natural kind with fixed boundaries; it is a moving target that responds to being named.
This tradition descends from Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1966), which argued that social reality is produced through habitualization and institutionalization, and from feminist and postcolonial work on how categories like gender and race are socially constituted. Its contribution to social ontology is the insight that social kinds are interactive: the classification is part of the phenomenon. Its challenge is to avoid collapsing into the claim that everything is constructed, which would make the thesis unfalsifiable; Hacking's careful distinctions were an attempt to keep the claim precise.
Critical Realism and the Stratified Social
Roy Bhaskar's The Possibility of Naturalism (1979) and the critical realist school that followed argued that social reality has emergent strata: individual actions, social structures, and cultural meanings are distinct levels, each with its own causal powers, and none is reducible to the others. Social structures are real because they have effects—a recession constrains choices regardless of what anyone believes—but they are concept-dependent: they exist only through human activity and would not exist without it. This "transformational model" of social activity (people reproduce or transform the structures they inherit) tried to steer between holism and individualism.
Critical realism's influence has been strongest in sociology, economics, and international relations rather than in mainstream analytic metaphysics, but its central claim—that social structures are real without being things—overlaps with the analytic debate about the metaphysics of institutions.
The Present: Analytic Social Ontology
Today the field is dominated by analytic metaphysics, and its central question is grounding: what makes institutional facts obtain? Searle's constitutive-rules account remains the reference point, but it has been refined and contested. Brian Epstein's The Ant Trap (2015) argued that Searle's formula is too simple: social facts depend not only on collective acceptance but on frameworks—laws, conventions, and physical facts—that are themselves social, generating a layered ontology. Katharine Hawley and others have pressed the metaphysics of social kinds; Sally Haslanger's work on gender and race as social positions has connected constructionism to analytic metaphysics.
The collective-intentionality debate continues: Gilbert's plural subject, Bratman's reduction, and Tuomela's we-mode remain the main positions, with new work on group agency (Christian List and Philip Pettit's Group Agency, 2011) arguing that groups can be genuine agents with beliefs and desires irreducible to members'. The question of group responsibility—can a corporation be blameworthy?—has moved from thought experiment to legal and political philosophy.
Open questions remain sharp. What grounds collective acceptance, and can it be revised? Are social kinds real kinds or merely useful classifications? Does the metaphysics of institutions have implications for how they should be designed? And the oldest question of all—whether social reality is agreement, emergence, meaning, rule, or construction—has not been settled so much as distributed: each tradition now explains a different layer of the social world, and the field's frontier is the integration of those layers into a single account of how the shared world is built.
References
- Social ontology (introduction, Central questions, History, Collective intentionality and status functions, Joint commitment and plural subjects), Wikipedia
The frameworks of Social Ontology
Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.
- 1895-1980
- 1922-1980
Methodological individualism
Do social facts reduce to individual meanings?
- 1979-Present
- 1980-Present
- 1988-Present
- 1989-Present
- 1995-Present
Constitutive Rules and Institutional Facts
How do rules create social facts?
How the ideas connect
Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.
Methodological individualism reacted against Sociological Holism
Weber defined his interpretive sociology against Durkheimian holism, insisting that social facts be understood through individual subjective meanings rather than explained by other social facts.
Carried by Max Weber; Economy and Society (1922).
Social Kinds and Looping Effects grew out of Social Constructionism
Hacking's account of looping effects and social kinds grew directly out of Berger and Luckmann's social constructionism, refining its claim that reality is institutionally produced into a thesis about interactive classifications.
Carried by Ian Hacking; The Social Construction of What? (1999).
Reductive Shared-Intention Theory reacted against Collective Intentionality
Bratman's reductive shared-intention theory arose as a direct alternative to the non-reductive we-intention accounts of Tuomela and Miller, arguing that shared intention is a web of individual attitudes.
Carried by Michael Bratman; Shared Agency (2014).
Reductive Shared-Intention Theory reacted against Plural Subject Theory
Bratman's reductive account was framed against Gilbert's plural subject theory, denying that joint commitment creates an irreducible normative 'we' beyond individual commitments.
Carried by Michael Bratman; Shared Agency (2014).
Analytic Social Ontology grew out of Constitutive Rules and Institutional Facts
Analytic social ontology grew out of Searle's constitutive-rules framework, which set the agenda of status functions, deontic powers and collective acceptance that later analytic work refined and contested.
Carried by John Searle; The Construction of Social Reality (1995).
Critical Realism influenced by Sociological Holism
Critical realism took from Durkheimian holism the idea that social structures are real and causally efficacious, while rejecting its refusal to specify the mechanisms by which they depend on agents.
Carried by Roy Bhaskar; The Possibility of Naturalism (1979).
Critical Realism reacted against Methodological individualism
Bhaskar's critical realism defined itself against methodological individualism, arguing that social structures cannot be reduced to individual meanings and that both poles form a duality.
Carried by Roy Bhaskar; The Possibility of Naturalism (1979).
Analytic Social Ontology influenced by Collective Agency and Responsibility
Analytic social ontology took up the question of group agency and responsibility, asking what ontological structure groups must have to bear obligations and be held accountable.
Carried by Philip Pettit; Christian List.
Plural Subject Theory rival of Collective Intentionality
Gilbert's plural subject theory and the Tuomela-Miller we-intention analysis were contemporaneous rivals, each offering a different account of what makes an intention genuinely collective.
Carried by Margaret Gilbert; Raimo Tuomela.
Constitutive Rules and Institutional Facts influenced by Collective Intentionality
Searle drew on the collective intentionality tradition, treating 'we intend' as the primitive attitude underlying the collective acceptance that assigns institutional statuses.
Carried by John Searle; The Construction of Social Reality (1995).
Analytic Social Ontology influenced by Collective Intentionality
Analytic social ontology inherited the collective-intentionality debate over whether shared attitudes reduce to individual ones, making it a central test case for accounts of institutional facts.
Carried by Michael Bratman; Margaret Gilbert.
Beyond the field
Where Social Ontology's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 50 links.
Methodological individualism reacted against Sociological Holism in Philosophy Of Social Science
Methodological individualism arose as a direct attack on Durkheimian sociological holism, rejecting the claim that social facts are sui generis realities irreducible to individuals. The individualist programme defined itself by denying that social wholes have explanatory priority.
Carried by Émile Durkheim; Max Weber.
Methodological individualism reacted against Durkheimian sociology in Sociological Theory
Methodological individualism was formulated against Durkheim's holist rule that social facts must be explained by other social facts, insisting instead on explanation through individual action. The individualist position is defined by its rejection of Durkheimian explanation.
Carried by Émile Durkheim; Max Weber.
Critical Realism led to Realist Evaluation in Philosophy Of Social Science
Realist evaluation derives from critical realism in social ontology, using its account of structures and generative mechanisms to explain how programs work. The evaluation framework applies critical realist ontology to program contexts.
Carried by Ray Pawson; Nick Tilley.
Critical Realism reacted against Positivism in Philosophy Of Social Science
Bhaskar's critical realism was formulated as a direct attack on the positivist account of science, rejecting its Humean model of laws as constant conjunctions and its reduction of reality to the observable. A Realist Theory of Science (1975) defines itself against positivism.
Carried by Roy Bhaskar; A Realist Theory of Science (1975).
Collective Intentionality influenced Social ontology in Metaphysics
The theory of collective intentionality, especially the notion of we-intentions and shared attitudes, provided social ontology with its core mechanism for how institutional and social facts are constituted. The later field's accounts of social reality rest on this analysis of collective intentionality.
Carried by John Searle.
Reductive Shared-Intention Theory influenced by Planning Theory of Intention in Philosophy Of Action
Reductive shared-intention theory is a direct development of Bratman's planning theory, extending his individual planning account of intention to shared intention through interlocking plans.
Carried by Michael Bratman.
Social contract influenced by Sovereignty Theory in Political Philosophy
Bodin's theory of indivisible sovereignty posed the question of where supreme authority lies, and Hobbes answered it by deriving sovereignty from a contract among subjects. Hobbes's Leviathan (1651) takes up Bodin's problem of the location and limits of sovereign power.
Carried by Jean Bodin; Thomas Hobbes; Leviathan (1651).
Social contract influenced by Rationalism in Modern Philosophy
Hobbes built his contract theory on the rationalist method of geometry and deductive construction from definitions, the model Descartes set out in the Discourse on Method (1637). The state of nature and the laws of nature are derived as a geometrician derives theorems.
Carried by René Descartes; Discourse on Method (1637); Thomas Hobbes.
Sociological Holism provoked Ethnomethodology in Sociological Theory
Ethnomethodology rejected sociological holism, arguing that social order is not a collective reality standing over individuals but an ongoing achievement of members' methods. Garfinkel's programme defined itself against the Durkheimian treatment of social facts as things.
Carried by Harold Garfinkel.
Sociological Holism influenced Social ontology in Metaphysics
Sociological holism's thesis that social wholes are irreducible to individuals posed the central question social ontology inherited: how collective entities relate to their members. The later field took up and refined this holism-individualism dispute.
Carried by Émile Durkheim.
Sociological Holism influenced Structural-Functionalism in Anthropology
Sociological holism, the doctrine that social wholes have properties not reducible to individuals, is the philosophical position structural-functionalism presupposed in treating societies as systems of interrelated parts. Durkheim's rules of sociological method stated that holism and it carried into Radcliffe-Brown's programme.
Carried by Émile Durkheim; The Rules of Sociological Method (1895).
Sociological Holism influenced Social ontology in Philosophy Of Social Science
Social ontology developed in debate with Durkheimian sociological holism, rejecting the treatment of social facts as sui generis entities over and above individuals. The field defined its problem space by opposing that holist position.
Carried by Émile Durkheim.

Social Ontology is a planet in Nousfarer
Its city has a tower for each of these 12 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.
Land on Social OntologyRelated fields
Fields its ideas are linked to
- Philosophy Of Social Science 8 links
- Metaphysics 6 links
- Sociological Theory 4 links
- Sociology 4 links
- Philosophy Of Action 3 links
- Social Epistemology 2 links
- Mental Representation 2 links
- Self Knowledge And Subjectivity 2 links
- Multiagent Systems 1 link
- Anthropology 1 link
- Masculinity Studies 1 link
- Historiography 1 link
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