Philosophy Of Time

Time is the most familiar thing in the world and one of the least understood.

13 frameworks, from 600 BCE to today · Metaphysics · Philosophy

still a working view ended · each leads to its entry below

Overview

Time is the most familiar thing in the world and one of the least understood. We check it, waste it, run out of it; we remember the past and anticipate the future, and we never confuse the two. Yet when we ask what time is, or whether it really "passes," or why the past is fixed and the future open, ordinary experience stops being a guide. The philosophy of time is the branch of metaphysics that presses on exactly these questions: Is time a real feature of the world or a way we organize experience1? Does only the present exist, or past and future too1? What makes the "now" move, if anything does1? And how do the deliverances of physics—relativity, thermodynamics—bear on the answers?

What is at stake is not only the nature of time but the nature of persons, freedom, and causation. If the future already exists, in what sense is it open? If only the present is real, what becomes of the past we remember? The history of the field is a long argument between those who trust the manifest image of a flowing time and those who trust a timeless, mathematical picture of reality.

Cyclical and linear time in ancient cosmology

The earliest systematic reflections on time were cosmological. In ancient Mesopotamia, India, and Greece, thinkers asked whether time runs in a straight line toward some end or turns in recurring cycles. Cyclical models—found in Stoic cosmology, in Hindu yuga cycles, and in much ancient astronomy—held that the cosmos periodically returns to a prior state, so that events repeat. Linear models, most influentially in the Hebrew and later Christian traditions, held that time has a beginning, a direction, and an end, and that history is unrepeatable.

The contrast mattered because it shaped what could be said about human life. In a cyclical cosmos, the individual's fate is one instance of a pattern; in a linear one, each life is unique and historically significant. Greek philosophy contained both tendencies: Plato's Timaeus describes a created cosmos measured by time, while Aristotle, in the Physics, treats time as the measure of motion—"the number of motion with respect to before and after"—and raises the puzzle of whether time could exist without a soul to count it.

Augustine and the psychological present

Augustine of Hippo, writing around 400 CE in the Confessions, posed a problem that has never quite gone away2. If the past is no longer and the future is not yet, how can either be said to exist? His answer was psychological: the past exists as memory, the future as expectation, and the present as attention. Strictly speaking, he concluded, there are three presents—a present of past things, a present of present things, and a present of future things—all located in the mind.

This "psychological presentism" made time depend on the soul's activity of distension (distentio animi), the stretching of the mind across what it remembers, perceives, and expects. It set a template: time as a feature of experience rather than of the world in itself. Later thinkers would return to Augustine whenever they wanted to explain temporal passage by appeal to consciousness.

Scholastic and theological time theory

Medieval scholasticism turned time into a technical problem. Boethius, in the early sixth century, distinguished tempus (discursive, successive time) from aevum (the mode of existence of angels, which have a beginning but no end) and from aeternitas (God's simultaneous possession of endless life). This framework let theologians say how a timeless God could know temporal events without determining them—a problem that fed directly into later debates about divine foreknowledge and free will.

Thomas Aquinas and later scholastics refined the distinctions, asking whether time is a substance, an accident, or a relation; whether the world could have existed from eternity; and how motion, rest, and the instant relate. The vocabulary they built—instant, duration, succession, simultaneity—became the common property of later philosophy.

Absolute versus relational time

The decisive early modern episode was the dispute between Newton and Leibniz1. Newton, in the Principia (1687), argued that true time flows "equably without relation to anything external"—absolute time, a container in which events are placed. Leibniz rejected this as a violation of sufficient reason: if the universe were shifted in absolute time, nothing observable would differ, so absolute time posits distinctions without a difference. For Leibniz, time is the order of succession among things, a relation rather than a substance.

The debate was not settled by argument alone. Newton's view was vindicated in practice by the success of mechanics, and Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), tried to transcend the dispute by making time neither a thing nor a relation but a form of intuition—the a priori structure through which the mind must order experience. Time, on Kant's account, is empirically real (everything we experience is temporal) but transcendentally ideal (it does not characterize things as they are in themselves)3. This move made time a condition of possible experience rather than a feature of the world, and it set the terms for much nineteenth-century discussion.

The A-theory and the B-theory

The most important structural distinction in the modern field was drawn by J. M. E. McTaggart in 1908456. He distinguished two ways of ordering events in time14. The A-series orders events as past, present, and future—positions that change as time passes15. The B-series orders events as earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than one another—relations that never change15. McTaggart argued that the A-series is contradictory (every event is past, present, and future, but these are incompatible properties) and that the B-series is insufficient for time without it, concluding that time is unreal156.

Few accepted the conclusion, but the distinction became the field's organizing axis. A-theorists hold that the A-series is fundamental: there is an objective present, and events genuinely acquire and lose the property of being present. B-theorists hold that the B-series is all there is: time is a dimension of relations among events, and "now" is indexical, like "here"—a fact about the speaker, not about reality14. The B-theory is closely allied with eternalism, the "block universe" view that past, present, and future all exist equally, laid out as a four-dimensional manifold17.

Presentism, the growing block, and the moving now

Among A-theorists, the central question is what exists. Presentism holds that only the present exists; the past and future are not8. This matches ordinary talk but struggles to explain truths about the past (what makes "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" true if Caesar no longer exists?) and to accommodate relativity. The growing block theory, revived by C. D. Broad in the 1920s, holds that past and present exist but the future does not; reality grows as new events come into being. It captures the intuition that the past is fixed and the future open, at the cost of explaining why we seem to be located at the very edge of the block.

The moving now—temporal passage—is the hardest item for any A-theory to explain. If the present moves, what does it move relative to? A second time? That threatens regress. B-theorists argue that passage is an illusion or a projection of our experience; A-theorists reply that denying passage denies something we know directly. The debate remains live, with sophisticated versions on both sides.

Time and experience

A parallel tradition asks how temporal experience is possible at all. William James, in the Principles of Psychology (1890), described the "specious present"—the short interval (a few seconds) that we experience as a single now, within which succession is directly apprehended. Edmund Husserl's phenomenology of internal time-consciousness (lectures from around 1905) analyzed how retention and protention—echoes of the just-past and anticipations of the just-to-come—constitute the experience of a flowing present. These analyses connect the metaphysics of time to the structure of consciousness and remain a bridge between the two literatures.

The arrow of time

Why does time have a direction1? The fundamental laws of physics are largely time-symmetric: a film of particles colliding looks equally plausible run backward19. Yet the world is full of irreversible processes—heat flows from hot to cold, eggs break and do not unbreak1. The arrow of time is the name for this asymmetry9. Boltzmann's statistical mechanics (late nineteenth century) explained it by entropy: isolated systems overwhelmingly tend toward higher entropy, and the asymmetry is probabilistic, grounded in a low-entropy initial condition. Later work distinguished thermodynamic, cosmological, and psychological arrows and asked how they relate. The question of why the universe began in such a special low-entropy state remains open.

The philosophy of physics of time

Einstein's special relativity (1905) transformed the debate10. Simultaneity is relative to a frame of reference; there is no frame-independent "now."1 This seemed to favor the B-theory and eternalism, and many philosophers—including Einstein himself in correspondence with Michele Besso—drew that conclusion. But the fit is not perfect: relativity permits many foliations of spacetime into "nows," and presentists have developed sophisticated responses (for instance, treating the present as a privileged but frame-dependent slice, or denying that relativity settles the metaphysics). General relativity adds further puzzles about the global structure of time, and quantum gravity raises the possibility that time is not fundamental at all.

The field today

Contemporary philosophy of time is a dense, technical conversation between metaphysics and physics. The A/B distinction still organizes much of it, but the terms have been refined: tensed versus tenseless theories, dynamic versus static conceptions, presentism versus eternalism versus growing-block and "moving spotlight" views. Philosophers of physics work on the direction of time, the nature of spacetime, and the implications of relativity and quantum theory; metaphysicians work on persistence, causation, and the truthmakers for tensed claims; phenomenologists and psychologists continue to study temporal experience. The open questions are the old ones in sharper form: whether passage is real, what grounds the asymmetry of past and future, and whether time itself is fundamental or emergent.

References

  1. Philosophy of space and time (introduction, Leibniz and Newton, Flow of time, Relativity of simultaneity, Direction of time, Thermodynamics solution), Wikipedia
  2. Confessions (Augustine), Wikipedia
  3. Critique of Pure Reason (Transcendental Aesthetic), Wikipedia
  4. B-theory of time (Origin of terms, introduction), Wikipedia
  5. J. M. E. McTaggart (McTaggart's paradox), Wikipedia
  6. The Unreality of Time, Wikipedia
  7. Eternalism (philosophy of time), Wikipedia
  8. Philosophical presentism, Wikipedia
  9. Arrow of time, Wikipedia
  10. Special relativity (introduction, History), Wikipedia

The frameworks of Philosophy Of Time

Each framework is a way of working the field has used: when it held, and the question it answers.

  1. 600 BCE-400
  2. 397-1300

    Psychological Presentism

    Where do past and future exist if not now?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  3. 500-1500

    Scholastic and Theological Time Theory

    How does created time differ from God's eternity?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  4. 1687-1800

    Absolute versus Relational Time

    Is time a container or an order of things?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  5. 1781-1900

    Kantian Time as Form of Intuition

    Is time a feature of the mind or the world?

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  6. 1870-Present

    Arrow of Time

    Why does time have a direction?

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  7. 1890-Present

    Phenomenology of Temporal Experience

    How does consciousness experience succession?

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  8. 1905-Present
  9. 1908-Present

    A-theory and B-theory of Time

    Is the present real or merely indexical?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  10. 1908-Present

    Eternalism

    Do past and future exist as much as now?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

  11. 1920-Present

    Moving spotlight theory of time

    What makes the present move through time?

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  12. 1920-Present
  13. 1923-Present

    Growing block universe

    Does reality grow as the future becomes present?

    Fly to its tower in Nousfarer

How the ideas connect

Each arrow runs from an earlier idea to the later one it shaped. The list below says what passed between them.

Cyclical and Linear Cosmological TimePsychological PresentismScholastic and Theological Time TheoryAbsolute versus Relational TimeKantian Time as Form of IntuitionArrow of TimePhenomenology of Temporal ExperiencePhilosophy of Physics of TimeA-theory and B-theory of TimeEternalismMoving spotlight theory of timePhilosophical presentismGrowing block universe

Beyond the field

Where Philosophy Of Time's ideas came from in other fields, and what they led to there: the strongest 12 of 32 links.

A city in Nousfarer: a red-carpeted stair climbing terraces to a crowned tower on an acropolis, more towers round it, forest and snowy mountains beyond.
A city in Nousfarer, the game played in the browser.

Philosophy Of Time is a planet in Nousfarer

Its city has a tower for each of these 13 frameworks. Land, walk in, and climb one concept at a time.

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Related fields

Fields its ideas are linked to

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